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Hesiodic Voices

*Studies in the Ancient Reception of
Hesiod's Works and Days*

RICHARD HUNTER

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HESIODIC VOICES

Richard Hunter selects central texts illustrating the literary reception of Hesiod's *Works and Days* in antiquity and considers how these moments were crucial in fashioning the idea of 'didactic literature'. A major chapter considers the development of ancient ideas about didactic poetry, relying not so much on explicit critical theory as on how Hesiod was read and used from the earliest period of reception onwards. Other chapters consider Hesiodic reception in the archaic poetry of Alcaeus and Simonides, in the classical prose of Plato, Xenophon and Isocrates, in the Aesopic tradition, and in the imperial prose of Dio Chrysostom and Lucian; there is also a groundbreaking study of Plutarch's extensive commentary on the *Works and Days* and an account of ancient ideas of Hesiod's style. This is a major and innovative contribution to the study of Hesiod's remarkable poem and to the Greek literary engagement with the past.

RICHARD HUNTER is Regius Professor of Greek in the University of Cambridge, where he has taught since 1978, and a Fellow of Trinity College. He has published extensively in the fields of Greek and Latin literature; his most recent books include *The Shadow of Callimachus* (Cambridge 2006), *Critical Moments in Classical Literature* (Cambridge 2009), *Plutarch: How to Study Poetry (De audiendis poetis)* (with Donald Russell, Cambridge 2011) and *Plato and the Traditions of Ancient Literature: The Silent Stream* (Cambridge 2012). Many of his essays have been collected in the two-volume *On Coming After: Studies in Post-Classical Greek Literature and its Reception* (Berlin/New York 2008).

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ABBREVIATIONS

Standard abbreviations for collections and editions of texts and for works of reference are used, but the following may be noted:

<i>CEG</i>	P.A. Hansen, <i>Carmina epigraphica Graeca</i> , 2 vols., Berlin 1983, 1989
<i>FGE</i>	D.L. Page, <i>Further Greek Epigrams</i> , Cambridge 1981
<i>FGrHist</i>	F. Jacoby, <i>Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker</i> , Berlin 1923–30, Leiden 1940–58
<i>GHI</i>	P.J. Rhodes and R. Osborne, <i>Greek Historical Inscriptions 404–323 BC</i> , Oxford 2003
<i>GP</i>	A.S.F. Gow and D.L. Page, <i>The Greek Anthology. The Garland of Philip</i> , I–II, Cambridge 1968
<i>GVI</i>	W. Peek, <i>Griechische Vers-Inschriften</i> I, Berlin 1955
<i>HE</i>	A.S.F. Gow and D.L. Page, <i>The Greek Anthology. Hellenistic Epigrams</i> , I–II, Cambridge 1965
<i>IG</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i> , Berlin 1873–
<i>LfgRE</i>	<i>Lexikon des frühgriechischen Epos</i> , Göttingen 1955–2010
<i>LIMC</i>	<i>Lexicon iconographicum mythologiae classicae</i> , Zurich 1981–1999
<i>LSJ</i>	H.G. Liddell, R. Scott, H. Stuart Jones, R. McKenzie, P.G.W. Glare, <i>A Greek–English Lexicon, with a revised Supplement</i> , 9th ed., Oxford 1996
<i>PMG</i>	D.L. Page, <i>Poetae melici Graeci</i> , Oxford 1962
<i>PMGF</i>	M. Davies, <i>Poetarum melicorum Graecorum Fragmenta</i> I, Oxford 1991
<i>RE</i>	A. Pauly, G. Wissowa, W. Kroll, <i>et al.</i> (eds.), <i>Real-Encyclopädie der classischen</i>

List of abbreviations

	<i>Altertumswissenschaft</i> , Stuttgart/Munich 1893–1980
<i>SGO</i>	R. Merkelbach and J. Stauber, <i>Steinepigramme aus dem griechischen Osten</i> , Munich 1998–2004
<i>SH</i>	H. Lloyd-Jones and P. Parsons, <i>Supplementum Hellenisticum</i> , Berlin 1983
<i>SSH</i>	H. Lloyd-Jones, <i>Supplementum Supplementi Hellenistici</i> , Berlin 2005
<i>SVF</i>	H.F.A. von Arnim, <i>Stoicorum veterum fragmenta</i> , Leipzig 1903–24. Reference is made by volume and entry number

CHAPTER I

READING HESIOD

Hesiod and the Hesiodic

One of the Platonising ethical dialogues of Dio Chrysostom (later first to early second century AD) is devoted to the subject of envy (φθόνος).¹ The starting-point for the examination conducted by Dio, here playing a familiar ‘Socrates-role’ with a nameless interlocutor in front of (apparently) a listening crowd,² is an investigation of the wisdom (σοφία) of Hesiod through an examination of the truth and implications of *Works and Days* 25:

ἦ τε καὶ ἀπάλαμόν περ ὅμως ἐπὶ ἔργον ἐγείρεν.
εἰς ἕτερον γάρ τις τε ἶδεν ἔργοιο χατίζων
πλούσιον, ὃς σπεύδει μὲν ἀρόμεναι ἥδ' ἐφυτεύειν
οἶκόν τ' εὖ θέσθαι, ζηλοῖ δέ τε γείτονα γείτων
εἰς ἄφενος σπεύδοντ'· ἀγαθὴ δ' Ἔρις ἦδε βροτοῖσιν.
καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων,
καὶ πτωχὸς πτωχῷ φθονέει καὶ ᾠοιδὸς ᾠοιδῷ.
(Hesiod, *Works and Days* 20–6)

[One Strife] rouses even the shiftless no less to work. For the man without work sees another, a rich man, hastening to plough and plant and to set his household in good order; neighbour feels envy of neighbour as he hastens towards wealth. Potter is angry with potter and carpenter with carpenter, and beggar is jealous of beggar and bard of bard.

While perhaps hinting that more than one interpretation of v. 25 (and v. 26) was current, Dio argues that the only possible reason why Hesiod could have said that someone in one trade would be jealous of or feel malice towards a fellow tradesman

¹ *Oration* 77/78 in the now standard numeration; the double numeration arises from the fact that Photius (168a, III p. 114.4–5 Henry) lists two works of Dio *περὶ φθόνου* and some manuscripts mark a break after chapter 14. For convenience I shall refer to it as *Oration* 77.

² Cf. Von Arnim 1898: 288–9.

is that the fewer tradesmen of one type there are in any location, the more money the few will obviously make (chap. 3); the economics of competition for monetary gain operative in Dio's analysis is an updating to a different economic situation of the competitiveness for strictly limited resources which modern scholars have identified in the community which Hesiod describes in the *Works and Days*.³ Dio then proceeds to demonstrate that, while this situation of malicious jealousy may be true for some trades, including disgraceful ones such as running a brothel, it cannot be true, for example, for steersmen of ships or for doctors, and in general for the ethically virtuous. It is these latter upon whom Dio's interest comes to focus, that is men with no interest in the pursuit of wealth, political honour and reputation, and the final section of the work is a description of the ἀνδρεῖος καὶ μεγάλοφρων whose free-speaking cares for the souls of his fellow men; this is of course Dio's self-portrait, built upon the Platonic portrait of Socrates.

In widening the investigation beyond the two trades mentioned in *Works and Days* 25, Dio is following the practice of his Socratic model, but the justification of his method of examining the Hesiodic utterance is of particular interest:

In other matters too it is Hesiod's custom to discuss a whole subject in one or two particulars. For example, when he says that one would not even lose an ox were it not for the wickedness of one's neighbour [cf. *Works and Days* 348], he is presumably not saying that a wicked neighbour would destroy an ox or allow others to do so, but would not steal a sheep, if he could get away with it, nor one of the splendid goats which produce much milk and bear twins. It is clear that he is speaking to the audience of his poetry as intelligent people. (Dio Chrysostom 77.5)

This argument, which we might call an argument for 'extendability' or 'extrapolation', and the particular example of *Works and Days* 348 are both elsewhere associated with the Stoic Chrysippus (third century BC),⁴ who apparently argued that

³ Cf. esp. Millett 1984; Millett does not mention Dio 77, but that essay in fact supports Millett's case.

⁴ Cf. Plutarch, *How to study poetry* 34b, Hunter–Russell 2011: 192. *WD* 348 seems to have been put to a rather different use by Aristotle, if an extract from Heracleides Lembos (2nd cent. BC), *On Constitutions*, goes back to him, as seems all but certain

one should extrapolate ‘useful’ (χρήσιμον) information by extending the range of wise poetic utterances to ‘similar things’ (τὰ ὁμοειδῆ). Dio appears here to be in Chrysippus’ debt, but behind him also stands the earliest extant citation of (a version of) *Works and Days* 25–6 in Plato’s *Lysis*, in the course of the discussion concerning the nature of φιλία, ‘friendship’;⁵ Dio’s investigation of the value of a Hesiodic utterance is thus a creative *mimesis*, very typical of its time, of a classical form. It is as though Plato himself was once again putting Hesiod under the microscope:

I [i.e. Socrates] once heard someone saying – and I’ve just remembered – that like is most hostile to like, as are good men to good men. He brought forward Hesiod as a witness, citing ‘Potter is angry with potter and bard with bard and beggar with beggar’, and he said that it was inevitable that this was the situation in all other cases, that the things which are most alike are filled with jealousy and contentiousness and enmity towards each other, whereas things which are most unlike are filled with friendship. (Plato, *Lysis* 215c4–d4)

It is not improbable that Plato himself is responsible for the alleged ‘source’ of this use of the Hesiodic verses (‘I once heard someone say, and I’ve just now remembered ...’),⁶ but it is also likely enough that Plato was not the first to discuss them in the service of a wider argument.⁷

These passages of Plato and Dio illustrate several features of the ancient reception and discussion of Hesiod’s *Works and Days*. First, there is simply the vast time span of this interest in the poet from Ascrea: this book will consider examples covering more than a thousand years, starting not many decades after the composition of the poem itself through to the commentary of the neo-Platonist Proclus in the fifth century AD. If

(Titel 143, I, 11.38 Gigon = fr. 611.38 Rose). There we read that at Cyme (in Aeolia) neighbours helped protect each others’ property, as neighbours would have to make a contribution if a theft should occur; Hesiod, whose father came from Cyme, was adduced as evidence of this custom.

⁵ There are, I think, no very clear echoes of the *Lysis* in Dio 77, but I note (for what it is worth) 214a2 λέγουσι δὲ δήπου οὐ φαύλως ἀποφαινόμενοι περὶ τῶν φίλων and ἀπεφάνετο ... φαῦλον in Dio 77.2, and the repeated use of ἐντυγχάνειν at *Lysis* 214b1–3 and τούς ἐντυγχάνοντας at Dio 77.5.

⁶ Cf. Penner–Rowe 2005: 95–6.

⁷ On this passage of the *Lysis* cf. further below pp. 11–14.

Hesiod cannot quite compete with the interest shown in Homer and the tragedians (notably Euripides), particularly in the later centuries of antiquity, he always occupied, as we shall see, a special place in the idea of ‘ancient wisdom’. Secondly, there is the familiar fact of Hesiod’s ‘quotability’, the fact that the *Works and Days* is replete with memorable one-liners and what were or were to become proverbial or semi-proverbial utterances; vv. 25 and 26 of the *Works and Days* are prime examples of this phenomenon, and in an important recent study Hugo Koning has traced some of the effect of this quotability within the history of Hesiodic reception.⁸ One effect of this quotability, of course, is that, as with any very quotable poet, verses may be cited out of, or even against, the original context, and this has certainly happened elsewhere with *WD* 25–6. The current case is in fact particularly illuminating. The pursuit of wealth, which Dio puts at the heart of his analysis, is indeed central to the broader context of *WD* 25, as it is the sight of a ‘rich’ (πλούσιος) neighbour, active in the pursuit of wealth (ἄφενος), which stirs the shiftless to work (vv. 21–4).⁹ The nature of the ‘wealth’ involved in these verses, namely abundant crops, differs from that in Dio’s analysis, but then the rivalries of vv. 25–6 do indeed differ from those of vv. 21–4; whereas vv. 21–4 concern the necessity of agricultural work, presumably to secure the prosperity of one’s own family, vv. 25–6 concern rivalries, probably both ‘commercial’ and artistic, between those who seek to perform services for others or to rely on others’ generosity (‘beggars’, πτωχοί); Dio’s analysis of vv. 25–6 hardly seems far from what we might think of as the ‘natural’ one.

Despite this shift within the sense of the passage, on the face of it vv. 25–6 illustrate the spirit of competition (ἐρις) which is good for mortals and function as an amplification of v. 23 ‘neighbour competes with (ζηλοῖ) neighbour’. Dio, however, like the Platonic Socrates before him (cf. *Lysis* 215d cited above), interprets the emotions involved in vv. 25–6 in a negative light, and in this he seems to stand within the

⁸ Koning 2010; see also Ford 2010.

⁹ On the syntactical problems in these verses cf. the notes of West and Verdenius ad loc.

masinstream of ancient tradition. The scholia on these verses, which go back to Proclus' commentary on the *Works and Days* (fr. 25 Marzillo),¹⁰ observe that they should 'rather' (μᾶλλον) be referred back to Hesiod's 'bad strife' (vv. 13–16) because anger and envy are bad things and are not appropriate to the 'good strife'. How far back in antiquity such an observation goes is unknown, but it all but certainly does not originate with Proclus; Plutarch's commentary on the *Works and Days* was a principal source for Proclus,¹¹ and it is overwhelmingly likely that Plutarch discussed vv. 25–6 in some detail.¹²

The apparent traces of an ancient debate about these verses lead us to another common pattern in the history of the reception of the *Works and Days*. Some ancient readers at least seem to have been troubled by the apparent gap between the usually negative emotions to which these verses refer and Hesiod's apparent inclusion of them under the umbrella of the 'good strife'. Where ancient readers led, modern ones have followed; time and again in the course of this book we shall see a similar continuity between focuses of ancient and modern puzzlement over the Hesiodic text. The current case in fact offers a rather good snapshot of some of the most influential modern approaches to the *Works and Days*, at the level both of detail and in terms of overall approach. Modern commentators roughly divide into those who see the lines as problematic and those who do not. Of the former, those who want to impose upon the text as tight a coherence, as that term is now understood, as possible have gone so far as to argue that the verses should be deleted as an early interpolation, thus giving – so it is argued – a much neater run of sense directly from v. 24 to v. 27.¹³ The author of the most important and influential

¹⁰ Cf. below p. 7. ¹¹ Cf. Chapter 4 below.

¹² Plutarch's brief essay 'On envy and hatred' survives (*Moralia* 536e–8e). At *Moralia* 473a–b *WD* 25 is adduced within an argument that we must not envy or be angry with those who are different and/or better off than ourselves, and – perhaps more interestingly in view of the Proclan scholium – at *Mor.* 92a–b the whole of vv. 23–6 are rejected as giving bad advice, because it is towards our enemies, not our friends and those like us, that we should feel envy.

¹³ For the arguments and the doxography (deletion was proposed by more than one earlier scholar) cf. Bona Quaglia 1973: 41–2, Blümer 2001: II 42–50.

modern commentary on the poem, Martin West, on the other hand, goes some way towards the view of the scholia in describing anger and envy as ‘not in the spirit of the good Eris’, but rather than adopting the solution of the scholia or deleting the verses (West does not even mention that deletion has been proposed),¹⁴ he suggests that these ‘not altogether apt verses’ were ‘presumably proverbs that already existed’ and ‘came into [Hesiod’s] mind’ through association with v. 23, ζῆλοϊ δέ τε γείτονα γείτων; the verses thus illustrate ‘mental association’ as ‘an important factor in the sequence of [Hesiod’s] ideas’.¹⁵ Here then we are offered a kind of poem which operates with a very different ‘logic’ than is often supposed to characterise argumentative attempts at persuasion, such as the *Works and Days* appears to be. Defenders of the appropriateness of the verses, on the other hand, have in general looked to the nature of Greek competitiveness: Wilamowitz saw a progression from ζῆλος to κότος and finally φθόνος,¹⁶ and Verdenius too argues that ‘good *eris*’ need not exclude ‘malevolence’, given the fierce intensity of Greek rivalries.¹⁷ If it is in fact the case that part of the difficulty for us and for the ancients arises here because, after Hesiod, some Hesiodic language bears greater ethical and moral import than that with which his own verses seem to be freighted, then this case would find many parallels in the

¹⁴ Nor does Solmsen in the Oxford Classical Text.

¹⁵ The quotations are from West 1978a: 47 and 147. In his commentary Ercolani 2010 broadly follows West’s approach, but spells out his view that the alliteration and assonance of vv. 25–6 may suggest that Hesiod here gave priority to ‘la dimensione sonora’ over meaning.

¹⁶ ‘Erst möchte man es auch so haben, dann ärgert man sich, dass es der andere hat, schliesslich wirft man seinen bösen Blick darauf, missgönnt es ihm’ (n. on v. 23).

¹⁷ For such an approach to the verses cf. also Walcot 1970: 87–93 and 1978: *passim*; the central social role of competitiveness, envy and downright hostility is a leitmotif of, e.g., Campbell 1964, a study of a very different kind of Greek community, the Sarakatsanoi (transhumant shepherds). Rosen 1990: 106–7 rightly brings out some of the links between ‘beggars’ and ‘poets’, but does not discuss the implications of the verb: φθονέει is more than ‘vying with’. I am unpersuaded by Hamilton 1989: 50–1 (and cf. 59) that, when we have read further in the poem, we realise that the situation is in fact of a beggar (Perses) arguing with a poet (Hesiod), a situation which is ‘ultimately resolved in the picture of poet (Hesiod) competing with other poets’, i.e. in vv. 654–9.

history of Hesiodic reception; the post-Hesiodic development in sense of Hesiod's ἀρετή (*WD* 289), which seems in Hesiod to contain at least an important element of '(agricultural) success, social standing', is probably the best known case.¹⁸ Moreover, it is presumably important for our understanding of the passage that Hesiod has the 'bad *eris*' operate through 'war and strife' (vv. 14–16), presumably between cities and population groups, whereas the 'good *eris*' is operative within communities and between individuals, thus making vv. 25–6 more appropriate to this latter case, despite the view of the Proclan scholia.¹⁹

The *Works and Days* is, of course, very far from the only ancient text where decisions of interpretation at the level of textual detail are intimately connected to views about the nature and origin of the work as a whole, but it is an unusually extreme case. Here, of course, is an area where ancient and modern discussion tends to part company. Put very broadly, ancient criticism is more interested in the interpretation and application of the individual verse or passage than of overall structure and 'meaning'. The reasons for this are well known: the physical difficulty of reading long works synoptically in antiquity and the rhetorical and educational framework in which 'literary criticism' developed, a framework in which the habit of selective anthologising flourished, are among the more prominent. On the other hand, the first half of the *Works and Days*, in particular, with its powerful episodes of Prometheus and Pandora, the Myth of Races and the diptych of the Just and Unjust Cities, provided a very rich canvas of story and moralising to which poets and writers returned hungrily throughout antiquity. What for later ages gave particular bite to the use of the *Works and Days* was the voice claiming authority with which the Hesiodic poem was invested and which seems from the very

¹⁸ To what extent Hesiodic ἀρετή already carries a moral-ethical charge is an important matter of scholarly disagreement, but the general nature of the point being made here does not depend upon a detailed discussion of the issue.

¹⁹ Hamilton 1989: 60 makes a somewhat similar point in terms of the bad *eris* causing 'external' effects, while the good *eris* produces only 'internal' ones.

beginning to have been fundamental in shaping the ways in which the poem was exploited.²⁰

In *Oration* 77, for example, Dio's interrogation of a piece of Hesiodic 'wisdom' is set up as an examination of whether Hesiod deserved his reputation or not:²¹

Is it for these and such reasons that Hesiod was considered wise (σοφός) among the Greeks and in no way unworthy of that reputation, because he did not compose and sing his poems through human art, but because he had met the Muses and become their own pupil (μαθητῆς)? As a result of this, whatever occurred to him, all of it he uttered musically and wisely, with nothing lacking purpose ... (Dio Chrysostom 77.1)

It is perhaps hard not to detect an amused irony here. At one level, Dio is making use of the Platonic distinction between the poetry of τέχνη and the poetry of 'inspiration' to suggest that Hesiod belongs with those poets and performers who in fact 'know nothing', as was most famously set out in Plato's *Ion*. Hesiod himself has the Muses 'teaching' (διδάσκειν) him (*Theogony* 22, *WD* 662), but to make him their μαθητῆς is to express the relationship in more banal terms than the initiation scene of the *Theogony* might naturally suggest; such language is more usually found in contexts of literary or intellectual descent than of divine inspiration.²² So too, to describe the subject matter of his poetry as 'whatever occurred to him' (ὃ τι ἐπήγρει αὐτῷ) might be thought at least unflattering. Why this matters is precisely a question of authority. Behind Dio stands a very long tradition of the examination of poetic wisdom, most notably of course that of Homer, and Plato is the principal figure who gave shape to that tradition: in Dio's constitution of the history of σοφία, Hesiod stands (with Homer)

²⁰ Cf. further below pp. 26–9.

²¹ This was of course a very common mode of citation and introduction to discussion, cf., e.g., Plato, *Laws* 4.718e, 'the many regard Hesiod as *sophos* for saying that the road to κακότης is smooth and can be travelled without sweat ...'.

²² Cf., e.g., Plutarch, *Mor.* 158b, Aesop the μαθητῆς of Hesiod. In *Oration* 55 Dio seeks to demonstrate that Socrates was Homer's μαθητῆς, though he could never possibly have met him (cf. Hunter 2009a: 19); he notes there (55.1) that 'Hesiod says that, while looking after his flock on Helicon, he received the gift of poetry in a laurel-branch from the Muses, so that we would not have to take the trouble to enquire after his teacher'.

at its beginning, then there was Socrates, then Plato, and now Dio. At need, 'Hesiod' could almost function metonymically for 'received opinion', whether real or constructed ad hoc for the purposes of an argument; 'Hesiod' thus acted as a wind-mill against which any would-be σοφός could try his lance. The present book may be seen as a description of various of these attempts over several centuries.

Dio returns to Hesiod in the latter part of the treatise (chapters 22–5), when the subject has somewhat shifted towards rejection of the pursuit of earthly pleasures and of admiration by the unthinking mob; what the wise man or the good artist wants, and this too is a very Platonic theme, is the approval of the intelligent and skilled few. Dio illustrates this truth first by an ancient version of the familiar joke that a camel is a horse designed by a committee. According to this anecdote, an excellent painter displayed a painting of a horse which was a 'marvellous and accurate' depiction, and then got his slave to take note of the comments which the painting elicited. Everyone who looked at the picture found fault with a different part of the horse, whether it be the head or the legs or whatever, and so the painter produced another painting in conformity with the criticisms which the slave had collected and the two paintings were displayed side-by-side; the first, of course, was 'very accurate', the second 'very ugly, quite laughable, and resembling anything other than a horse'. What matters, then, is the judgement of the intelligent man who will not seek after or sway in conformity with the opinions of the uninformed masses. The lesson of the painted horse is then confirmed by a story from the gods, and there is no higher authority than that:

Just so, the myth says that Pandora was not fashioned by one of the gods, but in common by all of them, each giving and adding a different gift, and what was fashioned was not at all wise (σοφόν) nor beneficial, and turned out to be a complicated and elaborate evil (παντοδαπὸν . . . καὶ ποικίλον . . . κακόν) for those who received her. When a motley crowd of gods, a populace creating and working together (θεῶν ὄχλος καὶ δῆμος κοινῇ δημιουργῶν καὶ ἐργαζόμενος), was not able to work well and without fault (καλῶς τε καὶ ἀμέμπτως), what would one say of a way of life and a man which was fashioned and created by human opinion? Obviously, the really sensible man (τῷ ὄντι φρόνιμος) would

Reading Hesiod

pay no attention to the talk of the masses nor would seek their praise in every matter, and would in fact regard this praise as neither great nor worth having nor, so to speak, good. As he does not think it a good thing, he is incapable of feeling malicious jealousy (βασκαίνειν) towards those who have it. (Dio Chrysostom 77.25)

Hesiod is here not named, but it is clearly his story which is at issue: παντοδαπὸν...καὶ ποικίλον...κακὸν is indeed what the gods fashion in Hesiod (*Theogony* 570, 585, 589, *WD* 56–8, 82–3, 89 etc.). What is most striking, of course, about this telling of the story is the spin which Dio puts on it: in Hesiod the gods did indeed (from one point of view) craft a work of art καλῶς τε καὶ ἀμέμπτως, a work of art perfectly matching the purposes they had in mind, one indeed intended to be κακὸν for ‘those who receive it’. The blame to be attached to their workmanship comes not from the workmanship itself, but from the damage it did to the human race; Dio glides seamlessly from Pandora as a κακὸν to men to Pandora as an example of something crafted κακῶς, just as the claim that the artifact was ‘not at all wise (σοφόν)’ plays with the intellectual and artistic (‘skilful’) resonances of the term σοφόν.²³ The name ‘Pandora’ certainly invited an interpretation based upon the plurality of those involved in her creation (cf. *WD* 81–2), but at the very least Dio suppresses the controlling role of Zeus in the Hesiodic story, if indeed θεῶν ὄχλος καὶ δῆμος, ‘a motley crowd of gods, a populace’, does not entirely misrepresent it by suggesting that some form of Olympian radical democracy was in play. The analogy between the creation of Pandora and the fashioning power of ‘human opinion’ might seem to be fairly loose at best, however helpful our memory of the foolish but accurately named ‘Epimetheus’ might be – Dio’s τῷ ὄντι φρόνιμος is the modern descendant of Hesiod’s Prometheus – but Dio here appropriates a famous story because of its very familiarity; that familiarity carries its own persuasive power. On the other hand, Hesiod is almost entirely erased here: the poet is not named and the (quasi-allegorical)

²³ Very similar techniques for distorting the meaning of verses are clearly on show in Plutarch’s *How to study poetry*.

interpretation of his story, an interpretation precisely offered not as an interpretation but as simply ‘the story’, makes this now Dio’s myth, not Hesiod’s, despite the fact that the theme of malicious jealousy with which the passage ends reintroduces the Hesiodic theme to which the whole essay is devoted. The replacement of one teacher (Hesiod) by another (Dio), so openly paraded in the earlier examination of *Works and Days* 25, is here effected with similar decisiveness, but with a much more oblique rhetoric. Dio has appropriated a famous piece of Hesiod for an anti-Hesiodic argument. It is again, however, Hesiod’s very authority which drives Dio’s rhetorical structure.

When at the start of the *Lysis* Socrates turns back to Lysis after a brief exchange with Menexenus, he introduces the wisdom of the poets as a starting point for further discussion:

I think, Lysis, you are correct that, if we were looking at the matter correctly, we would never have got lost (ἐπλάνωμεθα) in this way. Let us not go in this direction any further, for our enquiry looks to me like a rather difficult path (χαλεπή . . . ὁδός). I think we should proceed from where we turned aside (ἐτράπημεν), making our enquiry in accordance with the poets who are, as it were, our fathers and guides (ἡγεμόνες) in wisdom. (Plato, *Lysis* 213e1–14a2)

Socrates’ extended metaphor of philosophical investigation as a path or a journey is, of course, ubiquitous in Plato and is one of the most familiar of all images in ‘didactic’ literature of all kinds;²⁴ Plato himself seems to play with the very familiarity of the idea in the *Laws*, which does indeed tell of a literal as well as an intellectual journey.²⁵ Later in antiquity, at least, Hesiod’s famous passage on the smooth and easy path of κακότης and the rough and difficult (χαλεπή) path of ἀρετή (*WD* 286–92) became the most celebrated and reworked image for the acquisition of, respectively, fallacious and real knowledge,²⁶ and it is not out of the question that these verses already resonate in Plato’s use of the metaphor. Be that as it may, Socrates’ next words will introduce us to another important aspect of how Hesiod was used:

²⁴ Cf. below pp. 92–7 on ‘the didactic plot’.

²⁵ Cf. Hunter 2012: 193–4. ²⁶ Cf. below pp. 92–100.

Reading Hesiod

[The poets] certainly express themselves very well about who our friends are. They say that god himself makes people friends, by leading them to each other. I think the sort of thing they say is

αἰεὶ τοι τὸν ὁμοῖον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον
(Homer, *Odyssey* 17.218)

‘ever does the god lead like to like’

and make them acquainted; or have you not come across these verses? (Plato, *Lysis* 214a2–b1)

The poets, it turns out, will lead the conversation in the right direction, just as ‘god’ leads ‘like to like’; Socrates’ metaphor of the path of investigation here spills out into the subject under investigation. The verse of the *Odyssey* which Socrates cites was to become proverbial,²⁷ and perhaps already was in Plato’s day, a resonance enhanced by the fact that Socrates does not name the poet he is citing, as though the verse floated freely detached from any context. Nevertheless, the introduction of Homer here, just before the examination of *WD* 25–6, reminds us that, almost more often than not in later literature, Hesiod travels together with Homer.²⁸ Whereas in *Oration* 77 Dio replaces Hesiod’s authority by his own, passages of Homer are on three occasions (chapters 16, 27, 38)²⁹ cited to lend their confirming authority to Dio’s argument. Dio’s use of Homer here is, from one perspective, entirely standard, but within the context of *Oration* 77 an implied ‘contest’ between Hesiod and ‘another poet’ (16) is established. This is in fact another aspect of Dio’s creative *mimesis* of the passage from Plato’s *Lysis* (cf. above), as Plato had shown the way in opposing quotations from Homer and Hesiod.

Socrates’ subsequent discussion in the *Lysis* of *Odyssey* 17.218 is almost a ‘textbook’ lesson in one form of the ancient interpretation and exploitation of poetry. Socrates moves from

²⁷ That we are to feel a proverbial flavour in Homer is suggested by the fact that the verse is spoken by a rustic, the abusive goatherd Melantheus, cf. below pp. 13–14.

²⁸ This also is a central theme of Koning 2010.

²⁹ Cf. also the allegorical interpretation of Circe and her animals at chapters 34–5. The interpretation of *Odyssey* 17.423 offered in chapter 16 is strongly reminiscent of many of the critical ‘recipes’ explained in Plutarch’s *How to study poetry*.

this verse (interpreted as a claim that like is φίλος to like) to ‘the prose writings of the wisest men’ (214b2–3), who write about ‘nature and the universe’ and teach the same lesson; although the point is not made explicitly, the implication is that poetic wisdom is usually prior to and may foreshadow the wisdom of more ‘technical experts’.³⁰ We will meet such a claim in the case of Hesiod many times in the course of this book. Having then got his interlocutor to agree that in fact bad men are not either like or friendly to each other, or even to themselves, Socrates concludes that those who say this kind of thing, presumably both poets and prose-writers, ‘are riddling’ (αἰνίττονται), i.e. employing hidden meanings, in what they write; what was meant in saying that ‘like is friend to like’ was in fact that ‘only the good man is friend to (only) a good man’, whereas ‘the bad man never reaches true friendship with either a good man or a bad man’ (214d3–7). Two points about patterns of ancient interpretation are noteworthy here. First, Socrates’ recourse, however ‘ironic’ it may be here, to the assertion of ‘riddlingness’ or ‘allegory’ is a standard move when one wishes to find confirmation for a more modern view in the poetry of the past; if what a poet says does not obviously fit what one would like him to say, then it is easy enough to claim that he is not in fact saying what he appears to be saying.³¹ Secondly, however much the earlier part of the dialogue has prepared for Socrates’ introduction of a distinction between the good and the bad, we will still feel here the resonance of the wider context of the Homeric verses which Socrates cited; the worthless goatherd Melantheus here mocks Eumaeus and the disguised Odysseus:

³⁰ The point is similarly clear at Aristotle, *EN* 8.1155a32–5b1 where, at the head of his discussion of φίλα, Aristotle evokes this section of the *Lysis* by again juxtaposing the same two poetic quotations, without, however, naming either poet: ‘Some say that friendship is a kind of likeness and the like are friends, whence they say “like to like” and “jackdaw to jackdaw” and such things. Others, on the other hand, say that all potters are hostile to each other, and so on’. This method of quotation both varies that of the *Lysis* and reduces the poetic citations to the level of anonymous proverbs, i.e. to the most basic form of popular wisdom. From there Aristotle can move to citations from named figures (Euripides, Heraclitus and Empedocles), whose investigations are ἀνώτερον ... φυσικώτερον, cf. further Koning 2010: 179.

³¹ Most ancient allegorising of Homer does not, of course, fit into such a simple framework; for bibliography on ancient allegorical interpretation cf. Hunter 2012: 61 n. 63. On the present passage cf. further Penner–Rowe 2005: 78.

Reading Hesiod

νῦν μὲν δὴ μάλα πάγχυ κακὸς κακὸν ἡγηλάζει,
ὥς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον.
πῇ δὴ τόνδε μολοβρόν ἄγεις, ἀμέγαρτε συβῶτα,
πτωχὸν ἀνιηρόν, δαιτῶν ἀπολυμαντῆρα;
(Homer, *Odyssey* 17.217–20)

Now one bad one is leading another; ever indeed does the god bring like to like! Where on earth are you leading this scum, you wretched swineherd, this baleful beggar, this plague upon feasts?

Time and again, from Plato through to the prose literature of the Second Sophistic and beyond, more of a context is relevant to how a poetic citation is used in argument than is actually cited; this book will have many examples of this phenomenon from the ancient reception of Hesiod.

After Socrates has raised serious doubts about the ‘like to like’ suggestion, he introduces Hesiod, as we have seen, as a witness on the opposite side. Here too poetic wisdom is made to foreshadow that of greater ‘expertise’, for the character who allegedly cited *Works and Days* 25–6 is credited with what may be seen as an extreme version of the ‘extendability’ or ‘extrapolation’ argument which we have noted above from Chrysippus and Dio; according to this anonymous source, ‘the most opposite things were most friendly to each other, since everything desires its opposite, not its like’ (215e3–5), thus replacing Hesiod’s ‘particulars’, potters, carpenters, beggars and bards, by a universal claim. This thesis is then illustrated from opposed qualities such as dry and wet, cold and hot, bitter and sweet and so forth; the identity of the anonymous expert is unclear, but views of this kind were not uncommon in natural science and medical writing,³² and we will not be surprised when Socrates has little trouble in dismissing this argument also. Homer and Hesiod, then, travel together, but often enough on opposite sides of the road of investigation.³³

³² Penner–Rowe 2005: 96 n. 65 briefly discuss the similarities to the arguments of the doctor Eryximachus in the *Symposium*.

³³ This passage of the *Lysis* is considered from different perspectives by more than one contributor to Boys-Stones–Haubold 2010, cf. 46–8 (Boys-Stones), 75 (Yamagata), 150–1 (Ford); at 75 n. 26 a suggestion of Haubold that this passage is inspired by the *Contest of Homer and Hesiod*, with Hesiod as ‘the poet of discord whereas Homer preaches harmony’, is noted.

To return to Dio 77. Many of the lessons about Hesiodic reception which this essay suggests could be illustrated many times over from the texts of the Second Sophistic, but – as we shall see in the course of this book – much is illustrative of the use of Hesiod in earlier periods also. An example on a smaller scale, also from Dio, will demonstrate how the ‘quotability’ of Hesiod proved a rich resource for, and often stimulus to, rhetorical discourse of all kinds. Dio begins the ‘Olympian Oration’ (*Oration* 12) with an extended comparison between himself and the owl, to which all other birds flock despite its unprepossessing appearance; just so, people have gathered to hear him, when they also had the opportunity to listen to ‘many sophists, like brilliant peacocks, who are raised aloft by their reputation and their pupils as though on wings’ (12.5).³⁴ Picking up a familiar theme of the Platonic Socrates,³⁵ Dio ironically praises to the skies what an education with teachers other than himself would be able to do for those listening to him or for their sons:

...ὥς ἂν παιδευθέντες ἱκανῶς καὶ γενόμενοι σοφοὶ παρὰ πᾶσιν “Ἕλλησι καὶ βαρβάροις ὀνομαστοὶ ὥσι τὸ λοιπόν, διαφέροντες ἀρετῇ καὶ δόξῃ καὶ πλούτῳ καὶ δυνάμει τῇ πάσῃ σχεδόν. οὐ γὰρ μόνον πλούτῳ, φασίν, ἀρετῇ [Geel: ἀρετὴν] καὶ κύδος ὅπηδεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ πλούτῳ [von Arnim: λόγος] ἀρετῇ συνέπεται ἐξ ἀνάγκης. (Dio Chrysostom 12.11)

[You will arrange this] so that [your sons], having been properly educated and become wise, will for the future be famed among all the Greeks and barbarians, as outstanding for virtue and reputation and wealth and power of almost every kind. For not only, as the saying goes, do virtue and renown follow upon wealth, but wealth too inevitably follows virtue.

Dio here plays with a Hesiodic tag which, though its meaning is entirely explicable within the context of archaic poetry,³⁶ naturally gave trouble later in antiquity:

³⁴ The text is uncertain, cf. Russell 1992: 164.

³⁵ The opening part of *Oration* 12 makes Dio’s Socratic pose very clear (see esp. 12.5, ‘the man who knows nothing and denies knowing anything’, 12.13) and indeed explicit in 12.14.

³⁶ Cf. West ad loc.; West omits Dio 12.11 from his list of ancient citations of the verse. The problems posed by this verse were presumably increased by its proximity to v. 311, one of Hesiod’s most notorious tags, cf. below pp. 208–15.

Reading Hesiod

πλούτῳ δ' ἀρετὴ καὶ κῦδος ὀππιδεῖ
(Hesiod, *Works and Days* 313)

Virtue and renown follow upon wealth

Although the text of Dio's citation has suffered corruption in transmission,³⁷ it is plain that, with sharp sarcasm, Dio uses the potentially outrageous suggestion that virtue is a function of wealth³⁸ to laud the prospects for young men educated by his rivals. The Hesiodic wisdom may indeed be proverbial (φασίν), but we are clearly to understand that it is also simply not true, or only true if 'virtue and renown' are understood in a very limited (and limiting) sense. There is, moreover, another reason why Dio introduces the Hesiodic tag as a piece of proverbial wisdom not assigned to a named poet: a few chapters later he will explicitly cite, with Hesiod's name, the opening invocation to the Muses and 'hymn to Zeus' of the *Works and Days*, describing the poet as 'a good man and one dear to the Muses' and the verses as an example of how to begin 'very sensibly', μάλα ἐμφρόνως (12.23). The 'mixed signals' which the two uses of the poetry of the past send out both illustrate how that poetry is not to be used uncritically, and also put Dio in the tradition of the great σοφοί of the past, while laying the foundations for his claim to surpass them.

The very breadth of subject-matter of the *Theogony* and the *Works and Days* – cosmic history, the development of society, the nature of poetry, the nature of kingship, the need for a moral order and hard work and so forth – together with the 'quotability' of much of the text contributed in antiquity to a sense of 'the Hesiodic', in a way in which (it may be suggested) there is not 'the Homeric', there is just Homer and the texts of the Homeric poems. It goes, I hope, without saying how simplifying this generalization is, but it is the case that Hesiod offered subsequent writers a chance to expand from even slight suggestions within his text in often quite new directions,

³⁷ Cf. Russell 1992: 168.

³⁸ Plutarch deals with this dangerous possibility at *How to study poetry* 24e, cf. Hunter–Russell 2011: 138.

while apparently remaining within the authorising orbit of the Hesiodic voice. Let me take an example again from Dio.

In one of Dio Chrysostom's most famous orations, the *Euboean Oration*, he inveighs against the corruption and immorality of the city (presumably Rome),³⁹ and in so doing evokes a famous (and famously problematic) verse of the *Works and Days*:

ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν ὄνειδος, ἀεργίη δέ τ' ὄνειδος.
(Hesiod, *Works and Days* 311)

Work is no disgrace, not working is a disgrace.

Dio is here, as so often, setting himself in the tradition of Plato and Xenophon, who both discussed potentially dangerous interpretations of this verse, and he borrows, as we shall see,⁴⁰ a traditional interpretation of it – by ἔργον Hesiod meant only 'good' or 'honourable' tasks or crafts:

[Hesiod, who was σοφός] would never have praised equally every kind of work, if he deemed any wicked or disgraceful work deserving of that name...no free or reasonable man would himself undertake any of these [harmful] activities or know about them or teach them to his sons, since he would then be, according neither to Hesiod nor to ourselves, a worker (ἐργάτης), if he were to put his hand to any such thing, but would incur the slavish reproach of idleness and avarice, and would simply be called low (βάναισος) and useless and good for nothing. (Dio Chrysostom 7.110–11)

Dio's extended gloss on the Hesiodic verse leads into a rather hair-raising account of shamefully immoral activities and 'crafts', and concludes with an extended attack upon the evils of prostitution, promiscuity of all kinds and especially male homosexual activity; here we are reminded – as has been observed – of no other ancient writer so much as Juvenal.⁴¹ Hesiod certainly had some unflattering things to say about women and their sexual appetite, and it is perhaps even possible to find allusions to homosexual desire in the *Works and Days* (cf. vv. 444–7),⁴² but there is really nothing to match,

³⁹ Cf., e.g., Moles 1995: 177–80.

⁴⁰ Cf. below pp. 208–15. ⁴¹ Cf., e.g., Russell 1992: 12.

⁴² If so, those verses would be a very early (and perhaps influential?) example of the motif which became so frequent later, namely that desire distracts one from work,

or even to suggest, the range and scale of Dio's denunciation. Nevertheless, this whole attack upon the ills of the city in the final section of Dio's *Euboean Oration* takes much of its rhetorical force from the fact that it lays claim to the moral urgency of a Hesiod. For some details of the attack we may indeed sense a specific forerunner or 'seed' in Hesiod; when, for example, in a familiar topos, Dio inveighs against lawyers whose only interest is money, not the morality of those hiring them (7.123–4), we may feel in the background Hesiod's harsh words to Perses about 'listening wide-eyed to quarrels in the market-place' (*WD* 29), which is no activity for a man without resources, either in Hesiod (*WD* 30–2) or Dio 7. That mode of Hellenistic moralising discourse to which we often give the name 'diatribe' must count, in its urgency and its mixture of scorn and concern for the health of one's fellows, the Hesiod of the *Works and Days* among its forbears.⁴³ Even, however, where there is no possible specific analogue in Hesiod, the context in Dio makes us feel the whole denunciation as 'Hesiodic' in its mode.

One small instance from this same text of Dio will illustrate one further, and unsurprising, aspect of 'the Hesiodic' in antiquity. At the root of many of the social ills which Dio attacks is wealth, and wealth is the cause of 'what Hesiod judged the thing most worthy of reproach (ἐπιπνεῖδιστον), namely idleness (ἀργία)' (7.116). Here Dio clearly picks up again a reference to the same passage of Hesiod as he had evoked in chapters 110–11 (note the repeated ἀργίη... ἀεργός in *WD* 311–12, and θνηιδος ~ ἐπιπνεῖδιστον), but in support of his claim he adduces, without ascription, a well known verse (*Margites* fr. 2.1) adapted from the archaic poem (often ascribed to Homer) about the proverbially foolish dolt Margites and, secondly, a paraphrase of Homer:

just as work can help to prevent distracting desire; of particular interest would be Theocritus 10, perhaps the most overtly 'Hesiodic' of the corpus (cf. Hunter 1999: 199–200), where one of the characters cannot work properly because he is in love (with a woman).

⁴³ Cf. further below p. 50 n. 26 on the modern view that Hesiod's voice finds its closest ancient analogue in Roman satire.

Hesiod and the Hesiodic

People would say ‘You sir

οὔτε σκαπτῆρα θεοὶ θέσαν οὔτ’ ἀροτῆρα
the gods made neither a digger nor a ploughman

and in any case your hands are like those of the suitors, unhardened and soft [cf. *Odyssey* 21.150–1]. (Dio Chrysostom 7.116)

Hesiod, the *Margites* and Homer in rapid succession show Dio here operating with easy mastery of the art of poetic quotation, but his technique has misled some modern readers into thinking that he is here citing the verse from the *Margites* as Hesiodic; rather, the ‘Hesiodic’ flavour of the verse follows naturally on from the reference to Hesiod and idleness which precedes. If we ask why, apart from literary virtuosity, Dio in fact turned away from ‘real Hesiod’ at this moment, then one answer presents itself immediately in the context of *WD* 311:

ἔργον δ’ οὐδὲν ὄνειδος, ἀεργίη δέ τ’ ὄνειδος·
εἰ δέ κεν ἐργάζηι, τάχα σε ζηλώσει ἀεργός
πλουτέοντα· πλούτῳ δ’ ἀρετὴ καὶ κῦδος ὀπηδεῖ.
(Hesiod, *Works and Days* 311–13)

Work is no disgrace, not working is a disgrace. If you work, soon the workless will envy you your riches; excellence and renown follow wealth.

‘Wealth’ is precisely not what Dio wants to foreground in any positive sense at this moment, but a verse about digging and ploughing might just as well have come from Hesiod’s reproaches to Perses in the *Works and Days*. The ‘Hesiodic’, then, comes to cover (and colour), at both macro- and microscopic levels, much of the ‘agricultural’ literature of antiquity, even when there is no reason to posit dependence upon Hesiod; we shall see an excellent example of this, at the macroscopic level, in Xenophon’s *Oeconomicus*.⁴⁴

Finally, Dio’s *Euboean Oration* offers a large-scale example of how Hesiod often accompanies Homer in literary reworkings. As is well known, Dio 7 offers not just explicit discussion (of a rather unusual kind) of the moral lessons to be drawn from

⁴⁴ Cf. below pp. 64–71.

Homer (chaps. 83–96), and indeed a justification for the discussion and criticism of poets' views more generally (chaps. 97–102), but also, in the opening narrative of Dio's shipwreck on Euboea and the hospitality offered to him by a family of hunters, a creative reworking of important scenes of the *Odyssey*.⁴⁵ Just as the themes of the work itself hover between past and present,⁴⁶ so the rewriting of the great poetry of the past both 'updates' that poetry and draws out and exploits its timelessness; Homer and Hesiod are always as modern as one wants them to be.

The most famous illustration of this truth, but perhaps also the most striking absence from the present book, is indeed a work which exploits to the full the sense of Hesiod as a figure of the past, but also 'the Hesiodic' as a constantly renewed mode of discourse. This is, of course, Virgil's *Georgics*, which has in fact a surprisingly small amount of direct imitation and verbal reworking of the authorizing model which it claims in archaic Greek poetry, the *Works and Days*; as is well known, most direct imitation and evocation of Hesiod is restricted to Book 1, and it has indeed been asserted that Virgil's reference to his poem as *Ascraeum... carmen* at 2.176 'actually signals the end of Hesiodic influence'.⁴⁷ The reason why such an idea might ever have been entertained lies at the heart of the nature of the *Georgics*, but it is worth recalling that these two related patterns, that of the choice of a great figure from the past as explicit model and the moving away from that figure and/or expansion of the poetic range of poetry considered as originating from that figure, have been familiar from (at least) the Hellenistic period on.⁴⁸ Most famously, we might think of Callimachus' *Iambi*, which introduce Hipponax, though Hipponax with a difference, at the very beginning, but which then move well beyond (as far as we can tell) Hipponactean subject-matter; so

⁴⁵ Much modern bibliography can be traced through Lehmann et al. 2012.

⁴⁶ Cf. esp. Ma 2000.

⁴⁷ Farrell 1991: 27 (cf. also p. 134); Farrell's book itself subsequently provides evidence with which to refute this claim, but his account (pp. 134–57) of Virgil's imitation of the *Works and Days* in Book 1 is very valuable. For a helpful and brief account of the 'models' for the *Georgics* cf. Thomas 1988: 1.4–11.

⁴⁸ Cf. Fantuzzi–Hunter 2004: 1–17.

too, though in a quite different mode, Nicander inscribes ‘Hesiod of Ascrea’ in the proem of his *Theriaca*, a poem which lays claim to ‘the Hesiodic’ in a way very different from Virgil’s.⁴⁹ In the *Aitia*, Callimachus lays claim at the beginning to a ‘Hesiodic voice’ by the reworking of the archaic poet’s initiation by the Muses as a dream experience, and he recurs to this in the closing *envoi* (fr. 112 Pf.);⁵⁰ this reworking calls attention to the crucial relationship between the subject-matter of the *Aitia* and that of Hesiod’s *Theogony*, as well perhaps as to that between the form of the *Aitia* and that of Hesiod’s *Catalogue of Women*, but it is also true that the *Aitia* goes very far beyond the subject-range of these invoked archaic models. The past, then, is appropriated and made appropriate to new forms, not rejected.

In the *Georgics* we see Hesiod standing at the head of, and being incorporated into, a very rich literary heritage. Thus Virgil shows us ‘the Hesiodic’ when, at the very start of his poem, he combines Hesiod with Aratus, as he is to continue to do throughout the first book in particular:⁵¹

quid faciat laetas segetes, quo sidere terram
uertere, Maecenas, ulmisque adiungere uitis
conueniat, quae cura boum, qui cultus habendo
sit pecori, apibus quanta experientia parcis,
hinc canere incipiam. (Virgil, *Georgics* 1.1–5)

What makes the crops flourish, under what star one should turn the earth, Maecenas, and join vines to elm trees, what tending cattle require, what care is needed in looking after a flock, what skill for the careful bees – this shall be the beginning of my song.

As Servius saw, *faciat* and *quo sidere* in v.1 correspond to Hesiod’s ‘works’ and ‘days’;⁵² as Maximus of Tyre was later

⁴⁹ Cf. below pp. 25–6.

⁵⁰ I pass over here all the debate about the actual position and reference of this fragment, cf. Harder 2012: 2.855–70.

⁵¹ Farrell 1991: 316–17 describes this technique as ‘a confrontation between ... the genuine, archaic Hesiod and ... the symbolic, Alexandrian Hesiod in the person of Aratus’.

⁵² If this is correct (as I believe it is, and note also *Georgics* 1.276–7 at the head of a ‘Hesiodic’ passage), then the opening of the *Georgics* is to be added to the evidence for the title *Works and Days* as going back (at least) to the Hellenistic period, cf. West 1978a: 136. Moreover, if, as conventionally believed, Virgil’s title alludes to the

to put it, ‘Hesiod helps us in life, both with respect to the tasks (ἔργα) we must do and the days (ἡμέραι) on which they must be done’ (26.4). The reference to stars is perfectly appropriate for Hesiodic time-reckoning, but if our thoughts were here already turning to Aratus, then the fact that Virgil foregrounds *terram uertere* as the first agricultural task to be named shows that we were on the right track, for he is picking up *Phainomena* 7–9:⁵³

λέγει δ' ὅτε βῶλος ἀρίστη
 βουσί τε καὶ μακέλησι, λέγει δ' ὅτε δεξιά ὥραι
 καὶ φυτὰ γυρῶσαι καὶ σπέρματα πάντα βαλέσθαι.
 (Aratus, *Phainomena* 7–9)

He [Zeus] tells when the earth is most ready for oxen and mattocks, he tells when the seasons are right for digging in crops and casting all manner of seed.

The list of tasks with which Virgil begins the *Georgics*, which is also to some extent a table of contents for his poem, elaborates the list of tasks at *Phainomena* 7–9, but it also marks, on a small scale, the poem’s relationship with Hesiod: the *Works and Days* does include advice on viticulture, though not the use of trees to support vines (a subject perhaps of rather greater interest to Romans),⁵⁴ oxen appear in the Greek poem, but there is very little (if anything) about *cura boum* (cf. however *WD* 436–40), and there is certainly nothing on pastoralism, despite the fact that Hesiod claims, once upon a time, to have been a shepherd (*Theogony* 23),⁵⁵ and certainly nothing explicit about bee-keeping, although the two famous Hesiodic passages

Γεωργικά of Nicander, whom Quintilian names as a model for Virgil (10.1.56), but the opening verse evokes the title of Hesiod’s poem, then here too Virgil is acknowledging a ‘Hesiodic’ tradition (Hesiod and Aratus and Nicander), as well as Hesiod’s own poems.

⁵³ For other aspects of *terram uertere* at the head of the *Georgics* cf. Katz 2008, and on this passage of the *Phainomena* cf. below pp. 102–3. It is odd that the echo of *Phainomena* 7–8 in vv. 1–2 is not recorded in either of the commentaries of Thomas and Mynors.

⁵⁴ Cf. Mynors on Virgil, *Georgics* 2.221; Xenophon, *Oeconomicus* 19.18 (with Pomeroy 1994: 337) is instructive in this regard.

⁵⁵ The absence of pastoral advice, despite Hesiod’s ‘profession’, perhaps lies behind the poet’s defence to Lycinus at Lucian, *Hesiod* 4 that the Muses should be held to account for what is in his poems, whereas he could only justly be called to account for what he himself understood, namely ‘herding and shepherding and driving out and milking and all the other tasks and knowledge (μαθήματα) of shepherds’; the use of the term μαθήματα ironically points to Hesiod as a ‘didactic’ poet.

comparing women and the idle to drones (*Theogony* 594–9, *Works and Days* 304–6) may have suggested to later readers that this too was a subject for ‘Hesiodic didactic’, as indeed it later became.⁵⁶ The opening verses of the *Georgics*, then, both start from Hesiod and already enact a movement towards the wider ‘Hesiodic’ tradition.

The evolution of the *Works and Days* into a wider ‘Hesiodic’ tradition may also be illustrated from Virgil’s own aetiology for the necessity to work, a theme quite as Hesiodic as any other:

pater ipse colendi
 haud facilem esse uiam uoluit, primusque per artem
 mouit agros, curis acuens mortalia corda
 nec torpere graui passus sua regna ueterno.

(Virgil, *Georgics* 1.121–4)

The father himself wished that the path of agriculture should not be easy; he first used art to turn the fields, sharpening men’s hearts with cares and not allowing his kingdom to lie idle in heavy sluggishness.

The reference to the *haud facilis uia* which we must follow evokes Hesiod’s ‘long and steep path’ towards ἀρετή and the sweat which ‘the gods’ placed in front of it (*WD* 289–92); unlike the path of Hesiod’s ἀρετή, however, Virgil’s will never become *facilis*/ρήϊδιη (*WD* 292).⁵⁷ On the other hand, although Zeus has a major role in the aetiologies for the nature of our life which Hesiod offers in the *Works and Days*, Virgil’s *pater ipse* recalls rather the caring Zeus of the proem of Aratus’ *Phainomena* (Διὸς . . . αὐτὸς . . . πάτερ), who sets out the order of the agricultural year and ‘rouses men to their work’. Virgil, moreover, now no longer offers us a choice between κακότης and ἀρετή, because Jupiter has imposed a universal rule upon mankind; we sense here that Virgil is reading the lessons of the Pandora–Prometheus myth as essentially the same as that of

⁵⁶ Virgil’s reference to drones at *Georgics* 4.244 seems to have a Hesiodic colouring, cf. Thomas 1988: 2.191. Nicander wrote a Μελισσοουργικά (Ath. 2.68c = fr. 92 Schneider), which suggests how the subject was made ‘Hesiodic’ before Virgil.

⁵⁷ On other aspects of the Virgilian passage cf. Farrell 1991: 180–1, Fowler 2000: 208–9; the thick Lucretian texture here is perfectly compatible with the picture of a ‘Hesiodic tradition’ which I have been building. For other aspects of the *Nachleben* of Hesiod’s ‘ease’ motif cf. below pp. 96–100.

the image of the two paths, and this would be a reading shared by very many modern students of Hesiod: if things were not as they are, life would indeed be easy (cf. *WD* 43–4). The ‘Hesiodic’ texture is in fact thickened by what Jupiter rejected, *torpere graui... ueterno*, which elaborates the Hesiodic rejection of ἀεργίη (*WD* 303–6, 311 etc.), and leads into the ‘Hesiodic’ account of conditions before the reign of Jupiter, which are a version of Hesiod’s ‘golden age’ (*Georgics* 1.125–35). Such re-combinations of Hesiodic elements are, from one perspective, just what we would expect in the *mimesis* of a sophisticated poet. The coming of the harder age of Jupiter, for example, is marked by various new dangers and deprivations, including (v. 131) the ending of honey dripping from the trees, a boon that goes back, with some fantastical elaboration,⁵⁸ to Hesiod’s City of the Just, where bees make their homes in the trunks of trees (*WD* 233), and the hiding of fire, a crucial stage in the Hesiodic myth of Prometheus; these re-combinations are also, of course, ‘interpretations’ of the Hesiodic text, and Virgil might be thought to be at least as sensitive a reader of the links between various elements of the *Works and Days*, the myth of Prometheus and Pandora, the myth of the Races, the descriptions of the necessity which governs our life, as some modern students of the poem have been. This fusing together of elements from more than one of what Martin West designates as the ‘heavy units’ of the *Works and Days* is indeed an important way in which ‘Hesiodic’ material and the ‘Hesiodic’ tradition are fashioned out of Hesiod’s poems. When, in Plato’s *Protagoras*, the eponymous sophist relates his famous *mythos* to show that ‘ἀρετή is teachable’, he starts with a reworking of the myth of Prometheus and Epimetheus from the *Works and Days* (320c8–2a2); here not only are two major elements of the *Works and Days*, ἀρετή and the myth of Prometheus, re-combined to suit a new intellectual context, but the poem of Hesiod, whom Prometheus had claimed as a forerunner of himself (316d7), is itself fashioned retrospectively as a demonstration that ‘ἀρετή is teachable’ – a reading of the poem which

⁵⁸ Cf. West on *WD* 233; to the commentators on this verse add Farrell 1991: 147.

in fact seems far from unreasonable and one that it is hard to imagine that Hesiod himself would not have welcomed.⁵⁹

In programmatically combining Hesiod and Aratus at the head of the *Georgics*, Virgil almost certainly had predecessors, of whom the most important might have been Nicander, the poet from whom Virgil borrowed the title Γεωργικά. At the head of the *Theriaca*, his poem on poisonous creatures, particularly snakes, Nicander set, after a dedication to Hermesianax, a passage on the origins of venomous creatures:⁶⁰

ἀλλ' ἦτοι κακοεργὰ φαλάγγια σὺν καὶ ἀνιγρούς
 ἐρπηστὰς ἔχιάς τε καὶ ἄχθεα μυρία γαίης
 Τιτῆνων ἐνέπουσιν ἀφ' αἵματος, εἰ ἐτεόν περ
 Ἀσκραῖος μυχάτοιο Μελισσήεντος ἐπ' ὄχθαις
 Ἥσιοδος κατέλεξε παρ' ὕδασι Περμησσοῖο.
 τὸν δὲ χαλαζήεντα κόρη Τιτηνὶς ἀνῆκε
 σκορπίον ἐκ κέντροιο τεθηγμένον, ἦμος ἐπέχρα
 Βοιωτῶι τεύχουσα κακὸν μόρον Ὠαρίωνι,
 ἀχράντων ὅτε χερσὶ θεῆς ἐδράξατο πέπλων·
 αὐτὰρ ὃ γε στιβαροῖο κατὰ σφυρὸν ἦλασεν ἶχνευς
 σκορπίος ἀπροΐδης ὀλίγῳ ὑπὸ λαῖι λοχήσας·
 τοῦ δὲ τέρας περίσημον ὑπ' ἀστέρας ἀπλανὲς αὖτως
 οἷα κυνηλατέοντος ἀείδελον ἐστήρικται.
 (Nicander, *Theriaca* 8–20)

Men say that dangerous spiders, together with grievous reptiles and vipers and the countless burdens of the earth, arose from the blood of the Titans, if indeed the Ascræan on the slopes of furthest Melisseis, Hesiod beside the waters of the Permessus, spoke the truth. A Titan daughter sent forth the chilling scorpion with its sharpened sting, when in her wrath she planned a wretched death for Boeotian Orion, because he grabbed the stainless garment of the goddess with his hands. The scorpion, which had lurked unseen beneath a small stone, struck him in the ankle of his strong foot, but his brilliant image is fixed unmoving amid the stars, like that of a man hunting, standing out clearly.

The fact that we cannot identify the Hesiodic passage on the origin of poisonous creatures to which Nicander here refers

⁵⁹ Cf. further below pp. 267–9.

⁶⁰ There is here a striking difference from the *Alexipharmaca* where Nicander moves directly from the dedicatory verses to the main subject of the poem; the difference deserves closer attention than it normally receives, though cf. Effé 1974: 121, who seeks to draw from it conclusions about the relative chronology of Nicander's work.

has led to much discussion; views have ranged from a mistake on Nicander's part (which seems improbable), to a reference to a lost Hesiodic poem, to a deliberately false 'source note' by Nicander, a note which would be particularly pointed, given Hesiod's foregrounding of the 'truth' of his poetry at the head of both the *Theogony* (vv. 27–8) and the *Works and Days* (v. 10).⁶¹ εἰ ἔτεόν περ in v. 10, however, all but certainly picks up εἰ ἔτεόν δῆ in the first myth of Aratus' *Phainomena*, that of the Bears (v. 30), a myth which itself looks back to Hesiod (fr. 163 M-W); however, therefore, the reference to Hesiod is to be understood, Nicander draws our attention to, and places himself within, a very thick 'Hesiodic' tradition. Moreover, placing the only catasterism of the poem at its head, and a catasterism described also by Aratus in a passage (*Phainomena* 634–46) to which Nicander seems here indebted,⁶² leaves Nicander's acknowledgement of his literary heritage and generic affiliations beyond question; the Aratean flavor of vv. 19–20 is almost palpable (ἐσθήρικται occurs at verse-end four times in the *Phainomena*).⁶³ Whether there was any similar kind of generic signalling at the head of Nicander's Γεωργικά we cannot of course say – the extant fragments largely concern what we might call horticulture rather than agriculture – but Virgil's announcement of his Greek heritage is now seen to be itself a typically subtle version of a Greek technique.

One thread that connects much of the ancient reception of the *Works and Days* is the importance of 'authority' as a marker of the Hesiodic. Homer, too, of course, is an authoritative model, *the* authoritative model in fact, and the two poets are often linked together in the early period as 'religious

⁶¹ The scholia to Nicander already note that Nicander is wrong (ψεύδεται) and that this story of the origin of snakes, common enough in later texts, is nowhere to be found in the works of Hesiod circulating then; in their edition of the fragments of Hesiod, Merkelbach and West class Nicander's reference to Hesiod among the *spuria* (fr. 367) and note that Nicander 'videtur auctores confudisse'.

⁶² Nicander varies the Aratean model by not explicitly saying that the scorpion was catasterised, as Orion was, and by making the creature small enough to lurk 'unseen under a small stone', whereas Aratus' scorpion is a μέγα θηρίον (*Phain.* 84, cf. 644 πλειότερος), which emerged from the breaking open of a whole island (*Phain.* 642).

⁶³ Effie 1974 is the clearest statement of the literary relationships here; cf. also Claus 2006: 174–6.

experts',⁶⁴ but the very variety of Homeric poetry, and of course the prominence of narrative, all but missing (except for the story of Prometheus and Pandora) from the *Works and Days*, made the range of Homeric imitation infinitely greater than that of the Hesiodic. Nevertheless, from an early date, Hesiod is exploited because of the authority of his figure and voice, an authority which would eventually play the principal role in his evolution into the first 'didactic poet'. A primary example here is the engagement with his poetry, often at the close textual level, in the works of the pre-Socratics, notably Xenophanes, Parmenides and Empedocles.⁶⁵ The nature of the various poems ascribed to him, the encounter with the Muses which opens the *Theogony*, the semi-oracular style not just of such major units as the Myth of Races and the Just and Unjust Cities but of 'popular' elements such as the kennings ('he who sleeps in the day' for a burglar, and so forth), the moral concerns and proverbial wisdom and the 'religious' lore on display in the *Works and Days*, together perhaps with stories about his life and death, found Hesiod a natural place, not just among 'semi-mythic' poets and founders of culture such as Orpheus and Musaeus, but also among wonder-workers and 'gurus' of varying degrees of historicity, such as Pythagoras and Aristeas.⁶⁶ Hesiod, for his part, is not shy in proclaiming his own special knowledge and authority – he can, after all, tell us about sailing, though he has virtually no experience of it,⁶⁷ and when he claims that he will tell Perses a story (which is the Myth of Races) 'well and with understanding', εὖ καὶ ἐπισηταμένως (*WD* 107), this is a claim to insight denied to most men, particularly of course to Perses⁶⁸ – and his poetry is full of such

⁶⁴ Cf., e.g., Graziosi 2002: 180–4.

⁶⁵ There is a survey in Koning 2010: Chap. 6, and cf. esp. Most 2007: 280–92; with particular regard to the influence of *Theogony* 27–8 see also Bryan 2012. Earlier bibliography includes Buzio 1938: 26–32, Solmsen 1949: 104 n. 6 and Hershbell 1970.

⁶⁶ Helpful remarks in Scodel 1980: 314–18, and cf. Struck 2004: 103–4 on the links found in antiquity between some of the gnomic utterances of the *Works and Days* and Pythagorean 'symbols'.

⁶⁷ Cf. below pp. 52–5.

⁶⁸ It may in fact be that one of the differences between the λόγος of the Myth of Races and the αἶνος of the hawk and nightingale which follows is that the former is 'new',

implicit claims; the matter will be considered in greater detail in Chapter 2 below, but here we may note the importance of the ‘Days’, which is a large-scale demonstration of authoritative knowledge withheld from most of mankind. When Hesiod tells us to bring a wife into the house on the fourth of the month, ‘having made out (κρίνας) the bird-omens which are the best for this action’ (*WD* 800–1), we should be in no doubt that Hesiod would know just how to do this and what those bird-omens were (cf. v. 828, cited below). The conclusion of the ‘Days’, and hence of the poem as a whole,⁶⁹ is worth quoting at length for its repeated claims to special knowledge:

παῦροι δ' αὖτε ἴσασι τρισεινάδα μηνὸς ἀρίστην
 ἄρξασθαί τε πίθου καὶ ἐπὶ ζυγὸν αὐχένι θείναι 815
 βουσί καὶ ἡμίονοις καὶ ἵπποις ὠκυπόδεσσιν,
 νῆα <τε> πολυκλήϊδα θοὴν εἰς οἶνοπα πόντον
 εἰρύμεναι· παῦροι δέ τ' ἀληθέα κικλήσκουσιν.
 τετράδι δ' οἷγε πίθον – περὶ πάντων ἱερὸν ἦμαρ –
 μέσσηι. παῦροι δ' αὖτε μετεϊκάδα μηνὸς ἀρίστην 820
 ἡοῦς γεινομένης· ἐπὶ δεῖλα δ' ἐστὶ χερείων.
 αἶδε μὲν ἡμέραι εἰσὶν ἐπιχθονίοις μέγ' ὄνειαρ·
 αἱ δ' ἄλλαι μετὰδουποι, ἀκήριοι, οὗ τι φέρουσai.
 ἄλλος δ' ἀλλοίην αἰνεῖ, παῦροι δέ ἴσασιν.
 ἄλλοτε μητρυιὴ πέλει ἡμέρη, ἄλλοτε μήτηρ 825

in the sense that it is constructed as a revelation to its audience, whereas the latter is told, in an apparently abbreviated manner (cf. below pp. 242–3), to an audience of βασιλεῖς who are constructed as familiar with it (φρονέουσai καὶ αὐτοῖς).

⁶⁹ This, of course, is to ignore the question of the *Ornithomanteia*, which, according to the scholium on v. 828, ‘some people joined’ to the end of the *Works and Days* and which had been athetised by Apollonius of Rhodes; for discussion of this question cf. the notes of West and Ercolani ad loc. We do not know how commonly this poem or set of verses was indeed included in texts of *WD*, either before or after the Hellenistic period, but there is no reason not to believe, and some reason to do so, that at least a major break in the corpus was perceived both by readers and scribes of texts after *WD* 828; that Callimachus alludes to the last two words of v. 828 in introducing the very ‘Hesiodic’ narration of Erysichthon (*Hymn to Demeter* 22, cf. Reinsch-Werner 1976: 216–19, below pp. 37–8) may also be thought to point to a structurally significant position for that verse. The repeated emphasis on ‘knowledge’ in the final passage and the markedly closural sense of vv. 826–8 would have strengthened that perception. When the Platonic Socrates and Ion agree that both Homer and Hesiod ‘say something about μαντική’ (Plato, *Ion* 531b1–2), this may – if Plato has something specific in mind – be a reference to the *Ornithomanteia*, but there are in fact enough references to divination in the *WD* to make this the poem which Socrates’ words evoke (neither Murray nor Rijksbaron discuss the matter in their commentaries on the *Ion*).

Hesiod and the Hesiodic

τάων. εὐδαίμων τε καὶ ὄλβιος, ὃς τάδε πάντα
εἰδὼς ἐργάζεται ἀναίτιος ἄθανάτοισιν,
ὄρνιθας κρίνων καὶ ὑπερβασίας ἀλεείνων.

(Hesiod, *Works and Days* 814–28)

Again, few people know that the thrice-ninth is the best day of the month for starting on a jar and for placing a yoke on the neck of oxen and mules and swift-footed horses, and for drawing a many-benched, swift ship down to the wine-dark sea; few people call things truly. On the middle fourth open a jar – above all days it is a holy one. Again, few people know that the twenty-first is the best of the month when dawn comes; in the evening it is worse.

These days are a great benefit for men on earth. The others are uncertain, without fixedness, bringing nothing. One man praises one sort of day, but few know. At one time a day of this kind is a stepmother, at another a mother. Happy and blessed is he who knows all these things and works without offending the immortals, distinguishing bird signs and avoiding transgressions.

In considering the effect of this passage, it does not seem very helpful merely to note that *παῦροι δ' αὖτε* (814, 820) is a formulaic phrase;⁷⁰ for any listener or reader this is a strikingly assertive way with which to end a poem – Hesiod, we will not need to be told, is very clearly one of ‘the few’ who both ‘know’ and ‘call things truthfully’.⁷¹ If we were in any doubt, the *makarismos* with which the poem ends, with its themes of knowledge, work and piety, will hardly leave us in any doubt: who is it who fits this bill?⁷²

⁷⁰ So Ercolani on v. 814; the passage, particularly the need to assume the verb in vv. 820–1, has not fared well in modern criticism, cf. West on v. 820 ‘not a good piece of writing’, Solmsen 1963: 304 ‘slipshod practice’.

⁷¹ The theme of the poet’s knowledge was to become central to the later tradition of ‘didactic poetry’, cf. below pp. 52–8 on Hesiod’s ability to tell of sailing, despite his lack of personal experience. A suggestive descendant of the closing passage of the *Works and Days* is Nicander, *Theriaca* 805–36 with its fourfold anaphora of οἶδα (vv. 805, 811, 822, 829).

⁷² Proclus’ instincts (scholium on vv. 826–8 = fr. 283 Marzillo) in referring these verses to the poem, which for him at least they completed, were once again not misplaced: ‘In these verses he defines who is truly happy: the man who knows the works he must do and the days on which what is done will reach its proper conclusion, that man is happy’. The reference of the final verses is, of course, general and wide, though it is difficult to accept that it is the newly instructed Perses of whom we should be thinking (so, e.g., Hamilton 1989: 83). On Hesiod as a figure of ‘special authority’ cf. also Murnaghan 2006: 104.

One measure of the effect of these implicit and explicit claims which underpin the *Works and Days* is the very prominent place given to Hesiod in the conversation of the archaic sages in Plutarch's *Symposium of the Seven Sages*; this is not merely part of Plutarch's imaginative recreation in that work of a past time, but also marks Hesiod as in fact the sages' 'poet of choice', almost indeed one of them.⁷³ Of particular interest in this regard is what can be dimly perceived of the use made of Hesiod by the Cretan holy man, Epimenides (seventh or sixth century), a character associated with, and sometimes classed among, the Sages and around whose name marvellous legends arose and to whom theogonic and narrative poetry was ascribed.⁷⁴ Maximus of Tyre (10.1) records that Epimenides reported that he had slept 'for many years' in a cave of Zeus and had there met (ἐντυχεῖν) 'the gods themselves and the words of the gods and Truth and Justice'; it was presumably during this dream encounter that one or more of the gods, perhaps Truth herself,⁷⁵ addressed to him what is for us the most famous fragment associated with his name:

Κρήτες αἰεὶ ψεύσται, κακὰ θηρία, γαστέρες ἄργαι
(Epimenides fr. 1 D-K)

Cretans are always liars, wretched creatures, idle bellies

Not only does this verse clearly rework the Muses' scornful address to Hesiod (*Theogony* 26), with the pointed variation that Cretans are always liars, whereas Hesiod's Muses claim to be purveyors of both lies and truth (though not at the same time),⁷⁶ but the whole episode seems to have been modeled, in part at least, upon Hesiod's encounter with the Muses, an encounter which, at least later in antiquity, was also sometimes

⁷³ On the prominence of Hesiod in Plutarch's *Symposium* cf. Stamatopoulou forthcoming, who however takes a rather different view of the significance of that prominence, and below pp. 171–5.

⁷⁴ On Epimenides see Dodds 1951: 141–6, Burkert 1972: 151, West 1983: 45–53, Federico–Visconti 2001.

⁷⁵ Cf. Maass 1892: 345.

⁷⁶ For ψεύσται in such invective cf. Homer, *Iliad* 24.261–3, a passage with something of a Hesiodic feel (note also ἐλέγχεα πάντα in v. 260, and the 'pastoral' abuse of v. 262).

regarded as a dream.⁷⁷ The account in Diogenes Laertius adds a detail, whether ‘original’ or not, which brings the story even closer to that of Hesiod and other tales of poetic initiation: ‘One day Epimenides was sent by his father into the fields to look for a sheep, and at mid-day he turned off the path and slept in a cave for fifty-seven years...’ (Diog. Laert. 1.109).⁷⁸ Another striking link between Hesiod and Epimenides is related to the ἄλιμος, a preparation or drug which allowed Epimenides to go for very long periods without other food. From an early date (cf. Plato, *Laws* 3.677e) this was brought into association with Hesiod’s claim in the *Works and Days* (v. 41) of the ‘great benefit’ in asphodel and mallow, which were sometimes then thought to be ingredients for the ἄλιμος.⁷⁹ It is a possible, though hardly certain, inference that Epimenides himself was believed to have drawn the link with Hesiod’s verse.⁸⁰ Be that as it may, here is Hesiod (again) constructed as a forerunner of mystic wisdom, as the purveyor of special knowledge, and this – as we have seen – is indeed fundamental to how the voice of his poetry was received.

It was left to Lucian in his brief *Conversation with Hesiod* to put the final satirical nail in this claim to special knowledge – not only did Hesiod not know about (ἐπίστασθαι) anything of which he sang, a point descending from the Platonic view of ‘inspired’ poets, but in particular he made no prophecies about the future, despite what he claimed about the nature of the Muses’ gift (*Theogony* 32); Hesiod was fine when it came to ‘pieces of advice and precepts’, παραινέσεις καὶ ὑποθήκαι,⁸¹ though even here farmers would do a better job than poets (another barb descending from Plato’s *Ion*), but as far as being able ‘to know in advance what is unclear and in no way at all

⁷⁷ Cf., e.g., Kambylis 1965: 55–61.

⁷⁸ The poet of *Anth. Pal.* 9.64, perhaps Asclepiades (= XLV G-P/Sens), identifies mid-day as the time of Hesiod’s encounter with the Muses.

⁷⁹ For Plutarch’s interest in the matter cf. below p. 171.

⁸⁰ This is hardly ruled out by the fact that Plutarch makes Periander reject any connection between Hesiod’s verse and Epimenides’ drug (*Symp.* 157f); at 158b Cleodorus is made to say ‘Aesop has, I think, more right to declare himself Hesiod’s pupil than does Epimenides’, which may point in the direction I have indicated.

⁸¹ *Hesiod* 8; for this language cf. below pp. 75–86.

in plain view' Hesiod is no better than any ordinary mortal.⁸² Without placing too much weight on this witty *jeu d'esprit*, it is significant that it was the claim of the Hesiodic voice to a special knowledge denied to most men that Lucian skewers as Hesiod's vulnerable spot; there is, of course, more than one important difference between the voice (or voices) of the *Theogony* and the *Works and Days* and the voice of a Calchas or a Teiresias, even when the semi-oracular style of significant elements of the latter poem is taken into consideration,⁸³ but – even without *Theogony* 32 – Lucian's satirical technique draws on the tendency in Greek culture to assimilate any claim to special knowledge to one of the forms of μαντική, and as Hesiod was also credited by some with an *Ornithomanteia*, it was not difficult to gather him in under this umbrella, as he had already been gathered under so many others.

Hesiodic voices

The previous section has given some idea of the scope and interest of the ancient reception of the *Works and Days*, and how this reception raises important questions about the poem itself, even if disagreement seems inevitable about the extent to which ancient reception can in fact illuminate this most intriguingly problematic of ancient texts. The present book is an attempt both to explore some important moments of that reception and to seek to build a more general picture of how the Hesiod of the *Works and Days* acted as a creative stimulus throughout the literature of antiquity. The chapter which follows this one explores the question of the *Works and Days* as 'didactic poetry', not principally by looking (inevitably in vain) for explicit ancient theory on the subject or through the body of modern discussion which has grown up in the last decades, as ancient didactic has become again a subject of

⁸² Hesiod might have pleaded in self-defence the apparent prophecy of *WD* 176–201 (the ultimate decline of the iron age), but Lucian is of course not interested in 'fairness', and what are in play here are prophecies (however mythical) which are known to have come true, such as those of Calchas (*Hesiod* 8).

⁸³ Cf. below p. 272 n. 109.

greater interest, but rather through how Hesiod and ‘Hesiodic’ themes were actually used and discussed in both literary and non-literary contexts.

An approach to the *Works and Days* through what we know of how it was read in antiquity brings with it a significant advantage, which also represents a significant danger. As is well known, the *Works and Days* presents sometimes bewildering problems of structure, coherence and purpose, at both the micro- and macro- levels, regardless of the critical approach and tools which are brought to bear upon it; the problems might seem most acute for ‘unitarian’ critics, of whatever kind, but even hard-core ‘analysts’, who see parts at least of our text of the poem as a conflation of variously layered versions originating in different contexts, then further complicated by later interpolation, find a residue of problems which seem (to them) to resist analysis of any kind.⁸⁴ We know that, at least from the Alexandrian period on, scholarly ancient readers too were concerned to identify the non-Hesiodic in the *Works and Days*, but there was of course nothing like the modern concern with structural coherence at the level of detail. To some extent, then, focus upon the ancient reception of the poem allows us to sidestep some of the central issues of modern scholarship on the poem by assuming that the *Works and Days* is indeed, broadly speaking, as it appears to be. We have already observed (cf. above p. 4) that Hesiod’s ‘quotability’ meant that ancient readers had a great deal to keep them interested, without too much bother about structural coherence or what sort of a poem the *Works and Days* actually is. The danger in this approach through ancient reception arises, of course, from the very same source. ‘Sidestepping’ may also be ‘glossing over’, and approaching the *Works and Days* in this way inevitably tends to create a poem

⁸⁴ Generalisations inevitably simplify, but the present state of criticism might suggest that anglophone scholarship tends to the unitarian (of all persuasions) – perhaps both a tribute and a reaction to the influence of M.L. West’s edition – whereas Italian scholarship takes more diverse positions and still has a strong ‘analyst’ strain, whether we understand that in a traditional sense borrowed from Homeric scholarship or also allow it to embrace the situation of alternative versions of passages incorporated within our text but perhaps both going back to Hesiod (cf., e.g., Rossi 1997).

with a much more even texture and fewer serious problems than there actually are; it may well be that a detailed commentary is the most appropriate form in which to tackle those problems. I do not imagine that in the present book I have entirely escaped from this danger, but I have tried to bear it constantly in mind, and the risk that readers will imagine that studies of this kind may serve as a substitute for wrestling with the problems of the poem, whether in a detailed commentary or another format, seems very small. It might, moreover, be argued that the *Works and Days* is such a ‘one-off’, both from our perspective and from that of what we know of Graeco-Roman antiquity,⁸⁵ that no single reworking or critical meditation is likely to catch even a good part of what is distinctive to it, and so an approach through various ‘moments’ of reception and reaction, a kind of circling around and closing in on the poem, has reasonable claims as a critical method for studying the poem itself, quite apart from what it might teach us about the ways and intellectual contexts in which it was read through all of antiquity.

There is another danger in this study of which I am very conscious. I have claimed above (p. 16) that there was in antiquity a sense of ‘the Hesiodic’, and that this emerges in many texts and ideas which often seem to have very few explicit links with Hesiod, such as shared vocabulary. The result of my sense of this ancient sense is that the ‘voices’ I will be discussing in this book differ very greatly in their distance from the Hesiodic text, whether that be measured in shared vocabulary or authorial consciousness of the presence of a Hesiodic trace. The pursuit of Hesiodic themes and ideas through antiquity seems to me at least as important a task for the understanding of ancient culture as does the tracking of verbal echoes of Hesiod’s poems, although of course the two tasks inevitably go together, but there is an obvious danger of losing sight of ‘the real Hesiod’ altogether; one of the anonymous Press readers for this book pointedly observed, ‘not every uphill climb is an

⁸⁵ It is standardly observed that no real ‘parallel’ for the poem has been identified in other ancient cultures, despite the extensive material that the poem manifestly shares with other literatures and modes of discourse, as Martin West has most fully demonstrated (cf. West 1978a: 3–25).

allusion to Hesiod, surely', and the desire to link together two passages on a similar theme which happen to have survived is a familiar weakness of both ancient and modern scholars.⁸⁶ It can, however, reasonably be claimed that the *Works and Days* is a 'special case', one of those central texts of ancient literate culture which were, through educational practice, so ingrained in habits of expression and thought that the search for its influence must indeed sometimes take the form of deep-trench archaeology, rather than surface survey. In the context of that literate culture, quite a few uphill climbs may indeed be claimed to be indeed 'Hesiodic', particularly in the context of the acquisition of forms of knowledge,⁸⁷ and I have in general preferred to run the risk of a sort of pan-Hesiodism, rather than to let the sometimes faint traces of the poet of Ascrea trail away without following them to the end. The *Works and Days* is such an extraordinarily suggestive text in so many different ways that our starting expectation might indeed have been that its traces in subsequent literature will be similarly both diffuse and very various in their manner. This book, then, is in part aimed at testing the rightness of that expectation.

One thread which runs through many ancient reworkings of Hesiod is what might be termed 'testing the relevance' of what Hesiod has to say. Plato is here the most complex and for many perhaps the most interesting case, but the concern surfaces throughout the tradition. Plutarch's commentary on the *Works and Days* (Chapter 4 below) stands very obviously at one end of a long spectrum, but much of what Plutarch is doing is 'updating' the Hesiodic text by making sense of it in the context of a very different material, cultural and intellectual society, and this is not so far removed from other less explicit appropriations; with Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* (pp. 64–71 below), for example, our sense of a felt Hesiodic background flickers

⁸⁶ I discuss what might be a nice example of this (the scholia on Aristophanes, *Peace* 1320–8) on pp. 155–6 below, but that case also illustrates the fact that smoke may indeed sometimes indicate fire. As for paths, we might well wonder whether, in view of what comes later in the *Republic*, there is not indeed something 'Hesiodic' about the opposition between the possible paths of old age, the *τραχέϊα καὶ χαλεπῇ* and the *βασιδαὶ καὶ εὐποροῦς*, which Socrates evokes at 1.328e3–4.

⁸⁷ For this argument cf. below pp. 92–100.

in and out in the course of reading, but the whole presentation of a well-to-do Attic estate and its owner finds a new place for the *Works and Days* – as in a different way did Plutarch – in a changed world. Other texts, particularly in the period of the Second Sophistic, may of course emphasise contemporary difference from Hesiod, how ‘old-fashioned’ he feels, but the sense that the material of the *Works and Days* is always to be measured against, and works its effects through, a different context of reception seems to have been a central part of Hesiodic reception from the earliest period.⁸⁸ This should not really surprise: the great majority of our evidence comes from readers of Hesiod who were not like, and had no desire to model themselves upon, the most obvious addressees of the *Works and Days*,⁸⁹ and this – together with the very distinctive poetic voice of the *Works and Days* – means that a sense of ‘strangeness’ is a very common, and productive, phenomenon in ancient appropriations, both strong and weak, of this poem.

The decision to focus in this book almost exclusively on the *Works and Days* was determined by the demands of coherence, by a view about where work most needed to be done, and by the patterns which the material itself seemed to present. It goes without saying, of course, that none of the three major Hesiodic works in antiquity was absolutely walled off from the others. In the most obvious case, it is often difficult, and may sometimes be misguided, to seek to distinguish between the *Theogony* and the *Works and Days* in post-Hesiodic versions of the myths of Prometheus and Pandora, unless of course a prominent feature which is absent from one Hesiodic poem, such as the jar which Pandora opens, is in play. Similarly, what the Muses said to Hesiod on Mount Helicon (*Theogony* 22–34) becomes a marker of ‘the Hesiodic’, one by no means restricted to theogonic poetry.⁹⁰ When Theocritus reworks

⁸⁸ Cf. below pp. 123–6 on Alcaeus 347 V.

⁸⁹ The principal partial exception here is the Aesopic tradition, cf. below Chapter 5.

⁹⁰ A rather odd instance of the running together of the two poems is perhaps found at Dio 2.8 where Alexander dismisses Hesiod as a poet for ‘shepherds, carpenters, and farmers’, because ‘he says that shepherds are loved by the Muses, gives very good (μάλα ἐμπείρως) advice to carpenters as to what size of axle to cut and to farmers

more than one element of the poetic initiation of the *Theogony* during the course of the journey of the *Thalysia* (*Idyll* 7) – the gift of a staff, the stress upon truth, the idea that there is more than one kind of poetic performance (vv. 43–8, 128–9) – it is the *Works and Days*, rather than the *Theogony*, to which the substance of the poem most directs our attention: a poem recording a festival to give thanks to Demeter for agricultural plenty incorporates a central message of that poem (cf. *Works and Days* 299–301), however removed the voice of the narrator of that poem might seem to be from the character and voice of the Hesiodic poem. So too, another poem in honour of Demeter, Callimachus’ hymn to the goddess, appears to combine material from the *Works and Days* and the *Catalogue*. The central narrative of the poem is that of Erysichthon, punished with insatiable hunger for arrogantly damaging the goddess’ sacred grove. The myth, of particular importance to the women who are fasting in the goddess’ cult, ‘tells of a Hesiodic “worst case”, a man loved by hunger and hated by Demeter’ (cf. (again) *Works and Days* 299–301),⁹¹ and is framed by echoes of the *Works and Days*; the poem is also a tale of Erysichthon’s lack of αἰδώς and a watching νέμεσις (cf. vv. 36, 56), whereas the women pray for agricultural plenty and peace, the condition foregrounded by Panedes’ award of the *Contest of Homer and Hesiod* to the latter,⁹² ‘so that he who ploughs may reap the harvest’ (v. 137). Piety and full barns, impiety and hunger are intimately linked in both Hesiod and Callimachus. The Hellenistic poet makes full use of the familiar Odyssean motif of the ‘cursed belly’, but he also clearly has his eye, not just on the *Works and Days*, but also on the extended narration in the *Catalogue of Women* of Erysichthon and his daughter Mestra (fr. 43a M-W = 69 Most). In this remarkable episode, Erysichthon has been afflicted with the familiar ‘burning

when to start on a cask’; the last two cases clearly refer, even if inaccurately, to specific verses of the *Works and Days* (424, 368), but the first, which corresponds to nothing in either poem, presumably alludes to the poetic initiation of the shepherd Hesiod in the *Theogony*.

⁹¹ Hunter 1992: 30; further discussion and bibliography in Hunter 1992: 29–33, Reinsch-Werner 1976: 210–29, Sistakou 2009: 248–52, Faraone 2012.

⁹² Cf. below pp. 302–15.

hunger' (αἰθων λιμός, v. 7, cf. Callimachus, *Hymn to Demeter* 66–7), though the preserved text does not tell us why, which has in fact resulted in him being called by the name of Αἰθων (vv. 5, 37); Erysichthon keeps the hunger at bay by giving his daughter in marriage to a succession of suitors in return for a large (and edible) bride-price (cf. vv. 21–4, ?45–6,⁹³ cf. Callimachus, *Hymn to Demeter* 77, 105–10), and, once married, Mestra gets out of the situation by using the gift of changing shape which Poseidon has given her. Much of the preserved text is concerned with a dispute between Erysichthon and the wily Sisyphus, who wanted to marry Mestra to his son Glaucus, but who is defeated by the higher plans of the gods. Callimachus re-orientes the focus of the narrative by making his Erysichthon apparently a considerably younger man than his Hesiodic forerunner: he is still living at home as 'the king's son' (vv. 79, 114, and note the repeated τέκνον of vv. 46–7 and ὁ παῖς in v. 56), there is no sign of a daughter, and his action in damaging the grove to provide the pleasures of dining for himself and his ξῆταροι, thus placing them on the level of Penelope's wasteful suitors, is very much the unthinking self-confidence of youth. This new focus turns Erysichthon into a paradigmatic illustration of the 'moral' of the *Works and Days* – even a young βασιλεύς is subject to universal moral principles. Such new constructions out of the blending of more than one related poem are of course the very lifeblood of Hellenistic and Roman *mimesis*; the opening words of Aratus' *Phainomena*,

ἐκ Διὸς ἀρχώμεσθα, τὸν οὐδέποτε' ἄνδρες ἑώμεν
ἄρρητον (Aratus, *Phainomena* 1–2)

Let us begin from Zeus, whom we men never leave unspoken,

⁹³ The narrative role of the mules in vv. 45–6 is quite unclear (cf. Hirschberger 2004: 278), but the appearance of 'mules' eaten by Erysichthon in v. 107 of Callimachus' hymn gives at least pause for thought. Be that as it may, the list of animals in vv. 21–4 which seem to be the bride-price offered, but which will in fact be eaten, puts a knowing new twist on what was presumably a familiar motif of such catalogue poetry, cf., e.g., fr. 204.50–1 M-W (Ajax's offering for Helen); Callimachus saw and imitated the point.

combine an echo (with variation) of the opening verse of the *Theogony* (ἀρχώμεσθα) with the first of many echoes of the proem of the *Works and Days* (ἄρρητον), the poem which is to be Aratus' principal archaic model.

The scope of the subject means of course that the present book is, at best, a very partial (in both senses) account of the *Works and Days* in antiquity. I have already pointed to one of the most glaring omissions, Virgil's *Georgics*; whether justice could be done to that subject within one chapter of a book such as this one may be debated, but there is at least no shortage of bibliography to which those interested may turn, and it can be argued, with at least some plausibility, that the broad outlines of how Virgil uses Hesiod are familiar enough that a new treatment at concise length is unlikely to open new vistas. Other areas of silence will be equally apparent.⁹⁴ What, however, will emerge, I hope, is how the varied riches of the *Works and Days* provoked a matchingly rich ancient response, both at the level of explicit interpretation and of creative imitation. Beyond that, I must also hope that, with a subject such as this one, the half really is more than the whole.

⁹⁴ Perhaps the most obvious is Plato (though see pp. 45–50, 117–21 below and Chapter 4 on Plutarch's Platonising interpretations); Boys-Stones–Haubold 2010 offers an excellent introduction to the subject. Any full treatment would pay particular attention to Plato's repeated reworkings of the Myth of Races, notably in the *Republic*, both in the 'noble lie' and elsewhere, and in the *Statesman*; the principal reason for this silence here is Van Noorden forthcoming.

CHAPTER 2

A DIDACTIC POEM?

Learning from Hesiod

From the area of Hadrianoupolis in southwestern Paphlagonia survives a funerary poem of the early second century AD commemorating a Priscus, whose name was appropriate to the timeless virtues of his life:¹

χαίροις· χαιρόμενος μέγα, ξένε, δεῦρ' ἀνάγνωθι·
Πρεῖσκος ἀνὴρ κείται, πολλῶν φίλος ἥδ' ὑπολήπτηρ,
ὅς ποτ' ἐν στρατιῇ δοκιμὴν συνκλήτῳ ἔδωκεν
ἄθλα τε παντ' ἐποίησε ὅς' αἰεὶ ποτε ἐποίησεν Ἀχιλλεύς
ἦθ' [υἱὸς] Πριάμοιο· ἴσον καὶ Πρεῖσκος ἐποίησεν.
θάμβησεν δ' αὐτὸν μέγας αὐτοκράτωρ Τραιανός
κάλλος τ' ἡλικίην τε βίην καὶ ἄντος ἔχοντα,
δῶκε δὲ οἱ μεγάλῃν ἀρχήν· νεικηφόρον ἄθλων
ἔστεφάνωσε καλῶς καὶ αὐτῷ τὸ σκῆπτρον ἔδωκεν,
σημεῖον βασιλῆιον· τοιοῖ' δωρήσατο δῶρον
σημεῖαις προάγειν· λαὸν δ' ἐφύλασσαν ἅπαντα.
ὥς δ' ἐτέλεσσαν ἀγῶνα μέγαν κέπελῆλυθε πάτραι,
φένγος πᾶσιν ἔλανψε, μάλιστα δ' ἐοῖσι γονεῦσιν,
καὶ τότε νοῦν ἔστρεψεν ἀροτρεῦειν πατρεάν γῆν,
πάντα ποιῶν ἅμα καὶ θρεπτοῖς ἐπέτελλε γεωργοῖς
ἄρμενα πάντα ποιεῖν, ὅσα Ἡσίοδος περὶ γεωργούς
[ἔξα]μάειν καρπούς μεγάλους ἐπεδείξατ' ἀφειστῶς.
β[ρ]ῖσε δ' ὅ]λοις ἀγαθοῖσι πολὺν χρόνον ἰσπαταλήσας,
ὀλβῳ καὶ πλοῦτῳ κεκορεσμένος εἰς ἀνάπαυσιν.

(SGO 10/02/28)

'Greetings!' 'Much greeting to you, stranger: come hear and read': Here lies Priscus, the friend and helper of many. When serving in a newly formed unit he gave proof of his worth, and he met all the challenges which once upon a

¹ I have not thought it worthwhile to record problems of text, translation and interpretation where they are not germane to the matter being discussed, and have also not noted obvious restorations in the text. The best discussion of the text, and one to which I am indebted, is the *editio princeps* of Marek 1993: 100–16; vv. 12–19 are Hesiod T 51 Most.

time Achilles and the son of Priam ever met: Priscus too did just the same. The great emperor Trajan wondered at him for his beauty, his youth, his strength and the bloom upon him, and gave him a great command. He placed a noble garland upon him as bearer of the Victory in battle and he gave him a sceptre, the imperial sign . . . He gave him as a gift the right to go ahead with the standards, and he protected the whole army. When he had completed the great struggle and returned to his native land, he shone as a light to everyone, above all to his parents, and then he turned his mind to ploughing his native soil, both carrying out everything himself and he gave orders to the land-workers born on the estate to put everything in good order, as Hesiod had instructed for farmers, so as to harvest great crops without stint.² He [was laden down] with all good things and lived in plenty for a long time, his cup full with prosperity and wealth to his death.

For each half of a life that fell into two parts, Priscus chose what his education had taught him was the appropriate poet: the poet of war and the poet of peace. Priscus' evocation of his models, moreover, does not remain at the level of the purely general, but evokes particular verses or motifs. As far as Hesiod is concerned, v. 16 seems to be a clear verbal echo of *WD* 407, χρήματα δ' εἰν οἴκῳ πάντ' ἄρμενα ποιήσασθαι, the motif of instructing his farm-workers³ picks up a number of Hesiodic passages (e.g. *WD* 597, 608), and the final couplet, which celebrates Priscus' success and prosperity, in a time of what was, at least for him, peace, suggests in context that he had practised justice and been rewarded with agricultural plenty (cf. *WD* 225–237) as Hesiod had predicted,⁴ even if Hesiod might not have approved all of the language in which Priscus' prosperity is described; ὀλβῶι καὶ πλούτῳι (19) is, however, a Hesiodic pairing (cf. *WD* 637), though presumably not uniquely

² The *editio princeps* of Marek 1993, followed by, e.g., Most 2006: 196–7, understands the end of the verse as ἀφεῖς τῷς, 'thus allowing [the farm-workers] to harvest . . .'. Merkelbach–Stauber understand ἀφειστῶς, 'without stint', an otherwise unattested adverb, which they apparently construe with ἐπεδείξατ'; if their interpretation is correct, there is at least a temptation to take the adverb with the notion of a rich harvest.

³ On θρεπτοῖ as labourers born on and tied to an estate cf. Marek 1993: 114. The development of agricultural estates after Hesiod gave the motif of 'how to instruct one's workers' particular prominence in subsequent didactic literature, cf. below pp. 64–71 on Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*.

⁴ Note ὅλοις ἀγαθοῖσι 18 ~ *WD* 236 θάλλουσιν δ' ἀγαθοῖσι διαμπερές; if βρῖσε is correctly restored in v. 18, this may be a memory of καταβεβρίθασι in the same Hesiodic passage (*WD* 234).

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so, and it is hard not to see an attempt here to create a Hesiodic flavour,⁵ alongside a pride, more Roman than Greek perhaps (we think of the legend of Cincinnatus ‘summoned from the plough’), in the combination of sturdy farmer and brave soldier.⁶ Not dissimilar in some respects is the hexameter poem for one Epicrates, inscribed by his sons on a funerary column in Bithynia in the third century AD:

Ἐπικράτης [υἱὸς καὶ Δωρό]θεος συνόμεμοι
βωμὸν ἀνέστησαν [φιλίῳ] πατρὶ δακρῦσαντες
τοῦνομα Ἐπικράτης, ἐπεὶ φίλος ἐγενήθη,
πολλὰ κοπωθέντι κέ πᾶσι φίλοις ἀρέσαντι
τὴν δὲ γεωπονίην ὡς Ἡσίοδος κατέδειξεν.
πᾶσι δ’ ἐπ’ ἀνφιβόλοισι δικασπὸλος ἦεν .. δικος
ἄρξας δις ἐν πατρίδι Βειθυνέων Ἀδριανῇ
συνδικίην τελέσας] ὑπὲρ πατρίδος ἀνυβρίστως ...
(SGO 09/09/11 vv. 1–8)

Epicrates [his son and Doro]theos, who are brothers, set up this altar for their dear father as they wept; his name was Epicrates, since he was dear to them. He worked very hard and pleased all his friends; [he worked] at agriculture as Hesiod showed.⁷ In all disputes he was a [?]just adjudicator. He twice held office in his native Hadriana in Bithynia and filled the office of legal adviser for his home town without infringing people’s rights ...

Epicrates too, then, was the embodiment of the principal theme of the *Works and Days*, namely the relationship between a straight justice which rejects *hybris* and, on the other hand, agriculture. As a glance at, for example, Virgil’s *Georgics* or the Preface to Columella will show, that relationship was, in some ways, the principal legacy of the *Works and Days* to the ancient literature of agriculture.

⁵ κεκορεσμένος (19) might seem out of keeping with the ethos of the *WD* (though note v. 593), but the close juxtaposition of κορέσασθαι with φείδεσθαι and φειδῶ at *WD* 368–9 is noteworthy in view of the possibility of ἀφειστῶς at the end of v. 17, cf. n. 2 above.

⁶ Our principal sources for Cincinnatus might well be thought to have ‘Hesiodic touches’: in Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Cincinnatus observes that his call to public service will result in the loss of the crop and ‘we shall all go terribly hungry’ (*AR* 10.24.2), and in Livy he is covered in ‘sweat and dust’ when the officials come to find him (3.26.10).

⁷ The syntax has gone a bit awry here; one of CUP’s readers suggests that the meaning ‘He like Hesiod demonstrated how to work the land’ might have been intended. The use of κατέδειξεν might remind us of Aristophanes, *Frogs* 1032–4 (below pp. 86–7).

Priscus' actual farming techniques, as also those of Epicrates, may have been closer to those of Hesiod than his fighting experience in the Roman army was to heroic combat in the Homeric mould, but there will have been differences. Hesiod clearly offered an inspiring model, but perhaps we should not simply dismiss the implication of the two poems that Hesiod was a 'didactic' model as well. This is, of course, not a matter of wondering whether Priscus and Epicrates took their copies of the *Works and Days* with them out into the fields, but rather of a habit of mind which constructs oneself as following the Hesiodic path, even when doing something really rather different; the didactic quality of poetry is, importantly, a matter of how poetry is received, and this simple truth is too often lost in the modern concern with poetic intention.⁸ From one insistent ancient viewpoint, of course, Homer was 'didactic', and, as the basis of all (or much) knowledge, central to the educational system at all levels, but it has always rightly been recognised that this does not make the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* 'didactic poetry' in any particularly (for us) helpful sense. The poem for Priscus, on the other hand, draws (implicitly) an instructive contrast between Homeric and Hesiodic poetry, one related, as we shall see, to a contrast drawn between them in the *Contest of Homer and Hesiod*,⁹ and one which can help us to grasp something of what makes the *Works and Days* 'didactic'. On the field of battle, Priscus' achievements were those of an Achilles or a Hector, they were not, for example, 'what Homer described'; Priscus is imagined as 'performing' Homer, but as following the agricultural prescriptions of Hesiod, who, unlike Homer, is explicitly named.¹⁰ With Priscus' self-projection (or that of his descendants) we may compare a third-century AD funerary epigram from Cilicia for a lady called Berous (*SGO* 19/19/02), who 'in reality not in story' was a 'Penelope of Homer'; Homeric

⁸ Cf. below on the different recipes of Effe and Volk for 'didactic poetry'.

⁹ Cf. below pp. 302–15.

¹⁰ Cf. the explicit naming of Tyrtaeus on *GVI* 749 = Tyrtaeus, T 9 Gerber (3rd cent. BC): the dead Timocritus 'preserving (φυλάσσων) in his heart the Spartan utterance of Tyrtaeus, chose courage over life'; in both his poetry and its reception, Tyrtaeus is much the most 'didactic' of the archaic elegists.

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characters offer patterns and ‘lessons’ by which we can shape our lives, patterns which, as Plato knew only too well, encourage and challenge imitation, whereas Hesiod explicitly (‘didactically’) prescribed how we are to live our moral and social lives. We might be surprised to find that this is the case for women as much as for men.¹¹ A late imperial epitaph from Side commemorates a priestess of Artemis called Nane:

Ἀρτέμιδος ζάκορόν με πολυθρήνον ἄπασιν
λεύσις, ἦν Ἀείδου σ[κυθρός ἐ]χει θάλαμος.
παρθενικὴν λίπον.[]οιο Κόνωνος,
ἄρτι τὸν Ἑσιόδου.[]..ην
κεῖμαι δ’ οὐκ ἄψυχος...

(SGO 18/15/14. 1–5)

You see me, a priestess of Artemis, much bewailed by everyone; the [grim] wedding-chamber of Hades holds me. I left my virgin... of Konon; recently the... of Hesiod... I lie not lifeless...

This unfortunately broken poem is usually, and surely rightly, associated with *WD* 698–9:

ἡ δὲ γυνὴ τέτορ’ ἠβώοι, πέμπτωι δὲ γαμοῖτο.
παρθενικὴν δὲ γαμεῖν, ὥς κ’ ἦθεα κεδνὰ διδάξεις.
(Hesiod, *Works and Days* 698–9)

A wife should have reached puberty four years before and be married in the fifth; marry a virgin so that you can teach her careful ways.

The poem will thus declare that Nane died at the age at which Hesiod had told his male audience that women should be married; Nane interprets Hesiod’s advice as also addressed to women, giving them too a socially approved norm to follow. That Nane did indeed follow this advice is something which redounds to her credit (we should be in no doubt about her ἦθεα κεδνὰ), but instead of marriage, the Hesiodic age

¹¹ Particularly striking in this regard is αἰμύλα κωτίλλουσα, which Hesiod uses of the treacherous wiles of the γυνὴ πυγοστόλος (*WD* 374), used in two Hellenistic epitaphs of the childish babble of girls who died at the ages of two and three (*GVI* 840, 1512 = *SGO* 05/01/52, cf. West 1986: 5, Garulli 2012: 226–30). Garulli 2012: 230–1 also discusses another echo of the *Works and Days* in a Pontic epitaph of a young wife from the third century AD.

The poet's knowledge

brought her the sadly conventional 'wedding with death'.¹² The Hesiodic reminiscence carries a tragic double edge. Here, as elsewhere, the relatively humble reception of Homer and Hesiod in imperial funerary poems has much to teach us.

The poet's knowledge

During the discussion in Plato's *Theaetetus* of the proposition that knowledge is 'true judgement'¹³ together with an account' Socrates raises the possibility that this is to be understood as the ability to give an account in terms of 'the elements' (τὰ στοιχεῖα) which compose anything (206e7). He elaborates this suggestion by citing the second half of *Works and Days* 456:

φησὶ δ' ἄνθρωπος φρένας ἀφνειὸς πῆξασθαι ἄμαξαν
νήπιος, οὐδὲ τὸ οἶδ' ἑκατὸν δέ τε δούρατ' ἀμάξης.
τῶν πρόσθεν μελέτην ἔχέμεν οἰκία θέσθαι.
(Hesiod, *Works and Days* 455–7)

The man who is rich in his thoughts says that he will build a wagon; fool, he does not know that the timbers of a wagon number one hundred. Make sure that you store them up at home in advance.

You and I, says Socrates, would not be able to 'say' or 'tell' (εἰπεῖν) these hundred timbers,¹⁴ but we would be content, if asked what a wagon is, if we replied 'wheels, axle, body, rails, yoke' (207a4–7). Thus, continues Socrates, someone who held the view of knowledge under discussion would say that we have a correct opinion about a wagon, whereas

the man who is able to go through the being (οὐσία) of a wagon by means of these hundred timbers has, by adding this, added an account to his true judgement, and instead of being a man who makes judgements (δοξαστικός)

¹² The problems of interpretation are insoluble in the current state of the text. The noun to which παρθενικήν is attached is presumably lost in the lacuna, or we might consider emending to παρθενική, 'a virgin, I left...'; there is, similarly, room for debate as to whether Konon was Nane's husband or father.

¹³ I have adopted this translation of δόξα; Platonic scholars divide between 'judgement' and 'opinion', but nothing, I think, hangs on the choice for my present discussion.

¹⁴ The awkwardness of my expression here is intended to reproduce the ambiguity of the Greek.

A didactic poem?

has become an expert and knowledgeable (τεχνικός τε καὶ ἐπιστήμων) about the being of a wagon, by having gone through the whole by means of the elements. (Plato, *Theaetetus* 207b9–c4)

It is not here necessarily implied, I think, that Hesiod could indeed ‘go through the being (οὐσία) of a wagon by means of these hundred timbers’,¹⁵ despite the more detailed knowledge of these matters on show earlier in the *Works and Days*,¹⁶ but Socrates’ choice of example raises interesting questions about ‘didactic poetry’, whatever light it also sheds upon Platonic epistemology.

Hesiod’s context is the need for forethought and preparation.¹⁷ It is no good turning your mind to acquiring or constructing a wagon when the ploughing season is already upon you; someone who does that, ‘rich [only] in thoughts’, does not (even?) know that a hundred timbers are necessary for a wagon, and that – if you do not already have a wagon – you have to have gathered and stored those timbers beforehand, ready for the day. We can only guess what (or what in the previous critical tradition) caused Plato to choose this example from the *Works and Days*, but it is suggestive at many levels. Modern scholars are divided, for example, on whether their ancient forerunners (cf. scholium on 455a) were correct to understand ‘one hundred’ in Hesiod as simply a conventionally large number, just another way of saying ‘many’, or whether the Platonic Socrates’ exactitude is already Hesiodic.¹⁸ If Hesiod is indeed ridiculing someone who does not know that it takes a lot of wood to make a wagon, then we might think that ridicule richly deserved (though presumably, in Platonic terms, such a man would know, ‘in theory’ as we

¹⁵ Pace Koning 2010: 231. Koning’s account of this passage of the *Theaetetus* goes in a rather different direction from that offered here.

¹⁶ Cf. below pp. 48–9.

¹⁷ The need for forethought was to become, unsurprisingly, a leitmotif of subsequent agricultural writing; Hesiod makes the point most dramatically, of course, through the story of Prometheus ‘Forethought’, man’s benefactor. The theme is, however, an ambivalent one, as farming is precisely an activity where all the forethought in the world may not save your farm from the effects of bad weather and disease; hence, as both Hesiod and Xenophon (*Oeconomicus* 5.18–20) make plain, forethought must go hand in hand with pious attention to the gods.

¹⁸ Of the commentators West follows the ancient scholars, Ercolani does not.

might say, what an axle or a wheel is), but even if the target is someone who has no idea of the actual number, even in 'ball-park' terms, of timbers in a wagon, the passage still evokes (even implicitly) different levels of knowledge. It is one thing to know the amount of wood needed, quite another then to be able to put the pieces together. Though Plato has, of course, for his own purposes misrepresented Hesiod, the misrepresentation grows out of a reading of a connected passage of Hesiod, not just a memory of a quotable paroemiac.¹⁹ The influence of the previous verses is important here:

ῥηίδιον γὰρ ἔπος εἰπεῖν· 'βόε δὸς καὶ ἄμαξαν'
ῥηίδιον δ' ἀπανήνασθαι· 'πάρα δ' ἔργα βόεσσιν'.
(Hesiod, *Works and Days* 453–4)

It is easy to say 'Give me a pair of oxen and a wagon'; it is also easy to refuse – 'the oxen have work to do'.

It is easy to make a request and easy to refuse one; making a wagon is *not* easy, even if you happen to know how much wood you need. For his part, Hesiod leaves us in fact in no doubt that he does know how to make a wagon, and the way in which he convinces us of this sheds light upon what was to become an important principle of later didactic poetry.²⁰

The authority of the *Works and Days* resides principally in Hesiod's knowledge, rather than, as in the *Theogony*, in that of the Muses;²¹ at the head of the poem he summons the Muses, not however to give him his song, but rather to sing of Zeus, while he himself 'will tell true things to Perses'.²² This explicit

¹⁹ That it is, however, a quotable gnomic utterance (cf. West on *WD* 218) emphasises the depth of the fool's ignorance.

²⁰ Dio's Alexander observes (2.8), with amused sarcasm, that Hesiod is a major poet for 'shepherds and carpenters and farmers' because (*inter alia*) 'he gives carpenters excellent advice based on experience (μᾶλα ἐμπείρως παραινέει) how big an axle to cut'; for Alexander, then, Hesiod was indeed an expert, but unfortunately in matters beneath the attention of a king.

²¹ Cf., e.g., Haubold 2010. Haubold interestingly constructs a narrative of cultural development out of Hesiod's biographical move from *Theogony* to *Works and Days*. For the apparent exception to the source of Hesiod's knowledge, namely sailing, cf. below pp. 52–4.

²² Hermogenes 393.7–11 Rabe notes that appeals to 'the Muses or Apollo or some other god' are characteristic of poetry, and poets thus seem to speak 'not from

claim of truth is not something which Homer made for his narratives. In the case of the preparation of a wagon, however, we do not have to rely merely upon what we might think of as a generic feature operative through the whole work. The preparations for the winter ploughing, including the gathering of timber and the acquisition of oxen (vv. 436–40), were of course to be made in the autumn, and in the corresponding section of the poem, which immediately precedes the passage we are considering, Hesiod has indeed shown his mastery of the details:

τῆμος ἄδηκτοτάτῃ πέλεται τμηθεῖσα σιδήρῳι 420
 ὕλη, φύλλα δ' ἔραζε χέει πτόρθοιό τε λήγει'
 τῆμος ἄρ' ὕλοτομεῖν μεμνημένος, ὥριον ἔργον.
 ὄλμον μὲν τριπόδην τάμνειν, ὕπερον δὲ τρίπηχυν,
 ἄξονα δ' ἑπταπόδην· μάλα γάρ νύ τοι ἄρμενον οὔτω· 425
 εἰ δέ κεν ὀκταπόδην, ἀπὸ καὶ σφυράν κε τάμοιο.
 τρισπίθαμον δ' ἄψιν τάμνειν δεκαδῶρῳι ἀμάξῃ.
 πόλλ' ἐπικαμπύλα κἄλα· φέρειν δὲ γύην, ὅτ' ἂν εὕρησις,
 εἰς οἶκον, κατ' ὅρος διζήμενος ἢ κατ' ἄρουραν,
 πρίνινον· (Hesiod, *Works and Days* 420–8)

At that time [i.e. autumn] wood which is cut by iron is least bitten by worms, the leaves fall to the ground and cease to shoot. At that time, then, remember to cut wood, a task for that season. Cut a mortar three feet long, and a pestle of three cubits, and an axle seven feet long; these are very appropriate sizes. If your axle is eight feet, you could also make a mallet-head from it. Cut a three-span wheel for a ten-palm wagon. There are many curved timbers: search on the mountain or in the fields and if you find one of holm-oak, bring it home to be a plough-tree.

This passage has greatly puzzled modern scholars who claim to understand wagons and completely baffled those who do not,²³ and it apparently provoked some amused head-scratching in antiquity,²⁴ but it is clear that the very detail of the knowledge,

themselves'; here is another way in which, according to ancient criteria, the *Works and Days* is 'unpoetic'. There is a striking effect when Dio (12.23–4) cites only *WD* 1–8, thus turning the proem into a very different kind of 'appeal' to the Muses.

²³ Richardson–Piggott 1982 is a helpful guide through the maze and the bibliography; see also Beall 2004: 13–14.

²⁴ The Proclan scholia on vv. 423–7a (= fr. 172 Marzillo) report that Plutarch (fr. 62 Sandbach) defended these verses against those who ridiculed Hesiod's *σικρολογία*; one of the passages which Plutarch adduced in support was Plato, *Laws* 5.746e, in which it is said that the lawgiver must not shrink from prescribing that no citizen

what would later be called τὸ ἀκριβές, makes an important contribution to the authority of the poetic voice. By the time we are invited to feel disdain for the fool who does not even know the number of timbers in a wagon, we will have been left in no doubt that there is much else he does not know also. Hesiod does not, of course, give us full instructions for making a wagon, any more than he gives us full instructions for anything 'technical', but this will not affect our view as to whether he is, as the Platonic Socrates puts it, τεχνικός τε καὶ ἐπιστήμων about wagons. Such a man, according to Socrates, has 'gone through the whole by means of the elements' (*Tht.* 207c3–4); Hesiod allows us to understand that he is indeed such a man, and – this is at least as important – the reason why he does not give us a full account is that this is not the task he has set himself.²⁵ To convince Perses of the need for constant work (cf. v. 382) it is not necessary to give a complete calendar for every task or a complete account of any individual task – enough that Perses gets the idea, the flavour, of what is required. The information

should be allowed to possess any utensil (σκεῦος) of inappropriate size, 'out of fear of a reputation for σμικρολογία'. The mockery of Hesiod was presumably connected to notions of the avoidance of the ταπεινόν in high poetry: the bT-scholia on *Iliad* 24.266 observe that, in applying multiple epithets to Priam's wagon (ἄμαξα), Homer 'ornamented an everyday and common thing with a variety (ποικιλία) of poetic terms', and cf. in general Nünlist 2009: 219 n. 92, 292 n. 41, 296. Some aspects of Virgil's version of this passage (*Georgics* 1.160–75) might be thought to be a similar attempt to 'poeticise' the everyday above the level of banality, and the transitional verses which follow that passage, *possum multa tibi ueterum praecepta referre, | ni refugis tenuisque piget cognoscere curas*, seem surprisingly like the Platonic passage which Plutarch had adduced; it would hardly surprise, of course, if Virgil's rewriting of Hesiod also reflected scholarly discussion of his model.

²⁵ Cf. West 1978a: 52, '[Hesiod] assumes a general understanding of the purpose and method of ploughing, reaping, threshing, and so forth ...' Mynors 1990: 37 says of Virgil's 'plough passage' (see n. 24 above) that it is not 'the poet's purpose to tell us how a plough is made: he wants to maintain his power over us by the suggestion that he knows everything ...' Such a view is more helpful than that of Wilkinson 1969: 58, 'Hesiod's lines on making a plough ... are not didactic, in the sense that they do not tell you *how* [Wilkinson's italics] to do it'; they do in fact tell you *part* of how to do it. It is a pity that, in the course of an important discussion of Virgil's imitation of Hesiod here, Farrell (1991: 70–7) falls back on rather too easy dichotomies (Hesiod's 'delightful ramble' versus Virgil's 'usual tight, meticulous order'); there is in fact much more pattern and meaningful sequence in Hesiod than Farrell allows. Hesiod's 'leisurely' (Farrell 1991: 71) description of autumn as the right time to cut wood (vv. 414–22) in fact puts the season within the orderly pattern of the movement of the stars, a central theme of the poem, and *explains* (vv. 421–2) why autumn is the right time.

that Hesiod does give us, partial and exemplary as it is,²⁶ shows us what will be required of us, without attempting the inevitably foolish undertaking of a ‘comprehensive’ account. It should never occur to us to doubt that, if challenged, Hesiod could indeed give such an account. The Proclan scholia on vv. 427–34 (fr. 173 Marzillo) observe that in that passage (the preparation of a plough) ‘Hesiod is teaching us about the construction of a plough, and one must know what a share is, what a stock, what a plough-tree, what a pole, and what a plough-tail, which are the parts of a plough’; the scholia then indeed go through the parts and explain them, but Hesiod of course did not: his knowing (in both senses), almost casual, use of the ‘technical terms’ for the parts was enough to establish his mastery of the subject.²⁷

²⁶ For this idea cf. further Fantuzzi–Hunter 2004: 234; a related approach is that of Nelson 1998: 49–58, for whom Hesiod’s aim is ‘descriptive’, i.e. he wants to let us know what it is like to be a farmer, and ‘the didactic stance’ serves the descriptive ends by allowing us to see the world as farmers see it. The argument about the ‘extendability’ of terms in ‘wise’ utterances (cf. above pp. 2–3) is obviously related to the argument being made here, though it is not co-extensive with it.

Lightfoot forthcoming rightly notes that the question of ‘comprehensiveness’ is different, and couched in different rhetoric, for different didactic poets; the situation for Hesiod seems, however, clear. West 1978a: 53 rightly notes that ‘the earlier sections of the Farmer’s Year ... are considerably longer and more detailed than the later ones’ and that ‘this is a common pattern when a poet has to deal with a succession of items in a series’; in the case of ‘didactic’ poetry, however, this pattern has a particular rhetorical force. Hunt 1981: 30–1 claims that ‘the poet’s maxims would be of little value to a farmer’ and sees in ‘Hesiod’s refusal to provide Perses any real help’ a ‘consistent feature of the poem’s ironic design’; Hunt’s analogy with the mode of Roman satire (p. 34) is in some ways helpful and suggestive – Horace, *Satires* 2.2, for example, can recall Hesiod in certain passages – but there is simply too much in the *Works and Days* which does not fit Hunt’s account of the poem. Nisbet 2004 takes Hunt’s point further, though apparently unaware of Hunt’s article: he too compares the mode of Roman satire and sees Hesiod as an ‘unreliable narrator’ and a ridiculously incompetent ‘teacher’ whose persona is ‘self-deflating’.

²⁷ Of the plough-parts mentioned by the scholia, the ὄνις (share) does not in fact appear in the Hesiodic text (or indeed in any passage of archaic or classical poetry). The scholia may draw on one of a number of lexicographic sources on the parts of a plough (cf. Gow 1914: 262–5), which perhaps go back to Eratosthenes’ Ἀρχιτεκτονικός, without realising that the knowledge of the ὄνις is not necessary for understanding Hesiod. Nevertheless, it is of interest that Plutarch discussed this word at *QC* 4.670a, and cf. also *Romulus* 11.2; there must be a good chance, at least, that rather more of this scholium goes back to Plutarch than just the information explicitly ascribed to him at the end (fr. 64 Sandbach) about the kind of wood used for ploughs in Boeotia. On Hesiod’s plough passage see, with earlier bibliography, Rechenauer 1997.

If some of this analysis is along the right lines, then there are obvious implications for the relationship between the *Works and Days* and later 'didactic' poetry where, in at least one influential account, an important hallmark is a totalizing 'systematisation' of a particular body of (often arcane) knowledge drawn from written prose sources,²⁸ though even here, of course, there are important differences from poet to poet, between, say, Aratus and Nicander.²⁹ Whatever has changed between Hesiod and the later period, and however much the ancient and modern sense of Hesiod as a 'didactic poet' is a retrojection from a poetic form that really only took shape in the late classical and Hellenistic periods, there is no doubt that later systematisation is, *inter alia*, a systematisation and generalisation of Hesiodic practice itself. It is, of course, important to stress that the *Works and Days* presents a very variegated appearance in this regard; some parts of the 'farmer's year' seem markedly less 'didactic' than others. The relatively lengthy account of winter (vv. 493–563), for example, itself perhaps mimetic of how long winter seems to a farmer, might be thought predominantly 'descriptive' rather than didactic – surely everyone knows that the wind is bitterly cold then... – even if one wanted to set the ornamented description of the 'soft-skinned young girl' who is not reached by the wind (vv. 519–23) in the context of what else the poem has to say about women;³⁰ even the advice on what to wear (vv. 536–58) allows Hesiod to be by his standards relatively expansive:

κεφαλῇφι δ' ὕπερθεν
 πῖλον ἔχειν ἀσκητόν, ἵν' οὐατα μὴ καταδεύῃ.
 ψυχρὴ γάρ τ' ἡὼς πέλεται Βορέας πεσόντος
 ἡῷος δ' ἐπὶ γαῖαν ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος
 ἀῆρ πυροφόροις τέταται μακάρων ἐπὶ ἔργοις,
 ὅς τε ἀρυσάμενος ποταμῶν ἀπὸ αἰναόντων,

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²⁸ This is an important theme of Effe 1977.

²⁹ These differences too often (understandably) disappear in generalisations concerning 'didactic poetry'. One area which would repay study is the different approach of Aratus and Nicander to the Hesiodic, and very 'didactic', theme of πρόνοια (cf. n. 17 above): it might well be thought that we are simply not capable of the kind of πρόνοια which Nicander seems to demand in the *Theriaca*.

³⁰ Cf., e.g., Hamilton 1989: 72, 82.

A didactic poem?

ὕψου ὑπὲρ γαίης ἀρθεῖς ἀνέμοιο θυέλλῃ,
ἄλλοτε μὲν θ' ὕει ποτὶ ἔσπερον, ἄλλοτ' ἄησιν
πυκνὰ Θρηκίου Βορέω νέφεα κλονέοντος.
τὸν φθάμενος ἔργον τελέσας οἴκονδε νέεσθαι,
μή ποτέ σ' οὐρανόθεν σκοτόεν νέφος ἀμφικαλύψει, 555
χρῶτα δὲ μυδαλέον θήῃ κατὰ θ' εἴματα δεύσει·
ἄλλ' ὑπαλεύασθαι·

(Hesiod, *Works and Days* 545–57)

On your head wear a close felt cap, so that your ears do not get wet. The dawn is cold when Boreas comes down; at dawn a mist from the starry sky stretches over the earth on the wheat-bearing fields of the blessed. This mist is drawn up from ever-flowing rivers and is raised up high above the earth by a blast of wind, and sometimes it rains towards evening, and sometimes the wind blows, as Thracian Boreas routs the thick clouds. Finish your work before he comes and get home, lest a shadowed cloud from heaven stand over you and soak your skin and drench your clothes. Avoid this.

Much of the didactic poetry of the Hellenistic and Roman periods imitated Hesiod creatively in this stylistic ποικιλία, as in so many features:³¹ any balance between ‘didactic’ and ‘poetic’ features is not to be seen in terms of compensation of one by the other. Moreover, as this last passage of the *Works and Days* shows, the distinction between the two is often at best problematic, at worst meaningless. Upon the (excellent) advice that one should avoid getting wet in winter, Hesiod hangs a description of the origin of dawn mist, which is rightly assigned by the Proclan scholia on vv. 548–53 to the realm of natural science (φυσικῶς);³² Hesiod’s knowledge of the workings of nature here reinforces the urgency and authority of the advice in which that knowledge is embedded.

One famous passage of the *Works and Days* has some claim to be the exception which establishes the nature of Hesiodic didacticism. In one of the most discussed passages of the *Works and Days* Hesiod turns his attention to sailing:³³

³¹ Cf., e.g., Jacques 2007: lxxx.

³² Sandbach’s suggestion that the bulk of these scholia go back to Plutarch (fr. 75 Sandbach) is very attractive.

³³ There are serious questions about the structure of the whole passage on sailing (vv. 618–94), but they do not affect the importance of vv. 646–52 for Hesiod’s self-presentation and the subsequent tradition; many scholars believe that our text

The poet's knowledge

εὐτ' ἂν ἐπ' ἐμπορίην τρέψας ἀεσίφρονα θυμόν
 βούλῃαι χρέα τε προφυγεῖν καὶ λιμόν ἄτερπέα,
 δείξω δὴ τοι μέτρα πολυφλοίσβοιο θαλάσσης,
 οὔτε τι ναυτιλῆς σεσοφισμένος οὔτε τι νηῶν.
 οὐ γάρ πώ ποτε νηὶ γ' ἐπέπλων εὐρέα πόντον,
 εἰ μὴ ἐς Εὐβοίαν ἐξ Αὐλίδος, ἧ ποτ' Ἀχαιοὶ
 μείναντες χειμῶνα πολὺν σὺν λαὸν ἀγειραν
 Ἑλλάδος ἐξ ἱερῆς Τροίην ἐς καλλιγύναικα.
 ἔνθα δ' ἐγὼν ἐπ' ἀεθλα δαΐφρονος Ἀμφιδάμαντος
 Χαλκίδα τ' εἰσεπέρησα· τὰ δὲ προπεφραδμένα πολλὰ
 ἄθλ' ἔθεσαν παῖδες μεγάλητορος· ἔνθα μέ φημι
 ὕμνωι νικήσαντα φέρειν τρίποδ' ὠτῶντα.
 τὸν μὲν ἐγὼ Μούσης Ἑλικωνιάδεσσ' ἀνέθηκα,
 ἔνθα με τὸ πρῶτον λιγυρῆς ἐπέβησαν ἀοιδῆς.
 τόσσον τοι νηῶν γε πεπείρημαι πολυγόμφων·
 ἀλλὰ καὶ ὥς ἔρέω Ζηνὸς νόον αἰγιόχοιο·
 Μοῦσαι γάρ μ' ἐδίδαξαν ἀθέσφατον ὕμνον αἰδεῖν.
 (Hesiod, *Works and Days* 646–62)

Whenever you turn your foolish spirit to trade and wish to escape debts and the misery of hunger, I shall show you the measures of the tumultuous sea, being without special knowledge of sailing or ships. For I have never sailed the wide sea in a ship, except to Euboea from Aulis, where once the Achaeans waited out a storm and gathered a large army for the expedition from holy Hellas against Troy of the beautiful women. There I crossed over to Chalcis for the games of brave Amphidamas; his sons had declared many prizes in honour of the great-hearted man. I declare that there I was victorious in song and won a tripod with handles, which I dedicated to the Heliconian Muses, where they had first set me on the path of clear song. This is the limit of my experience of ships of many bolts. Even so, however, I will tell you the mind of aegis-bearing Zeus, for the Muses taught me to sing boundless song.

Here Hesiod claims both a lack of σοφία, that quality which has been on show earlier in the poem, in nautical matters, but also an ability to expound these matters because of the Muses' teaching. In describing what he can say as 'the mind of aegis-bearing Zeus' (v. 661), Hesiod uses a phrase not only appropriate to 'the seasonal cycle of wind and weather, which governs

presents material from more than one version (cf. West 1978a: 55 n. 1, Ercolani 2010: 47–8, 367–8); West 1978a: 55 sees the difficulties rather as arising from Hesiod's intrusion of autobiographical material into an otherwise straightforward structure. On Plutarch's excision of this passage cf. below pp. 186–7. It is standardly assumed that this passage lies behind Solon fr. 13.43–6 West.

seafaring' (West ad loc.), but also to subject matter which no mortal could describe without the inspired instruction of the Muses. This is subject matter quite different from the kind of wood suitable for a plough.³⁴ We are to have confidence in Hesiod's inspiration because he won a tripod at Chalcis which he subsequently dedicated to the Muses on Helicon, where – so we are to understand – we could see it if we so wished, just as it (or something like it) was indeed on show for tourists there in later antiquity (Pausanias 9.31.3). The tripod is a visible sign of the Muses' gifts to the poet, and Hesiod needs to emphasise his close relationship to them exactly when he turns to a subject on which he has no personal experience. These verses clearly also take us back to the instruction of Hesiod by the Muses at the opening of the *Theogony*, thus creating an analogy between the subject-matter of the earlier poem and that of seafaring.³⁵ That the Hesiod of the *Theogony* was a shepherd until the Muses initiated him in song shows just how far he was, before their intervention, from knowing anything about 'what was to come and had been before' and the 'race of the blessed immortals', the subjects which the Muses bid him sing;³⁶ seafaring falls into the same, or at least a very similar, category.

Hesiod's disavowal of practical experience of seafaring, alongside his confident claim to be able to sing about it, was to have a very rich *Nachleben* and some claim to be a foundational declaration for later didactic poetry.³⁷ To what extent

³⁴ On Hesiod's different stances according to the subject matter to be conveyed cf. Griffith 1983: 60–2.

³⁵ On Hesiod's use of the *Theogony* in *WD* more generally cf., e.g., Most 1993.

³⁶ Lucian uses this for satirical purposes in his *Hesiod*, in which he makes the poet defend himself against the accusation of not foretelling the future as he had undertaken to do in the *Theogony*. According to Lucian's Hesiod, the fault lies with the Muses who were responsible for what he sang, whereas he himself could only be justly accused in areas of his own personal knowledge, namely the various tasks of the shepherd. It is tempting to see behind this a recognised distinction between the authoritative voice of the *Theogony* and that of the *WD*, and there is I think some element of that, but there is also very little ποιμενικά in *WD*.

³⁷ One very early set of echoes has been sought in Ibycus' famous poem to Polycrates (*PMG* 282), cf. Barron 1969: 134, Steiner 2005, Wilkinson 2013: 71–3. There is perhaps some chance that this passage also played an important role in the later denial of accurate knowledge to poets, what we might call the 'anti-didactic' view

we should read such a passage as a self-conscious positioning against an epic tradition, or even a programmatic declaration of a non-epic poetics, is an area where difference of opinion seems inevitable, even setting to one side questions of the relative chronology of early hexameter poems.³⁸ Be that as it may, the verses do clearly evoke a contrast between Hesiod's own poetic 'undertaking' and the Greek expedition to Troy which was celebrated in epic, and most notably Homeric, verse, and this contrast was important, at the very least, in establishing for later ages a sense of difference within poetic traditions. One of the most striking witnesses to this sense of difference is Callimachus' evocation of this passage of Hesiod in a famous fragment of the *Aitia* in which he recounts a meeting in Egypt with Theogenes, a traveller from the small Aegean island of Ikos, when both attended a celebration of a traditional Athenian festival held by an Athenian expatriate named Pollis (fr. 178 Pf. = 89 Massimilla).³⁹ Just as Pollis keeps traditions alive by repetitive celebration, so Callimachus' catalogue-style verse records and preserves the cultic traditions of the whole Greek world; Hesiod and a sense of the Hesiodic tradition are fundamental to this project.⁴⁰ The poet asks Theogenes to tell him 'all that his heart longs to learn' about (fairly obscure) Ikian traditions, and apparently (the text is unfortunately very broken) puts his ignorance down to the fact that he has never been to the area; that he is in fact all but a non-sailor seems suggested by Theogenes' answer:

of poetry. Strabo (7.3.6) reports that, in his work *On the Catalogue of Ships*, Apollodorus of Athens (*FGrHist* 244 F157) cited with approval the view of Eratosthenes that Homer and the early poets were ignorant of places far from Greece and 'had no experience of long journeys and of seafaring (τὸ ναυτιλλεσθαι)'; might Eratosthenes have cited *WD* 646–53 in support of his claim?

³⁸ Rosen 1990 offers what we may term a 'strong' reading in which I am unable to follow him the whole way; the seed for both 'weak' and 'strong' versions of such a reading seems to have been sown by Nagy 1982: 66 (~ Nagy 1990b: 78). Subsequent criticism has elaborated Rosen's discussion (cf., e.g., Steiner 2005, Tsagalis 2009: 151–7), but for rather different approaches to this passage see Clay 2003: 175–82, and Scodel 2012b, who elaborates some of the points made by Graziosi 2002: 170–1.

³⁹ On this fragment as a whole see Fantuzzi–Hunter 2004: 76–83, Harder 2012: 2.953–87.

⁴⁰ Cf. Fantuzzi–Hunter 2004: 51–60.

A didactic poem?

τρισμάκαρ, ἧ παύρων ὀλβιὸς ἔσσι μέτα,
ναυτιλίας εἰ νῆιν ἔχεις βίον· ἄλλ' ἐμός σιῶν
κύμασιν αἰθυίης μᾶλλον ἔσωικίσατο

(Callimachus fr. 178.32–4 Pf.

(= 89.32–4 Massimilla))

Thrice-lucky – happy indeed as few others – are you, if your life is ignorant of sailing. My days have been more settled in the waves than those of a gull...

Callimachus, like Hesiod, is ‘instructed by the Muses’, but Theogenes’ response rather evokes the words of Odysseus on his storm-threatened raft:⁴¹

τρὶς μάκαρες Δαναοὶ καὶ τετράκις, οἳ τότε δλοντο
Τροίῃ ἐν εὐρείῃ (Homer, *Odyssey* 5.306–7)

Thrice and four-times lucky those Danaans who perished then in broad Troy...

In a move imitating the cut-and-thrust of sympotic badinage, Theogenes answers the poet’s ‘Hesiodic’ pose with a ‘Homeric’ one, thus creating a contrast between an epic life of adventure and the quiet life of ‘Hesiodic’ research; Callimachus has thus picked up the sense of difference embodied in Hesiod’s verses about sailing, but – as far as what survives of the text allows us to see – his usual self-deprecatory irony prevents any claim analogous to Hesiod’s of victory in a poetic contest.

The didactic poem of Dionysius Periegetes offers another extended reworking and variation of the Hesiodic (and Callimachean) voice and persona, but one which not only uses the Hesiodic disavowal of seafaring as a strong marker of generic affiliation, but also brings Hesiod ‘up to date’ by suggesting that the Muses embody education and the scholastic learning on which Dionysius’ poem, no less than Callimachus’ *Aitia*, is based:⁴²

ῥεῖα δέ τοι κἄν τήνδε καταγράψαιμι θάλασσαν,
οὐ μὲν ἰδὼν ἀπάνευθε πόρους, οὐ νηὶ περήσας·
οὐ γάρ μοι βίος ἐστὶ μελαινάων ἐπὶ νηῶν,
οὐδέ μοι ἐμπορίη πατρώϊος, οὐδ’ ἐπὶ Γάγγην
ἔρχομαι, οἷά περ ἄλλοι, Ἑρυθραίου διὰ πόντου,

710

⁴¹ Noted also by Harder 2012: 2.986.

⁴² Cf. Hunter 2004: 228–9.

The poet's knowledge

ψυχῆς οὐκ ἀλέγοντες, ἴν' ἄσπετον ὄλβον ἔλονται,
 οὐδὲ μὲν Ὑρκανίοις ἐπιμίσσομαι, οὐδ' ἔρεϊνῶ
 Καυκασίας κνημίδας Ἑρυθραίων Ἀριηνῶν
 ἀλλὰ με Μουσῶν φορέει νόος, αἵτε δύνανται
 νόσφιν ἀλημοσύνης πολλὴν ἄλα μετρήσασθαι
 οὐρεά τ' ἠπειρόν τε καὶ αἰθερίων ὁδὸν ἄστρον.
 (Dionysius Periegetes 707–17)

715

Easily could I describe this sea to you,⁴³ never having seen its routes from afar, nor travelled them in a ship. My life is not on black ships, nor is trade my inherited activity; I do not go to the Ganges, as others do, passing through the Red Sea and putting their lives at risk to win boundless wealth. I do not mingle with the Hyrcanians, nor search for the Caucasian ridges of the Arieni of the Red Sea. Rather, I am transported by the mind of the Muses, who without aimless wandering can measure the vast sea and the mountains and the continent and the path of the stars through the air.

Unlike Hesiod, however, Dionysius, whose poem very obviously lacks the variety of subject-matter of Hesiod's, does not really draw important distinctions within the sources of his information, or rather within the sources of authority on which his poetic voice draws. In this, Dionysius follows what had become the mainstream. In the *Phainomena*, for example, Aratus asks the Muses to 'guide' (τεκμήρατε) all his song (v. 17), and no other source of authority is named.⁴⁴ So too, Aratus uses negative attitudes towards seafaring to locate his poem within a 'Hesiodic' tradition, most notably in the so-called 'second prologue', which is concerned with the importance of learning and watching out for weather-signs:

μέλοι δέ τοι, εἴ ποτε νηϊ
 πιστεύεις, εὐρεῖν ὅσα που κεχρημένα κεῖται
 σήματα χειμερίοις ἀνέμοις ἢ λαίλαπι πόντου.
 μόχθος μὲν τ' ὀλίγος, τὸ δὲ μυρίον αὐτίκ' ὄνειαρ
 γίνετ' ἐπιπροσύνης αἰεὶ πεφυλαγμένῳ ἀνδρὶ.
 αὐτὸς μὲν τὰ πρῶτα σάωτερος, εὖ δὲ καὶ ἄλλον
 παρειπὼν ὤνησεν, ὅτ' ἐγγύθεν ὥρορε χειμῶν.
 (Aratus, *Phainomena* 758–64)

760

⁴³ For the motif of the poet's 'ease' cf. below pp. 96–7.

⁴⁴ The framing pattern of the prologue, 'beginning from Zeus' ~ 'the Muses', is not unlike that of the proem of Apollonius' *Argonautica*, 'beginning from Apollo' ~ 'the Muses'.

A didactic poem?

If ever you trust in a ship, take pains to discover all the signs provided for stormy winds or a squall at sea. The labour is small, but the immediate benefit of watchfulness enormous to the man who is always on his guard.⁴⁵ In the first place, he himself is safer, and with good advice he can benefit another when a storm threatens near at hand.

‘If ever you trust in a ship’ suggests more than a little of Hesiod’s wariness about the sea, despite the fact that sailors are, for Aratus, an important part of the proclaimed audience (cf. vv. 42, 406–30 etc.). For Hesiod, if you have to sail, then you must do it at the right time (ὥραῖος . . . πλόος, v. 665), and Aratus offers a set of refinements of Hesiod’s indication of what that time is (‘for fifty days after the summer solstice’, v. 663).⁴⁶ Sailing, in fact, seems to be one of the subjects which notably brings out ‘the Hesiodic’ in Aratus, and this is a marker of how it had become a touchstone of the Hesiodic tradition. Night’s pity for the πόνος of sailors caught by a storm re-uses Hesiodic ideas in a new way (*Phainomena* 408–19), and in high summer it is the etesian winds which make sailing difficult:

τῆμος καὶ κελάδοντες ἐτησίαι εὐρέϊ πόντῳ
ἄθροοι ἐμπίπτουσιν, ὁ δὲ πλόος οὐκέτι κώπαις
ῥοῖος· εὐρεῖται μοι ἄρεσκοιεν τότε νῆες,
εἰς ἄνεμον δέ τε πηδᾶ κυβερνητῆρες ἔχουσιν.
(Aratus, *Phainomena* 152–5)

At this time the roaring etesians riot across the broad sea; that is no time to travel under oars. Then I would want broad ships, and let the steersmen hold their steering-oars into the wind.

τῆμος and πλόος . . . ῥοῖος (cf. *WD* 630, 665) catch elements of the Hesiodic manner taken from the section on sailing, as also do the concern with the size of ships (cf. *WD* 643) and the injunction expressed as a personal preference of the poet (cf. *WD* 682–3).

⁴⁵ Virgil echoed v. 761 in the proem of *Georgics* 4 (*in tenui labor, at tenuis non gloria*), both giving a newly enriched sense to a Greek thought (as mimetic art aimed to do), and also renewing his acknowledgement of the Aratean heritage with which Book 1 had begun (above pp. 21–3).

⁴⁶ On the difficulties of this verse cf. West ad loc.

Poetry and prose

Much of importance about the nature of ‘didactic poetry’ can be gleaned from a comparison of the *Works and Days* with the extant technical treatises (*technai*) on various subjects which survive from the fourth century BC, notably those of Xenophon. I have set out some of the important considerations in an earlier discussion,⁴⁷ but the explicit role of Hesiod in this tradition calls for further comment.

In the closing chapters of his treatise on hunting,⁴⁸ Xenophon adopts a Hesiodic voice in praise of *aretê* (here translated as ‘virtue’) and the labours necessary to attain her (*Cyn.* 12.18–22). Virtue is rather like the Hesiodic Dike (or Zeus’ countless watchers, *WD* 249–55), always watching us and our actions, but not in turn seen by us:

She is present everywhere because she is immortal and she honours those who behave well towards her (οἱ ἀγαθοί), and she dishonours those who do not (οἱ κακοί).⁴⁹ If men knew that she was watching them, they would be keen for the toils and training by which, though with difficulty, she can be captured (ἄλίσκεται) and they would achieve her. (Xenophon, *On Hunting* 12.21⁵⁰)

This passage is an encomium not just of virtue, but also of honourable toil,⁵¹ and it would be all but impossible for an

⁴⁷ Cf. Hunter 2008a: 169–75 and (more briefly) Fantuzzi–Hunter 2004: 234; on the relationship between ‘didactic’ poetry and prose cf. also Hutchinson 2009.

⁴⁸ These chapters played an important role in earlier arguments about the authenticity of the treatise, cf. Gray 1985.

⁴⁹ The language of ‘the good’ returns powerfully at the very end of the treatise (13.17–18), cf. below pp. 61–2.

⁵⁰ A light sexual resonance hovers over the language here, triggered by the comparison immediately before (12.20) of Virtue to an *erômenos* in whose presence the lover will do nothing shameful. Note also 12.18, ‘that all men love (ἐρῶσι) Virtue...’, language which almost equates virtue and hunting, cf. 12.10 ‘some say one must not love hunting’, 13.18 ‘all men who have loved hunting’. Delebecque refers ἄλίσκεται in 12.21 to the language of hunting rather than to that of erotic pursuit, but this may remind us of just how close are the language, mythology and iconography of love (‘the pursuit’) and hunting. In *Epigram* 31 Pf. Callimachus compares his attitude to *eros* to that of a hunter who will endure all kinds of hardship in pursuit of the quarry, but loses all interest once the prey is caught – it is the hunt that matters; this notably elite and elitist attitude (cf. Hor. *Sat.* 1.2.101–10, with Hunter 2006a: 109–14) picks up the same aristocratic attitude to the hunt that we find, for example, in Xenophon’s treatise.

⁵¹ On Xenophon’s concept of (aristocratic) toil cf. Johnstone 1994.

educated Greek of Xenophon's time to avoid recalling *Works and Days* 286–92 in such a context. Nevertheless, Xenophon is here picking out more than one strand from the *Works and Days*, as what he wishes to emphasise is the value for their city of those trained young in hunting, and hence in the pursuit of virtue, in times of difficulty: it is from the ranks of hunters that good soldiers and generals come (12.8). Men of old realised that hunting made young men 'self-controlled and just, because they were educated in what was true' (12.7); such men 'would not allow their city to be wronged nor their land to suffer damage' (12.9). Here then the Hesiodic link between the practice of 'justice', which we have already seen to have been influential on Xenophon's account here of *aretê*, and the flourishing of a city and land (*WD* 225–37), is appropriated for a different mode of using the land, namely hunting rather than agriculture. The toil that brings virtue, in this case learning and practising the art of hunting, also saves cities (12.15), as Hesiod almost suggested that it could. Hunting has here taken the place of the ἔργα to which Hesiod insistently invites Perses; *On Hunting* thus offers a 'Hesiodic' linking of 'technical' information on an important subject to a moral message, or rather, as does Hesiod, emphasises how that information is itself integral to a moral vision. Just as in Hesiod the practice of justice will bring mortals as close as is possible to the condition of the Golden Age (*WD* 116–19 ~ 225–37) and of the demigod heroes whose existence after death resembles the Golden Age (*WD* 116–18 ~ 170–3), so the toil of hunting and the *aretê* which follows it bring us as close as possible to the legendary pupils of Cheiron – Melanion, Nestor, Odysseus, Peleus, Achilles etc. – who all learned their *aretê* (1.5) through training in hunting (*Cyn.* 1, 12.18). Like these heroes, young men can become 'dear to the gods' through hunting (13.17, cf. 1.2–3 on the legendary heroes), and thus 'good to their parents and their whole city and to each and every one of their fellow-citizens and friends' (13.17); as this sentence makes clear, Xenophon's world is one of competing, often democratic, cities, whereas the world of the legendary heroes was one of kings and the

war with Troy (1.17), but otherwise the situations are directly comparable.⁵²

As in Hesiod, moreover, there is another kind of man, ‘the bad’, to whom ‘the good’ are opposed. In Hesiod those who practise *hubris* and ‘rash deeds’ (σχετλια ἔργα) bring destruction, often in the form of famine or disease, upon their cities and armies (*WD* 238–47), for Zeus and Dike are watching them. In chapter 12 Xenophon introduces people who claim that the pursuit of hunting leads to neglect of domestic affairs (τὰ οἰκεῖα). Such people, Xenophon retorts, are driven by envy (φθόνος) and bring destruction upon themselves by their κακία (12.12), which is manifested in the pursuit of pleasures and a lifestyle which heeds neither laws nor good advice (12.16); the results of their κακά ἔργα are ‘diseases and losses and death for themselves, their children and their friends’ (12.13). The Hesiodic pattern is here once again pressed into service. So too, in chapter 13 the public service offered by hunters is contrasted with the πλεονεξία of those who (like Perses?) seek to defraud both private individuals, including friends, and the state, men whose physical unfitness makes them useless in time of war (13.11).⁵³ However many similar texts lie between them, Hesiod’s preaching against κακά κερδαίνειν and against ἄρπαξ (*WD* 320–6, 352–6) is again not far away from Xenophon’s rhetoric. For Xenophon, such harmful individuals are characterised by shameless boldness (μετὰ αἰσχροῦ θράσους), malice (κακοήθεια) and avarice (αἰσχροκέρδεια) (13.15–16). We may well think again of Hesiod’s warnings:

εἰ γάρ τις καὶ χερσὶ βίηι μέγαν ὄλβον ἔλθῃται,
ἢ ὁ γ’ ἀπὸ γλώσσης λήισσεται, οἷά τε πολλὰ
γίνεται, εὖτ’ ἂν δὴ κέρδος νόον ἐξαπατήσῃ
ἀνθρώπων, Αἰδῶ δέ τ’ Ἀναιδείῃ κατοπάζῃ,
ῥεῖα δέ μιν μαυροῦσι θεοί, μινύθουσι δὲ οἶκον
ἀνέρι τῷι, παῦρον δέ τ’ ἐπὶ χρόνον ὄλβος ὀπηδεῖ.
(Hesiod, *Works and Days* 321–6)

⁵² On the difficult problem of the text of chapter 1 cf. Delebecque 1970: 39–46.

⁵³ For speculations as to the identity of Xenophon’s target here cf. Delebecque 1970: 28–9.

A didactic poem?

For even if someone carries off great wealth in his hands by force, or grabs it through the power of his tongue, as often happens, when profit deceives men's minds and Shamelessness drives out Shame, the gods easily bring him to naught and waste away that man's house; the wealth attends him for a short time.

At the beginning of chapter 13 Xenophon introduces the 'so-called sophists', most of whom claim to 'lead young men towards *aretê*, but in fact lead them in the opposite direction' (13.1). Like those in chapter 12 who oppose hunting,⁵⁴ the sophists deal in fact in pleasure, rather than *aretê* (13.2). Their writings are characterised by artificial diction and a complete absence of 'improving maxims (γνώμαι ὀρθῶς ἔχουσιν) by which young men may be educated in virtue' (13.3). The former claim may perhaps remind us of the Platonic Socrates' assertion that he will not use 'speech made pretty with expressions and words, dressed-up speech' (κεκαλλιεπημένους γε λόγους . . . ῥήμασί τε καὶ ὀνόμασιν . . . κεκοσμημένους), but rather the whole truth (*Apology* 17b7–c1), and Xenophon too of course wants to imply the truth of what he has said in contradistinction to the 'pretty words' of the sophists, words rooted in seeming and deceiving (13.4, 7–8). It is perhaps unsurprising that the later critical tradition, reflected in Proclus' introduction to the *Works and Days*, made the style of this poem also 'largely free of refinements and added ornaments and metaphors' as befitted the simplicity and naturalness of an ethical discourse (*Proleg.* Ab, p. 2, 3–5 Pertusi),⁵⁵ and one aimed – as also is *On Hunting* – at παιδεία, but the combination of this claim to stylistic simplicity together with an appeal to the presence of γνώμαι, repeated immediately afterwards (13.5, 'it is not words which would educate, but *gnômai*, if they are soundly stated'), might be thought to call Hesiod irresistibly to mind.⁵⁶ Xenophon is seeking to

⁵⁴ Delebecque 1970: 27–8, however, takes the opponents of hunting to be largely the same as the sophists of chapter 13. No doubt there was overlap (it is easy enough to imagine *epideixeis* against the idleness of hunting), but the nature of the criticism of hunting as stated in 12.10 suggests a rather different group of critics.

⁵⁵ On ancient assessments of Hesiod's style cf. below Chapter 6.

⁵⁶ Gray 1985: 159–61 lays emphasis upon the *On Hunting* as a *parainesis*, which both looks back to the *Works and Days* and forward to Isocrates' parainetic works (cf. Section (iv) below).

write what is χρήσιμον (13.7), and this is precisely how the tradition was to see Hesiod also.

Xenophon proclaims himself an ἰδιώτης and appeals to the aristocratic ideal, most familiar to us perhaps from Pindar, of the ‘naturally good’ (13.5); he does not speak σεσοφισμένως, ‘like a cunning sophist’; the unique adverb – only here (I think) in extant classical literature – drips with sarcasm,⁵⁷ and in case we miss the point, Xenophon almost immediately tells us that ‘they play the wise man (σοφίζονται) with their words and not with their thoughts’ (13.6).⁵⁸ At one level Xenophon is ringing some changes on the very familiar contrast of word and deed, of appearance and reality:

I do not want [what I write] to seem useful (χρήσιμα), but rather to be so, so that it may be unrefuted for all time (ἀνεξέλεγκτα . . . εἰς αἰί). (Xenophon, *On Hunting* 13.7)

Commentators have rightly not resisted the temptation to see here an echo of Thucydides’ famous declaration that he wants his work to be ‘a possession for all time rather than a display-piece (ἀγώνισμα) for immediate hearing’ (1.22.4). Xenophon’s χρήσιμα is a variation on the ὠφέλιμα which immediately precedes in Thucydides’ text, and ἀνεξέλεγκτα picks up a word which Thucydides had used in the previous chapter with a rather different connotation (1.21.4). Both Thucydides and Xenophon are contrasting the permanent value of their work, a value grounded in the truth of what they write, with the immediate gratification offered by competing forms of discourse; it is noteworthy that in this same passage Thucydides more than once stresses the labour involved in ascertaining historical truth (1.20.3, 22.3), a labour which, by implication, others are unwilling to endure. There is here in Xenophon, then, a nest of ‘Hesiodic’ motifs, drawn both from Hesiod himself – hard work, truth (cf. *Theog.* 27–8, *WD* 10) – and from descriptions of the

⁵⁷ It is of course tempting to see here a pointed memory of Hesiod’s claim to be οὐ σεσοφισμένος about nautical matters (*WD* 649, above p. 53), but despite the Hesiodic background of the whole passage, the matter must remain open.

⁵⁸ Xenophon reinforces his witty barb by the assonance of ὀνόμασι . . . νοήμασιν, thus in fact mimicking the alleged style of the sophists and showing that, should he wish to do so, he too could write like them.

Works and Days – straightforwardness of language, usefulness of subject-matter, importance of sound *gnômai* etc. The coming of technical treatises in prose and of prose historiography is often – and to some extent rightly – seen as forcing a decisive change both in the use of verse for didactic ends and in attitudes to the didactic verse of the pre-classical age, but the extent to which that new tradition drew upon what was already inherent in the language and ideas of Hesiodic poetry must not be underplayed.⁵⁹

The Xenophontic text in which one might have expected the greatest influence from the *Works and Days* is the *Oeconomicus*, a treatise devoted to the management of a relatively well-to-do agricultural estate, together with the domestic residences associated with it.⁶⁰ After a long introductory conversation on these subjects between Socrates and Critoboulos, a rich follower of Socrates who appears elsewhere in Xenophon (and cf. also Plato, *Apology* 38b7), Socrates reports a conversation he allegedly once had with Ischomachus, a wealthy and successful Athenian;⁶¹ the rest of the treatise is devoted to lessons from Ischomachus, and these have gained a certain modern notoriety, due in large measure to Ischomachus' reports of how he trained his young wife in her domestic duties. Through most of the treatise we sense the *Works and Days* lurking in the background, rather than being explicitly evoked. It is taken for granted that it is the husband's duty to instruct the wife properly (3.11, 7.4–43, cf. *WD* 699); Critoboulos married his wife when she was 'a young child (παῖς νέα) who had seen and heard very little' (3.13), and Ischomachus' bride was fourteen (7.5, cf. *WD* 695–9).⁶² The ideal wife emerges from the treatise as a kind of anti-Pandora, who, while herself not eating very much

⁵⁹ Of particular interest, in view of debates about the 'comprehensiveness' of didactic literature (cf. above p. 50), is the apparent claim (unfortunately, the text is corrupt) in 13.6 that Xenophon's opponents might object that his essay is not written ἐξῆς, 'in sequential order'.

⁶⁰ The introduction of Pomeroy 1994 offers a helpful survey of the various issues the work raises; cf. also Murnaghan 2006: 107–16.

⁶¹ On the possible 'historical' identity of Ischomachus, which has played a central role in discussions of irony in the text, cf., e.g., Pomeroy 1994: 259–64, Pelling 2000: 244–5.

⁶² On these various ages cf. West on *WD* 698, Pomeroy 1994: 268–9.

(7.6, contrast *WD* 704),⁶³ makes sure that the resources of the estate are properly stored away for use, rather than scattered and wasted; it is the wife who, like Pandora opening the jar, is largely responsible for how the resources earned by the husband are spent (3.15), and a failure by either party leads to a reduction of the *oikos*. The good wife is, in an elaboration of an image most familiar from Semonides,⁶⁴ like a queen bee (7.17, 32–4, 38),⁶⁵ and the vision of marriage as a partnership of loving equals, in which one cannot distinguish between man and wife in terms of *μνήμη καὶ ἐπιμέλεια* (7.26), seems worlds removed from Hesiodic society.

Beginning in chapter 16 Xenophon offers his own account of the farming year, and it is hardly surprising that we will occasionally be reminded of Hesiod, particularly through the repeated condemnation of idleness, but what is particularly noteworthy about these sections is the ‘personification’ of the land, which grows and nurtures the crops, takes pleasure (16.3), teaches us what we have to do and so forth. The land is ‘on our side’ in the daily struggle, for example by making very plain what can and cannot be grown:

The earth never reveals anything to deceive us, but straightforwardly makes clear what in truth she can and cannot do. I think that, by making readily known and easy to learn everything she provides, the earth is the best examiner of the bad and the good.⁶⁶ Whereas with regard to other crafts those who avoid work can plead that they are ignorant, all men know that the earth returns good deed with good deed. (Xenophon, *Oeconomicus* 20.13–14)

On one hand, such encomiastic personification looks forward to later treatments of agriculture, most notably perhaps to Virgil’s *Georgics*, whereas, on the other hand, we may be

⁶³ Cf. West on *WD* 373–4; Glazebrook 2009: 244–5 rightly connects Ischomachus’ wife to the Pandora tradition.

⁶⁴ Cf. below pp. 161–2. It is typical of Greek elite literature that language normally applied to animals is applied to Ischomachus’ wife, cf., e.g., 7.10.

⁶⁵ 7.33, the queen bee does not allow the others to be idle, should be compared with *WD* 302–6. We might be reminded again of Hesiod’s drone-women and of Semonides’ portraits when Ischomachus advises his wife ‘not forever to be sitting around like a slave’ (10.10, 10.13).

⁶⁶ The text is uncertain here; in Marchant’s OCT τοὺς κακοὺς τε καὶ ἀργοὺς (taken over by Pomeroy 1994) appears to be a misprint for, rather than an emendation of, the transmitted τοὺς κακοὺς τε κάγαθους.

tempted to trace the ancestry of this ‘romantic’ attitude to the land and to farming back to descriptions of the Golden Age, when the land did indeed produce, but no one had actually to work it (*WD* 117–19, 230–4, Homer, *Odyssey* 9.109–11 etc.). The two attitudes are fundamentally different, but something of the flavour of the Golden Age has here been pressed into service for a new age. We should, I think, connect this re-appropriation of the idea of the kindness of the earth, an idea which Hesiod’s audience can only connect with a world of lost ease, with the fact that Xenophon is describing the activities and responsibilities of the ‘gentleman’ (καλὸς κᾶγαθός) owner of a prosperous land-holding (cf. 6.13–7.2–3), one which is exploited for profit, not the struggling farmers who are implied in Hesiod’s narrative of the agricultural year. Ischomachus’ aim, moreover, is not survival from season to season, but growth and indeed acquisition – with a view to profit – of new land which has been neglected or unsuccessfully worked by previous farmers (20.22–9), a desirable possibility already indeed envisaged by Hesiod (*WD* 341). Ischomachus certainly works hard, but much of that work is the direction of others in their manual tasks; Ischomachus’ success derives from his knowledge, his experience and his παιδεία, not from the unremitting Hesiodic practice of τὸ ἐργάζεσθαι. Ischomachus’ success is based on the relationship of φιλία and humane reciprocity which he has established with the land of his estate; farming for him is an extension of the educated and ‘civilised’ ethics by which he lives his whole life and by which he is constituted both καλὸς κᾶγαθός and ἐλεύθερος (cf. 5.1, 11 etc).⁶⁷ At one level, this is no more than a re-imagining of Hesiodic δίκη, of the link between the way you treat your fellow-farmers and the way the gods treat you, but, from another perspective, Xenophon speaks to a quite changed world. Ischomachus, moreover, spends much time on his duties in the city; Socrates comes upon him sitting in the agora, ‘apparently at leisure’ (7.1) – this is not how Hesiodic farmers are supposed to spend their time. Someone who apparently finds considerable time to

⁶⁷ Cf. Pomeroy 1994: 259.

practise making forensic and other speeches (11.21–3) would find a hostile reception in the *Works and Days*.

One area where there is both continuity and change is the idea of the reciprocity between farmer and the earth, seen, for example, in 20.14 (quoted above) and with particular emphasis in 5.12, where the earth is said to teach justice (δικαιοσύνη) to those able to learn, because ‘she gives the greatest benefits in return to those who look after (θεραπεύειν) her best’.⁶⁸ The agricultural rewards in Hesiod for those who practise straight justice are here a lesson taught by the earth itself. The theme of reciprocity is connected to that of piety: the earth provides the plants, incense and so forth with which the altars and statues of the gods are decorated (5.3) and their festivals celebrated (5.10). Here again Xenophon is drawing out an implication of Hesiodic protreptic, though the ideas were by now much more widely diffused. A character in Menander’s *Georgos* makes ironically comic play with the same related notions:⁶⁹

ἀγρόν εὐσεβέστερον γεωργεῖν οὐδένα
οἶμαι· φέρει γάρ μυρρ[ίνην, κιττόν] καλόν,
ἄνθη τοσαῦτα· τᾶλλα δ’ ἂν τις καταβάλῃ,
ἀπέδωκεν ὀρθῶς καὶ δικαίως, οὐ [πλέον
ἄλλ’ αὐτὸ τὸ μέτρον.

(Menander, *Georgos* 35–9 Sandbach–Arnott)

I don’t think anyone farms a piece of land which is more pious! It produces myrtle, excellent [ivy], flowers galore – but if you sow other plants, it gives you a correct and just return, not [more than it should], but exactly the proper amount.

⁶⁸ The choice in 5.12 between ἡ γῆ θέλουσα (the manuscripts are divided between θέουσα and θέλουσα) and ἡ γῆ θεὸς οὖσα (Stobaeus, adopted by Chantraine, Meyer 1975 and Pomeroy, without discussion) raises interesting questions; θέλουσα is not to be discarded lightly. Although the idea of the earth as a divinity would sit well with the theme of reciprocity and the language of θεραπεύειν in the following sentence, θέλουσα would offer a use of and variation on Hesiod’s picture of the Golden Age in which the earth gave boundless crops αὐτομάτῃ and men gathered these crops (cf. below pp. 231–2) ἐβελήμοι (*WD* 118–19); cf. 4.13 ὅσα ἡ γῆ φύειν θέλει. The idea of reciprocity between earth and farmer (together with the verb θεραπεύειν) also appears, in a list of such reciprocities, in Virtue’s speech to Heracles at *Memorabilia* 2.1.28; whether or not this is an argument for the Xenophontic, rather than Prodician, origin of that passage may be debated.

⁶⁹ The comic verses may in fact explicitly evoke *WD* 349–50, εὐ μὲν μετρεῖσθαι παρά γείτονος, εὐ δ’ ἀποδοῦναι, | αὐτῷ τῷ μέτρῳ κτλ. (so, e.g. Austin’s note on Quintilian’s reference to the passage of Menander at 12.10.25).

Nowhere perhaps is the change from the Hesiodic world more keenly felt than in the encomium of agriculture (γεωργία) and the earth which Socrates delivers to Critoboulos in chapter 5, an extended passage remarkable both for its subject and for its style; here, for example, Socrates pulls out all the stops:

τίς δὲ ἄλλη θεοῖς ἀπαρχὰς πρεπωδεστέρας παρέχει ἢ ἑορτὰς πληρεστέρας ἀποδεικνύει; τίς δὲ οἰκέταις προσφιλεστέρα ἢ γυναικὶ ἡδίων ἢ τέκνοις ποθεινότερα ἢ φίλοις εὐχαριστοτέρα; (Xenophon, *Oeconomicus* 5.10)

What other (art) offers more appropriate first-offerings to the gods or occasions festivals attended by more people? What art is dearer to servants or more pleasant to a wife or more loved by children or more agreeable to friends?

The overall vision of this passage marks *Oeconomicus* 5 as a remarkable document in the history of ancient attitudes to working the land and thus to the development of what we may term ancient ecology.⁷⁰ A leitmotif of the passage is that farming brings not only benefit but also manifold pleasure (5.1–2, 8, 9, 11, cf. 15.4); the *Works and Days* has little to say about the pleasures of farming (or indeed any other kind of pleasure), a theme which was to enjoy a very rich afterlife in western literary depictions of work on the land. For Xenophon, the earth does not of course bear αὐτομάτη, as she did in the Golden Age⁷¹ – one needs to work (ἐργάζεσθαι, 5.2) – but this work, whether the manual toil of slaves and hired-hands or the direct-ing efforts of overseers and owners, is in fact a gift with distinct ‘side-benefits’:

The earth offers her goods in very great abundance (ἄφθονώτατα), but does not allow us to take them while remaining soft (μετὰ μαλακίας); she accustoms men to endure the cold in winter and the heat in summer. She increases the strength of those who work the land (αὐτουργοί) with their hands by making them exercise, whereas she makes men of those who oversee agricultural work by waking them early in the morning and compelling them to move at a keen pace (πορεύεσθαι σφοδρῶς). (Xenophon, *Oeconomicus* 5.4)

⁷⁰ Kronenberg 2009: 46–9, however, sees the passage as ‘reflect[ing] a morality based on material self-interest and in conflict with the teaching of Socrates in chapters 1 and 2’; on the ‘ironic’ interpretation of the treatise see further below.

⁷¹ Cf., however, above n. 68 on the text of 5.12.

Farming on this model, an activity which Socrates describes as ‘the easiest to learn and the most pleasant to carry out’ (6.9), is indeed better than the Golden Age in which men enjoyed the fruits of the earth ἡσυχοί (*WD* 119); whatever nuance the adjective bears in the *Works and Days*, it seems possible that Xenophon’s stress on the fitness conferred through the physical exercise demanded by agriculture at all levels reads the Hesiodic ‘Golden’ idea, if not explicitly *WD* 119, in a negative light. Be that as it may, it is hard to resist the idea that, in noting that farmers have to and do rise early, Xenophon is not just recording an obvious truth, but has in mind a famous passage of the *Works and Days* about the ‘good *eris*’:

ἢ τε καὶ ἀπάλαμόν περ ὁμῶς ἐπὶ ἔργον ἐγείρει·
 εἰς ἕτερον γάρ τις τε ἴδεν ἔργοιο χατίζων
 πλούσιον, ὃς σπεύδει μὲν ἀρόμεναι ἢ δὲ φυτεύειν
 οἶκόν τ’ εὖ θέσθαι· ζηλοῖ δὲ τε γείτονα γείτων
 εἰς ἄφενος σπεύδοντ’ ἀγαθὴ δ’ Ἔρις ἦδε βροτοῖσιν.
 (Hesiod, *Works and Days* 20–4)

[The good Eris] rouses even the hapless man to work. For a man who is not working sees another man who is wealthy, who hurries to plough and plant and arrange his household well. One neighbour envies another who hastens towards wealth; this Strife is good for mortals.

Xenophon has not only taken over the motif of early rising, but he has re-interpreted the repeated σπεύδειν of the Hesiodic passage in terms of physical exercise and the hurried pace of the busy man.⁷²

There is another way also in which the *Oeconomicus* allows us to see how the heritage of the *Works and Days* was re-shaped. In chapter 16 Ischomachus criticises those ‘who have given a full account of farming in the greatest detail, but have little practical experience’ (οἱ λόγῳ μὲν ἀκριβέστατα αὐτὴν διεξιόντες, ἥκιστα δὲ ἐργαζόμενοι, 16.1); according to Ischomachus, such writers make what is actually a simple matter into something very complicated (ποικιλώτατον). In seeking to defend the value of his practical advice against the encroachment of

⁷² The two ideas are combined again at *WD* 461, πρῶτὴ μάλᾳ σπεύδων, of the farmer in the ploughing-season.

‘technical handbooks’,⁷³ Xenophon opposes practical experience to the mere words of theory, in a pointed variation of the familiar contrast between λόγος and ἔργον. Here, as elsewhere,⁷⁴ we see Xenophon caught in a transitional period between traditional modes of teaching and the passing on of knowledge, both technical and ethical, from father to son (as, for example, from Ischomachus’ father to Ischomachus, 20.22–8) and from teacher to pupil, and the rise of ‘handbooks’ (τέχναι) which claimed to give a complete account of ‘how to do X’. The language of detail, of τὸ ἀκριβές, is elsewhere associated with written texts of a ‘modern’ kind,⁷⁵ and the contrast which Xenophon’s Ischomachus draws here is not unlike that which Xenophon draws between himself and the ‘sophists’ in *On Hunting* (cf. above). Some of the language in which Ischomachus expresses himself is, nevertheless, surprising, to such an extent that some modern readers have wondered how seriously all of this is to be taken:⁷⁶

This idea [of buying up neglected land for profit], Socrates, is worth so much and is so easy to learn that, now that you have heard it, you know (ἐπιστάμενος) as much as I do and can go off and teach someone else, if you wish to. (Xenophon, *Oeconomicus* 20.24)

Land-acquisition, agricultural improvement and profit-taking are a simple matter of common sense, particularly as the earth has no secrets from us, but rather openly tells us what it needs to be at its most productive (e.g. 20.13–15); although Ischomachus elsewhere stresses the need for patient learning and education (21.11), the principal lesson of the *Oeconomicus* is not narrowly ‘didactic’, but rather it sets out a style of living one’s life,⁷⁷ a paradigm to be imitated and, as such, exemplary rather than all-encompassing, as also was the *Works and Days*.

⁷³ On the identity of these treatises cf. Pomeroy 1994: 322–3.

⁷⁴ Cf. Hunter 2008a: 170–5. ⁷⁵ Cf. Hunter 2003.

⁷⁶ The ironic reading of the *Oeconomicus* has had some strong recent support, cf., e.g., Danzig 2003, Kronenberg 2009: Part I. To some extent, critical disagreement hinges on the weight that is to be given to apparent inconsistencies in the views expressed by characters, notably Socrates.

⁷⁷ Cf., e.g., Johnstone 1994: 229–40.

Xenophon's account of the agricultural year, even if far from complete, is however certainly more orderly and 'systematic' than Hesiod's, and Critoboulos urges Socrates to 'go through the subject completely' (διεκτεροῖν, 6.1); Xenophon himself, of course, was not immune from the directions in which the recording of factual and technical information was moving. What remains important, however, is – as we have seen – that for Xenophon (and Ischomachus) farming is 'very easy to learn' (15.4, cf. 19.17 farming is itself the best teacher of how to farm, 20.14 quoted above), not an arcane specialism, and what stands in the way of success for the estate-owner is not ignorance of a technical subject, but rather lack of constant vigilance, ἐπιμέλεια (20.4–26); it is the farm-labourers who do the actual manual work, the Hesiodic ἐργάζεσθαι, and here idleness is indeed a danger (20.16–20). The Hesiodic protreptic now operates at two levels: estate-owners must be ever watchful, and one of the things that they have to watch is that their workers are indeed constantly and productively working. The meaning of 'work' has now broadened, but the Hesiodic link between success and moral health is stronger than ever.

From another perspective, Xenophon's transitional position may be seen as giving Hesiod an unexpected voice in a context very far removed from seventh-century Ascræ. If 'didactic poetry' was soon to part company even more decisively with Hesiod,⁷⁸ Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*, for all its striking influence on later agricultural writers, was also to give way to fuller, more comprehensive and more detailed (ἀκριβέστατα) treatises. The *Nachleben* of the *Works and Days* and of Xenophon's 'Works and Days' were in fact to follow curiously similar paths and indeed were often to travel together. Two examples of this shared afterlife will sketch out what became a familiar pattern.

One of the discourses of the Stoic Musonius Rufus (first century AD), surviving to us only in summary, concerns the value of farming as a way of life for the philosopher (fr. 11 Hense). Some of the motifs are very familiar, particularly from Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*: the earth 'gives the fairest and justest return

⁷⁸ Cf. above p. 51.

(ἀμείβεται) to those who take care of it, giving a return many times that which it receives', only someone who was corrupt or soft (θρυπτικός, μαλακός) would object to agriculture as a fitting activity for an ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός and so forth. Both Hesiod and Hesiodic themes are, however, also not far away. Hesiod himself is introduced as an illustration of the fact that working on the land, like being a shepherd, is no bar to becoming θεοφιλής τε καὶ μουσικός. What Musonius most approves of in rural activities which do not make too strenuous physical demands, such precisely as being a shepherd, are that they give one's *psyche* 'plenty of leisure' for intellectual activity; what the Hesiod of the *Works and Days* would actually have made of this we can only imagine, but the poet's meeting with the Muses from the proem of the *Theogony* is here 'read' as an encounter with 'education', that realm of life which did indeed stand under the aegis of the Muses and for which the Muses often functioned metonymically. Even more strenuous labour is, according to Musonius, appropriate for the philosopher, particularly when there are regular rest-breaks (!), and particularly for a young man, if he thus has a chance to work alongside his teacher and listen to the teacher 'discoursing on *sophrosyne* or justice or endurance'; what in fact could be more advantageous than to be with, and under the eye of, one's teacher 'night and day', free of all the 'ills of the city' which get in the way of education and philosophy. Here the familiar teacher-pupil relationship of didactic poetry is adapted to a new vision of Stoic teaching, with Musonius in the role of Hesiod, and the Hesiodic combination of justice and rural labour is appropriated for a new lesson. Far better, as Hesiod too knew, to work diligently in the countryside than to 'sit around in the city', listening to false philosophers. Above all, Musonius stresses that the practice of agriculture makes one self-sufficient, not dependent upon anyone else for one's needs; self-sufficiency was of course a central theme of Stoic and Cynic ethics, but it was also a very Hesiodic theme, given particular emphasis at *Works and Days* 394–404. Hesiodic authority, what is didactic about this 'didactic poem', is constantly being reconfigured throughout antiquity: this is no more surprising than the fact that it was also possible to

make jokes about how out-of-date Hesiod was; Hesiod's potent mixture of the 'moral' and the 'technical' made him a resource which could always be poured into a new bottle.

Something similar happens in *Orations* 23 and 24 of Maximus of Tyre (second century AD) which concern the relative merits of soldiery and farming, judged above all in terms of service to the community. The form of such 'comparative debates' (συγκρίσεις) is very common in rhetorical literature,⁷⁹ but in this case the *Contest of Homer and Hesiod* cannot be far away, and it is virtually invoked in 24.6 when the champion of farming juxtaposes a military 'tag' from the *Iliad* (2.554) to *Works and Days* 383–4, the famous verses on the Pleiads which begin the passage which Hesiod selects as his finest in the *Contest*.⁸⁰ The opposition between a man σοφός in warfare, 'the most disturbing and gloomy of mortal affairs', and one σοφός in farming, whose concern is 'the seasons of the year, the course of the moon, the rising of the stars, the measures of rainfall, and the timing of the winds', is all but explicitly an opposition between Homer and Hesiod. The *Contest*, in what were doubtless its many versions over the centuries, was the authorising text which set peace against war, farming against military service.⁸¹ When in *Oration* 23, the proponent of soldiery argues that this debate is precisely *not* a debate between war and peace (23.6), because desirable, well-worked land actually leads to strife and war (cf. further below), this can be seen as a rejection of the reasons for his verdict which Panedes imposed in the *Contest*. The detailed arguments on both sides need not be rehearsed here at any length – some, such as again the fair and just reciprocity between farmer and land (24.4), are now very familiar – but there is one particularly striking appropriation of the Hesiodic voice by the champion of soldiery which deserves a moment's attention.

If farming and peace were indeed essentially the same thing, then – so the argument runs – of course we should all farm. Unfortunately, the world is not like that:

⁷⁹ Cf., e.g. McKeown 1989: 259–60.

⁸⁰ Cf. below pp. 302–15. ⁸¹ Cf. Koning 2010: 276–84.

A didactic poem?

νῦν δὲ μεστὰ πάντα πολέμου καὶ ἀδικίας· αἱ γὰρ ἐπιθυμίαι πλανῶνται πανταχοῦ,
περὶ πᾶσαν γῆν τὰς πλεονεξίας ἐπεγείρουσαι, καὶ πάντα μεστὰ στρατοπέδων ἐπὶ
τὴν ἀλλοτρίαν ἰόντων. (Maximus of Tyre 23.6)

Everything is full of war and injustice; desires wander everywhere over the whole earth, arousing greedy ambitions, and everything is full of armies proceeding against others' lands.

Not the least of these ruinous desires is the desire for territorial expansion, and that is why farming is actually the cause of war. The almost apocalyptic tone here is owed in good measure to a reworking of the ruin which the Hesiodic Pandora wrought by taking the lid off the jar:

ἄλλα δὲ μυρία λυγρὰ κατ' ἀνθρώπους ἀλάληται·
πλείη μὲν γὰρ γαῖα κακῶν, πλείη δὲ θάλασσα·
νοῦσοι δ' ἀνθρώποισιν ἐφ' ἡμέρηι, αἱ δ' ἐπὶ νυκτὶ
αὐτόματοι φοιτῶσι κακὰ θνητοῖσι φέρουσαι
σιγῇ, ἐπεὶ φωνὴν ἐξείλετο μητίετα Ζεὺς.

(Hesiod, *Works and Days* 100–4)

Countless other miseries roam among men: full is the earth of evils and full the sea. Sicknesses come upon men by day, and others come of their own accord by night, bringing evils to men in silence, since wise Zeus took away their voice.

What in Hesiod had been an aetiology for why life is hard and one must work unremittingly is turned against the very practice of farming for which Hesiod was an almost metonymic text.⁸² The substitution of Hesiod's μυρία λυγρὰ and νοῦσοι by 'desires' is a development typical of almost any philosophically inflected prose from Plato onwards; that 'desire is the greatest evil for man' (24.4) is about the only thing on which the proponents of Maximus' two sides agree.

Finally, in view of how Hesiod had been constructed as the fountainhead of the didactic tradition, it is noteworthy that Maximus' reworking of *Works and Days* 100–4 combines those verses with their earlier imitation and reversal at the head of Aratus' *Phainomena*:

⁸² For Aratus' use of these Hesiodic verses cf. below p. 75.

Useful maxims

ἐκ Διὸς ἀρχώμεσθα, τὸν οὐδέποτε ἄνδρες ἔωμεν
ἄρρητον· μεστὰ δὲ Διὸς παῖσαι μὲν ἀγυαί,
παῖσαι δ' ἀνθρώπων ἀγοραί, μεστὴ δὲ θάλασσα
καὶ λιμένες· πάντη δὲ Διὸς κεχρήμεθα πάντες.

(Aratus, *Phainomena* 1–4)

Let us begin from Zeus, whom we mortals never leave unspoken. Full are all the streets with Zeus, and full the gathering-places of men, and full the sea and the harbours; all of us need Zeus in every place.

Like modern scholars, Maximus realized that *Phainomena* 2–4 precisely reverse the bleak vision of *Works and Days* 100–1, but this is not just an example of ‘window allusion’, i.e. the combination of a model with that model’s model, but is a way of taking aim at the whole Hesiodic tradition: even the more ‘positive’ reading of that peace-loving tradition, as seen in the *Phainomena*, is to be rejected and turned against itself by the proponent of warfare.⁸³

Useful maxims

One of the earliest and most explicit references to Hesiodic didacticism comes in Isocrates’ treatise on kingship addressed to Nicocles, the son of Evagoras who succeeded his father on the throne of Cypriot Salamis in 374/3 BC. In reflecting *more suo* on the nature of the treatise which he is sending to the young king, Isocrates notes that most people praise such good advice, but do not act upon it:⁸⁴

⁸³ Something related to this combination of Hesiod and Aratus occurs in the proem of *Oration* 24, where Maximus rouses ‘from Helicon a poet no less distinguished (οὐδὲν ἄδοξότερον) than Homer to reprove men of the present day (τῷ νῦν γένει) ...’; we can hardly interpret this as a reference to anyone other than Hesiod, thus explicitly marking the opposition of *Orations* 23 and 24 as a replay of the *Contest*, and yet the verses which Maximus gives to this Heliconian poet are in fact Aratus, *Phainomena* 131–2 (the rewriting of the Hesiodic Ages myth) on how the men of the Bronze Age (κείνων γένος ἀνδρῶν) were the first to sacrifice ploughing oxen. The verses, with their reference to agriculture, suit the context, but everything else about the passage suggests Hesiod to us; Maximus may be playing fast and loose, though an interesting fusion of two ‘Hesiodic’ poets may in fact be the explanation.

⁸⁴ For other aspects of these chapters cf. Halliwell 2011: 290–5.

A didactic poem?

It is very clear to me that, although all men consider poems and prose works which give advice to be the most useful, they do not find the greatest pleasure in listening to them, but they react as they do with those who reprove them; they praise such men, but wish to spend their time with those who have their same faults, not with those who seek to deter them from those faults. As evidence of this one could adduce the poetry of Hesiod and Theognis and Phocylides; men say that these have been the best advisors for human life, but while saying this they choose to spend time (συνδιατρίβειν) with other men's follies rather than these men's precepts (ὑποθήκαι). Moreover, if one were to select out the so-called *gnômai* of the leading poets, the ones over which they have taken most care, men would be similarly disposed towards these; they would listen with greater pleasure to the lowest comedy than to passages composed so artfully. (Isocrates, *To Nicocles* 42–4)

Hesiod is here grouped with Theognis, in whose elegies – as in sympotic elegy generally – gnomic and ethical advice plays a very large part;⁸⁵ Theognis' exhortations are, of course, also addressed (in part) to a young man, Kynos, as Isocrates' are to Nicocles. As for Phocylides, his gnomic hexameter poem, however it was structured,⁸⁶ may perhaps have been, in whole or part, addressed to a παῖς (cf. fr. 1 West), and this encourages the view, as also does Isocrates' choice of ὑποθήκαι, that the Hesiodic poem which Isocrates has principally in mind is the *Precepts of Cheiron* (fr. 283–5 M-W), in which the wise centaur instructed the young Achilles; three verses which are reported to have been the opening of the poem certainly recall the flavour of much of the *Works and Days* (and indeed of Phocylides):

εὖ νῦν μοι τὰδ' ἕκαστα μετὰ φρεσὶ πνευκαλίμησι
φράζεσθαι· πρῶτον μὲν, ὅτ' ἂν δόμον εἰσαφίκηαι,
ἔρδειν ἱερὰ καλὰ θεοῖς αἰγιγενέτησιν
(Hesiod fr. 283 M-W)

Please now take note of each of these things in your wise heart. First, whenever you come home, offer a fair sacrifice to the immortal gods...

Although disappointingly little information about the *Precepts* survives to us,⁸⁷ the poem seems to have been known both

⁸⁵ Cf. below pp. 126–40, Koning 2010: 329–32.

⁸⁶ Cf. West 1978b.

⁸⁷ Cf., e.g., Friedländer 1913: 571–2, Kurke 1990, D'Alessio 2005: 231–2, Ford 2010: 147.

before and after Isocrates, and a reference to it would certainly suit the context here; nevertheless, although the *Works and Days* was addressed to a foolish brother, rather than to a boy by an older man, the gnomic quality of much of Hesiod's better known poem means that we should at least keep open the possibility that Isocrates had the *Works and Days* in mind (as well) here. However little popular appeal they may have had, unlike, say, the poems of Homer (chaps. 45–6), Isocrates clearly aims to write a prose version of such improving works, and Nicocles will have the good judgement to 'spend his time in the company of' (συνδιατρίβειν, 45), i.e. 'read', Isocrates' advice rather than of pleasure-loving fools who will lead him astray.

When Isocrates conjures up the possibility of 'selecting out the so-called *gnōmai* of the leading poets, the ones over which they have taken most care', he is all but certainly referring to a practice which did indeed already exist. The fourth century seems to have been the key period for the formation of poetic anthologies, a practice intimately tied to school and educational practice,⁸⁸ and it seems very likely that both the poetry of Hesiod, almost certainly the *Works and Days* as well as the *Precepts*, and Theognis had been excerpted in this way, and that such anthologies existed alongside fuller texts of those poets;⁸⁹ as is clear, both from classical quotations and from the later anthological tradition, the *Works and Days* was very 'quotable' indeed, and a section such as *WD* 695–764 might indeed be thought to be a relatively unstructured 'anthology' of precepts from which one could 'pick out' at leisure. 'Hesiodic' poetry might well have played some formative role in the very idea of the gnomic anthology. However that may be, the existence of the *Precepts of Cheiron* and of Phocylides' poem, which was clearly influenced by

⁸⁸ For evidence and bibliography cf. Hunter–Russell 2011: 15–16, adding Bowie 2012: 124–8 on the possibility of fifth-century anthologies.

⁸⁹ For the *Works and Days* cf., e.g., Ford 2010: 147–8. This is not the place for a discussion of the history of the *Theognidea*; the evidence suggests that a much fuller text of the poet than we possess survived in Athens at least to the time of Isocrates, but Isocrates' hypothetical mode at *To Nicocles* 44 hardly rules out the possibility that anthologies already played a major role in education.

Hesiod,⁹⁰ will very probably have encouraged the reading of the *Works and Days* itself in a ‘piecemeal’ fashion. Recent, particularly anglophone scholarship and particularly in reaction to Martin West’s rather negative view of the coherence of the poem, has sought to find a more cohesively organised structure, at both the macro- and the micro-level, than has often been imagined in the past; this should not, however, blind us to the obvious possibility of seeing and using the *Works and Days* as a structure which readily lends itself to fragmentation into ‘quotable’ extracts. There is very good evidence that this was in fact a principal mode of reception of the poem in antiquity.⁹¹

It has been observed that Isocrates’ ‘presentation of material [in *To Nicocles*] in the form of a catalogue of maxims shows the influence of Hesiod’;⁹² some Hesiodic influence on the structure of the work is certainly not to be doubted in the light of Isocrates’ professed models, although the material of the *To Nicocles* is in fact all much of a piece, as it is concerned with the relation between a king and his subjects,⁹³ and there is never really any sense that the treatise is breaking down into a string of gnomic maxims. Rather more interesting in this regard is the *To Demonicus*, a moralising treatise addressed to the young son of one of Isocrates’ friends; the authenticity of this essay has very commonly been doubted,⁹⁴ and was so already in antiquity, but it seems to have been associated with Isocrates from a relatively early date, and the light which, as we shall see, it throws upon the Hesiodic tradition is not out of keeping with this important strand of Isocratean moralising.⁹⁵

Isocrates insists at the beginning of the work that he has not written a protreptic for the young man, a παρακλήσις, but

⁹⁰ It is noteworthy that Phocylides plays the same structural role of opposition to Homer in Dio 36 (‘the Borysthenitic Oration’) as Hesiod does in Dio 2; at Dio 2.5 Alexander groups Phocylides with Theognis, as indeed was very common.

⁹¹ Cf. below pp. 150–1 on the sympotic performance of the *Works and Days*.

⁹² Mirhady–Too 2000: 157.

⁹³ This subject had, of course, a very long history; cf., e.g., the maxims on kingship to be found at the conclusion of Pindar’s *First Pythian* for Hieron of Syracuse.

⁹⁴ For the case against cf. Mathieu–Brémond 1928: 111–17.

⁹⁵ To focus, as I am doing, on the relationship between Isocrates and Hesiod is, of course, to simplify Isocrates’ intellectual affiliations and connections with writers and thinkers much nearer his time, but not, I hope, misleadingly so.

rather a παραίνεσις, one of the words with which the Hesiodic *Precepts of Cheiron* is described (cf. Pindar, *Pyth.* 6.23, Pausanias 9.31.5) and, as we shall see, an important word in the ancient conception of ‘didactic poetry’; when ‘famous Hesiod’ is named in a rock-cut inscription from Armenia of c.200 BC (*SGO* 12/05/02 = T 106 Most), it is his role as ‘adviser’ (παρ-ήνεσεν) to Perses which seems to be paramount. παραίνεσις was also to become a generic term applied to the *To Demonicus* and the *To Nicocles* in the subsequent tradition.⁹⁶ The advice that Isocrates will give Demonicus will help him follow along the path which has been already travelled by those who ‘have been able truly to reach virtue’ (5); if this leads us to suspect that Isocrates is here adopting a Hesiodic voice, then the encomium of virtue which follows (6–8) will do nothing to dispel that suspicion: Heracles and Theseus are adduced as proof, *inter alia*, that virtue regards ‘sluggishness (ἄκνως) as a cause for criticism, and hard work (πόνος) as one for praise’. The proem concludes by introducing the advice which is to follow:

διόπερ ἐγὼ σοι πειράσομαι συντόμως ὑποθέσθαι, δι’ ὧν ἂν μοι δοκεῖς ἐπιτηδεύμάτων πλείστον πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐπιδοῦναι καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ἀνθρώποις εὐδοκιμῆσαι.

For this reason I shall try to advise you briefly as to the practices which, I think, will enable you to make the greatest progress towards virtue and to win the best reputation in all men’s eyes. (Isocrates, *To Demonicus* 12)

The language here (ὑποθέσθαι, ἐπιτηδεύματα, εὐδοκιμῆσαι) is strikingly similar to that in which the Platonic Hippias describes a work of moral instruction he has written, in which Nestor instructed the young Neoptolemos (Plato, *Hippias Maior* 286a–b = 86 A9 D–K);⁹⁷ that work looks very much like an ‘updating’ of the *Precepts of Cheiron*, with Nestor taking the place of Cheiron and Neoptolemos taking the place of his father, Achilles, and it is indeed clear that in the *To Demonicus*

⁹⁶ Cf. below on the discussion of the *To Demonicus* in the *Life of Isocrates*.

⁹⁷ In an extant fragment of one of his works, Hippias claims to have put together ‘the most important similar passages’ from Orpheus, Musaeus, Hesiod, Homer and other poets and prose writers and created a καινὸς καὶ πολυειδὴς λόγος (fr. 6 D–K); it is often thought that this is to be identified with a work of which we hear elsewhere entitled *Συναγωγὴ* (fr. 4 D–K).

also Isocrates is adopting a Hesiodic voice. The string of precepts which follow and which occupy most of the rest of the treatise, beginning – as indeed did the *Precepts* – with piety towards the gods, do indeed resemble a series of maxims, varying widely in length and subject; pithy ‘one-liners’ jostle alongside more structured paragraphs, and – in the absence of the *Precepts* – we may be reminded of nothing so much as *Works and Days* 695–764.⁹⁸ There seem to be clear echoes of Theognis (19, 25), and if it is unsurprising that some themes shared with the *Works and Days* appear (the keeping of oaths, the avoidance of unjust profit), there is at least one maxim, ‘reproach no one with misfortune, for chance is our common lot and the future is unseen’ (29), where Isocrates might be thought to be drawing upon Hesiod directly, cf. *WD* 717–18, a couplet which certainly passed into the anthological tradition, and may perhaps have already found its way there when Isocrates composed the *To Demonicus*.⁹⁹

When Isocrates concludes the treatise with an exhortation to the young man not only to put into practice what he has read, but also ‘to learn the best parts/sayings (τὰ βέλτιστα) of the poets’ (51), we will recall the notion of the *To Nicocles* that one could ‘make a selection of the so-called gnomes of the leading poets over which they have taken most serious pains’ (44, cf. above); that the anthologising attitude, if not indeed the practice, is here involved is then immediately confirmed by the closing image of the bee taking τὰ βέλτιστα from every flower, just as anyone ‘who aims to reach *paideia*’ should ‘gather what is useful (τὰ χρήσιμα) from everywhere’.¹⁰⁰

The subsequent fate of Isocrates’ παραινέσεις seems also in some regards to have shadowed that of the *Works and Days*, and the connection with Hesiod which we drew from the work itself was made already in antiquity. The surviving *Life of*

⁹⁸ The exiguous fragments of Phocylides suggest that, in that poem also, there was some notable variation in the length of individual precepts; fr. 14, an imitation of *WD* 695–705 and of Semonides fr. 7 West, is eight verses long as it stands.

⁹⁹ Cf. further below pp. 127–8.

¹⁰⁰ On the image of the bee in connection with anthologies cf. Barns 1950: 132–4, 1951: 6, Hunter–Russell 2011: 183.

Isocrates, often thought to be the work of Zosimus of Ascalon (late fifth to early sixth century AD), discusses the matter at some length.¹⁰¹

...It is reasonable that we read the *paraineseis* first, not because they are better than his other works... but because they are particularly concerned with moral behaviour (ἥθη). One must pay close attention to (κοσμήσαι) morals before paying attention to words¹⁰² ... As he was writing to young boys (παῖδες), he was compelled to use a lower (ταπεινότερα) style. It is also worth asking why we read these works in a particular order, first the *To Demonicus* and then the *To Nicocles*... The answer is that Isocrates wanted to be generally useful (κοινωφελής), but as he thought it vulgar to address his advice to the whole world, he wanted to seem to write to these individuals, but in fact he advises (παραινεί) everyone through the three *paraineseis*. Just as Hesiod seems to address his brother, ‘work, foolish Perses’,¹⁰³ but advises (παραινεί) everyone, so too does Isocrates... The *paraineseis* belong to the symbouleutic mode (τὸ συμβουλευτικὸν εἶδος), and they are called *paraineseis* from *ainos*, which means advice (συμβουλή), as in Hesiod also, ‘now an *ainos* for the kings’... Isocrates wrote precepts (ὑποθήκαι) to Demonicus, as he wished to teach him how he ought to live... (Anonymous, *Life of Isocrates*)

Apart from the multiple connections which the *Life* makes with the *Works and Days*, it is worth noting that the emphasis upon the work’s concern with ἥθη, ‘moral behaviour’, is one which is shared with the Proclan *prolegomena* to the *Works and Days*, as also, perhaps more strikingly, are the idea of κοσμεῖν (‘making fine’) one’s behaviour,¹⁰⁴ the notion that these works are to be read before the rest of the corpus, just as the *Works and Days* is to be read before moving on to the higher *Theogony*, and the relative simplicity of style appropriate to educational and moralising works. So too, just as the Isocratean *Life* stresses that the *paraineseis* are really addressed to everyone, not just to the nominal addressee, so Proclus takes it for granted that

¹⁰¹ The text is most accessible on pp. 211–14 of Vol. I of Mandilaras’ Teubner text of Isocrates.

¹⁰² This formulation may ultimately derive from *To Demonicus* 4, where Isocrates distinguishes his ethical treatise from the works of those who offer to teach young men to be δεινοὶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις.

¹⁰³ It is of some interest that *WD* 397 is cited here: for the possibility that this verse was part of the passage cited by Hesiod in the *Contest* as his κάλλιστον cf. below p. 83.

¹⁰⁴ In the *Prolegomena* to *WD* this is part of a play with κόσμος as the subject of the *Theogony*.

mankind at large is the object of Hesiod's protreptic (cf. *Proleg.* Aa7 Pertusi, παρακαλῶν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους κτλ.). The shared motifs suggest how a generic sense of 'the Hesiodic' prevailed in later antiquity (at least), and Isocrates has given us (again) good reasons to want to push that sense well back into the classical period.

Central, then, to the Isocratean appropriation of a Hesiodic voice is moral advice and exhortation; this is where Hesiod's 'didactic' heart lies.¹⁰⁵ The idea is, as we have seen, a very common one, but there may be more to be said about how central this was to the generic sense (if there was one) of ancient 'didactic poetry' and of Hesiodic reception more generally. In the extant version of the *Contest of Homer and Hesiod*, King Panedes is made to justify his decision in favour of Hesiod on the grounds that it was right for victory to go to 'the one who urged (προκαλούμενον) people towards agriculture and peace, not the one who described (διεξιόντα) wars and slaughters' (*Certamen* 13). The difference of verb is, of course, not to be pushed too hard, and yet the king clearly is drawing a distinction, not just between the subjects of the two bodies of poetry, but also their respective social value; Homer may always have been thought to 'teach', but his poetry, on this view, is narrative, whereas Hesiod's is explicitly protreptic.¹⁰⁶ The king is also clearly referring not just to the *Iliad* and the *Works and Days* in general, but also to the passages which the two poets have just cited as the finest of their poems.¹⁰⁷ There is uncertainty in both cases as to whether the two citations preserved to us, *Works and Days* 383–92 and *Iliad* 13.126–33 and 339–44), represent those of the original text; it is likely enough, in any case, that different tellings of the story offered citations of different lengths. As for Hesiod, the rest of the ancient tradition offers not much help, because although vv. 383–4 ('When the Pleiades rise...') are very frequently

¹⁰⁵ At need, this 'moral' advice could also be political: Aeschines 3.134–5 cites a version of *WD* 240–7 (without vv. 244–5) to show Hesiod 'educating the ordinary people and advising cities not to accept wicked politicians' (such as Demosthenes).

¹⁰⁶ Cf., e.g., Irwin 2005: 159.

¹⁰⁷ For the passages chosen by the two poets cf. below pp. 302–15.

cited and were clearly famous, the remainder of the passage has a very thin attestation in later literature and grammatical works; vv. 383–92 were perhaps as a whole ‘very well known in antiquity’,¹⁰⁸ but the evidence is in fact singularly lacking for all but the initial couplet. It has, however, been pointed out that a passage of Philostratus’ *Heroicus* perhaps suggests that he knew a version in which the cited passage was *WD* 383–404, rather than just vv. 383–92; there (*Heroicus* 43.7), the verses with which Hesiod is said to have won ‘bade (ἐκέλευεν) Perses to work (ἐργων ἄπτεσθαι) and to apply himself to farming, so that he would not depend on other people and not go hungry’.¹⁰⁹ If this is correct, then the stylistic contrast between the two passages would be even more striking,¹¹⁰ the contrast between poetry of and for the group and poetry of and for the individual more marked, and the *Works and Days* passage would be even more strongly protreptic and injunctive (cf. προκαλούμενον in Panedes’ judgement) than it is already (ἐργάζεσθαι, νήπιε Πέρση, ‘work, foolish Perses’ v. 397); vv. 403–4, ἀλλὰ σ’ ἄνωγα | φράζεσθαι χρεῖων τε λύσιν λιμοῦ τ’ ἄλεωρήν, ‘but I bid you take thought for release from your debts and for warding off hunger’, are a pithy summary of Hesiod’s principal message to his brother,¹¹¹ and one which Philostratus seems to paraphrase (ἄνωγα ~ ἐκέλευεν). This must, of course, remain at the level of speculation – Philostratus himself could be extending the range of the quotation – but there is no doubt that antiquity saw here a very important moment in the *Works and Days*;

¹⁰⁸ Koning 2010: 252. What is perhaps most surprising is the apparent paucity of citation of, and allusion to, vv. 391–2, given Virgil, *Georgics* 1.299 and the famous parody of that verse (on which see Barchiesi 2004, below p. 312 n. 90). Ar. *Lys.* 1173 may amusingly echo v. 391. It is, however, a curious coincidence (?) that in Lucian’s *Hesiod* Lycinus mocks the poet’s claims to have foretold the future in the *Works and Days* by noting that, by these criteria, he (Lycinus) too is a prophet because he can predict that ‘if someone goes about naked (γυμνός) when it is freezing, and there is also rain or hail from the sky, that man will catch no small chill (ἡπίαιλος)’ (chap. 8). Was there a Greek tradition to match the parody of Virgil’s verse? Reinsch-Werner 1976: 138–40 (accepted by Harder 2012: 2.243–4) argues that βοωπέων at Callimachus fr. 24.5 Pf. (= 26.5 M) evokes *WD* 391, thus humorously suggesting that, in asking Theiodamas for food, Heracles has become like the Hesiodic beggar of *WD* 394–5.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. West 1967: 442 n. 3. ¹¹⁰ On the stylistic contrast cf. below pp. 302–15.

¹¹¹ On the thematic importance of φράζεσθαι cf. below p. 130.

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what we are not quite sure about is how extended that moment was.

The verses which immediately precede ‘When the Pleiades rise . . .’ seem to anticipate the principal themes of what follows:

σοὶ δ’ εἰ πλούτου θυμὸς ἐέλδεται ἐν φρεσὶ σῆλιν,
ὥδ’ ἔρδειν, καὶ ἔργον ἐπ’ ἔργῳ ἐργάζεσθαι.
(Hesiod, *Works and Days* 381–2)

If the spirit in your heart longs for wealth, act in this way, and work at work upon work.

Modern scholars have hesitated over whether to see here the beginning of a new section, a purely transitional couplet, or indeed the conclusion of the previous section, but the Proclan scholium on vv. 381–2 sees here a major transition:

What has been said up to this point were all general instructions about living in communities (πολιτικὴ ζωή), reminding us of the causes of wickedness and the variety of types of life, and moulding character through the use of *gnōmai*. What will now follow leads the hearer away from bad deeds and towards the life of farming and the just income which derives from it, by sketching out the appropriate times and patterns for ploughing, harvesting, planting, the vintage and all such things. After this he will discuss seafaring for those who wish to support themselves in this way also, by similarly sketching out the seasons for sailing and ways of looking after ships. (Proclus, *Scholium on Works and Days* 381–2 = fr. 161 Marzillo)

Here too, then, as in the *Contest*, it is Hesiod’s protreptic effect upon his audience that is at the core of his poetry; the ‘factual information’ is at the service of this effect.¹¹² ‘Act in this way, and work at work upon work’ (v. 382) – that is ‘the essential Hesiod’.

One very striking testimony to Hesiod’s reputation is the so called ‘Euthycles-stele’ or ‘Helicon-stele’ (*IG* VII 4240 = Hesiod T105 Most) of (probably) the late third century BC and first published in 1890.¹¹³ The stele, found at Boeotian Thespieae in the Valley of the Muses, is dedicated to the Muses and depicts Mt Helicon as a hairy and bearded one-eyed giant rising behind

¹¹² Cf., e.g., Effe 1977: 24 n. 35.

¹¹³ Cf. Jamot 1890; the most important subsequent discussions are Peek 1977, Hurst 1996 and Veneri 1996.

mountain-peaks to face the viewer; the stele is inscribed with three epigrams, one of which identifies the dedicator as (almost certainly) ‘Euthykles son of Amphikritos’. The least well preserved of the poems begins ‘Hesiod, son of Dios, [celebrated] the Muses and divine Helicon with the most beautiful songs ...’ and the third poem also refers to Hesiod:¹¹⁴

οὕτως ἀντῶποις ἀριγγρα[λ]έος βροτῶι ἴσα
οὐκ ἄδ[α]ῆς Ἑλικῶν Μουσάων χρησμὸν ἱαχέω·
πειθομένοι[σ]ι βροτοῖς ὑποθήκαις Ἡσιόδοιο
εὐνομία χ[ώ]ρα τ’ ἔσται καρποῖσι βρύουσα.

Thus, very aged like a mortal, I, Helicon, not ignorant of the Muses, declare my oracle to those who look me in the face: ‘Those who obey the precepts of Hesiod will have *eunomia* and a land teeming with crops’.¹¹⁵

This stele has, not unreasonably, been brought into connection with a roughly contemporary boundary-stone (*IG* VII 1785 = Hesiod T 104 Most), found also at Thespieae, which marked land belonging either to ‘the Hesiodians who sacrifice together to the Muses’ or (perhaps) to ‘those who sacrifice together to the Muses of Hesiod’,¹¹⁶ both artefacts illustrate the strength of Hesiodic memory, and probably also Hesiod’s status as a hero, long before Pausanias’ famous description of Helicon. In light of the last verse, the reference to the ‘precepts of Hesiod’ seems to refer not so much to the ‘Precepts of Cheiron’ as to the *Works and Days*, and in particular perhaps to vv. 225–37 on the rewards which

¹¹⁴ The text here is taken from Peek 1977, with the omission of sublinear dots (only affecting the first two words).

¹¹⁵ Two points of translation are worthy of note. In taking ἀριγγρα[λ]έος βροτῶι ἴσα together I follow, e.g., Hurst 1996, whereas Peek 1977: 175 understands ‘like a mortal not ignorant of the Muses’, i.e. able to deliver his oracle in verse; both word order and sense seem to me against this. The phrase seems to refer to the depiction of the mountain as an old man (though of gigantic size); for Euthycles’ concern to match poem to figure note also ἀντῶποις calling attention to Helicon’s dramatically frontal position. Secondly, all editors seem to take οὐκ ἄδ[α]ῆς ... Μουσάων together (cf. perhaps Callimachus fr. 1.2) and I have, with some hesitation, followed them; it is, however, at least tempting to take Μουσάων χρησμὸν together, thus making Helicon play the Pythia to the Muses’ Apollo. οὐκ ἄδαῆς would normally be followed by a genitive, but cf. *Anth. Pal.* 16.84.1 (also describing a work of art and introducing a wise saying) οὐκ ἄδαῆς ἔγραψε Κίμων τάδε κτλ.

¹¹⁶ Cf. Roesch 1982: 162–6, Koning 2010: 137.

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await those who practise ‘straight justice’; βρύουσα seems to pick up the repeated stress in those verses on abundance and fertility (τέθηλε... ἀνθεῦσιν... θαλίῃς... τοῖσι φέρει μὲν γαῖα πολὺν βίον... καταβεβρίθασι... θάλλουσιν... καρπὸν δὲ φέρει ζείδωρος ἄρουρα). Moreover, the tone of those Hesiodic verses could reasonably be described as ‘mantic’, and the epigram seems indeed to exploit that hieratic tone: those who practise straight justice are indeed obeying the precepts of Hesiod.¹¹⁷ Here, then, is a Hesiod who is indeed a poet of farming, but it is again above all the moral and protreptic message of the *Works and Days* which takes centre stage.

Didactic intentions

A famous passage of Aristophanes’ *Frogs* is regularly (and rightly) brought into discussions of ancient didactic poetry:

σκέψαι γὰρ ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς
ὥς ὠφελίμοι τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ γενναῖοι γεγέννηται.
Ὅρφεὺς μὲν γὰρ τελετάς θ’ ἡμῖν κατέδειξε φόνων τ’
ἀπέχεσθαι,
Μουσαῖος δ’ ἐξακέσεις τε νόσων καὶ χρησμούς, Ἡσίοδος δὲ
γῆς ἐργασίας, καρπῶν ὥρας, ἀρότους· ὁ δὲ θεῖος Ὅμηρος
ἀπὸ τοῦ τιμὴν καὶ κλέος ἔσχεν πλὴν τοῦδ’, ὅτι χρήστ’
ἐδίδαξεν,
τάξεις, ἀρετάς, ὀπλίσεις ἀνδρῶν;

(Aristophanes, *Frogs* 1030–6)

Observe from the earliest times how beneficial noble poets have been. Orpheus taught us rites and to keep away from killing, Musaeus taught cures for diseases and oracles, Hesiod how to work the land, the seasons for crops, ploughing; did not the divine Homer receive honour and renown precisely from this, that he taught us useful things, battle-formations, acts of valour, how men are armed?

Just how ‘comic’ is the comic Aeschylus’ account of how poets have always been ‘beneficial’ has been very much discussed, but

¹¹⁷ Although εὐνομίη occurs only once in Hesiod (*Theogony* 902 as the name of one of the three Horai, where see West’s note), it was clearly felt to have a special connection with Hesiod; in the second century someone in Attica inscribed *WD* 197–200 on a stone, but replaced Nemesis by Eunomie, apparently to produce the name of the Hesiodic Horai (*Epigr.* 1110 Kaibel).

it is important to see this passage within its context. Aeschylus is seeking to demonstrate that his own plays fit the criteria for a praiseworthy poet which Euripides enunciates in vv. 1009–10, ‘cleverness and the advice we give, because we make men better in their cities’; at issue, then, are moral character and communal attitudes. Aeschylus claims that the *Seven against Thebes* and the *Persians* made the citizens true warriors with a longing to defeat the enemy; he drew inspiration from Homer in order to ‘incite’ (ἐπαίρειν) every citizen ‘to exert himself whenever he should hear the war-trumpet’ (v. 1042). What, then, is important about the χρήστὰ ‘useful things’ which Homer taught is not merely, or even primarily, the ‘factual information’ of ‘battle-lines, heroic deeds and armings of men’, but rather the attitudes which such descriptions instilled in his hearers. So too, it would have been possible for Aeschylus to argue that Hesiod ‘incited’ people to want to farm, rather than just teaching the technicalities of agriculture. The slide between ‘inspiring men to want to fight (or farm)’ and ‘teaching warfare (or agriculture)’ is of course a very easy one, but in these two related ways of looking at poetry lies the seed of very important distinctions which help to define ‘didactic poetry’.

The grandeur of Homeric (or Aeschylean) poetry is precisely of an emotional, overpowering kind – terms such as *ekplêxis* are associated with ‘sublime’ poetry of this kind; it is a familiar observation that the *Works and Days* figures nowhere in ‘Longinus’ treatise *On the Sublime*. Homeric epic ‘teaches’ many things, as the scholia repeatedly assert, both ‘facts’ and ‘moral attitudes’ (cf. Aristophanes, *Frogs* 1009–10), but that is not the primary effect of Homeric verse. Hesiodic verse is also protreptic and ‘didactic’, but in a much more explicit, and less emotionally stirring, way; the balance between the two ways of looking at poetry suggested by the comic Aeschylus’ argument, the emotional and the factual, is with Hesiod very different. Secondly, the desire to change behaviour, particularly ‘moral’ behaviour, might seem to distinguish the *Works and Days* from some at least of the ‘didactic poetry’ of the Hellenistic and Roman periods, where it is the conveying of ‘information’, rather than the protreptic to attitudes inculcated by the

possession of that information which are paramount. A very crude literary history then would see Hesiod, and particularly the *Works and Days*, as the authorising archaic model for what was essentially a 'new' poetic form in the Hellenistic period, but a 'new' form which advertised its links with, and its efforts to recreate, an older form; we might again compare the role that Hipponax plays in the *Iambi* of Callimachus and the *Mimiambi* of Herodas.¹¹⁸ To ask, then, 'Is Hesiod (or indeed Parmenides or Empedocles) a didactic poet?', particularly from the perspective of later poetry, is a way of focusing upon differences.

One helpful modern attempt to draw together a 'genre' of ancient didactic poetry, that of Katharina Volk, proposes four, 'purely intra-textual', criteria for inclusion in the genre: explicit didactic content, a teacher-student constellation, poetic self-consciousness, and poetic simultaneity (this last being 'the illusion that the poem is really only coming into being as it evolves before the readers' eyes').¹¹⁹ In her judgement, the *Works and Days* 'just about qualifies', though a very unusual balance in the 'poetic self-consciousness' column means that Hesiod's poem is in fact 'a strange hybrid... a unique, and none too coherent, mixture of genres'.¹²⁰ Whatever we might think of these criteria and their application,¹²¹ many may agree with Volk's decision to stick to the 'intra-textual' because, in her words, 'the actual intentions of authors (Did Virgil really want to teach farmers?) and reactions of readers (Did people really read the *Ars amatoria* to learn the art of love?) are extremely hard to assess...'.¹²² Volk is here clearly seeking to avoid the problems which arose from Bernd Effe's attempt to establish didactic poetry as a genre in which an ordered body of knowledge is systematically presented in poetic form, a genre which Effe then broke down into sub-groups, according to the poet's

¹¹⁸ For this argument in greater detail cf. Fantuzzi–Hunter 2004: 3–10, above p. 20.

¹¹⁹ Volk 2002; the quotation comes from p. 13. ¹²⁰ Volk 2002: 47–9.

¹²¹ Volk seems to me to restrict 'poetic self-consciousness' (almost) to explicit references to the Muses, which very greatly reduces the helpfulness of this criterion: see, e.g., p. 12 on the *Odyssey* or pp. 49–50 on Parmenides. As for the *Works and Days*, Volk makes no reference in this connection, e.g., to the 'hawk and the nightingale', to Hesiod's knowledge of what goes on in heaven (the Pandora story) etc.

¹²² Volk 2002: 38.

attitude to his material and to his intention.¹²³ Volk rightly recognises that any notion of genre ought to consider the contract of expectation between writer and audience, and she is at least partly right that there was in 2002 (and still is) a dearth of work on the reception of didactic poetry in antiquity,¹²⁴ but, as is now clear, there is a persistent ancient approach to the *Works and Days* which enables us at least to sense what is ‘didactic’ about it, and how it differed radically from Homeric epic. If we were to concentrate upon ancient reception, there would indeed be several poems of the traditional ‘didactic’ corpus about which very little could be said, but we would on the other hand be able to move on from ritual lamentations about why ancient works of criticism have so little to say about ‘didactic’.¹²⁵

The question of ‘authorial intention’ has indeed blighted the study of ‘didactic poetry’, more perhaps than that of any other poetic mode, even if we leave to one side the theoretical issues raised by the whole vexed question of intentionality. That ancient readers and scholars had, on the whole, no problem with this idea is, of course, very familiar, but we may be able to push some familiar witnesses a little further. Strabo, for example, famously ascribes to Eratosthenes the view that ‘every poet aims at *psuchagôgia*, not *didaskalia*’ (1.2.3 = Eratosthenes fr. I A20 Berger), a view which Strabo then tries to demolish, at least in the case of Homer. This discussion is in fact our fullest ancient account of the matter, and it can hardly be ignored – as it too often is – by those concerned with the nature of didactic poetry; it starkly sets out for us, for example, the potential difference between what poems or poets ‘intend to do’ and how they are used, a subject which the centrality of poetry to ancient educational practice, and ideas such as

¹²³ Effe 1977. For some of the problems which arise cf. Kenney 1979, Sider forthcoming. For Effe, the *Works and Days* is not, then, a didactic poem because the ‘factual information’ is embedded in, and secondary to, the moral protreptic (Effe 1977: 24 n. 35).

¹²⁴ Volk strangely overlooks what we know of the ancient reception of Aratus’ *Phainomena*, and the work which has been done on it.

¹²⁵ The most helpful survey of ancient ‘theory’ on didactic poetry is probably Pöhlmann 1973: 815–35. On ancient reception cf. above on Hesiod’s appearance in imperial epitaphs.

that of poetry as a ‘first philosophy’, make crucial for any conception of didactic poetry in antiquity.¹²⁶ Moreover, Strabo claims that Eratosthenes contradicts himself in holding both that poets aim at *psuchagôgia* and that they have always been keen to display (εἰς τὸ μέσον φέρειν) the results of their enquiries (ἱστορία) about geographical matters, a claim that he illustrates from Homer (fr. I A4 Berger). Although some modern scholars have been inclined to accept Strabo’s view that there is a contradiction in Eratosthenes’ position,¹²⁷ the two claims are, of course, entirely compatible, if we stress the distinction between what the poet ‘aims at’ and what we find in the poems or how the poems are used. Homer is indeed full of geographical information, much of it very accurate, but that does not make *didaskalia* his aim; it is rather Strabo who confuses the issue, however understandably, by inferring, for example, from the geographical accuracy of Homer’s epithets that he was indeed a ‘teacher’ rather than an ‘entertainer’. For Strabo there is in fact virtually no difference between what a poet says ἱστορικῶς, ‘in accordance with facts’ (or perhaps ‘on the basis of his researches’), and what is said διδασκαλικῶς, ‘with a view to instruction’ (cf., e.g., I.I.IO),¹²⁸ and Strabo’s attitude is indeed shared by the main tradition of Homeric scholia which has reached us, but Eratosthenes seems to have taken a rather more sophisticated view of the different kinds of pleasure and ‘entertainment’ which poets can provide. It is, however, important to remember that although Strabo claims that Eratosthenes applied his dictum about *psuchagôgia* to ‘every poet’, we do not in fact know whether exceptions were made or in what sense Eratosthenes was using the word ‘poet’ or how firmly he would have held the line when pressed. What Eratosthenes would have thought of, say, either Hesiod or Aratus we cannot know.¹²⁹

Strabo continues in this same chapter to criticise Eratosthenes’ apparent puzzlement (perhaps expressed in a

¹²⁶ For a brief survey of Strabo’s arguments cf. Hunter–Russell 2011: 13–14.

¹²⁷ Cf., e.g., Schenkeveld 1976: 56. ¹²⁸ Cf. further Kim 2010: 61.

¹²⁹ Roller 2010: 113–14 suggests that Eratosthenes’ real target may have been the didactic poetry of the third century, such as that of Aratus, but there is no real sign of this – Homer seems to have been at the heart of the discussion.

rhetorical question) as to what it could contribute to the *aretê* of a poet for him to be knowledgeable about ‘many geographical locations or generalship or agriculture or rhetoric, as some people want to ascribe to the poet’ (fr. I A21 Berger). We recognize here a view (and an argument) about the ‘knowledge’ of a poet which descends for us from the *Ion* of Plato: the expertise of a poet, so Eratosthenes will have assumed or argued, is in poetry, however that is to be understood, not in whatever technical fields may be represented or mentioned in poetry.¹³⁰ Since the time of the *Ion*, views of this kind had spread beyond poetry to other fields of linguistic expertise. In the *De oratore*, for example, Cicero makes Crassus observe that, if an orator is to be required to speak on a technical subject outside his field, such as warfare, he will seek advice and instruction from an expert in that field, but will then speak about it with greater oratorical skill (*ornatius*) than the expert, because that is his specialty (1.65–9). He goes on to compare the case of poetry, where Aratus, a man ‘ignorant of astronomy’, nevertheless spoke of the heavens *ornatissimis atque optimis uersibus*,¹³¹ and Nicander, a man *ab agro remotissimus*, wrote with distinction on rural matters, with a skill which was ‘poetical rather than rural’ (1.69). Strabo is willing to concede to Eratosthenes that some people go rather too far in ascribing knowledge of technical fields to Homer – we are most familiar with this tradition from the pseudo-Plutarchan *On Homer* – though he earnestly protests that Homer was far more knowledgeable in diverse fields than he accuses Eratosthenes of allowing, but he seeks to divert the force of Eratosthenes’ argument about the *aretê* of a poet by turning rather to the *aretê* of the audience:

As for the audience of the poets, is no contribution made to their *aretê*? I mean becoming experienced in many geographical locations or generalship or agriculture or rhetoric, [advantages] which listening to poetry naturally brings with it. (Strabo 1.2.3¹³²)

¹³⁰ Cf. Hunter 2012: 102–5 for a fuller consideration of the history of this argument.

¹³¹ On debates about Aratus’ knowledge cf. below pp. 103–11.

¹³² There is some awkwardness of expression here, caused by Strabo’s sarcastic repetition of Eratosthenes’ own words, and this led H.L. Jones, the Loeb translator, to misunderstand the sentence.

Here again, then, Strabo turns from the poet's 'intention' to what an audience can derive from a poem, or how they use it, and to the fact that it is impossible to be a 'good poet' without being a 'good man', all arguments, however, which are essentially different from Eratosthenes' famous claim about 'what poets aim at', though Strabo either does not see that or prefers to blur the point with the force of his rhetorical indignation.¹³³ He tries to confront Eratosthenes on the latter's own ground by demonstrating that the fact that the Homeric Odysseus was manifestly 'experienced in many geographical locations and generalship and agriculture and rhetoric' shows that Homer must have been also (1.2.4–5),¹³⁴ but – again – that is a different argument. Strabo has further arguments in his arsenal, such as the educational role of myth, but enough has been said to suggest that there was in antiquity a much richer tradition of debate about 'didactic poetry' than the few and late pieces of explicit evidence which are usually adduced might suggest.

There have, of course, been other modern attempts to find shared features of ancient didactic poems which may help shape a generic sense. One of the most influential has been Don Fowler's notion of 'the didactic plot', that movement through a poem taken by both poet and addressee, which is also movement along a path towards knowledge and enlightenment, a movement which may be variously figured as a return or as initiation into mysteries.¹³⁵ Fowler's principal witnesses are Lucretius and Virgil's *Georgics*, but the pattern he sketches

¹³³ Elsewhere, however, Strabo seems to take a more cautious approach to the 'information' in Homer, cf. 8.1.1.1, Schenkeveld 1976, Kim 2010: chapter 3.

¹³⁴ προσήφεν at the start of 1.2.4 is a variation on περιποίησιν in the statement of Eratosthenes attacked immediately before, but this verbal link shows how it is, for Strabo, all part of one argument.

¹³⁵ Fowler 2000. Aratus' *Phainomena* circulated in antiquity with at least two other prologues than the one with which we are now familiar (cf. J. Martin 1956: 14–18). One (*SH* 84) began as follows, Ἀγκλείδην, ξείνων ἱερὸν θάλας, εἰ δ' ἄγε σὺν μοι | οὐρανὴν ψάσσειας ἐπὶ τρίβον: noteworthy here are both the single addressee, a phenomenon very familiar from the subsequent tradition of 'didactic poetry', and the poet's reference to 'the path of the heavens', which might suggest that this prologue introduced both the heavenly path which was to be the subject of the poem and the idea of the path of learning and knowledge along which the addressee was to move. A Latin translation of this prologue survives, but unfortunately it is horribly garbled and largely incomprehensible.

out has obvious resonances for, say, Parmenides' poem as well. If the *Works and Days* itself stands somewhat at the margins of this paradigmatic plot – Perses and the poet are not engaged in anything like a joint enterprise, and there is no real sense that either 'progresses' through the poem¹³⁶ – what is probably its best known passage holds a very special place at the heart of this conception of what didactic is. Hesiod's two roads, the smooth and easy path to ruin and the steep and difficult path to *aretê* (*WD* 286–92), become the central manifestation of the didactic choice: if agriculture involves hard work, so too does the struggle for knowledge which didactic poetry represents. In Fowler's words, 'the reading/learning process in the *Georgics* demands effort and skill of the postlapsarian reader: it is not just a question of picking up acorns from the ground'.¹³⁷

One text which dramatises how the 'two roads' passage of *Works and Days* 286–92 came to represent the quest for, or path to, knowledge at all levels is a passage in Plutarch's essay *Progress in Virtue*.¹³⁸ Plutarch notes that a young man who has 'been bitten' by philosophy and begun to make progress in it is like the young man in love who cannot bear to be parted from the object of his affection,¹³⁹ and he finds an analogy for this in Hesiod's 'path of ἀρετή':

The same or very like this is the very ancient account of progress (προκοπή) in Hesiod, who says that the road is no longer uphill and very steep, but easy and smooth and quite straightforward, as though it had been smoothed out by practice (δσκησις) and in philosophy produced light and brightness instead of the perplexity (ἀπορία) and wandering and shiftings of purpose (μεταμέλειαι) which students of philosophy meet at first. It is like those who leave behind the land they know and cannot yet see the land to which they are sailing; they have given up the ordinary things to which they are accustomed (τὰ κοινὰ καὶ συνηθῆ) before they have come to know and seize hold of what is better, and so they are carried about between the two and often turn back. (Plutarch, *Progress in Virtue* 77d–e)

¹³⁶ Clay 1993: 30 offers an explanation of the address to Perses at v. 299 as δῖον γένος which suggests otherwise, but – even if we were to accept her explanation – this really amounts to very little; cf. Tilg 2003 and Ercolani ad loc. for a survey of the views which have been held.

¹³⁷ Fowler 2000: 209.

¹³⁸ For some other relevant passages cf. Koning 2010: 146–7.

¹³⁹ For this idea cf. Lucian, *Nigrinus* 6–7 with Hunter 2012: 16–18.

Plutarch here might be thought at least to distort the balance of the Hesiodic passage by placing all his emphasis upon the ease of the path of Virtue, once one has climbed it; in doing so he borrows ‘smoothness’ from Hesiod’s other path, that of *κακότης* (*WD* 288), which is itself effaced from the passage. The idea of the ‘light of philosophy’ is of course a very common one, but there are perhaps here the resonances of another text to be pursued. Plutarch’s account of the ascent to philosophy finds an important analogue in a similar passage at the end of his treatise *How to Study Poetry*; Plutarch is describing the effect on young men when they first hear philosophers expressing views quite opposed to the materialistic values which their parents had sought to inculcate, and he explains how a ‘philosophical’ reading of literature can help to prepare the young for the shock:

When they hear from the philosophers things which are opposed to such views, at first they are gripped by astonishment and confusion and amazement, and do not allow or endure these ideas, unless, as though they were going to see the sun after having been in thick darkness, they have become accustomed, by means, as it were, of a borrowed light in which the brilliance of the truth is softened by being mixed with stories, to gaze on such things without pain, rather than fleeing from them. (Plutarch, *How to Study Poetry* 36e)

The comparison of the coming of philosophy to an initiation into mysteries is plainer perhaps in this passage than in that of *Progress in Virtue* 77d–e, but the importance of the idea in both places may be seen from a comparison with a famous passage in which Plutarch apparently describes the process of initiation:

In the beginning there is exhausted roaming and wandering around and nervous, endless journeys through darkness, then just before the end all the terrors, shivering and trembling and sweating and amazement (*φόβη καὶ τρόμος καὶ ἰδρώς καὶ θάμβος*). After this an amazing light and open spaces and meadows receive [the wanderer]... (Plutarch fr. 178 Sandbach)

‘Initiation’ is of course another common mode of figuring ‘the didactic plot’,¹⁴⁰ but of perhaps greater significance in the

¹⁴⁰ Cf. Fowler 2000: 213–15, who also cites Plutarch fr. 178 Sandbach in this connection.

current context is the obvious debt of *How to Study Poetry* 36e to Plato's allegory of the cave, and the philosopher's ascent from it, in *Republic* 7.¹⁴¹ Plato's cave was for the subsequent educational tradition the description par excellence of the ascent to knowledge and/or philosophy, of – we might say – ‘the didactic plot’, and it thus becomes tempting at least to wonder whether a link was drawn in antiquity between Plato's cave allegory and Hesiod's ‘long and steep and rough at first’ path to ἀρετή, perhaps even to the extent of seeing Plato here following in Hesiod's footsteps. The explanatory gloss on *WD* 290–2 in the Proclan scholium, which in fact makes this passage of Hesiod foreshadow Plato in another respect (a life of ἀρετή is the most pleasant life, cf. *Laws* 5.734d5–e2), is close enough to the language and ideas of *Progress in Virtue* 77d–e to allow us to entertain the idea that we can trace some of this at least back to Plutarch, despite the obvious Neoplatonic flavour of other parts of the scholium.¹⁴²

He calls the path τραχύς because it is difficult. We must learn many things of which we are ignorant and with which we at first engage only with difficulty, and we must set aside many bad habits (ἐθῆ πονηρὰ) with which we are loath to part because they have grown up with us. In short we must proceed by many laborious exercises (ἀσκήσεις). (Scholium, Hesiod, *Works and Days* 290–2 = fr. 125 Marzillo)

If anyone before Proclus was likely to have combined Plato and Hesiod, it was indeed Plutarch, but any reader familiar with both texts might have been reminded of Hesiod when Socrates describes someone from the cave being forcibly dragged up ‘in a rough and steep ascent (διὰ τραχείας τῆς ἀναβάσεως καὶ ἀνάντους)...to the light of the sun’ (*Rep.* 7.515e5–6), particularly as in Book 2 Adeimantos had cited *WD* 287–9 and then followed this with a paraphrase of vv. 290–1 as ‘a road which is long and rough and steep (ὁδὸν μακράν τε καὶ τραχεῖαν καὶ ἀνάντη)’, 2.364c8–d3.¹⁴³ Whether or not Plato meant us to remember Adeimantos' words when reading

¹⁴¹ Cf. Hunter–Russell 2011: 206–7.

¹⁴² On the issue of tracing Plutarch in the Proclan scholia cf. below pp. 167–79.

¹⁴³ The Proclan scholium glosses μακρὸς καὶ ὀρθίος as εἰς τὸ ἀνάντες ἀνάγων ἡμᾶς, and that is perhaps a reminiscence of *Rep.* 2.364d2.

about the ascent from the cave may be debated, but there are at least grounds for positing that the two ‘ascent’ passages were indeed linked in antiquity, as foundational descriptions of ‘the didactic plot’. Later, at least, no passage was more commonly cited in connection with progress in philosophy than Hesiod’s ‘long and steep path’ to virtue.¹⁴⁴

There is another way also in which Hesiodic ideas of ‘ease’ and ‘difficulty’ passed into didactic traditions. Hesiod’s path to ἀρετή becomes ‘easy’ (ρήϊδιη) when one reaches the top ‘for all its difficulty’ (*WD* 292); the expression has puzzled commentators, but – as is clear from Plutarch, *Progress in Virtue* 77d–e cited above – it fitted well with the important didactic idea of the ‘rewards of progress’. The idea of ‘ease’ is, unsurprisingly, rare in the *Works and Days*: very little is ‘easy’ for mortals, except ruin (vv. 287–8), unless their city practises justice, however easy life was in the Golden Age or is for the demigods on the Islands of the Blessed. The absence of ‘ease’ is indeed what marks our lives, because the gods keep the means of livelihood hidden (vv. 42–3). It is Zeus and the gods for whom everything is easy (vv. 5–7, 325, 379). Knowledge, however, is empowering, and Nicander was to foreground the ease with which he could instruct his addressee (*Theriaca* 1, *Alexipharmaca* 4) in a radical appropriation of the Hesiodic idea.¹⁴⁵ The poet has now reached the (Hesiodic) summit from which he can, god-like, dispense knowledge; it is perhaps not unreasonable to think also of Lucretius:

sed nil dulcius est, bene quam munita tenere
edita doctrina sapientium templa serena,
despicere unde queas alios passimque uidere
errare atque uiam palantis quaerere uitae,
certare ingenio, contendere nobilitate,
noctes atque dies niti praestante labore
ad summas emergere opes rerumque potiri.

(Lucretius, *De rerum natura* 2.7–13)

¹⁴⁴ Cf., e.g., Lucian’s satirical account of Cynic philosophers who recommend unremitting toil and ‘constantly recite Hesiod’s trite (πρόνδιμο) verses about virtue and sweat and the ascent to the top’ (*Menippus* 4).

¹⁴⁵ Cf. also Dionysius Periegetes 707 (above pp. 56–7), 881, Hunter 2004: 223–6, Clauss 2006: 162–9, Jacques 2007: lxxv, Magnelli 2010: 220–1.

But there is nothing sweeter than to dwell in lofty, serene regions well fortified by the teachings of wise men, from where you may look down upon others wandering all over the place and roaming around as they seek the path of life; they compete in talent, they contend in noble birth, and night and day they strive to reach, by unremitting labour, the peak of riches and control of the world.

Nicander too has reached the summit, and he will graciously dispense his *doctrina*. Lucretius' image of the search for the *uia uitae* has many forerunners other than Hesiod, but it is Hesiod's path of ἀρετή which indeed lies at the head of the tradition.¹⁴⁶ What has most changed, however, is that it is no longer 'unremitting labour' (τὸ ἐργάζεσθαι) in a banal sense which will get you to the top where calmness and ease reign, but rather knowledge and philosophy; Lucretius in fact turns the Hesiodic message on its head – the agonistic striving for wealth (*opes*) is no longer a 'good strife', but now a pointless waste of effort, when seen in the context of what is truly valuable.

The Hesiodic heritage of the 'didactic plot' is certainly fully on show in Lucian's 'Teacher of Rhetoricians' (*Rhetorum praeceptor*), an essay which can, from one perspective, be seen as a parodic subversion of the entire pattern of ancient didactic.¹⁴⁷ The speaker, who is never named, addresses a 'young man' (μειράκιον), who has asked how to become a *rhêtôr*, and the 'roads' which lead to this goal are immediately introduced and are to become the dominant image of the whole work; the teacher, for this is how we must at first understand the speaking voice, warns his pupil that he must follow his advice φιλοπόνως, because the prize waiting at the end is indeed one worth 'a great deal of hard work and sleeplessness and putting

¹⁴⁶ On Lucretius' image see Fowler 2002: 48–52, esp. 52 on the Hesiodic background; Fowler notes that 'the image of the hill naturally suits an active philosophy like that of the Stoa, and there is a piquancy in Lucretius' use of it in an Epicurean context'. For a somewhat different perspective on Lucretius' use of Hesiod cf. Gale 2013, esp. pp. 33–4 on the 'path' image.

¹⁴⁷ For recent discussion of the *Rhetorum praeceptor* cf. Cribiore 2007, Zweimüller 2008, Gibson 2012. Gibson argues that the work is a parodic inversion of the exercise of 'elaboration' of the *chreia* 'Isocrates said that the root of education is bitter, but its fruits are sweet', such as we find in later rhetorical texts; even if this does not actually explain the work, the article offers useful comparative material for understanding Lucian's essay.

up with anything at all' (2). If the irony is already hard to miss, it becomes blatant when the teacher then says that the path by which he will lead his pupil upwards is not the hopelessly steep path of struggle, but actually a very pleasant stroll through flowery meadows involving no hardship and 'no sweat' whatsoever (cf. 10, *WD* 289); one can acquire one's goal 'in an instant...virtually in your sleep' (3). Hesiod himself is then adduced as the exemplum which undermines the Hesiodic didactic model: if Hesiod could instantaneously move from shepherd to poet on Mt Helicon, what is to stop someone finding 'the swiftest path' to becoming a rhetorician (4).¹⁴⁸

The *Rhetorum praeceptor* is an extensive inversion of Hesiod and of the didactic tradition as a whole; it is a lesson in how to avoid πόνος, a return (8) to the Golden Age when everything grew without any effort on our part. The speaker paints a picture of Rhetoric on the top of a high mountain and explicitly adduces Hesiod (7) for the two different paths which lead to her; he himself was innocent enough to take, as did the likes of Plato and Demosthenes, the tough road of hard work when he was young, but now he knows better. The picture then becomes yet another replay of Prodicus' 'Heracles at the crossroads', with two guides conjured up by the speaking voice to compete for the young man's attention: one is toughened and tanned, a 'manly' figure who is presumably an image of Hesiod or one of his ideal farmers and who would guide the young man along the rough and steep path of πόνος, whereas the other is an effeminate and perfumed individual of mincing gait who offers (unsurprisingly) an utterly meretricious way of impressing gullible crowds on the basis of very little knowledge, a few hyper-atticisms and very considerable sexual inventiveness.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁸ For an apparently non-parodic use of the idea of 'learning without πόνος' cf. Dio 18.5–6, on the literary training necessary for a political career.

¹⁴⁹ It is not just the two guides who are differentiated sexually, but so to some extent is the end in view. Whereas the guide on the tough road holds out hope of a 'lawful marriage' with Rhetoric (9), the other route offers the opportunity of 'being with' (i.e. 'sleeping with', συνελθῖναι) Rhetoric while still in the prime of strength (10). The eroticisation of the young man's quest or hunt (cf. θήραμα, 2) is another 'didactic plot' which is here ironised; Ovid, of course, had already done this at great length. For the Platonic background to the image cf., e.g., *Republic* 6.496a: inappropriate 'liaisons' with Philosophy produce (lit. 'give birth to') nothing but sophisms.

The two figures are, of course, also personifications, not just of different educational methods, but also of different rhetorical styles, the manly style of substance and the effeminized style of sexy surface and empty interior. There is no need here to go through these παραινέσεις ῥητορικάι, ‘rhetorical precepts’ (cf. 25), in any detail, for the point is clear enough: in Hesiod the smooth and easy path led to κακότης; this is still very much the case, but κακότης (κακία in Prodicus’ fable) is now the desired end and indeed the end of the teacher’s autobiographical lesson: he has indeed reached the ‘topmost peak in every vice’ (τὸν ἀκρότατον ἐν πάσῃ κακίᾳ, 25).

The ending of the work remains, however, pointedly open. At the end the voice of the original teacher returns; declaring himself ἀγεννῆς . . . καὶ δειλός, ‘lacking in fine instincts and courage’, he says that he will now get out of the way and cease offending Rhetoric gratuitously,¹⁵⁰ for he has nothing to offer to her; the pupil has already beaten him, not because he was swifter, but because he took a path which was very easy and downhill. This ending has been variously interpreted, and some scholars have wanted to see a genuinely autobiographical declaration by Lucian – this is his ‘farewell to Rhetoric’;¹⁵¹ this is then often combined with a concern to identify the object of Lucian’s satire, usually thought to be the rhetorician Pollux.¹⁵² Such approaches are not, of course, necessarily wrong, but they must be complemented by an appreciation of how the ending of the essay twists the knife in the didactic tradition for the final time. The teacher realises that the skill he has to teach is of no intrinsic value and is in fact a way of life with which he does not wish to be associated; it is almost as if Hesiod suddenly declared that actually he was going to spend his time sitting around in the λέσχη, for he too is δειλός. From another perspective, however, we can see how Lucian’s essay descends from Plato’s presentation of rhetoric in the *Gorgias*, where rhetoric is contrasted with the pursuit through philosophy of the health of one’s soul. The choice between two paths to rhetoric which

¹⁵⁰ This seems to be the meaning of ἐπιτολάζων, cf. Plutarch, *QC* 2.1.634c.

¹⁵¹ Cf., e.g., Weissenberger 1996: 49. ¹⁵² Cf., e.g., Hall 1981: 39–41.

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the modern teacher sets before the young man is not, primarily at least, a choice where what is at stake is a better self or a healthy soul, as were the two paths which confronted the young Heracles in Prodicus' fable; it is rhetorical success at which the young man aims (1), and when what matters is the end not the means, why take the trouble to go by the long path, if it carries no reward?

The *Phainomena* of Aratus

The only certain fragment of Callimachus' prose work *Against Praxiphanes*, a Peripatetic philosopher and critic of the generation before Callimachus,¹⁵³ is the report that in that essay Callimachus 'greatly praised [Aratus] as very learned and an excellent poet (πολυμαθῆς καὶ ἄριστος ποιητής)' (fr. 460 Pf.).¹⁵⁴ If taken at face value, and Callimachus' famous epigram (27 Pf.) in praise of Aratus would seem to encourage us to do so,¹⁵⁵ then Callimachus not only expressed his admiration for Aratus, and very probably for the *Phainomena*, but also set that admiration within the framework of a traditional debate. Heraclitus had claimed that 'great learning (πολυμαθίη) does not teach one to have understanding (νόος), for [if it did] it would have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras and again Xenophanes and Hecataeus' (fr. 40 D-K), and there is evidence that a philosophical debate about the value of 'much learning' continued into Hellenistic times.¹⁵⁶ Heraclitus here dismisses the claims to understanding, and hence 'didactic authority', of four 'teachers' who themselves had been taught nothing; it is very likely that πολυμαθίη was particularly chosen to resonate against the

¹⁵³ Cf. Brink 1946, Pfeiffer 1968: 136.

¹⁵⁴ What is almost certainly another reference to the same passage uses πολυγράμματος rather than πολυμαθῆς; the latter seems much more likely to have been Callimachus' word.

¹⁵⁵ Cf. below pp. 292–301.

¹⁵⁶ Cf., esp., Ath. 13.610b–c, citing Timon, *SH* 794 = 20 Di Marco, with Di Marco 1989: 154, adducing (*inter alia*) Democritus fr. 64, 65 D-K. In that passage of Athenaeus Cynulcus attacks his fellow-guest Myrsilus' πολυμαθία as displayed in a prodigious catalogue of names (ὀνόματα); it is easy enough to see how the poet of the *Theogony* (at least) could be subsumed into such a rhetoric.

‘oneness’ of wisdom declared in fr. 41 D-K, and in fr. 57 D-K Heraclitus declares that ‘Hesiod was the teacher of most people (πλείστον), for they believe that he knows most things (πλείστα), though he even failed to recognise day and night, which are in fact one’.¹⁵⁷ However common the distinction between ‘learning’ and ‘intelligence’ had become, it is at least tempting to believe that in applying πολυμαθής to Aratus, a poet who very deliberately placed himself within the Hesiodic line of descent as Callimachus knew only too well (cf. *Epigram* 27 Pf.), Callimachus is reclaiming πολυμαθία as a virtue for a ‘Hesiodic’ poet in the face of Heraclitus’ sarcasm. We may also wonder how much weight was placed by Callimachus on the noun ποιητής: was he, for example, here taking a position in the debate, familiar to us particularly from Aristotle and Strabo,¹⁵⁸ on the degree of accuracy appropriate for a poet, rather than, say, for a scientist? If so, Callimachus may perhaps have been reacting to early criticisms of Aratus’ depiction of the heavens such as are familiar to us from the following century.¹⁵⁹

However that may be, Callimachus’ stress upon πολυμαθία as an important virtue for a poet is a manifestation of a shift in ways of talking about poetry in the Hellenistic age, and one with obvious implications, not just for Callimachus himself, but for ‘didactic’ poetry generally. Strabo calls both Homer and Callimachus πολυίστωρ, poets ‘of much research/learning’ (3.2.12, 9.5.17), and Homer’s πολυμαθία was a familiar element of his Hellenistic and later reputation.¹⁶⁰ The educated culture which gave a prominent place to the collection and recording of information now fashioned the great poets of the past in its own image. Nowhere perhaps is that appropriation of the past more clearly on view than in Aratus’ adoption of a Hesiodic voice in the *Phainomena*, his poem on the fixed stars and on weather-signs.

¹⁵⁷ Cf. Koning 2010: 208–9. One wonders if Heraclitus chose this example because of the ‘days’ of Hesiod’s poem; there is, of course, no evidence for ‘Works and Days’ as a title as early as this.

¹⁵⁸ Cf. above pp. 89–91. ¹⁵⁹ Cf. below pp. 103–11.

¹⁶⁰ Cf. Hillgruber 1994–9: I 98. It is telling that πολυίστωρ is applied to Homer in a Chian decree of Augustan date, cf. Jones forthcoming.

The *Phainomena* is very obviously a special case within the didactic tradition, both because of the complex stylistic and thematic *mimesis* of the *Works and Days* which, as is well known, our text of the *Phainomena* presents,¹⁶¹ and because there is one clear sense at least in which Aratus seeks to change behaviour: he does not just want us to know and use knowledge about the constellations and weather-signs, but he also wants us to see the design of Zeus in the stars, with the concomitant turn to δίκη that that is bound to impose. It is possible that the very depth of the Hesiodic texture in Aratus is one of the signs that this poem stands somewhere near the beginning, both chronologically and thematically, of a new Hesiodic, or ‘didactic’ tradition.¹⁶² Be that as it may, the proem of the *Phainomena* directly confronts its Hesiodic heritage in order to suggest a replacement, or at least realignment, of one order, literary as well as theological, by another. Instead of the miseries and diseases which strike men silently, because ‘cunning Zeus took away their voice’, and which Pandora, inspired by Zeus, let loose in the world, we have now a world ‘full of Zeus’ (*WD* 100–4 ~ *Phain.* 2–4), and this is a Zeus who is ‘kindly’ (ἡπιος) towards men (*Phain.* 5); our γένος is ‘his’, rather than the bleakness of the iron γένος into which Hesiod places contemporary man (*WD* 176 ~ *Phain.* 5). Of particular interest in this regard is *Phainomena* 5–9:

ὁ δ' ἡπιος ἀνθρώποισι
δεξιὰ σημαίνει, λαούς δ' ἐπὶ ἔργον ἐγείρει
μυμήσκων βιότοιον· λέγει δ' ὅτε βῶλος ἀρίστη
βουσί τε καὶ μακέλησι, λέγει δ' ὅτε δεξιὰ ὥραι
καὶ φυτὰ γυρῶσαι καὶ σπέρματα πάντα βαλέσθαι.
(Aratus, *Phainomena* 5–9)

In his kindness Zeus gives helpful signs to men and rouses people to work, reminding them of their livelihood. He tells when the soil is best for oxen and mattocks, and tells when the seasons are right for digging in plants and for sowing seeds of all kinds.

¹⁶¹ For discussion and bibliography cf. Fakas 2001, Fantuzzi–Hunter 2004: 224–38.

¹⁶² It is a great pity that we do not know more of Menecrates of Ephesos, a γραμματικός who is said to have been a teacher of Aratus, and to have composed a hexameter Ἔργα in at least two books (*SH* 542–50); the very scanty traces of his work show him as an imitator of Hesiod.

In v. 6 Zeus takes the place of Hesiod's 'good *eris*' in rousing people to work (*WD* 20),¹⁶³ but in vv. 7–9 we may be reminded of nothing so much as summary ancient accounts of what is in the *Works and Days*, such as Aristophanes' 'workings of the earth, seasons for crops, ploughings' (*Frogs* 1033, above) or Lucian's 'advice for farmers, all about the Pleiades and the right times for ploughing and harvesting and sailing and everything else' (*Hesiod* 1).¹⁶⁴ Who in Greek tradition, then, actually 'says' these things, other than Zeus himself? Hesiod, in the *Works and Days*. Once we have seen that, it is easier to see that vv. 6–7, 'he rouses people to work (ἐργον), reminding them of their livelihood', is also a perfect description of the message of the *Works and Days*, as we have repeatedly seen. In vv. 6–9, then, Aratus' Zeus replaces Hesiod as the 'authority' for agricultural time: Hesiod may sing of the Pleiades and other signs for work, but it is Zeus who is responsible for them (cf. αὐτός in v. 10); in fact, however, the *Works and Days* itself is fashioned by Aratus into one of Zeus's most important 'signs'.¹⁶⁵

Aratus' *Phainomena* is central to any discussion of ancient didactic poetry also because we have relatively generous information about its early reception. Callimachus' famous epigram (27 Pf.) acknowledges both the Hesiodic inspiration and the skill of the verses,¹⁶⁶ but astronomers, mathematicians and

¹⁶³ For ancient interpretations of *Phain.* 6 cf. below pp. 216–26.

¹⁶⁴ μακέλησι in *Phain.* 8 evokes Hesiod's description of ploughing and sowing at *WD* 467–71. Cf. also the Proclan scholia on vv. 381–2 cited above p. 84. As has long been acknowledged, the close of v. 7 reworks *Odyssey* 18.374, a very 'Hesiodic' passage.

¹⁶⁵ Something of this interplay between the poet and Zeus is appropriated in Leonidas' epigram about the *Phainomena* (*AP* 9.25 = *HE* 2573–8), in which Aratus is described as 'second to Zeus, because he made the stars shine brighter'; for some discussion of this epigram cf. Volk 2012, esp. 220–1.

¹⁶⁶ On this epigram cf. below pp. 292–301. There remains uncertainty among some modern scholars as to whether Callimachus refers in this poem to Hesiod's *Works and Days* or to the lost *Astronomia* ascribed to him (fr. 288–93 M-W, cf. below p. 105). That the *Phainomena* contains echoes of the Hesiodic *Astronomia* must, on purely general grounds, be thought likely (though the case of Hes. fr. 293 ~ *Phain.* 45–6 is complicated by Hesiod fr. 70.23, which the Aratean scholia quote), as of course there are also echoes of the *Theogony* (cf., e.g., Maass 1892: 276–7, Kidd 1997: 8–9). Nevertheless, the nature of the *Phainomena* itself, with, for example, its rewriting of the myth of races from the *Works and Days*, would seem to make the *Works and Days* both Aratus' privileged model and the reference of the

others engaged in a very lively debate on the correctness of Aratus' information and his status as an astronomer. Our information ranges from anecdotes claiming that King Antigonos deliberately gave Aratus and Nicander material to work on about which they knew nothing (*Vita* I, 8.25–9.1 Martin; cf. Cia. *De orat.* 1.69) to the second-century commentary on Aratus and Eudoxus by Hipparchus of Bithynia;¹⁶⁷ from somewhat later came a work of Posidonius entitled 'On the comparison of Aratus and Homer on mathematics' (fr. 48 Kidd). The very number of scholars and scientists who discussed or commented upon the *Phainomena* marks a very unusual concentration of attention upon a post-Homeric, and indeed Hellenistic, poem, and is perhaps a further sign that it early attracted attention, perhaps as a generically innovative experiment.¹⁶⁸ One strand in the debate was clearly an effort to claim (or retain) 'science' for 'scientists' (writing in prose). In his introduction, for example, Hipparchus notes that 'many others' have previously commented upon the *Phainomena*, including his older contemporary, the μαθηματικός Attalus of Rhodes, but that it requires little effort simply to expound the sense (διάνοια) of the poem, for the poet is 'simple and concise, and moreover clear for those even of moderate knowledge', whereas 'understanding' Aratus' subject-matter and knowing what he has got right and what wrong, this should be the business of a 'scientist', μαθηματικῆς ἱδίων ἐμπειρίας (I.I.4). ἐμπειρία is indeed a key word in this debate: Hipparchus goes on to note that Eudoxus, from whom Aratus took his material, wrote about the heavens ἐμπειρότερον, but Aratus' poem seems plausible both because of the winning χάρις of poetry and because of the authority

Callimachean epigram, but it is worth noting too that ancient scholarship seems to have been in no doubt about this, in comparing, for example, the poems of the *Works and Days* and the *Phainomena*. The author of the discussion of Aratus in *POxy* 4648 clearly looks to the *Works and Days* for his comparative material.

¹⁶⁷ For recent discussion of aspects of Hipparchus' commentary relevant to the present discussion cf. Tueller–Macfarlane 2009, Netz 2009: 168–71, and 182–7 on the *Phainomena* more generally.

¹⁶⁸ The catalogue of Aratean commentators at Maass 1892: 149–63 is a very mixed bag, but gives some sense of the interest the poem aroused; Maass 1892: 163–4 notes the prominence of Stoics in this catalogue.

of his sources (1.1.7–8). Moreover, continues Hipparchus, it is perhaps unfair to criticise Aratus for mistakes when he was only following Eudoxus and was not making a display of the results of his own scientific researches. Hipparchus' argument here is in part a 'scientific' version of a 'philosophical' observation made earlier about Hesiod by the author of the Platonic *Epinomis*:

[People are] unaware that the man who is truly an astronomer is very wise, not someone practising astronomy like Hesiod and all such people who have studied settings and risings, but the man who has studied seven orbits of the eight ... ([Plato], *Epinomis* 990a)

Whether the author has the *Works and Days* or the Hesiodic *Astronomia* principally in mind,¹⁶⁹ we recognise a 'marking of territory' in some ways similar to what we find in Hipparchus. The advent of a self-conscious rhetoric of science was marked in part by efforts to put poetry firmly in its place.

Central to that new scientific rhetoric were claims for the usefulness of the knowledge that science provided, and here a Hipparchus was seeking to appropriate virtues which, as Aristophanes' *Frogs* 1030–6 (above p. 86) comically exemplifies, had long been ascribed to poetry and, as for example Proclus' introduction to the *Works and Days* will show, would long continue to be so. Hipparchus thus claims that his work will be 'very helpful' (ὠφελιμώτατον) in clearing up Aratus' errors in the most fundamental (χρησιμώτατα) points (1.1.4–5). Throughout his discussion Hipparchus' watchwords are truth and ἀκρίβεια, 'detailed accuracy', and the scholia to Aratus, however late and/or mixed their date, allow us to glimpse some of the rhetoric 'on the other side' against which Hipparchus was struggling. The scholia are full of approval for Aratus' ἀκρίβεια; thus, for example, when confronted with an apparent failing of ἀκρίβεια, the scholiast (scholium on v. 322, p. 237.11–16) gives vent to his indignation: 'Is it the case that, having been accurate and detailed (τὴν ἀκρίβειαν ἐνδειξάμενος) in everything

¹⁶⁹ Cf. above p. 103 n. 166.

else, Aratus has slipped up in this one thing? Not at all...'. Weather-signs may be a less 'objective' realm of observational science than the movements of the stars, but here too the scholia recognize what Aratus is trying to do for us:

Aratus has given us signs (τεκμήρια) from the stars and the sun and the moon and the Manger which are god-sent (θεῖα) and true, as he knows that not all men are knowledgeable (ἐπιστήμονες) about heavenly matters, nor are educated in the detail (ἀκριβεῖς καὶ πεπαιδευμένοι) of grasping the signs in the heavens; he instructs us (διδασκαλίαν ποιεῖται) also from the signs that appear on the earth, such as from the sea, from birds, from fire, from animals and from many other things,¹⁷⁰ thus providing us with a power of understanding (κατάληψις) which is extremely useful (χρησιμωτάτη). (Schol. Aratus, *Phainomena* 909, p. 440.11–441.3 Martin)

Part of Hipparchus' problem was that 'scientists' too, most notably (for Hipparchus) Attalus, often appeared blind to Aratus' failings. At one point, Hipparchus cites a claim by Attalus that, with a particular correction of his own, 'the poet will appear to have described the belt not only knowledgeably (ἐμπείρως) but also with detailed accuracy (ἀκριβῶς)' (2.3.23), a result which brought Attalus considerable satisfaction;¹⁷¹ for Hipparchus, however, even the thought that ἀκριβεία was Aratus' principal aim is not worth entertaining (2.3.24).

It will be clear that the focus of attention in the ancient debate about the *Phainomena* was Aratus' knowledge (or lack of it) and his relationship to Eudoxus, rather than the didactic intention (or otherwise) of his poem.¹⁷² Such intention may, however, have been taken for granted, both because ancient

¹⁷⁰ The text is somewhat uncertain here, but the meaning is not in doubt.

¹⁷¹ On this passage cf. Tueller–Macfarlane 2009: 242–4. This passage also reminds us that another strand of the ancient struggle to find the didactic in poetry leads from the Platonic Socrates' questioning of the rhapsode Ion about the 'technical' parts of Homer through Aristotle's insistence that a poem which is 'well made' does not have to be accurate in all its details through to Strabo's observation (there is some uncertainty about the text) that 'we do not require that the poet should have made accurate enquiries about every detail (ἀκριβῶς ἕκαστα πυθέσθαι) nor do we demand accuracy (τὸ ἀκριβές) from him' (1.2.13), cf. Hunter 2012: 100–4.

¹⁷² As is well known, however, some modern readers have put the question of intention at the centre of the debate; Effe 2005: 28 claims that the success of the *Phainomena* as an educational textbook was 'contrary to the author's intention' and Tueller–Macfarlane 2009: 234 observe that 'the critical attention paid to the poem's astronomy in the next century... may well have surprised the poet'.

readers were less conscious of this issue than we are – poets were and always had been ‘teachers’ – and because Aratus’ declared desire ἀστέρας εἰπεῖν (v. 17), ‘to tell the stars’, may have left little room for doubt. Moreover, the accuracy or otherwise of Aratus’ information was not in antiquity really a separate issue from that of the didactic quality of the poem. Strabo’s response to Eratosthenes, who had indeed put the matter in terms of intention (‘every poet aims at (στοχάζεσθαι) entertainment, not instruction’ (Strabo 1.2.3), makes that very plain (cf. above pp. 89–90); thus, for example, it is to Strabo self-evident, as we have seen, that the accurate use of descriptive adjectives for particular places, ‘grassy Haliartos’ (*Iliad* 2.503) for example, a feature of Homer admitted even by Eratosthenes, is the mark of someone engaged in instruction rather than entertainment (1.2.3).¹⁷³ On the other hand, Aratus’ natural inclusion of mythical and ‘poetic’ material posed problems for those who wanted to insist on the work’s ‘scientific’ quality, and this material is instructive for the *Works and Days* also.¹⁷⁴ The first ‘myth’ of the *Phainomena* is the legend of the Bears who are said to have cared for the baby Zeus and were subsequently catasterised:

εἰ ἔτεδ' ὀν δή,

Κρήτηθεν κείναι γε Διὸς μεγάλου ἰότητι
οὐρανὸν εἰσανέβησαν, ὃ μιν τότε κουρίζοντα
Δίκτηι ἐν εὐώδει, ὄρεος σχεδὸν Ἰδαίοιο,
ἄνθρωποι ἐγκατέθεντο καὶ ἔτρεφον εἰς ἐνιαυτόν,
Δικταῖοι Κούρητες ὅτε Κρόνον ἐψεύδοντο.
(Aratus, *Phainomena* 30–5)

If the story is true, these Bears ascended to heaven from Crete through the will of great Zeus, because when he was at that time still a baby, they placed

¹⁷³ Cf. Kim 2010: 61.

¹⁷⁴ Netz 2009: 170–1 stresses that Hipparchus makes no concessions to Aratus qua poet, treating him rather as a bad scientist in need of correction: ‘[Hipparchus] keeps shadow-boxing the straw figure of Aratus, the prose author’. When cross-examined in Lucian’s *Hesiod*, the archaic poet protests, in a version of what was by then a very familiar argument, that poetry is not to be examined in the minutest detail (ἐς τὸ λεπτότατον ἀκριβολογούμενους), that ‘freedom and licence (ἐξουσία) in composition’ are the greatest blessing which poets have, and that Homer too has suffered from such captious criticism (Lucian, *Hesiod* 5).

A didactic poem?

him in a cave on fragrant Dicte¹⁷⁵ near Mount Ida and nurtured him for a year, while the Dictaeon Kouretes deceived Kronos.

In modern times the verses have been discussed largely for their possible links to Callimachus' *Hymn to Zeus*,¹⁷⁶ but the surviving scholia show us the ancient struggle to accommodate mythic material to 'scientific' verse, a compromise between the opposed poles of the dichotomy, ultimately derived from Aristotle, of the ποιητικόν and the φυσικόν. Unfortunately, the relevant scholium has been garbled in transmission, but in part at least reads:

His poem involves material which is particular to a poet, I mean¹⁷⁷ myth, but appropriately and not unreasonably (κατὰ καιρὸν μέντοι, οὐκ ἀπιθάνως): he introduces it qua poet, but as he is discussing natural science (φυσικά) he does not give the impression of totally going along with it. His 'if the story is true' marks someone who is uncertain. (Schol. Aratus, *Phainomena* 30–3, p. 80.5–10 Martin)

The scholia regularly mark the 'poetic' nature of passages in which, for example, the stars appear to be given emotions or to behave as humans might, but it is of course Aratus' Hesiodising story of the maiden Justice which provides the most important test-case:

All those who have seriously discussed (κατέλεξαν) the maiden are talking nonsense. The poet has composed the whole with the riddling licence given to poets: he represents Justice as uncorrupted [i.e. virginal] and leaving the earthly sphere because of the increase in wickedness to take up residence in heaven. This is what Hesiod too said about Aidos and Nemesis, 'And then to Olympus from earth' and so forth (*Works and Days* 197–200), as he attempted by means of reproach to turn us towards justice. (Schol. Aratus, *Phainomena* 96–7, p. 123.8–18 Martin)

Both Hesiod and Aratus, then, use mythic material qua poets, but do so to didactic ends.¹⁷⁸ The Proclan scholia on *Works and*

¹⁷⁵ On the problems of the text here cf. the note of Kidd ad loc. and J. Martin 1998: 72–9; the reading in v. 33 does not affect the present discussion.

¹⁷⁶ Cf. Kidd 1997: 184–5. ¹⁷⁷ Reading Maass's λέγω for the transmitted λέγων.

¹⁷⁸ Scholiastic material preserved in one manuscript proceeds to observe that the story of the Maiden shows that Aratus was a poet, but one who took his material from astronomers (p. 124.1–3 Martin). Pöhlmann 1973: 882–3 argues that, unlike Hesiod's Myth of the Races, Aratus' Myth of the Maiden is not tied to what Aratus

Days 109–10 (= fr. 69 Marzillo) note that Hesiod's Myth of Races is 'poetic', 'metaphor and the presentation of the truth through images is poetic', which in this case means 'higher than the Hesiodic norm', but what really needs stressing is that this is still 'the truth'.

The scholia here stand at the end of a long grammatical tradition which had sought to mark the space of 'the poetic' by the application of various criteria, beyond the most basic, that of metre. Principal among these criteria were the broad categories of κατασκευή, roughly 'stylistic elaboration', and the presence of ψευδος, 'fabrication', which did not exclude of course the presence also of elements of truth;¹⁷⁹ the dispute about the nature of the *Phainomena* which the scholia allow us to glimpse is in fact part of the same broad struggle over the nature of 'poetry' and 'science' which we see at great length in Strabo's attempt both to salvage Homer's geographical reliability after Eratosthenes' attack and to explain and defend the poet's obvious use of the mythical.¹⁸⁰ Another witness to this struggle is Plutarch. In a very paedagogical mode and one focused on the potential dangers concealed within poetry, Plutarch can deny the status of poetry to the poems of Empedocles, Parmenides, Nicander and Theognis because 'we do not know any poetry which does not contain μῦθος or ψευδος' (*How to Study Poetry* 16c); just before this claim he has offered a list

wishes to teach and hardly illustrates 'Stoic *pronoia*'; it is merely an excursus marking Aratus' poem as Hesiodic. This is not the way one at least of the views held in antiquity saw the matter (cf. below on the scholia to v. 136), but a wider question too arises: that Justice observes us from the heavens above can hardly be unrelated to the omnipresence of Zeus which is stressed in the prologue. The Maiden has, in fact, a very important didactic function, cf., e.g., Schiesaro 1996. Of course, the existence of discussion of the characteristics of poetry, such as myth, made a difference to the way poetry was actually written, but that is a rather different matter.

¹⁷⁹ For relevant passages and bibliography cf. Pöhlmann 1973: 819–20, Hunter–Russell 2011: 86. Quintilian's verdict on the *Phainomena* – *nulla uarietas, nullus affectus, nulla persona, nulla cuiusquam oratio* (10.1.55) – also evokes lists of criteria for 'poeticness'; the absence of 'characters who speak', of προσωποποιία, became in later antiquity one of the defining marks of didactic poetry, cf. Pöhlmann 1973: 828–9.

¹⁸⁰ For Strabo, even Homer's use of myth was more refined than that of his successors because he did not 'fill everything with marvels (τερατεύμενος), but contributes to knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) through the use of allegory or the revision of myth or making myths entertaining (δημαγωγῶν)' (1.2.7).

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of some of the other characteristics of poetry – ‘metre, figures of speech, elevation (ὄγκος) of diction, timely use of metaphor, harmonious word-arrangement’ – none of which, however, are as potent as μυθολογία (*How to Study Poetry* 16b). So too, the extant scholia to the grammar of Dionysius Thrax identify four necessary characteristics of any poem: ‘metre, myth, narrative, diction of a particular kind’. That such attempts at definition necessitated a constant recourse to judgement and the weighing up of balances when actual poems were being considered is clearly revealed in the scholia both to Hesiod and to Aratus.

For some, Aratus overstepped the mark: the scholia (p. 140.8–17 Martin) tell us that Aratus was criticised for drawing out (παρατείνειν) the myth of the Maiden to excessive length, in comparison to the earlier myth of Zeus and the Bears; presumably, those critics will have seen Aratus here weakening his claim to be ‘scientific’ and ‘didactic’, but the defence which the surviving scholia offer again has recourse precisely to Aratus’ role as teacher:

[In defence] we say that since the earlier myth, the one about the Bears and Zeus, was in part blasphemous, but this one is helpful for men’s lives (βιωφελής . . . τοῖς ἀνθρώποις), for this reason he extended it. (Schol. Aratus, *Phainomena* 136, p. 140.10–12 Martin)

Here too we can see the abundant signs of a struggle to find the appropriate balance between mythic, ‘poetic’ material and material which was ‘scientific’ and/or useful to human life (χρήσιμον, βιωφελές),¹⁸¹ and, from another perspective, this was no less than a struggle to establish parameters for ‘didactic

¹⁸¹ βιωφελές is a word particularly found in association with the didactic, Aratean tradition. It occurs only twice in Homeric scholia: bT-scholia on *Iliad* 9.497, where ‘even the gods themselves may be turned’ (introducing the Litai) is described as ἀποφθεγματικόν, and this latter term is defined as ‘when something useful (βιωφελές) is described in a brief utterance’ (a definition easily applicable to the gnomic element in Hesiod), and bT-scholia on *Iliad* 18.88–9, where an utterance of Achilles to Thetis which conforms to our own human experience is described as ἡθικόν καὶ βιωφελές. The Aratean scholia (in Martin’s edition) yield twelve examples; of particular interest is the scholium on v. 733 (p. 371.12 Martin) which describes the central transition of the poem: ‘After finishing his account of the seasons through understanding of the stars, he passes to another very useful (σφόδρα βιωφελές) work called Διοσημεΐαι’. On the description of Aesop at the opening of the *Life of Aesop* as ὁ πάντα βιωφελέστατος cf. below pp. 261–2.

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poetry'. As we have seen with regard to the myth of the Maiden as a whole, the poetic will generally be subservient to the useful in the mainstream of this critical tradition. The myth ends with the Maiden's flight to heaven:

καὶ τότε μισήσασα Δίκη κείνων γένος ἀνδρῶν
ἔπταθ' ὑπουρανίη, ταύτην δ' ἄρα νάσσαστο χώρην,
ἥχι περ ἐννουχίη ἔτι φαίνεται ἀνθρώποισι
Παρθένος ἐγγὺς ἐοῦσα πολυσκέπτοιο Βοώτεω.

(Aratus, *Phainomena* 133–6)

Then Justice, feeling hatred for the race of these men, flew up to heaven and took up residence in that place, where at night she appears to men as the Maiden close to far-seen Bootes.

The scholia on the final verse observe that the way the poet has expressed himself is 'poetic': 'the Maiden (Justice) wants men to pursue farming and the quiet (ἀπράγμων) life, and for this reason her star has been placed near Bootes ('the ploughman')' (p. 140.1–4 Martin). The mythical mode through which meaning is created is poetic, but the message could not be more didactic; the scholia make such observations precisely because they are treating Aratus as something more than just a poet. In this particular instance the message could also not be more Hesiodic: for Proclus, the *Works and Days* also summons us to be concerned with the management of our estates and the quiet life, ἡ οἰκονομία καὶ ἀπράγμων ζωή (Proleg. Aa Pertusi).

A moral poem?¹⁸²

In the sequence which followed the 'Reply to the Telchines' at the head of the *Aitia*, Callimachus apparently compared his dream experience to that of Hesiod's meeting with the Muses on Mt Helicon:

ποιμένι μῆλα νέμοντι παρ' ἵχινον ὀξέος ἵππου
Ἑσιόδωι Μουσέων ἐσμὸς ὅτ' ἠγντίασεν
μ]έν οἱ Χάεος γενεσ[
]ἐπὶ πτέρνης ὕδα[

¹⁸² This section is a revised version of Hunter 2008b, where more detailed argument about the passage of Callimachus should be sought.

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τεύχων ὡς ἑτέρῳι τις ἔῳι κακὸν ἥπατι τεύχει
]ῶ ζῶειν ἄξιον α[
].εν πάντες σε· τὸ γα[
].δε πρήσσειν εὖμα[
 (Callimachus fr. 2 Pf. (= 4 Massimilla))

5

When the bevy of Muses met the shepherd Hesiod as he grazed his flocks beside the print of the swift horse ... the creation (?) of Chaos ... at the water (?) of the hoof ... a man who fashions harm for another fashions it for his own liver ... to live worthily (?) ... everyone you ... easy (?) to achieve

Lobel and Pfeiffer understood vv. 3–5 to be a statement that on Helicon the Muses taught Hesiod not just the *Theogony* (v.3), but also the *Works and Days* (v.5), and this interpretation has, I think rightly, held the field ever since.¹⁸³ The choice of the (?) creation of Chaos to stand for the *Theogony* is readily understandable. In vv. 104–13 of that poem Hesiod invokes the Muses who have been the subject of the extended proem and asks them to sing of the earlier gods, the creation of the cosmos and the Olympian gods and the distribution of honours and functions among them; vv. 114–16 conclude the invocation and move on to the first subject:

ταῦτά μοι ἔσπετε Μοῦσαι Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχουσαι
 ἐξ ἀρχῆς, καὶ εἴπαθ', ὅτι πρῶτον γένετ' αὐτῶν.
 ἦτοι μὲν πρῶτιστα Χάος γένετ'
 (Hesiod, *Theogony* 114–16)

Tell me these things, Muses who dwell on Olympus, from the beginning, and say which of them was created first. First of all was created Chaos ...

Both ἀρχή and πρῶτιστα strongly mark these verses – or could by later readers be seen as so doing – as the beginning of ‘the poem proper’; Chaos is the first thing about which the Muses told Hesiod.¹⁸⁴

On the standard interpretation of fr. 2 Pf., Callimachus has rewritten *Works and Days* 265, or perhaps 265–6 (which are cited both separately and together in antiquity), and made this

¹⁸³ Cf. Di Benedetto 1995.

¹⁸⁴ Cf. Fantuzzi–Hunter 2004: 53, citing further evidence for Chaos as the ‘beginning’ of the *Theogony*.

A moral poem?

rewriting a kind of ‘shorthand’ reference to the whole Hesiodic poem:

οἱ τ' αὐτῶι κακὰ τεύχει ἀνὴρ ἄλλωι κακὰ τεύχων,
ἡ δὲ κακὴ βουλή τῶι βουλευέσαντι κακίστη.
(Hesiod, *Works and Days* 265–6)

The man who devises evil against another devises evil against himself; evil plans turn out worst for the plotter himself.

Why has Callimachus chosen these verses to represent the whole Hesiodic poem?¹⁸⁵ A number of answers suggest themselves. The naively proverbial structure captures an important signature of Hesiodic expression, particularly when set within the refined structures of Callimachean verse and the Callimachean poetic voice,¹⁸⁶ and by using these Hesiodic verses, Callimachus can pick up in the dream-sequence the Reply's theme of malignant *phthonos* and the damage it does to the liver of the malignant (fr. 1.8),¹⁸⁷ an idea which is thrown into relief by Callimachus' introduction of ἥπαρ into his rewriting of Hesiod; the Telchines themselves thus become prime examples of the wisdom of *WD* 265–6. Hesiod's constructed position as Callimachus' forerunner and authorising model is also reinforced; both stand under the protection of Apollo and the Muses (cf. *Theogony* 94–5), and both suffer from the machinations of those who really only harm themselves. The Hesiodic couplet stresses – for our benefit and the benefit of the Telchines – that ‘evil plotting’ has serious consequences for the plotters themselves, not just for their descendants or their societies (vv. 238–47). If we push the verses hard, we might say that the spiteful muttering (ἐπιτρύζειν) of the Telchines amounts

¹⁸⁵ On the use of this Hesiodic motto in the *Life of Aesop* cf. below pp. 262–4.

¹⁸⁶ Callimachus' rewriting of v. 265 is itself an *epideixis* of a style which is truly λεπταλέων: the repetition κακὰ τεύχει... κακὰ τεύχων is eliminated with κακόν now serving two verbs and the two halves of the hexameter interlaced rather than standing independently as in Hesiod, the colourless οἱ τ' αὐτῶι is replaced by ἐῶι... ἥπατι, which picks up important themes of the 'Reply' (cf. Hunter 2008b: 154–5), and the whole verse is framed by τεύχων... τεύχει.

¹⁸⁷ Cf. further Cameron 1995: 129–30, Hunter 2008b: 154–5. Harder 2003: 301–2 associates the choice of v. 265 with the fact that a number of the *aitia* show ‘evil people causing their own destruction’.

to ‘plotting’ with the prospect of *future* ‘(evil) action’ rather than action in the present, and so this Hesiodic warning is precisely what they need. Callimachus, on the other hand, speaks directly and straightforwardly to the Telchines in a demonstration of ‘straight-talking’, ἰθύνειν μύθους, whereas the Telchines’ indirect mutterings are as σκολιά, ‘crooked/devious’, as one could hope to find (cf. *WD* 263–4).

Callimachus here suggests, without actually insisting upon, the chronological priority of the *Theogony* over the *Works and Days*; this order, suggested of course by the works themselves, has also been fruitfully explored by modern scholarship in terms of Hesiod’s narrative presentation of his poetic self.¹⁸⁸ There is, however, more at stake in this sequence, when it becomes established as traditional reading practice, than mere chronology. To put it very simply, the cosmos and the divine order must first be established through the performance of the *Theogony*, and then human morality and the conduct of human life through the *Works and Days*; there is thus a meaningful structure to this sequential narrative, which is not just an accident of the flow of poetic inspiration. Moreover, this structure may be thought to be a ‘natural’ interpretation of the relevant passage of the *Works and Days* itself. Hesiod appeals to the *basileis* to practise justice, because (γάρ in vv. 249, 252) Zeus’ ‘thrice countless’ guardians and Dike herself are watching (*WD* 248–64). The verses with which we are concerned then follow, to some extent repeating the thought of the previous section, but also making more explicit that evil plotting, not just evil actions, has nasty consequences for the plotter; Zeus’ eye which ‘sees and understands everything’ (v. 267) is not explicitly said to be the reason why ‘evil plans turn out worst for the plotter’, but the juxtaposition, together with the sequence of thought which has immediately preceded, makes that inference overwhelmingly easy. Gods are a necessary precondition, as well as a reason, for human beings to behave properly to one another. We may perhaps be reminded of the famous verses of (probably) Critias in which Sisyphus argues that the idea of gods, ‘who

¹⁸⁸ Cf. Most 1993 and id. 2006: xxi–ii.

hear everything which is said among mortals and see everything which is done', was invented by some very clever man as a way of stopping mortals doing wrong secretly (fr. 19 K-S); the idea of that passage, despite its very contemporary resonances, is in fact a reworking of Hesiodic ideas, with 'real' gods replaced by fictional ones.¹⁸⁹

Callimachus' use of v. 265 to evoke the *Works and Days* fashions it as a poem about morality and shared communal values. Hesiod's poem had certainly played its part in fifth- and fourth-century debates about Justice and morality,¹⁹⁰ and it may well be precisely to those debates that Callimachus' evocation of Hesiod directs us. The 'message' of vv. 265–6, for example, seems to point ahead to ideas that we most associate with the Platonic Socrates – to do wrong causes you greater damage than being wronged – and the Proclan scholia interpret the lesson very much in a Platonic mode:

If we really knew that our attempts to harm others harmed ourselves more, we would avoid doing harm; for no one would willingly harm himself. But through ignorance we are caught in this evil and, while thinking that we are benefiting ourselves, we are harmed by ourselves, and the harm we do to ourselves is greater than the harm we do to others; for in such cases we damage others with regard to their wealth, but we damage ourselves with regard to what is most important, our souls. It is our souls which are affected by doing injustice, whereas the person who is harmed is injured with respect to external things. Rightly, then, does he say that someone who prepares evil for another brings it upon himself and that someone who plans evil against another is responsible for greater evil to himself. For if the plan does not come to fruition, it causes the plotter bitter pain, but if it does come to fruition, it damages him more severely, since doing wrong is a greater evil than suffering it, just as doing good is a greater blessing than receiving good. (Schol. Hesiod, *WD* 265–6, pp. 90–1 Pertusi = fr. 116 Marzillo)

The Platonic tenor of this extended gloss on the Hesiodic verses comes as no surprise in Proclus, but even another, non-Proclan, scholium on v. 266 explicitly cites, not just the Callimachean verse from which this discussion began, but also

¹⁸⁹ The idea was probably a commonplace of sophistic thought; cf. Antiphon on how one should follow *nomoi* 'in the presence of witnesses', but *phusis* 'when there are no witnesses present' (fr. 44a 1 DK-Pendrick).

¹⁹⁰ Cf. below pp. 267–9 on Protagoras' Hesiodic 'myth' in Plato's *Protagoras*.

Plato's doctrine that it is more disgraceful to do wrong than to be wronged (cf. *Gorgias* 474c). Proclus' principal source for his commentary on the *Works and Days*, Plutarch, had already connected *WD* 266 with the doctrines of the *Gorgias* and the *Republic* on how it is preferable to suffer than to do wrong (*How to Study Poetry* 36a), and it is not improbable that Plutarch lurks behind the Proclan scholium cited above.¹⁹¹ The Proclan scholium on *WD* 286 ('Very foolish Perses, I will give you some good advice') explicitly cites Plutarch's discussion of the verse and contrasts Hesiod's 'philosophical character' in seeking to correct his brother through admonition (νουθετεῖν) with other poets and philosophers who resorted to the abuse of those who had offended them:

[Hesiod] knew the saying of Socrates that every bad man is unwillingly bad, and thus requires admonition (νουθεσία) and will perhaps recognise his own badness.¹⁹² (Schol. Hesiod, *WD* 286, pp. 96–7 Pertusi = fr. 123 Marzillo = Plutarch fr. 40 Sandbach)

Sandbach is doubtful that this reason for Hesiod's mode of proceeding actually goes back to Plutarch, but the Platonising reading of Hesiod is, at the very least, of a piece with an ancient tradition of interpretation which we can still identify and in which Plutarch seems to have played a very important role.¹⁹³

There is indeed an obvious analogy, which Plutarch will not have been the first reader of Hesiod to have seen, between the

¹⁹¹ So, e.g., Scheer 1870. At *Mor.* 553f–4b Plutarch distinguishes between the message of *WD* 265–6, that wrongdoing is itself its own punishment, a view which Plutarch supports, and Plato's view, expressed at *Laws* 5.728c, that punishment is a 'suffering which follows upon wrong-doing'. Plutarch there is, however, in fact essentially following the standard Platonic line that wrongdoing damages the soul, though he lays no stress upon the curative power of punishment, unlike Plato in the *Gorgias*. One of the verses which Plutarch cites in that place is not in fact *WD* 265, but rather a syntactically complete version of Callimachus fr. 2.5 Pf., which is found in an epigram of Lucilius (*AP* 11.183.5). It seems unlikely that Plutarch would have mistakenly cited a verse of Lucilius as Hesiodic, and in the epigram the verse is, in any case, probably to be understood as a citation; it thus seems likely that a syntactically complete version of Callimachus' verse was in circulation before both Lucilius and Plutarch, and that the latter cited it by mistake as Hesiodic, whereas the former intends it to be understood as Callimachean.

¹⁹² The Platonic Socrates says such things in more than one place, but the reference here, as in the Proclan scholium on v. 15, may well be to *Laws* 5.731c2–3.

¹⁹³ Cf. Chapter 4 below.

arguments of the Platonic Socrates with such as Thrasymachus in *Republic* 1 and Callicles and Polos in the *Gorgias* and Hesiod's attempt to persuade his brother and the *basileis* that *dike* should be the governing principle among mortals, rather than the (natural) rights of the 'stronger' (οἱ κρείσσονες *WD* 210) to behave as they wish against the weak, like hawks towards nightingales. The analogy is in fact made explicit in the Proclan scholium on vv. 207–12 (= fr. 95 Marzillo), the fable of the hawk and the nightingale.¹⁹⁴ Here the speech of the hawk is said to encapsulate ὁ τῶν ἄρπακτικῶν νόμος, 'the law of the rapacious', as manifested in Thrasymachus (Socrates' violent opponent in *Republic* 1) and 'all such people', here illustrated by the notorious tyrants Phalaris of Acragas and Apollodorus of Cassandreia.¹⁹⁵ Plato had made Thrasymachus state more than once that justice consists in 'nothing else than the advantage of the stronger (ὁ κρείττων)',¹⁹⁶ and the pairing of Thrasymachus with tyrants also descends directly from Plato.¹⁹⁷ In *Republic* 1 Thrasymachus claims that tyranny is the τελεωτάτη ἀδικία, 'ultimate wrongdoing', which makes the man who does wrong εὐδαιμονέστατος, 'supremely happy' (344a–c); so too, when the Proclan scholium compares such men to 'kites and wolves and such like', we recognise not just the influence of the Hesiodic hawk, but also Plato's comparison of tyrants to wolves later in the *Republic* (8.565e1, 566a3). The bringing together of Hesiodic and Socratic–Platonic morality was not such a difficult task, provided one ignored the competitive side of the world which Hesiod depicts.

As for Plato himself, of particular importance in the context of the Hesiodic tradition is the speech of Adeimantos in *Republic* 2, urging Socrates to show the young men that justice must be chosen for its own sake, not because of any material or social advantage which arises from it, whether now or in

¹⁹⁴ On ancient and modern interpretations of the Hesiodic fable cf. below pp. 241–3.

¹⁹⁵ It is to be noted that both Phalaris and Apollodorus make appearances in Plutarch, Phalaris seven times in the *Moralia*, and Apollodorus thrice.

¹⁹⁶ *Republic* 1.338c2–3, 343c3–4, 344c7–8.

¹⁹⁷ Proclus also assimilates Thrasymachus, together with Callicles of the *Gorgias*, to tyrants at *Commentary on the Republic* II 176.4–9 Kroll.

the afterlife (362e–7e). Adeimantos’ speech is full of explicit and implicit allusions to poetry as the source of the ordinary approach to justice which he wishes Socrates to reject; it is the poets, notably Homer and Hesiod, but not just them (Musaeus, Archilochus and Pindar are all there), who are an important target for Plato here.¹⁹⁸ At 363b–c, for example, Adeimantos cites *WD* 233–4, the blessings bestowed upon the city which practises justice, and *Odyssey* 19.109–12, the similar blessings which attend a just king, as examples of the sort of rewards which are held out as a result of the good reputation which follows from justice.¹⁹⁹ So too, at 363d4–5 he notes that some people claim that the ‘children’s children and the family of the man who is pious and keeps his oath (τοῦ ὀσίου καὶ εὐόρκου) remain after them (κατόπισθεν λείπεσθαι)’. It is likely, though not certain,²⁰⁰ that Plato here has in mind *WD* 282–5:

ὅς δέ κε μαρτυρήσιον ἑκὼν ἐπίορκον ὁμόσας
 ψεύσεται, ἐν δὲ Δίκην βλάψας νήκεστον ἄσση,
 τοῦ δὲ τ’ ἄμαυροτέρῃ γενεῇ μετόπισθε λείλειπται·
 ἀνδρὸς δ’ εὐόρκου γενεῇ μετόπισθεν ἀμείνων.
 (Hesiod, *Works and Days* 282–5)

Whoever willingly swears falsely and lies in his witnessing, harms justice and himself is terribly ruined; in time to come his family is left more obscure, but the family of the man who keeps his oath is in time to come raised up.

The surviving scholium on the Platonic passage sees the reference, not to Hesiod, but rather to the passage in Herodotus (6.86) about the oracle given to Glaukos the Spartan who enquired whether he might use an oath to practise fraud; the last verse of that oracle is, however, identical with *WD* 285,²⁰¹

¹⁹⁸ Cf., e.g., Ford 2002: 214–16. Socrates recurs to Homer and Hesiod in claiming to have fulfilled his undertaking at 10.612b–c.

¹⁹⁹ The problem of ‘reputation’ was to continue to plague the Platonic tradition: Plutarch (*How to Study Poetry* 24d) defends *WD* 313, ‘aretē and kudos attend wealth’, on the grounds that *aretē* there means ‘reputation or power or success or some such thing’, cf. Hunter–Russell 2011: 138.

²⁰⁰ Plato’s κατόπισθεν is a variant for μετόπισθε(ν) in *WD* 284–5. Commentators also cite παίδων παῖδες καὶ γένος from Tyrtaeus 12.30 West, but the context there is very far from the Platonic one; worth noting also are Homer, *Iliad* 20. 307–8 and Solon fr. 13.32 West.

²⁰¹ Cf. below pp. 251–2.

and the context in both Hesiod and Plato is the rewards of justice (cf. *WD* 283). Even if Plato had in mind here a different passage of (? Orphic) poetry, the closeness to *WD* 284–5 shows just how embedded the Hesiodic tradition is in Adeimantos' speech about received notions of justice. It comes almost as no surprise that *WD* 287–9 ('the easy path of κακότης and the sweat and rough road which the gods have placed in front of ἀρετή') are adduced as a passage which 'wizards' (γόητες) use to demonstrate how one should not worry about a life of vice (364c–d);²⁰² wrongdoing can in any case easily be bought off by prayer, as Homer had notoriously taught (*Iliad* 9.497–501). One of the clear lessons of Adeimantos' speech, with its easy citations of Hesiod, Homer, Pindar and Archilochus, a lesson both explicitly spelled out and demonstrated through the style of the speech, is that the 'quotability' of poetry, enshrined in the excerpting and anthologising habit which already had a firm hold in Athenian culture by Plato's day,²⁰³ made it a particularly powerful opponent to the moral project which Plato sets himself in the *Republic*; the young man, who wants to decide (like Prodicus' Heracles) which course of life he should follow, the life of justice or the life of deceit, can 'flit' from passage to passage like a bee (365a8)²⁰⁴ – there will always be a suitable poetic defence for any moral stance.

In putting forward arguments in favour of appearing rather than being morally upright, on the grounds that it is appearance which will bring reward, Adeimantos notes that if there are no gods or if they have no concern with human affairs, then there is no point in worrying forever about keeping our immorality secret (λανθάνειν); if gods do exist and are concerned with our affairs, it is precisely the poets (and particularly those who have given us the genealogy of the gods, i.e., presumably, above all Hesiod in the *Theogony*) who teach

²⁰² It is possible that this passage shows that Plato understood ἰαδόν in *WD* 287 as 'in great supply, in plenty', i.e. with κακότης, rather than 'in companies, for crowds of men'; modern commentators are divided.

²⁰³ Cf., e.g., Ford 2010, above p. 77. For the twist that Adeimantos gives to his Homeric citations cf. below p. 254 n. 60.

²⁰⁴ Cf. Ford 2002: 215, Hunter–Russell 2011: 15–16.

us how to buy them off (365d–e). Here, as throughout this part of Adeimantos’ speech, Hesiod is not named, but in the *Works and Days* τὸ λανθάνειν is simply not possible (or so Hesiod would like the *basileis* to believe, cf. v. 268 οὐδέ ἐ λήθει κτλ) because of Zeus’ numerous guardians (vv. 252–5), the maiden Dike herself and Zeus’ omnipresent eye.²⁰⁵ Adeimantos sharply points out that ‘all who claim to be supporters of Justice, like you Socrates, beginning from the original heroes (ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἡρώων) whose works (λόγοι) survive right down to men of the present day’ (366d7–e2) find fault with injustice and recommend justice only because of the ‘reputation and honours and gifts’ which arise from each. It would be tendentious to claim that the move from heroes to ‘men of the present day’, in the context of λόγοι in praise of Justice, must evoke Hesiod – clearly Plato is taking a fairly broad aim – but Hesiod is certainly not far away here.

Adeimantos concludes by urging Socrates to ‘leave it to others to praise the rewards and reputation (that arise from justice), for while I could endure others praising justice and finding fault with injustice in this way ... I could not endure this from you ...’ (367d). Who are these ‘others’? Again, presumably, Plato’s aim is broad, but Hesiod seems to brood over this whole discussion. One other reader of Hesiod and Plato, at least, has trodden some way down this same path of associating the two. Plutarch excised all of *WD* 267–73, according to part of the Proclan scholium on vv. 270–3.²⁰⁶

πάντα ἰδὼν Διὸς ὀφθαλμός καὶ πάντα νοήσας
καὶ νῦ τάδ’, αἶ κ’ ἐθέλησις, ἐπιδέρεται, οὐδέ ἐ λήθει
οἴην δὴ καὶ τήνδε δίκην πόλις ἐντὸς ἔεργει.
νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ μήτ’ αὐτὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποισι δίκαιος
εἶην μήτ’ ἐμὸς υἱός, ἐπεὶ κακὸν ἄνδρα δίκαιον
ἔμμεναι, εἰ μείζω γε δίκην ἀδικώτερος ἔξει
ἀλλὰ τὰ γ’ οὐπω ἔολπα τελεῖν Δία μητιόεντα.

(Hesiod, *Works and Days* 267–73)

²⁰⁵ Solon fr. 13.27–8 West may pick up this motif from Hesiod, as many commentators assume.

²⁰⁶ Livrea 1967: 10–11 rightly takes the athetesis seriously, without however giving due weight to the explanation of the scholia.

A moral poem?

The eye of Zeus, which sees and understands all things, beholds these also, if he so wishes, and this kind of justice which the city contains does not escape him. I would not now be a just man among men, nor have my son so, since it is bad for a man to be just if the more unjust man will receive greater justice. But I do not think that wise Zeus will bring such things to pass.

If justice ought to be chosen (αἰρετόν), even if there is no Providence (πρόνοια), and injustice avoided (φευκτόν), it is clear that all this argument is superfluous. Therefore Plutarch excises the seven verses [*WD* 267–73] as unworthy of Hesiod's judgement on justice and injustice. (Schol. Hesiod, *WD* 270–3, p. 92 Pertusi = fr. 118 Marzillo = Plutarch fr. 38 Sandbach)

Justice is to be chosen for its own sake, not because of any rewards (or the avoidance of punishment) which might follow from it: here also Plutarch and Proclus seem to stand close to the arguments of the second book of Plato's *Republic*. Whether or not we can keep our immoral acts secret (cf. *WD* 268–9) should be immaterial; even the existence of a watching god and hence the possibility or otherwise of getting away with injustice ought to be irrelevant to a protreptic to justice, if justice is worth choosing for its own sake. Any Platonist might well have taken serious objection to vv. 270–2, but West observes that Plutarch's objection to vv. 267–9 is 'not clear'; this is, however, to ignore the Platonic frame through which Plutarch approached the text. Moreover, Plutarch may have felt that 'if he wishes to' in v. 268 not only emphasised the unpalatable idea that Zeus might see injustice and not punish it, but also gave Perses and the βασιλεῖς a get-out clause which was ruinous to the rhetoric of his argument. The suggested excision left the *parainesis* to the βασιλεῖς to conclude with the gnominically closural and excellently Platonic message of vv. 265–6 that wrongdoing harms the wrongdoer, not the intended victim. Plutarch's critical method here, which seeks (as so often) to harmonise Hesiodic and Platonic teaching, will not, of course, be the same as ours: for Plato, Hesiod – with all his talk of how difficult virtue is and of the agricultural rewards which flow from it – is part of the problem, not the solution (cf. *Republic* 2.363e–4d). Whereas, for example, the Platonic Protagoras set himself and his teaching within the traditions

of early poetry, notably Hesiod (*Protagoras* 316d7),²⁰⁷ in the *Republic* Adeimantos demands and Socrates delivers a radical break with the traditional authority of the past.

In their different ways, then, both Callimachus and Plato attest to a reading of the *Works and Days* as a moral poem about how we should live; for Callimachus, such morality stands under the protection of, and is promoted by, Apollo. For Hesiod too, of course, piety and morality go hand-in-hand; it is the powerful presence of the divine which guarantees both. In the matter of piety, as with morality, the *Works and Days* inevitably follows the *Theogony*, as knowledge of that divine presence necessarily precedes pious attitudes; impiety is a mark of those who, like the cannibal Cyclops, do not understand the power of the divine. Piety at many levels of sophistication is, of course, a striking hallmark of the poet's persona in the *Works and Days*. Callimachus' pious persona throughout the *Aitia* is thus in part an element of his 'Hesiodic' self-fashioning, as well as dictated by the subject matter of the poem and by the special relationship with Apollo which the 'Reply' establishes. We may, however, also wonder whether this is not another way in which the *Aitia* presents itself as the sequel to the *Theogony*:²⁰⁸ not merely in the fact that it tells of the rites and the cults of the gods whom the *Theogony* has established, but because it promulgates the pious moral attitudes which the certain existence of the Olympian order requires, even if the nature or resonance of that 'piety' is irrevocably changed by Callimachus' knowing exploitation of tradition. What is clear, however, is that the Telchines, 'no friends of the Muse', unlike both Hesiod and Callimachus, are disfigured in both moral and poetic terms: their malignancy, as Hesiod could have taught them, damages only themselves.

²⁰⁷ On Protagoras' 'Hesiodic' performance cf. below pp. 267–9.

²⁰⁸ Cf. Fantuzzi–Hunter 2004: 51–60.

CHAPTER 3

HESIOD AND THE SYMPOSIUM

Hesiodic authority

One of the best known imitations of the *Works and Days*, and perhaps for us the very earliest, is Alcaeus 347 Voigt–Liberman, a reworking of *WD* 582–96:

ἦμος δὲ σκόλυμός τ' ἀνθεῖ καὶ ἡχέτα τέττιξ
δενδρέωι ἐφεζόμενος λιγυρὴν καταχεύετ' ἀοιδὴν
πυκνὸν ὑπὸ πτερύγων, θέρεος καματώδεος ὥρη,
τῆμος πιόταταί τ' αἶγες, καὶ οἶνος ἀριστος, 585
μαχλόταται δὲ γυναῖκες, ἀφαυρότατοι δὲ τοὶ ἄνδρες
εἰσὶν, ἐπεὶ κεφαλὴν καὶ γούνατα Σείριος ἄζει,
αὐαλέος δὲ τε χρώς ὑπὸ καύματος· ἀλλὰ τότ' ἦδη
εἴη πετραίη τε σκιὴ καὶ Βίβλινος οἶνος
μάζα τ' ἀμολγαίη γάλα τ' αἰγῶν σβεννυμενῶν 590
καὶ βοὸς ὕλοφάγοιο κρέας μὴ πῶ τετοκυῖης
πρωτογόνων τ' ἐρίφων· ἐπὶ δ' αἴθοπα πινέμεν οἶνον,
ἐν σκιῇ ἐζόμενον, κεκορημένον ἦτορ ἐδωδῆς,
ἀντίον ἀκραέος Ζεφύρου τρέψαντα πρόσωπα·
κρήνης δ' αἰενάου καὶ ἀπορρύτου ἧ τ' ἀθόλωτος 595
τρεῖς ὕδατος προχέειν, τὸ δὲ τέτρατον ἰέμεν οἴνου.
(Hesiod, *Works and Days* 582–96)

When the golden thistle blooms and the chirping cicada sits on a branch and ceaselessly pours out its tuneful song from under its wings in the season of wearying summer, then are goats fattest and wine at its best, women are most wanton and men at their weakest, since Sirius burns the head and the knees and the skin is dry from the heat. At that time may I have the shade of a rock and Bibline wine, a milk cake, the milk of goats which are drying up, the meat of a cow that has been reared in the wood and not yet given birth and of newly born kids. Drink also gleaming wine as you sit in the shade, having taken your heart's fill of food, with your face turned towards the fresh zephyr; pour in three measures of unmuddied water from an ever-flowing spring which is running, and then a fourth of wine.

Hesiod and the symposium

τέγγε πλεύμονας οἴνωι, τὸ γὰρ ἄστρον περιτέλλεται,
ἃ δ' ὦρα χαλέπα, πάντα δὲ δίψαισ' ὑπὰ καύματος,
ἄχει δ' ἐκ πετάλων ἄδεα τέττιξ...
ἀνθαι δὲ σκόλυμος· νῦν δὲ γυναῖκες μιαρώταται,
λέπτοι δ' ἄνδρες, ἐπεὶ <δῆ> κεφάλαν καὶ γόνα Σείριος
ἄσδει (Alcaeus 347 Voigt)

Wet your lungs with wine, for the star is coming round, the season is hard and everything is thirsty in the heat. The cicada chirps sweetly from the leaves... the golden thistle is in bloom. Now are women most troublesome and men are feeble, since Sirius burns the head and knees...

Although the occasional dissenting or cautiously querying voice is still heard,¹ even those most sceptical of direct inter-textual borrowings in the early archaic period seem prepared to accept this case.² Alcaeus' reworking fits a familiar feature of sympotic poetry – the recasting, and hence citation, of earlier poetry in a new metrical and/or linguistic mode – but it also offers us an early glimpse of Hesiod being used as an authority, but in a lightly ironic way: 'Hesiod recommended a life of quiet ease, with good food and drink, at the time of the Dog-Star, so... who are we to argue with him?... let's get some hard drinking done...' The authority of 'didactic poetry' is thus already something to be played with: Alcaeus and his colleagues needed no excuse for their drinking, but Hesiod (given a particular and partial spin) may be used to confirm the *necessity* (γάρ, v.1) of getting properly drunk.³

¹ Cf. Petropoulos 1994: 81–2, and R. Martin 1992: 22–3, elaborating on Hooker 1977: 81 who speculated that both poets had access to a 'common body of poetic material dealing with the seasons', with Hesiod adapting such traditional material to the new mode of the Ionic hexameter (cf. also Nagy 1990a: 462); Kivilo 2010: 38 hedges her bets. For Martin 'Hesiod incorporated into his hexameter verse the language of a seasonal *song* he knew, one which survived in another stylisation by Alcaeus, in what may have been an older metrical and linguistic shape'. The existence of such song traditions is hard to doubt in principle (cf. Petropoulos 1994), and the integration of other song modes into hexameters is a familiar feature of the early period, just as the *Works and Days* is very clearly welcoming to a remarkable number of modes of λόγοι; nevertheless, this hardly rules out the possibility that Alcaeus is 'citing' Hesiod, with all the interpretative gain that this brings.

² Cf., e.g., West 1978a: 61, R. Fowler 1987: 37–8.

³ Cf. Rösler 1980: 256–64, who however makes rather heavy weather of Alcaeus' use of Hesiod, Bing 2009: 154 n. 12.

Alcaeus' song, whenever it was composed, presumably carried more point if indeed performed in mid-summer,⁴ though it is hardly necessary to suppose that any singer had to check that the cicadas really were buzzing and the thistle really in bloom before proceeding with his song; moreover, whereas Hesiod's idealising afternoon of leisure is set outdoors, Alcaeus' song, or at least what survives of it, functions perfectly well – and was very probably performed – indoors. Unlike Alcaeus, Hesiod was as concerned with food as with drink, and wine, which is not indeed the only desirable drink at this time (milk is on the menu also), seems to receive less emphasis in his verses than the quality of the water to be used; moreover, the strength of the drink which Hesiod suggests, one part wine to three of water, is (to judge from later texts) notably moderate, and the Proclan scholia on vv. 591–6, which very probably go back to Plutarch,⁵ observe that Hesiod's recommendation is aimed at 'those drinking σωφρόνως'. Alcaeus, on the other hand, who promotes the urge to drink to the very head of his song, has – at least in what survives of the poem – no apparent interest in food (as indeed would befit the model of the symposium), and the exhortation to 'soak your lungs in wine' is not a call to moderation.⁶ The ironic distance between 'model' and 'copy' which the practice of citation imposes is reinforced by the very particularity of the Hesiodic persona and by the subject-matter of the *Works and Days*: Alcaeus and his colleagues were (almost certainly) not agricultural workers having a well-earned rest from back-breaking toil in the heat of summer. The voice of the sympotic poet, then, is here poised between an 'impersonation' of Hesiod, performing Hesiod (if you like), and a citation and ironisation of Hesiod

⁴ Cf., e.g., Rösler 1980: 263, and Plutarch, *Mor.* 697f–8a cited in n. 58 below. A character in Athenaeus, however, notes that Alcaeus drinks 'in every season and every condition' and proceeds to cite a series of passages to prove it (Athenaeus 10.430a–c).

⁵ Cf. below p. 172.

⁶ In the very similar fr. 346 Voigt–Liberman Alcaeus apparently calls for unusually large cups and a mixture of one part water to two of wine (cf. Page 1955: 308), which is very seriously 'strong'. In that poem Alcaeus also teasingly suggests that drinking is a 'religious duty', as wine comes from 'the son of Semele and Zeus'.

as a known authority.⁷ Not altogether dissimilar may be an isolated couplet of the Theognidean corpus:

ἄφρονες ἀνθρώποι καὶ νήπιοι, οἵτινες οἶνον
μὴ πίνουσ' ἄστρου καὶ κυνὸς ἀρχομένου.
(Theognis 1039–40)

Stupid and foolish are men who do not drink wine at the onset of the star of the dog.

Here, we do not necessarily need to hear Hesiod in the background, but if we do, then ἄφρονες and νήπιοι also resound with the stern sound of Hesiodic instruction to Perses. Hesiod of course did not couch his advice in such terms: he wished for some shaded drinking in mid-summer (*WD* 582–96), but certainly did not denounce those who did not drink with characteristic terms of abuse.

These issues of performance and citation are particularly acute, and particularly interesting, in the case of the links between the *Works and Days* and sympotic, paraenetic elegy, with which Hesiod's poem shares both moralising themes and structures of teaching, such as the use of an addressee.⁸ There are of course the familiar problems of, particularly, the structure and origin of the Theognidean corpus to be acknowledged; our principal body of elegy is composed of excerpts of various date and authorship, and some excerpts are likely enough to be later recreations of the manner of early elegy, rather than actual examples of early 'sympotic elegy'.⁹ Nevertheless, even

⁷ A further point would be given to Alcaeus' appropriation of Hesiod here if he had shared the view of Rosen 1990: 107–9 that 'the cicada stands as an *ainos* for the Hesiodic poet', but the reasons to accept that suggestion are at best fragile. What can, I think, be said about *WD* 582–4 is that the unusually extended time-description mimetically introduces high summer as precisely a time of leisure and lack of hurry.

⁸ Cf., e.g., West 1978a: 23–4, 56, R. Martin 1984, Nagy 1990b: 71–2, Scodel 2012a: 123. The 'parallels' between Hesiod and Theognis listed by Buzio 1936: 52–60 are a very mixed bag; Rosen 1990: 109–10 compares Theognis' famous *sphragis* (vv. 237–50) with some of the language of the *Works and Days*, but it is unclear whether he is claiming a relationship between the two poets here, which seems very improbable. Solon's use of Hesiod is a special case within the elegiac tradition, cf. below pp. 140–1.

⁹ Cf. below pp. 133–9 on Theognis 1135–50.

with all due allowance for the difficulties which our inability to be sure of the provenance of much of the corpus impose, there remains a significant element of both general and specific similarity between the *Works and Days* and a body of poetry, most if not all of which was composed for sympotic performance. Verses such as Theognis 27–30, for example, the provenance of which we can identify as certainly as any verses of the corpus, seem to bring us very close to the *Works and Days*, both through their message and through an appeal to the poet's own autobiography:

σοὶ δ' ἐγὼ εὖ φρονέων ὑποθήσομαι, οἷά περ αὐτός,
 Κύρν', ἀπὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶν παῖς ἔτ' ἐὼν ἔμαθον·
 πέπνυσο, μῆδ' αἰσχροῖσιν ἐπ' ἔργμασι μῆδ' ἀδίκοισιν
 τιμὰς μῆδ' ἄρετάς ἔλκεο μῆδ' ἄφενος.

(Theognis 27–30)

With kindly intention I will give you advice, Kyrnos, such as I myself learned from good men when I was a child: be wise, and do not grab honours or success or wealth through shameful or unjust deeds.

In assessing specific similarities at the level of verbal detail, caution is always necessary, given the lacunose state of our evidence, but in some cases it is hard to resist an impression of direct borrowing:

μῆδέ ποτ' οὐλομένην πενίην θυμοφθόρον ἀνδρὶ
 τέτλαθ' ὀνειδίζειν, μακάρων δόσιν αἰὲν ἐόντων.

(Hesiod, *Works and Days* 717–18)

Never be reckless enough to blame a man for the curse of spirit-destroying poverty, which is the gift of the immortal gods.

μή ποτέ μοι πενίην θυμοφθόρον ἀνδρὶ χολωθείς
 μῆδ' ἄχρημοσύνην οὐλομένην πρόφερε·
 Ζεὺς γάρ τοι τὸ τάλαντον ἐπιρρέπει ἄλλοτε ἄλλως,
 ἄλλοτε μὲν πλουτεῖν, ἄλλοτε μῆδ' ἔχειν.

155

(Theognis 155–8)

Never in anger reproach a man with spirit-destroying poverty or with the curse of lack of resources. Zeus tips the scales now this way and now that – sometimes one is wealthy, sometimes penniless.

The Hesiodic verses come in a passage (*WD* 715–23) of advice on social behaviour which would suit the context of the symposium or feast. Hesiod himself may here be echoing (lost) sympotic elegy,¹⁰ but the structure of the Theognidean verses strongly suggests a debt to Hesiod:¹¹ πενίην θυμοφθόρον ἀνδρί appears in both passages, as does οὐλομένην;¹² the apparent redundancy of expression in the elegiacs, with both πενίη and ἀχρημοσύνη, *may be* the result of the adaptation of the hexameter to the structure of the elegiac couplet. Of particular interest is the ‘ethic dative’ μοι offered by Stobaeus in Theognis 155, against the τοι of the Theognidean tradition. Van Groningen objected to μοι, accepted by most recent editors, because it confusingly inclines us to construe this dative with the verb, but in fact, by producing a verse with two datives, this pronoun, if correct, both increases the chances that we have a direct borrowing from Hesiod, and places the verses within the intimate context of the symposium: the symposiast addresses one or more of those present, and ‘personalises’ (so to speak) Hesiod’s advice; whatever the context (now unfortunately irrecoverable), we do not have to do with a ‘straight’ citation or imitation of the hexameter poet. Whether the symposiasts were to recognise the Hesiodic text lying behind the verses is an important, but unanswerable, question – it is important because it would tell us much about how Hesiod was ‘performed’ in citation and hence, as with Alcaeus 347 V, much about what kind of authority was being constructed for the *Works and Days*.

With another example from Theognis, however, we may indeed be able to make this step, for here there can really be little doubt that the poet exploits our knowledge of the *Works and Days*:

ὄρνιθος φωνήν, Πολυπαῖδῃ, ὅξυ βρώσης
 ἦκουσ', ἣ τε βροτοῖσ' ἄγγελος ἦλθ' ἄρότου
 ὠραίου· καί μοι κραδίην ἐπάταξε μέλαιναν,

¹⁰ Cf. below p. 150. For the scholia on these verses and Plutarch’s explanation of them cf. below pp. 174–5.

¹¹ Koning 2010: 183 seems to assume the debt, though without discussion.

¹² A speaker also uses πενίης θυμοφθόρου at Theognis 1129.

Hesiodic authority

ὅττι μοι εὐανθεῖς ἄλλοι ἔχουσιν ἀγρούς, 1200
οὐδέ μοι ἡμίονοι κυφὸν ἔλκουσιν ἄροτρον
†τῆς ἄλλης μνηστῆς† εἵνεκα ναυτιλίας.
(Theognis 1197–1202¹³)

I heard the sharp cry of the bird, Polypaides, which is men's messenger that it is the season for ploughing. This struck my black heart, because others hold my flowering fields and mules do not pull the curved plough for me . . . because of seafaring.

The poet here recalls *WD* 448–51:

φράζεσθαι δ', εὖτ' ἂν γεράνου φωνὴν ἐπακούσεις
ὕψοθεν ἐκ νεφέων ἐνιαύσια κεκληγυῖης,
ἧ τ' ἀρότοιό τε σῆμα φέρει καὶ χείματος ὥρη 450
δείκνυει ὄμβρηροϋ, κραδίην δ' ἔδακ' ἀνδρὸς ἀβούτεω.
(Hesiod, *Works and Days* 448–51)

Take note, when you hear the voice of the crane sounding every year from out of the clouds on high: it brings the sign for ploughing and heralds the season of rainy winter, and it bites the heart of a man who has no oxen.

Like the Hesiodic 'man without oxen', the elegiac singer's heart is affected by the call of the crane,¹⁴ not however because he has no oxen with which to plough, but because he no longer has any fields; oxen have in any case been replaced by mules – the speaker really is ἀνὴρ ἀβουτῆς, both literally and because he carries the symbolic weight of the destitute Hesiodic character.¹⁵ On one hand, there seems much greater attention here to verbal variation from the model than in the Alcaeus poem, a fact which *may* have interesting consequences for the history of compositional and allusive techniques.¹⁶ Moreover, Theognis seems to have combined two related passages from the model

¹³ I am unconvinced by the defence of the transmitted text of v. 1202 in Nagy 1985: 64–6; for bibliography on this problem cf. Selle 2008: 258 n. 124. The best discussion known to me of this Theognidean use of Hesiod is Murnaghan 2006: 105–6.

¹⁴ Beall 2004: 20 takes the crane in Hesiod as a symbol of industriousness.

¹⁵ Hesiod makes his point through an insistent repetition of 'oxen' which appear in four successive verses (vv. 451–4), and this increases the probability that 'mules' is a deliberate intertextual alteration.

¹⁶ The most obvious variations are (Theognis given first) ὄρνιθος ~ γεράνου, ὄξυ βοώσης ~ ἐνιαύσια κεκληγυῖης, ἀγγεῖλος ~ σῆμα φέρει, ἐπάταξε ~ ἔδακε, κραδίην . . . μέλαιναν ~ κραδίην; ἀρότου ὠραίῳ (cf. above) is given a metrical position impossible in Hesiod's hexameters.

text: ἀρότου ὠραίου, a variation on ἀρότοιο ... ὦραν, occurs at *Works and Days* 616–17, immediately before the introduction of ναυτιλίη δυσπέμφελος (617); what is more, although the final verse of the Theognidean extract seems irremediably corrupt, it is hard to believe that some expression of regret about sailing did not here continue the Hesiodic voice of the passage.¹⁷ This is not just a reworking of a passage of Hesiod, but it is an experimentation with a Hesiodic voice.

Secondly, the elegiac poet is recounting a past experience of emotional pain, and so the fact that the call of cranes may not have been a common sound as sympotic nights wore on hardly matters. More important is the manner of the event. Hesiod tells us to take note of, ‘pay attention to’ (φράζεσθαι), the crane’s call – we are indeed to listen out for this important sign;¹⁸ elsewhere Hesiod uses this verb only in combination with ἄνωγα and always directed to a σέ, who will in the first instance be Perses, but which may also have a wider reference (*WD* 367, 404, 688), and it is thus a strong marker of didacticism within the poem. This is how we are to behave. On the other hand, the elegiac singer, so we are to understand, heard the cry ‘by chance’. For Hesiod’s audience this cry signals the time for ploughing or for pain if one does not have oxen; for the elegiac singer this is also the case, but the call triggered a realisation which was also a poetic reminiscence. The speaker’s fields are εὐανθεῖς in his nostalgic memory, and the epithet, inappropriate to fields at the time of ploughing, marks the singer’s removal from the reality of the agricultural cycle which governs his fields and to which Hesiod testifies.¹⁹ The natural world is

¹⁷ ναυτιλίη appears only here in early elegy. Critics have differed over whether sailing is to be seen in the Theognis passage as the cause or result of the loss of the poet’s fields. It is at least noteworthy that, immediately after having introduced the subject of sailing in v. 618, Hesiod explains that the setting of the Pleiades, i.e. the time for ploughing, is not the time for sailing (vv. 619–32); Theognis has thus inherited both the general, and a specific, Hesiodic opposition between agriculture and sailing.

¹⁸ The verb survives in Aristophanes’ reworking of this passage of Hesiod at *Birds* 711 (cf. below p. 153 n. 72), though the text is there disputed. φράζεσθαι and its compounds were subsequently to become important markers in didactic poetry: Nicander, for example, uses the imperatival infinitive of the simple verb several times and also ἐπιφράζευ, περιφράζω and περιφράζοιο.

¹⁹ I ignore here the possibility, observed to me – though not necessarily advocated – by Ewen Bowie, of reading Theognis 1200–2 as a sexual allegory.

now filtered through the authority of Hesiod; we are in fact on the way towards the time when the ‘natural’ world will indeed for poets be a literary construct built on allusion and reminiscence.

In both Alcaeus and Theognis, then, it is the distinctive didactic voice of Hesiodic poetry which gives the allusive echo its ironic force. Both later poets prove Hesiod ‘right’, but not in any straightforwardly literal way. From the period of its earliest reception, the authority of Hesiodic poetry is indeed confirmed by constant re-appropriation and redefinition. The same could, of course, be said for Homeric poetry, but it is the very particular distinctiveness of the voice of the *Works and Days* – the urgent personal appeals for justice, the ‘homely’ advice on farming – which creates very different effects when it surfaces in later texts. In a very broad and over-simplifying generalisation, we might say that Homeric poetry could be taken over and adapted into later poetic forms with little sense of disconcerting strangeness – its elite values could always be constructed as close to the literate mainstream and, what is at least as important, it was usually not so much ‘Homer’ as the polyphony of Homeric characters who were being echoed – whereas the voice of the *Works and Days* was constructed as indeed just that, a single, urgent and very distinctive voice. It was moreover a first-person voice which, as we have seen, could be appropriated by, and thus resonate behind, the first person of the sympotic singer. Adoption of the distinctive voice of a major Homeric character was of course always also possible on both public and private occasions, as for example in Solon’s well-known appropriation of an Odyssean voice as he bids farewell to a king on Cyprus:

νῦν δὲ σὺ μὲν Σολίοισι πολὺν χρόνον ἐνθάδ’ ἀνάσσω
 τήνδε πόλιν ναίοις καὶ γένος ὑμέτερον
 αὐτὰρ ἐμὲ ξὺν νηϊ θοῇ κλεινῆς ἀπὸ νήσου
 ἀσκηθῆι πέμποι Κύπρις ἰοστέφανος
 οἰκισμῶι δ’ ἐπὶ τῶιδε χάριν καὶ κῦδος ὀπάζοι
 ἔσθλόν καὶ νόστον πατρίδ’ ἐς ἡμετέρεην.

5

(Solon fr. 19 West)

Now may you rule over Soloi here for a long time residing in this city, you and your family. As for me, may Cypris of the violet crown escort me in a swift ship unscathed from your glorious island; may she grant favour and glory upon this foundation and a safe return to my homeland.

The Homeric resonances²⁰ offer a shared context (and a shared *paideia*) which draws host (here fashioned by implication as an Alcinous) and guest together. Elsewhere, however, Homer's third-person narrative was in fact more easily cited as an authorising, and often ironising, set of paradigms, rather than appropriated into the singer's own voice; the contrast between the enclosed space of the symposium and the world of epic adventure, where men of the heroic age can operate in the broad spaces of the unknown,²¹ meant that an attempt to bring the two worlds together was very likely in fact to expose the fissure between them. The contrast, however, with the exploitation of Hesiodic authority is of course far from absolute, and a very good, if problematic,²² example of this occurs at Theognis 1123–8:

μή με κακῶν μίμνησκε· πέπονθά τοι οἶά τ' Ὀδυσσεύς,
 ὅστ' Αἶδεω μέγα δῶμ' ἤλυθεν ἔξαναδύς,
 ὃς δὴ καὶ μνηστῆρας ἀνειλάτο νηλεῖ θυμῶι, 1125
 Πηνελόπτης εὐφρων κουριδῆς ἀλόχου,
 ἧ μιν δῆθ' ὑπέμεινε φίλῳ παρὰ παιδί μένουσα,
 ὄφρα τε γῆς ἐπέβη †δειμαλέους τε μυχοῦς†
 (Theognis 1123–8)

Do not remind me of my troubles. I have suffered as did Odysseus, who returned after coming up again from the great house of Hades, and who, with pitiless heart, calmly killed the suitors of Penelope, his wedded wife. She had long waited for him, staying by her dear son, until [Odysseus] stepped upon the land ...

²⁰ For discussion and bibliography cf. Irwin 2005: 147–9, Noussia–Fantuzzi 2010: 301–7; for Solon and Odysseus more generally cf. Irwin 2005: chapter 5.

²¹ For this contrast cf. above p. 56 on Callimachus fr. 178 Pf.

²² Not the least of the problems are the syntax of v. 1124 and the implications of εὐφρων in v. 1126; as neither is really germane to the current discussion, they are here left out of the account. Ewen Bowie has argued that the author is in fact Archilochus and that Euphron is a proper name (cf. Archilochus fr. 23.9 West): 'the singer has been away on a prolonged absence ... and returns to find Euphron trying to move in on the woman whom he can appropriately compare to a κουριδιῇ ἀλοχος', Bowie 2008: 140–1, cf. Bowie 2010: 64.

The end of the extract is again corrupt, but it seems likely that, as with the passage on ploughing, the singer opens a gap between his own situation and the poetic authority to which he appeals. How could any symposiast have ‘suffered’ as Odysseus did (for ‘suffering’ [troubles] as an Odyssean marker cf. *Odyssey* 1.4, 13.90–2)? Various (to my mind improbable) answers have been given,²³ and there are those who apparently take the symposiast’s complaint ‘straight’,²⁴ but the appeal to Odysseus’ κακά as analogous to those of the speaker emphasises distance, rather than nearness, particularly when what is spelled out are the ‘incredible’ return from Hades and the extraordinary single-handed slaughter of the suitors. Sympotic posturing is here seen in the clear implication of difference, as the singer overreaches towards a Homeric model; as with the Hesiodic examples we have considered, what is important is the gap which is displayed between model and reworking, but the very subjects of Homeric narrative make the nature of that gap very different.

If in Theognis 1197–1202 (above) we see a poet using allusion to the *Works and Days* to create a powerful sense of distance and regret, in another passage we see (probably) another poet rewriting Hesiod to create an authoritative voice, to *be*, if you like, Hesiod, rather than to use him:

Ἐλπίς ἐν ἀνθρώποισι μόνη θεὸς ἐσθλή ἔνεστιν,
 ἄλλοι δ’ Οὐλυμπόν<δ’> ἐκπρολιπόντες ἔβαν.
 ὦιχετο μὲν Πίστις, μεγάλη θεός, ὦιχετο δ’ ἀνδρῶν
 Σωφροσύνη, Χάριτες τ’, ὦ φίλε, γῆν ἔλιπον·
 ὄρκοι δ’ οὐκέτι πιστοὶ ἐν ἀνθρώποισι δίκαιοι,
 οὐδὲ θεοὺς οὐδεὶς ἄζεται ἀθανάτους, 1140
 εὐσεβέων δ’ ἀνδρῶν γένος ἔφθιτο, οὐδὲ θέμιστας
 οὐκέτι γινώσκουσ’ οὐδὲ μὲν εὐσεβίας.

²³ Van Groningen ad loc. argues that we are to understand ‘suffered’ in the sense ‘this is my lot’, and in fact the speaker is happy: just as Odysseus survived and eventually triumphed, so has the speaker, and therefore no one is to spoil the pleasure by reminding him of his ‘troubles’; for Carrière the speaker must be dead, so the text we have must be part of an epitaph. With perhaps greater plausibility, Hudson–Williams suggests that the speaker went on to say that, although Odysseus ‘wrought vengeance on his foes’, there will be no alleviation or recompense for him.

²⁴ Cf., e.g., Nagy 1985: 74–5, followed by Irwin 2005: 131.

Hesiod and the symposium

ἀλλ' ὄφρα τις ζῶει καὶ ὄρᾱι φῶς ἡελίοιο,
 εὐσεβέων περὶ θεοὺς Ἑλπίδα προσμενέτω·
 εὐχέσθω δὲ θεοῖσι, καὶ ἀγλαὰ μηρία καίων
 Ἑλπίδι τε πρώτῃ καὶ πυμάτῃ θυέτω.
 φραζέσθω δ' ἀδίκων ἀνδρῶν σκολιὸν λόγον αἰεὶ,
 οἳ θεῶν ἀθανάτων οὐδὲν ὀπιζόμενοι
 αἰὲν ἐπ' ἄλλοτρίοις κτεάνοισ' ἐπέχουσι νόημα,
 αἰσχρὰ κακοῖς ἔργοις σύμβολα θηκάμενοι.

1145

1150

(Theognis 1135–50²⁵)

Hope is the only good god among men, for the rest have abandoned us and gone to Olympus. Trust, a great goddess, has gone, and gone too from men is Sophrosyne and the Graces, my friend, have left the earth. Oaths of justice are no longer trustworthy among men, nor does anyone reverence the immortal gods; the race of pious men has disappeared, nor do men any longer recognize rules of conduct or acts of piety. But while one lives and sees the light of the sun, let him count on Hope, while being pious towards the gods. Let him pray to the gods, and in burning splendid thigh-bones let him sacrifice to Hope first and last. Let him ever be on his guard against the crooked words of unjust men, who pay no regard to the immortal gods and ever give their thoughts to other people's property, making shameful compacts through wicked deeds.

On one hand, by declaring explicitly that Hope is a 'good god' to whom we should constantly sacrifice, the poet brings out what is merely left, on any interpretation, implicit in the Hesiodic model (*WD* 96–9): Zeus left men with Hope precisely as a protreptic towards pious behaviour towards the gods – without Hope there would be no reason to 'hope' that one's sacrifices could influence the divine in your favour. On the other hand, by combining material from more than one passage of the model text,²⁶ the elegiac poet here draws out the clear suggestions within the *Works and Days* itself of similarities between the post-Pandoran world and the Iron Age, both understood as visions of the current world in which we all live. The lament that the *genos* of pious men has been extinguished (v. 1141) looks like a gesture towards the Hesiodic 'myth of races', whereas vv. 1147–9, ἀδίκων ἀνδρῶν σκολιὸν

²⁵ In vv. 1143–4 I have retained the usual punctuation, rather than West's enjambment with punctuation after θεοὺς.

²⁶ Ricciardelli Apicella 1984 is a helpful discussion.

λόγον²⁷...ἐπ' ἄλλοτρίοις κτεάνοις, seem almost a pastiche of Hesiodic themes and verbal expression, though in context there is probably a debt to *WD* 193–4, for the whole passage recalls Hesiod's prophecy of how the current age will end in the final triumph of *hubris* and the abandonment of the earth by 'good' divinities:

αἶψα δὲ γηράσκοντας ἀτιμήσουσι τοκῆας·
 μέμψονται δ' ἄρα τοὺς χαλεποὺς βάζοντες ἔπασσιν,
 σχέτλιοι, οὐδὲ θεῶν ὅπιν εἰδότες· οὐδέ κεν οἱ γε
 γηράντεσσι τοκεῦσιν ἀπὸ θρεπτῆρια δοῖεν.
 χειροδίκαί· ἕτερος δ' ἑτέρου πόλιν ἐξαλαπάξει·
 οὐδὲ τις εὐόρκου χάρις ἔσσεται οὐδὲ δικαίου
 οὐδ' ἀγαθοῦ, μάλλον δὲ κακῶν ῥεκτῆρα καὶ ὕβριν
 ἀνέρα τιμήσουσι· δίκη δ' ἐν χερσὶ καὶ αἰδῶς
 οὐκ ἔσται, βλάβει δ' ὁ κακὸς τὸν ἀρεῖονα φῶτα
 μύθοισι σκολιοῖς ἐνέπων, ἐπὶ δ' ὄρκον ὁμείται.
 ζῆλος δ' ἀνθρώποισιν οἰζυροῖσιν ἅπασιν
 δυσκέλαδος κακόχαρτος ὁμαρτήσῃ, στυγερώπης.
 καὶ τότε δὴ πρὸς Ὀλυμπον ἀπὸ χθονὸς εὐρυοδείης
 λευκοῖσιν φάρεσσι καλυψαμένω χρῶα καλὸν
 ἀθανάτων μετὰ φύλον ἵτον προλιπόντ' ἀνθρώπους
 Αἰδῶς καὶ Νέμεσις· τὰ δὲ λείπεται ἄλγεα λυγρὰ
 θνητοῖς ἀνθρώποισι, κακοῦ δ' οὐκ ἔσσεται ἀλκή.
 (Hesiod, *Works and Days* 185–201)

Straightaway they will dishonour their ageing parents; they will reproach them, speaking hurtful words to them – wretched men who do not understand the retribution of the gods. Nor will they pay their ageing parents a return for their rearing. Justice will lie in their hands, and one man will sack another's city. There will be no thanks for the man who keeps his oath, nor for the just and the good, but rather they will honour the doer of wickedness and the man of *hubris*. Justice will be in their hands and there will be no shame; the evil man will harm the better man by speaking crooked utterances, and will swear a false oath. Envy, ill-sounding, rejoicing in evil, hateful of face, will accompany all wretched men. And then Shame and Nemesis will go from the broad paths of the earth to Olympus, leaving men for the race

²⁷ Selle 2008: 325 apparently sees here a play with σκόλιον as the name of a drinking song (cf. *PMG* 892.4); he is correct to stress the (unsurprising) similarity of theme between some of the surviving *skolia* and passages of the *Theogoneia*, but I see no grounds for positing a pun in v. 1147. Van Groningen separates off vv. 1147–50 from the 'hymn to Elpis', but the Hesiodic texture of those verses is one argument, among several, for keeping the extract together.

of the immortals, having covered their beautiful bodies in white cloaks; terrible pains will be left for mortal men, and there will be no protection against evil.

Although the motif of Hope remaining after other good things have left the earth was deeply rooted in various popular traditions such as the fable,²⁸ which need not depend upon Hesiod, there seems here no good reason to resist the conclusion that, in this motif also, we are dealing with a direct debt to the *Works and Days*. The elegiac poet, moreover, takes over not just Hesiodic themes, but also an urgent didactic voice which, I think we may assume, is to sound ‘Hesiodic’, though how it does so deserves some attention.

These Theognidean verses are stylistically distinctive, whether considered against a Hesiodic background or merely in the context of the *Theognidea* themselves. Noteworthy features include the two adjectives (apparently) in parallel in v. 1139; εὔσεβέων (gen. pl.) – εὔσεβίας – εὔσεβέων (pres. participle) in 1141–4 obviously carries emphatic point, but it is also unsurprising that this repetition has elicited attempts at emendation. ἐλπίδα προσμένετω in v. 1144 is usually understood as ‘wait for, i.e. count on Hope’,²⁹ a message perhaps not unlike the moral of the fable-version of the jar story, as it is preserved in the Aesopic collections and in Babrius 58,³⁰ but one expressed in a verbal form which seems very hard to parallel;³¹ not improbably, we have here an awkward verbal variation on *WD* 498:

πολλὰ δ' ἀεργὸς ἀνὴρ, κενεὴν ἐπὶ ἐλπίδα μίμνων,
 χρηίζων βίότοιο, κακὰ προσελέξατο θυμῷ.

(Hesiod, *Works and Days* 498–9)

The man without work, waiting upon empty hope and lacking the means of life, heaps much abuse upon his spirit.

²⁸ Cf. below pp. 246–8.

²⁹ Cf. Van Groningen ad loc. and the translations of Carrière and Gerber.

³⁰ Cf. below pp. 246–8.

³¹ The required sense for προσμένειν cannot really be squeezed out of Sophocles, *Electra* 164, 303–4; more interesting, perhaps, is *OT* 835–7, where the verb appears in an exchange about ἐλπίς. In other circumstances, one might wonder whether the elegiac poet was influenced by Sophocles here.

In Hesiod the adjective ‘empty’ makes the meaning very clear, but the elegiac poet, in seeking to vary both the sense and the language has (again) created a sense of strain in the expression.³² Finally, αἰσχροῖ... σύμβολα θηκόμενοι (1150) is, to say the least, a difficult phrase which is again hard to parallel. When set against Hesiod, moreover, we notice that the important Hesiodic verb φράζεσθαι³³ is here used in a non-Hesiodic way, ‘guard against, be wary of’,³⁴ and that (unsurprisingly) Hesiod never uses the third person imperative in the way that runs through the second half of the Theognidean passage.³⁵ The didactic voice here addresses a third-person τις (1143) in a way which is not only not Hesiodic, but hard to parallel also in the elegiac corpus outside – and this is an instructive exception – Tyrtaeus’ martial exhortations to the Spartan fighters (especially fr. 10 and 11 W), which use all of first person plural jussives, second-person plural imperatives and third-person singular imperatives with τις or an equivalent, such as ἀνὴρ (e.g. fr. 11.4). Tyrtaeus’ rhetorical strategy constructs an inclusive communal voice, in marked contrast to the voice of most ‘symptotic’ elegy,³⁶ and in Theognis 1135–50, however Theognidean the themes, the rhetorical mode suggests that we have moved away from the urgent immediacy both of Hesiod’s haranguing of Perses and of Theognis’ protreptic addresses to Kyrnos and his fellow symposiasts towards the composition, in a quite uncertain context, of a set of universally applicable instructions about how to get through life. This may seem not to take account of ὦ φίλε in 1138, but that very colourless and simple vocative is itself distinctive, occurring nowhere else in the *Theognidea*: the closest parallel is perhaps the repeated verses 99–100 = 1164c–d, σὺ δέ μοι φίλε ταῦτ’ ἐνὶ θυμῷ | φράζεο, where the second person pronoun may be thought to make all the difference. It is tempting perhaps to think that the poet has used

³² West takes *WD* 498 as a tmesis for ἐπιμίμων; I do not think that this is necessary.

³³ Cf. above p. 130.

³⁴ LSJ s.v. II 6 suggests that this meaning occurs in archaic poetry only in reported oracles.

³⁵ The only third-person imperative in the *Works and Days* is 714, where the subject of the verb is not the addressee.

³⁶ For discussion and bibliography cf. D’Alessio 2009: 150–6.

ὦ φίλε to suggest the familiar situation of sympotic instruction within a poem which is no longer really rooted in that milieu; if there is little point in pursuing speculation further, a clear sense of difference about these elegiac verses needs to be registered.

In replacing the Hesiodic Aidos and Nemesis by Pistis, Sophrosyne and the Graces, the elegiac poet might be thought to have chosen virtues paradigmatic for the privileged elite male world of the symposium, though Aidos at least is still very much at home in that world. An isolated couplet elsewhere in the Theognidean corpus comes in fact close to, and may be a memory of, the Hesiodic ‘personification’:³⁷

ἦ δὴ νῦν αἰδῶς μὲν ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ὄλωλεν,
αὐτὰρ ἀναιδείῃ γαῖαν ἐπιστρέφεται.
(Theognis 647–8)

Now indeed has shame disappeared from men, and shamelessness roams the land.

Personified Πίστις has a substantial existence only very much later than the archaic period, largely as a translation of, or under the influence of, the Roman *Fides*,³⁸ though the theme is of course perfectly at home in sympotic elegy (cf. Theognis 66, 74 etc) and classical poetry more generally.³⁹ Pistis does appear, alongside Virtue, Memory and Wisdom, on the famous Hellenistic ‘Apotheosis of Homer’ relief by Archelaos of Priene, where she presumably indicates one of the virtues inculcated by Homeric poetry.⁴⁰ As for the Hesiodic background, this is to be sought in the theme of oaths which is so central to the moralising part of the *Works and Days*; the poet may have particularly in mind *WD* 190–4 (above), where χάρις too has departed. If Πίστις has at least a Hesiodic background, the same cannot be said for Σωφροσύνη, as Hesiod nowhere uses σῶφρων or related

³⁷ Cf. also Theognis 291–2. ³⁸ Cf. *RE* 20.1812, *LIMC* s.v. Pistis.

³⁹ Noteworthy is Sophocles, *OC* 611, θνήσκει δὲ πίστις, βλαστάνει δ’ ἀπιστία.

⁴⁰ For discussion cf. Pinkwart 1965: 72–5. Pinkwart appeals to the place of πίστις in Hellenistic ethics, but more relevant may have been the educational approach to Homer. The scholia on *Iliad* 1.526–7 (Zeus declaring the finality of whatever promise he assents to with a nod) note that those verses are παιδευτικά πρὸς πίστιν, because they imply the three principal reasons why men break their promises. The usual sense of πίστις in the scholia is ‘credibility’, ‘authentication’.

words; here we are dealing with a virtue which has importantly developed in the period after Hesiod, but which, as it is often a kind of opposite of *hybris*, might be readily adapted to a Hesiodic context.⁴¹ We may thus take Σωφροσύνη as a substitute for the Hesiodic Αἰδώς of *WD* 200, and we find in fact Σωφροσύνη as the daughter of μεγάλοφρων Αἰδώς on a well known Athenian elegiac epitaph of (probably) the late fifth century (*CEG* I 102).⁴² This may of course be simply a one-off conceit, but one wonders whether the poet of Theognis 1135–50 also took pleasure in replacing the virtue of his own ‘parent text’, namely Αἰδώς, with that virtue’s child, thus marking his relationship to Hesiod as a genealogical one, in a trope of literary placement which was to become very common later. Be that as it may, also from the later fifth century comes elegiac praise of moderate Spartan drinking by the Athenian Critias which seems close to the Theognidean verses:

καλῶς δ' εἰς ἔργ' Ἀφροδίτης
 πρὸς θ' ὕπνον ἥρμостαι, τὸν καμάτων λιμένα,
 πρὸς τὴν τερπινοτάτην τε θεῶν θνητοῖς Ὑγίειαν
 καὶ τὴν Εὐσεβίης γείτονα Σωφροσύνην.
 (Critias fr. 6.18–21 West)

[This drinking] is well suited to the deeds of Aphrodite and to sleep, the haven from troubles, and to Health, loveliest of gods for mortals, and to Sophrosyne, neighbour to Piety.

Critias helps us to understand that, in the Theognidean verses, just as the absence of Πίστις leads to the oath-breaking of v. 1139, so the absence of Σωφροσύνη is causally linked to the impiety of vv. 1140–2.⁴³

The insistent Hesiodic voice thus passed with relative ease into the variegated tones of archaic elegy. Most familiar (and most discussed) are the striking similarities between passages

⁴¹ Cf. North 1966: 12–19. North also notes (1966: 10) that ‘Hesiod nowhere personifies any of the qualities that were later considered virtues of the individual’. Another noteworthy use of σωφροσύνη in the *Theognidea* is v. 379, where it is opposed to ὕβρις, and we might sense Hesiod lurking in the background there.

⁴² For the association of αἰδώς and σωφροσύνη more generally in elegiac poetry cf., e.g., Cairns 1993: 167–74.

⁴³ Cf. North 1966: 18–19; the causal link is somewhat misrepresented by Cairns 1993: 172 n. 90.

of the *Works and Days* and the two major surviving fragments of Solon's 'political' elegies (fr. 4 and 13 West);⁴⁴ these similarities are such that an appropriation of Hesiodic themes and (in part) a Hesiodic voice may be regarded as one of Solon's principal poetic techniques. Like Hesiod (cf. especially *WD* 5–8), Solon could speak with a visionary rhetoric, as in the 'hymn to Eunomia':

ταῦτα διδάξαι θυμὸς Ἀθηναίους με κελεύει,
ὥς κακὰ πλεῖστα πόλει Δυσνομίη παρέχει·
Εὐνομίη δ' εὖκοσμα καὶ ἄρτια πάντ' ἀποφαίνει,
καὶ θαμὰ τοῖς ἀδίκοις ἀμφιτίθησι πέδας·
τραχέα λειαίνει, παύει κόρον, ὕβριν ἀμαυροῖ,
αὐαίνει δ' ἄτης ἄνθεα φυόμενα,
εὐθύνει δὲ δίκας σκολιάς, ὑπερήφανά τ' ἔργα
πραῦνει· παύει δ' ἔργα διχοστασίης,
παύει δ' ἀργαλέης ἔριδος χόλον, ἔστι δ' ὑπ' αὐτῆς
πάντα κατ' ἀνθρώπους ἄρτια καὶ πινυτά.
(Solon fr. 4.30–9 West)

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This is what my heart bids me teach the Athenians: Lawlessness brings the city very many evils, but Lawfulness makes everything well-ordered and appropriate, and often it puts fetters around the unjust. It smooths the rough, puts an end to excess, diminishes outrage, and withers the flourishing flowers of ruin; it makes straight crooked judgements, calms overweening acts, and puts an end to deeds of dissension and to the anger of bitter strife. Under her rule, all things among men are appropriate and sensible.

This 'Hesiodic *tour de force*'⁴⁵ extends the didacticism (and authority) of the earlier poem (cf. v. 30) into an address to the whole citizen-body, here bringing upon themselves the disasters which befall Hesiod's 'unjust city'.⁴⁶ Athens will not be destroyed by Zeus (vv. 1–2, contrast *WD* 238–47), but by the folly (ἄφραδία) and greed of the citizens themselves; we are here also not far from Theognidean complaints about the state of

⁴⁴ Cf. esp. Irwin 2005: chapter 6; further bibliography in Koning 2010: 172–7, to which add the commentary of Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010.

⁴⁵ Irwin 2005: 183.

⁴⁶ In the *Theogony* Hesiod made Dike and Eunomia sisters, the children of Zeus and Themis (v. 902), whereas Dysnomia and Ate, also sisters, are among the children of Eris (v. 230); ἄτη and ἔρις are among the ills to which Solon's Eunomia puts an end (fr. 4.35, 38). On Solon's language here – θυμὸς... κελεύει – cf. Noussia-Fantuzzi 2010: 257.

the city, and the citizens, around the poet. The performance context of Solon's elegies remains debated, but there are good reasons to believe that the symposium was the (or perhaps 'a') performance-context for even the political elegies,⁴⁷ and the moralising protreptic of sympotic poetry was certainly a natural heir to, and vehicle for, Hesiodic teaching.⁴⁸

Alcaeus 347 Voigt (above) has shown us a poet converting a memorable passage of the *Works and Days* into his own mode. The very 'quotability' of Hesiod's poem makes such a procedure unsurprising, particularly in the context of the symposium, where citation, allusion and role-playing were at the very heart of how the participants performed as symposiasts. It is unsurprising that the famous verses (*WD* 287–92) on the contrasting paths to wretchedness (κακότης) and success (ἀρετή), 'the Hesiodic passage quoted most often in antiquity',⁴⁹ were indeed to have a very rich *Nachleben*, and reworkings of these verses within sympotic contexts would not surprise and indeed have been identified.⁵⁰ These verses pose, however, a particular problem, in that their very familiarity and the broad sweep of notions of κακότης and ἀρετή mean that we are tempted to find echoes of them all over the ethical material which is so prevalent in archaic poetry; it will (usually) be the image of the path, combined with an ethical choice of some kind, that will be the clearest signal of Hesiodic imitation.

⁴⁷ Cf. esp. Bowie 1986: 18–21, Noussia–Fantuzzi 2010: 45–55.

⁴⁸ On the possible performance-context of the *Works and Days* itself cf. below pp. 150–1.

⁴⁹ Koning 2010: 144. Koning 2010: 144–9 offers a brief survey of the reception of these verses in antiquity. On the particular difficulty of tracing the *Nachleben* of these verses cf. above pp. 34–5.

⁵⁰ Thus, for example, Koning 2010: 145 takes Theognis 1027–8 as an adaptation of the Hesiodic verses in an ethical context; it is, of course, dangerous to assume that any contrast between κακότης and ἀρετή or, as in this case, τὸ ἀγαθόν evokes Hesiod, although the Theognidean couplet also contrasts the ease of the one with the difficulty of the other, as in Hesiod. An interesting case is Theognis 911–14: 'I stand at a crossroads; there are two paths in front of me, and I am considering which of these to follow...'. The paths are those of avoiding expenditure and hence living ἐν κακότητι, on one hand, and treating oneself luxuriously with the attendant danger of poverty, on the other. Hesiod famously spoke of two paths, but did not make them meet at a crossroads; once this step was taken, however, the pattern became almost inevitable, as we see from Prodicus' famous reworking, but it would be very nice to know how early that happened.

One certain archaic revision of these verses may or may not have had a sympotic context, but certainly stands, alongside the passages of the *Theognidea* just considered, as an early witness to the use of Hesiodic authority for the marking of difference. In a poem of unknown genre⁵¹ and date Simonides reworked these verses:

σοὶ δ' ἐγὼ ἐσθλὰ νοέων ἐρέω, μέγα νήπιε Πέρση·
τὴν μὲν τοι κακότητα καὶ ἱλαδὸν ἔστιν ἐλέσθαι
ῥηιδίως· λείη μὲν ὁδός, μάλα δ' ἐγγύθι ναίει·
τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἰδρώτα θεοὶ προπαρόιθεν ἔθηκαν
ἀθάνατοι· μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὄρθιος οἶμος ἐς αὐτὴν
καὶ τρηχὺς τὸ πρῶτον· ἐπὴν δ' εἰς ἄκρον ἵκηται,
ῥηιδίη δὴ ἔπειτα πέλει, χαλεπή περ ἐοῦσα.
(Hesiod, *Works and Days* 286–92)

To you, great fool Perses, I will speak my excellent thoughts. It is easy to seize wretchedness even in abundance, for the path is smooth and she lives very near at hand. But in front of success the immortal gods have placed sweat; the road to her is long and steep, and rough at first, but when a man reaches the top, then the path is easy, difficult though it was.

ἐστὶ τις λόγος
τὰν Ἀρετὰν ναίειν δυσαμβάτοις ἐπὶ πέτραις,
ἦν δὲ μιν θοαντὶ χώρον ἀγνὸν ἀμφέπειν.
οὐδὲ πάντων βλεφάροισι θνατῶν
ἔσοπτος, ὧι μὴ δακέθυμος ἰδρῶς
ἔνδοθεν μόληι,
ἵκηι τ' ἐς ἄκρον ἀνορέας·
(Simonides, *PMG* 579 = fr. 257 Poltera⁵²)

There is a tale that Aretê lives amidst rocks which are hard to ascend ... and dwells in a holy place. She is not visible to the eyes of all men, but to him upon whom comes heart-biting sweat from within and reaches to the peak of manhood.

ἔστι τις λόγος in Simonides functions as a forerunner of what has come to be known in the study of later poetry as an

⁵¹ Epinician or encomium are obvious possible contexts; we might, for example, imagine the following sequence: 'There is a story ... the peak of manhood. If any one meets this criterion it is X ...' Other contexts can of course be imagined.

⁵² ἀνορέας in v. 7 is West's emendation of the transmitted, but metrically difficult, ἀνδρείας.

‘Alexandrian footnote’, namely ‘the signalling of specific allusion by a poet through seemingly general appeals to tradition and report’;⁵³ we should perhaps understand that Simonides, who elsewhere is far from shy in citing and naming his predecessors, is indeed acknowledging that this Hesiodic passage is already familiar enough to have assumed the status of λόγος τις. If so, this fragment of Simonides marks a stage of particular importance along the path of intertextual reception, namely that stage in which an image may begin to break free from its original context and be evoked, as part of a common stock of poetic ideas, quite independently both of that context and of the model author. Both forms of reception, specific citation of the Hesiodic context and more general use of the idea of ‘two paths’, are familiar enough in the *Nachleben* of this passage of Hesiod. Here, however, there can hardly be any doubt that Simonides does indeed have the Hesiodic passage specifically in mind, and wants us to do so also, though Simonides’ rewriting is very far from a reproduction: Arete now lives in (ναίειν, cf. *WD* 288 of κακότης) a holy place, hidden from human eyes amidst steep rocks, and can only be glimpsed by someone who has felt ‘heart-biting sweat arise from within’ and ‘reached the peak of manliness’. The personification (or indeed deification) of Arete is more strongly marked than that of κακότης and ἀρετή in Hesiod, but Simonides may in fact be ‘Hesiodising’ Hesiod, as ‘personifications’ are the very stuff of the *Theogony* and important also in the *Works and Days* (Oath, Hunger etc.); Simonides would thus withhold Hesiod’s name (ἔστι τις λόγος...), but leave little doubt stylistically as to which poet he was following. Be that as it may, that Simonides’ ἀρετή had a far more moral sense than Hesiod’s is regularly assumed by critics, and no doubt rightly – Simonides’ ‘sweat’ also seems more metaphorical than literal, though in the state of our evidence we can hardly seek to define Simonidean ‘virtue’ too exactly.⁵⁴ The transition from ἀρετή as ‘(agricultural) success’,

⁵³ Hinds 1998: 1–2; Norden 1916: 123–4 is still a valuable discussion of such phenomena.

⁵⁴ On Simonides’ changes from the Hesiodic original cf., e.g., Babut 1975: 59–61.

the probable meaning in Hesiod, to ‘virtue’ is a well-mapped road in the history of the reception of this passage, though many of the authors who imitated Hesiod will, no doubt, have assumed that for him too ἀρετή was ‘virtue’.

The man who, in Simonides’ version, can glimpse ἀρετά will have come ‘to the peak of manliness’.⁵⁵ ἵκηι τ’ ἐς ἄκρον ἀνορέας [West: ἀνδρείας codd.] varies Hesiod’s εἰς ἄκρον ἵκηται, with the substitution of a more strongly metaphorical ‘to the peak’ for Hesiod’s extended image of a mountainous path. Simonides’ phrase finds more than one close parallel in archaic poetry which has also been brought into connection with the Hesiodic passage. The earliest is the conclusion of Tyrtaeus’ protreptic to martial ἀρετή:

ταύτης νῦν τις ἀνὴρ ἀρετῆς εἰς ἄκρον ἰκέσθαι
πειράσθω θυμῷ μὴ μετῖεις πολέμου.
(Tyrtaeus 12.43–4 West)

Let every man strive with his heart to reach the peak of this *aretê*, not slackening in war.

Despite occasional dissenting voices, the standard critical position is that these verses echo Hesiod’s, while taking a very different approach to the meaning of ἀρετή (note ‘this *aretê*’); nevertheless, if Tyrtaeus did have Hesiod in mind here, he makes nothing of his relationship with a ‘model text’.⁵⁶ Of rather greater interest perhaps is a passage from Pindar’s *Sixth Nemean*, a poem for an Aeginetan victor in the boys’ wrestling:⁵⁷

⁵⁵ I have wondered whether Simonides here wants us to think of Odysseus, the ἀνὴρ *par excellence*. δακέθυμος might then evoke θυμοδακῆς *Odyssey* 8.185 (the games on Scherie), and this would at least lend colour to the suggestion (above n. 51) that the Simonides passage was epinician or at least encomiastic in context; δακέθυμος is, in any case, a striking epithet, because we would expect ‘heart-biting’ to be something negative and painful, whereas here it is clearly positive, however painful the struggle.

⁵⁶ The arguments of Munding 1984, to which Koning 2010: 147 n. 87 gives his approval, amount to very little.

⁵⁷ Of the other Pindaric passages listed by Becker 1937: 59–60 as possible imitations of the Hesiodic passage, the most likely seems fr. 108a, εὐθεῖα δὴ | κέλευθος ἀρετὰν ἔλειν, where ἔλειν ~ ἐλέσθαι (*WD* 287) is suggestive.

In the summertime

ἐπεὶ οἱ τρεῖς ἀεθλοφόροι πρὸς ἄκρον ἀρετᾶς
ἦλθον, οἳ τε πόνων ἐγέυσαντο. σὺν θεοῦ δὲ τύχαι
ἕτερον οὐ τίνα οἶκον ἄπε-
φάνατο πυγμαχία <πλεόνων>
ταμίαν στεφάνων μυχῶι Ἑλλάδος ἀπάσας.
(Pindar, *Nemean* 6.23–6)

...since for him three victors reached the peak of *aretê* and tasted of toils. Through god's fortune, the art of boxing has revealed no other house to be the steward of more crowns in the centre of all Hellas.

Here again it must remain open whether or not Pindar is thinking specifically of Hesiod, though the reference to πόννοι is suggestive, and wrestling and boxing are indeed very sweaty pursuits, so any evocation of the Hesiodic passage will be tinged with a kind of wry humour. What these passages of Tyrtaeus and Pindar demonstrate is that εἰς/πρὸς ἄκρον with the genitive of an abstract noun is entirely standard Greek (cf. further LSJ s.v. II), and this is perhaps one further pointer to the fact that it is Hesiod's image and language, not that of his imitators, which demand explanation. Hesiod himself may in fact have re-literalised an image of the 'peak of the steep path which leads to Aretê' out of existing metaphorical expressions such as 'the peak of Aretê' – such a technique of 'literalisation' is familiar later in, for example, Aristophanes – and what we find in Tyrtaeus and Pindar is then a return to 'ordinary' language, as well as a deviation from Hesiod. Once again, then, ancient imitations of Hesiod can help us to defamiliarise Hesiodic language and thus see what is most remarkable about it.

In the summertime

Hesiod's description of mid-summer (*WD* 582–96, above p. 123) seems to have been one of the best known passages of the *Works and Days* from an early date.⁵⁸ In addition to

⁵⁸ As Alcaeus 347 too was to become very well known: Plutarch calls v. 1 of Alcaeus' poem τοῦτ' ἰδὲ τὸ πρόχειρον ἅπασιν (*Mor.* 697f–8a). Plutarch introduces the citation as something that one of his fellow-drinkers quoted ὥραι θέρους; it is tempting to see here an allusion by Plutarch to the Hesiodic original of the Alcaic poem (cf. *WD* 584), but this is certainly not necessary, and ὥραι θέρους is a not uncommon

Alcaeus 347 (above), Demetrius, *On style* 142 cites a snatch of (apparently) Lesbian poetry to illustrate charm (χάριτες) arising ‘from diction or metaphor, as in the description of the cicada...’. The unfortunately corrupt citation is now Sappho fr. 101A Voigt:

πτερύγων δ' ὕπα
κακχέει λιγύραν αἰοῖδαν,
ὄπποτα φλόγιον †καθέ-
ταν ἐπιπτάμενον καταυδείη†
(Sappho fr. 101A Voigt)

...and it pours out its clear song from under its wings, when burning...

The attempt, which goes back to Bergk and was adopted by Lobel and Page,⁵⁹ to insert this fragment within the text of Alcaeus 347 has now largely fallen out of favour; the combination indeed produces a rather laboured and repetitive text.⁶⁰ Unfortunately, however, not enough survives of the fragment cited by Demetrius to trace any relationship between the two Lesbian poems.

Rather more perhaps can be made of the apparent appropriation of this passage of the *Works and Days* in the Hesiodic *Shield*:

οἷος δ' ἐν βήσσης ὄρεος χαλεπὸς προῖδέσθαι
κάπρος χαυλιόδων φρονέει θυμῷ μαχέσασθαι
ἀνδράσι θηρευτῆς, θήγει δέ τε λευκὸν ὀδόντα
δοχμωθεῖς, ἀφρὸς δέ περὶ στόμα μαστιχόωντι
λείβεται, ὅσσε δέ οἱ πυρὶ λαμπετόωντι ἔικτον, 390
ὀρθὰς δ' ἐν λοφιῇ φρίσσει τρίχας ἀμφί τε δειρὴν·
τῷ ἵκελος Διὸς υἱὸς ἀφ' ἵππεϊου θόρε δίφρου.
ἦμος δὲ χλοερῷ κυανόπτερος ἤχετα τέττιξ
ὄζωι ἐφεζόμενος θέρος ἀνθρώποισιν αἰεῖδεν
ἄρχεται, ὧι τε πόσις καὶ βρῶσις θῆλος ἐέρση, 395
καὶ τε πανημερίος τε καὶ ἡῶιος χέει αὐδὴν
ἴδει ἐν αἰνοτάτῳ, ὅτε τε χροά Σεῖριος ἄζει,
τῆμος δὴ κέγχροισι πέρι γλῶχες τελέθουσι

Plutarchan phrase. Virgil unsurprisingly reworks elements of the Hesiodic passage in his description of mid-summer at *Georgics* 3.322–38, but changes both focus and detail; I suspect that *querulae... cicadae* (v. 328) picks up Hesiod's λιγυρή of the cicada's song, cf. Hunter 2006b: 122.

⁵⁹ Cf. Page 1955: 303–4. ⁶⁰ Cf. Rösler 1980: 256 n. 341, Liberman 1992.

In the summertime

τοὺς τε θέρει σπείρουσιν, ὅτ' ὄμφακες αἰόλλονται,
 οἷα Διώνυσος δῶκ' ἀνδράσι χάρμα καὶ ἄχθος⁶⁰
 τὴν ὥρην μάρναντο, πολὺς δ' ὀρυμαγδὸς ὀρώρει.
 ὥς δὲ λέοντε δύω ἄμφι κταμένης ἐλάφοιο
 ἀλλήλοισι κοτέοντες ἐπὶ σφέας ὀρήσωσι,
 δεινὴ δὲ σφ' ἰαχὴ ἄραβός θ' ἄμα γίνετ' ὀδόντων ...
 ([Hesiod], *Aspis* 386–404)

As in the glades of a mountain, a jagged-tusked boar, terrible to catch sight of, determines in its spirit to fight with hunters, and turns aside to sharpen its white tooth; foam gushes around its mouth as it gnashes its teeth, its eyes are like gleaming fire, the hair around its mane and neck bristles upright. Like that did the son of Zeus spring from the horse-drawn chariot. And when the dark-winged chirping cicada, whose drink and food is the moist dew, sits on the branch in the summer and begins to sing to men, and all day long and early in the morning it pours forth its voice in the worst heat, when Sirius burns the skin – at that time beards grow on the millet which they sow in the summer, when the grapes, such as Dionysus gives to men as both a delight and a burden, change colour – in that season they fought, and a great sound of clashing rose up. As two lions hurl themselves angrily at each other over the body of a deer and there is a terrible roaring and gnashing of teeth ...

The verses have (unsurprisingly) produced much scholarly tinkering: vv. 398 (after τῆμος δῆ) – 401 (to ὥρην), for example, have been expunged as syntactically awkward and as necessarily referring not to midsummer but to early autumn, though such seasonal ‘contradictions’ are hardly unparalleled within such idealising passages;⁶¹ certainly, v. 398–9, ‘when the beards grow on the millet which they sow in the summer’ (trans. Most), are surprising verses (in any context). The debt to the *Works and Days* can, however, hardly be denied:⁶² beyond the shared phrasing and structure, the observation that the cicada ‘eats and drinks’ only ‘fertile dew’ looks like both a way of evoking

⁶¹ Cf. below on Aristophanes, *Peace* 1140–78; Petropoulos 1994: 48–9, 74–5 argues that the cicada is also a traditional harbinger of the ripening of the grapes in mid-July and therefore helps to create a smoother sequence within Hesiod’s description of summer in the *Works and Days* than, e.g., West assumes. The reference to wine in *Aspis* 399–400 may also activate a memory of the wider Hesiodic context for us, though this may also be adduced as a reason for interpolation (so Russo 1965: 175).

⁶² Russo 1965: 21 claims that this is the only place where the genuine Hesiod has influenced the style of the *Aspis* (other than the opening *Ehoie*); this is a surprising claim, even if one accepts that *Aspis* 75–6 (cf. *WD* 148–9) and 400 (cf. Hesiod fr. 239.1 M-W) are interpolated, cf. *WD* 509 ~ *Aspis* 376.

the concerns of the model passage with food and drink – no such ‘summer diet’ for the poet-farmer – and a pointed replacement of one zoological belief about the cicada, the role of the wings in the production of its song (*WD* 584), by another.⁶³ Although the technique whereby a time of fighting is indicated by a ‘bucolic’ and peaceful scene is found already in Homer,⁶⁴ it would be difficult, I think, to parallel the extraordinary contrast between the extended description of the fierce boar which rages to fight against the men who hunt it (in order to eat it), and the tiny, winged cicada which can perch on a single branch and needs virtually no nourishment.

The contrast is a striking manifestation of the experimental poetics of the *Shield*,⁶⁵ but the passage also raises important questions of general significance. If indeed, as seems very likely, we are dealing here with a deliberate reminiscence of the *Works and Days*, the question arises – as it certainly would in a later period – whether we are to remember more of the Hesiodic context than is explicitly quoted. In other words, ought we to recall, for example, that at this time of the year ‘men’ are at their weakest (ἀφαιρότατοι) and the weather offers no alternative to gentle eating and drinking in the shade? If we do recall this, then one effect will presumably be to put even greater distance between ourselves and the ‘strange’ epic demi-gods who are about to do battle and also between ourselves as audience, at ease and ‘idle’, and the poetry to which we are listening and whose violent events we are to visualise. On one hand, the ordinary rhythms of the Hesiodic year, by which men such as ourselves order and place limits upon their lives, have no bearing on the likes of Heracles and Cynus, and, on the other, the

⁶³ The two passages are, of course, our earliest attestations for the two beliefs. θέρος (*Aspis* 394) looks like a rather awkward trace of *WD* 584, θέρεος καματώδεος ὥρη; Most understands it as ‘in the summer’, i.e. as equivalent in meaning to the Hesiodic phrase, whereas Evelyn-White, as also Paley, took it as the object of αἰδεῖν, ‘to sing of summer’, and Russo 1965 ad loc. may have agreed as he cites *Anacreontea* 34.11 West θέρεος γλυκύς προφήτης. I have wondered whether πανήμεριός τε καὶ ἡώιος (*Aspis* 396) has been influenced by *WD* 576–81.

⁶⁴ Cf. *Iliad* 11.86–9, adduced by Russo 1965: 21.

⁶⁵ Cf. in general R. Martin 2005. On this passage of the *Aspis* cf. also Bing 2012: 186–7.

intrusion of the summer idyll ‘defamiliarises’ the martial similes which surround it, so that their violent power is refreshed by the contrast; it may be thought that such a technique suggests a relatively late stage in the archaic hexameter tradition.⁶⁶

The framing of the peaceful Hesiodic passage by two violent ‘Homeric’ animal similes suggests an opposition between two different poetic styles and subjects, but we may further wonder whether it specifically exploits a felt contrast between the essence of the two poets, a contrast most familiar to us from our later text of the *Contest of Homer and Hesiod*. There is of course some need for caution here, and not merely because of uncertainty about the date of the *Shield*. The poet of the *Shield* may be attempting to produce an effect related to that of *Iliad* 18.525–9 on the Homeric ‘Shield’, namely a ‘peaceful’ pastoral idyll disrupted by slaughter, and extended time-descriptions in epic, such as that of the Hesiodic cicada (*Shield* 393–7), have important functional elements in common with Homeric similes, but the present case does at least raise the possibility of an early appreciation of Hesiod as a ‘poet of nature’. There has been more than one modern attempt to read *Works and Days* 582–96 itself as a metapoetic and programmatic statement of difference between Hesiodic and Homeric poetry,⁶⁷ but little can be hung upon this for the interpretation of the *Shield*.

Whether or not the *Shield* reflects an already developing ‘poetics of peace’, here set in vivid contrast with the dominant aesthetic of the surrounding poem, cannot in fact be known, though Xenophanes’ famous banishment of talk of ‘battles of Titans and Giants and Centaurs and violent disputes’ from the ideal symposium (fr. 1.21–3 West) at the very least does not weaken the possibility,⁶⁸ any more than does Anacreon eleg. fr. 2 W:

⁶⁶ Much of this analysis could remain in place if the *Aspis* and the *Works and Days* were in fact by the same poet and the *Works and Days* were the earlier poem, i.e. if we were dealing with a case of self-citation; I do not, however, believe that this is the case.

⁶⁷ Cf. Rosen 1990: 107–10, above p. 126 n. 7. ⁶⁸ Cf., e.g., Richardson 1981: 2–3.

Hesiod and the symposium

οὐ φιλέω, ὅς κρητῆρι παρὰ πλέωι οἶνοποτάζων
νεῖκεα καὶ πόλεμον δακρυόεντα λέγει,
ἀλλ' ὅστις Μουσέων τε καὶ ἀγλαὰ δῶρ' Ἀφροδίτης
συμμίσγων ἔρατῆς μνήσκεται εὐφροσύνης.
(Anacreon eleg. 2 West)

I have no time for the man who tells of strifes and war that brings tears as he drinks beside a full mixing-bowl, but rather for the man who mingles the glorious gifts of the Muses and Aphrodite and remembers lovely delight.

From a much later perspective we can see how *Works and Days* 582–96 may have been an important authorising model for parts of the bucolic tradition (cf. especially Theocritus 7.138–9), but the glimpses we have of the archaic reception of this passage (cf. above on Alcaeus 347) remain tantalisingly fleeting. Anacreon and Xenophanes, however, place any such ‘poetics of peace’ very clearly within the context of the symposium, and this has two related implications for *Works and Days* 582–96.⁶⁹ First, it suggests how this passage may have come to be seen as a bucolic version of the familiar sympotic theme of the best way to conduct socialised drinking; the best known example from archaic poetry is Odysseus’ famous ‘Golden Verses’ (*Odyssey* 9.1–11), but elegiac poetry amply accommodates the theme. In particular, the prescription of the strength of wine to be drunk at the end of the passage (vv. 595–6) would make an association between Hesiod’s verses and more straightforwardly ‘sympotic’ poetry a very simple one to draw, as had of course long since happened by the time of Athenaeus and the critical tradition represented for us by the scholia. Secondly, it reminds us that, whereas the *Theogony* assumes the public stage of performance at a festival or athletic games,⁷⁰ this is by no means the only part of the *Works and Days* which would lend itself to performance at a symposium, and it has indeed been argued that this is in fact the implied performance context of the poem as a whole, particularly when due note is taken,

⁶⁹ I discuss this matter further in Hunter forthcoming.

⁷⁰ Cf. Aloni 2010. It is, of course, not difficult to find testimonia to the performance of Hesiodic verses at later symposia, cf., e.g., T 84 and 86 Most. The broader question of the original performance context of the *Works and Days* cannot be pursued here: for recent approaches cf. Ercolani 2010: 43–6, Scodel 2012a.

not just of the parallels already observed of subject-matter and form (the addressee etc.) between the *Works and Days* and sympotic poetry,⁷¹ but also of the manner in which the *Works and Days* falls into relatively self-contained passages (Prometheus and Pandora, the Myth of Races, the different seasons etc.). Writers of sympotic prose in the imperial era, such as Plutarch and Athenaeus, reveal how readily some of Hesiod's puzzling, and often 'quaint', subject matter fitted into the pursuit of learned puzzles and discussions (ζητήματα) at symposia, but the possible links between this context of self-display and the strikingly individual poetic voice of the *Works and Days* is, as we have already seen in Theognis, by no means limited to this field of 'antiquarian' enquiry.

A rather later example of the 'poetics of peace' may perhaps reinforce some of these possibilities, and also shows again how easily a 'Hesiodic' atmosphere could be blended with thoughts of sympotic pleasures. The second parabasis of Aristophanes' *Peace* consists of a celebration by the chorus of farmers of the idyllic life which the coming of peace now makes possible. In the winter they will drink beside the fire, while roasting chickpeas and acorns (vv. 1127–39), and both the rainy season, which seems partially to overlap with the winter of vv. 1127–39, and high summer too bring their own pleasures:

οὐ γὰρ ἔσθ' ἥδιον ἢ τυχεῖν μὲν ἤδη ὀσπαρμένα,
τὸν θεὸν δ' ἐπιψακάζειν, καὶ τιν' εἰπεῖν γείτονα,
“εἰπέ μοι, τί τήμερον δὴ δρῶμεν, ὦ Κωμαρχίδη;”
“ἐμπιεῖν ἔμοιγ' ἀρέσκει τοῦ θεοῦ δρῶντος καλῶς.
ἀλλ' ἄφευε τῶν φασήλων, ὦ γύναι, τρεῖς χοίνικας,
τῶν τε πυρῶν μείζον αὐτοῖς, τῶν τε σύκων ἕξελε,
τόν τε Μανῆν ἢ Σύρα βωστρησάτω ἕκ τοῦ χωρίου.
οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τ' ἔστι πάντως οἰναρίζειν τήμερον
οὐδὲ τυντλάζειν, ἐπειδὴ παρδακὸν τὸ χωρίον.”

1145

(Aristophanes, *Peace* 1140–8)

There is nothing more pleasant than for the sowing to be done and the god sending down rain and for a neighbour to say, 'Tell me, Komarchides, what shall we do today?' 'As the god is doing his bit, I'd like to do some drinking.

⁷¹ Cf. above pp. 125–30.

Wife, roast three helpings of beans, mix some of the wheat with them, and take out some figs. Let Syra summon in Manes from the plot: there will be no work with the vines or digging today as the ground is sodden.'

'There is nothing more pleasant ...' (v. 1140) places these 'symptotic' verses within the same discourse as the opening verses of *Odyssey* 9; here is a comic and rustic, rather than an elite, answer to the symptotic 'What is best?' question. There is little, if anything, which is specifically Hesiodic here. Nevertheless, although any Athenian will have known that one wants most – but not all (cf., e.g., Xenophon, *Oec.* 17.2) – of the rain to come after the crops have been sown (vv. 1140–1, cf. Theophrastus, *HP* 8.6.1), this message was, or could also be, found in the *Works and Days*. Hesiod's instruction (v. 463) to sow fallow land 'while the land is still light (ἐτι κουφίζουσαν)', i.e. (apparently) easy to work, is most naturally taken, as the scholia do, as an injunction to do the autumn sowing before the ground is too sodden by rain. So too, the scholia interpret the famous injunction to 'sow, plough and harvest naked' (v. 391–2) as advice to do all of these jobs before the weather gets too cold and rainy, and the Proclan scholia (fr. 164 Marzillo) cite Plutarch's observation that 'it is better for rain to come after the sowing rather than before' (fr. 60 Sandbach). Modern scholars tend to see this as a mistaken interpretation of Hesiod, but it is at least not an *obviously* mistaken interpretation, and Virgil's famous imitation (*nudus ara, sere nudus. hiems ignaua colono* ... *Georgics* 1.299) shows that it was known to him also; certainly the winter is *ignaua* for these Aristophanic farmers. The Hesiodic flavour of what is to follow in the *Peace* (cf. below) perhaps, then, runs through the whole passage and is already felt in the second parabasis: Hesiodic tones, then, are by now almost inevitable when poets evoke life on the land.

The chorus of farmers also has its mind's eye on the grape-harvest:

ἡνίκ' ἂν δ' ἀχέτας
αἰδητὶ τὸν ἥδυν νόμον,
διασκοπῶν ἥδομαι

In the summertime

τὰς Λημνίας ἀμπέλους,
εἰ πεπαίνουσιν ἤδη (τὸ γὰρ φῖτυ πρῶιον φύσει),
τόν τε φήληχ' ὀρῶν οἰδάνοντ'.

(Aristophanes, *Peace* 1159–64)

When the chirper sings his sweet tune, then I take delight in examining my Lemnian vines to see if they are already ripening – that's naturally an early variety – and in watching the wild fig swell.

The Aristophanic scholia take the reference to the cicada as a borrowing from *Works and Days* 582–4. The matter is of course difficult. Scholars, ancient as well as modern, like to trace literary descent between passages which happen to have survived; the cicada in summer was presumably never the property of a single poet, and Aristophanes produces a further variant of this manner of designating high summer at *Birds* 1095–6:

... ἡνίκ' ἂν ὁ θεσπέσιος ὄξυ μέλος ἀχέτας
θάλπτεσι μεσημβρινοῖς
ἡλιομανῆς βοᾷ

(Aristophanes, *Birds* 1095–6)

...when the marvellous chirper, inspired by the sun, calls out its piercing song in the midday heat ...

There are, however, some further bits of circumstantial evidence to support the idea that, in *Peace* at least, Aristophanes has given his bucolic idyll a Hesiodic flavour.⁷² It is, first, at least curious that the same scholia adduce Hesiod a few lines later in the play in commenting upon the conclusion to the choral antistrophe, καῖτα γίγνομαι παχὺς | τηνικαῦτα τοῦ θέρους 'at that time of the summer I get fat' (v. 1170–1): 'This is because farmers are idle (ἀργοῦσιν) at that time during harvest, as Hesiod too says, "the servants should refresh their limbs" (Hes. *WD* 608)' (Schol. V Ar. *Peace* 1170). There seems no obvious reason for the scholiasts here to cite the Hesiodic 'parallel'; perhaps Hesiod was simply in their minds, or perhaps they saw *Peace* 1159–70 as a 'Hesiodic' unit, reflecting *Works and Days* 582–608, a

⁷² *Birds* 710–11 looks, as the scholia recognise, like a pastiche of a number of passages from the *Works and Days* (cf. Dunbar ad loc.), and it follows closely upon the comic 'theogony' of *Birds* 693–702.

passage that seems to begin with high summer (mid-July) and then move back to the threshing season in mid-June, before moving to the grape-harvest of late summer/early autumn in 609–14. Aristophanes' song combines high summer with the early vintage of late summer/early autumn, as also in fact, as we have seen, does *Aspis* 393–400. Both Hesiod and Aristophanes move somewhat impressionistically across strict seasonal boundaries, despite the comic farmers' knowledgeable observation about grapes which ripen early: unsurprisingly, an idyll of the imagination involves both freedom from work and a new vintage of wine.

Secondly, the chorus' song, which moves from the description of the peaceful countryside to the grim alternative of military service under a braggart but cowardly taxiarch, 'lions at home, foxes on campaign' (vv. 1172–90), is soon followed by a scene in which children who are to perform poetry at the wedding celebrations and symposium imagined to be going on behind the stage emerge to practise their verses. One child, who will turn out to be Lamachus' son, performs martial hexameters of an 'Iliadic' kind; two of these verses occur elsewhere (with small variations of phrasing) only as part of a riddle and its solution in the *Contest of Homer and Hesiod*:

ὥς οἱ μὲν δαίνυντο βοῶν κρέα, καὺχένας ἵππων
ἔκλυον ἰδρώοντας, ἔπει πολέμου ἐκόρεσθεν.
(Aristophanes, *Peace* 1282–3)

So they dined on the flesh of cattle and the necks of horses – they released, sweating, since they had had their fill of war.

We do not know from where Aristophanes took these verses, nor how his audience would have heard them, i.e. with what poem or author they would have associated them, but Nicholas Richardson rightly pointed out that the context in *Peace* is not unlike that of the overarching contrast between Homer and Hesiod in the *Contest*;⁷³ Lamachus' son is followed out

⁷³ Cf. Richardson 1981: 2–3, Graziosi 2001: 65–6; Richardson was inclined to see Aristophanes' citation as depending on an earlier version of the *Contest*. Führer 1987 pointed out a marked verbal similarity with Callimachus, *Hymn to Athena* 9–11; if this is more than accidental, it is certainly unlikely that Callimachus drew his model from Aristophanes.

on to the stage by the son of Kleonymos, an alleged ῥίψαςπις ('shield-abandoner'), who sings Archilochus' famous elegiacs about abandoning his shield until Trygaeos shuts him up – this is not the way to give peace a good name. At the very least, the protreptic to peace into which the king's choice for Hesiod over Homer turns the *Contest* has a flavour strongly analogous to these scenes of competing poetry in the *Peace*, and it is unsurprising if Trygaeos here to some extent acts as a spokesman for 'Hesiodic values':⁷⁴ Hesiod's link between peace and plenty on the one hand (*WD* 228–30) and war and hunger on the other (*WD* 242–7) chimed perfectly with some of comedy's most potent themes, as we see most clearly in the *Acharnians* and the *Peace*.⁷⁵ Trygaeos introduces the wedding which forms the finale of the *Peace* with a prayer for the prosperity of the land:

κἀπνευξαμένους τοῖσι θεοῖσιν
 διδόναι πλοῦτον τοῖς Ἑλλησιν,
 κριθάς τε ποιεῖν ἡμᾶς πολλάς
 πάντας ὁμοίως οἶνόν τε πολύν,
 σῦκά τε τρώγειν,
 τὰς τε γυναῖκας τίκτειν ἡμῖν,
 καὶ τὰγαθὰ πάνθ' ὅσ' ἀπωλέσαμεν
 συλλέξασθαι πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς,
 λῆξαι τ' αἰθωνα σίδηρον.
 (Aristophanes, *Peace* 1320–8)

1325

... praying to the gods to give wealth to the Greeks, that all of us alike should grow barley in abundance, and wine too, should nibble on figs, that our wives should bear us children, and that we should gather again from the beginning all the good things we have lost and there should be an end to glittering iron.

Trygaeos' list of the blessings of a prosperous land is of a very common type (cf. Olson on vv. 1324–7, West on *WD* 225–47), but it is at least noteworthy that the V-scholia again see a borrowing from the *Works and Days* in Trygaeos' prayer (v. 1325)

⁷⁴ For elaborations of this idea cf. Compton-Engle 1999, Hall 2006: 343–9, and (most elaborate of all) Telò 2013. On the possible relation between the *Contest* and the contest of Aeschylus and Euripides in the *Frogs*, cf. Rosen 2004 and below pp. 305–6.

⁷⁵ In the *Acharnians* it is Dikaïopolis, 'Mr Just City', who secures peace and plenty; this need not, of course, be a deliberate evocation of Hesiod, but it is at least to be remarked how these themes of justice and agricultural plenty travel together.

that ‘wives should bear children’; in Hesiod’s ‘just city’ of peace and plenty ‘wives bear children who resemble their parents’ (*WD* 235), whereas in the city of *hubris* ‘women do not give birth’.⁷⁶ The scholiasts’ turn to Hesiod may simply be another manifestation of the mindset of the scholar, but their instinct about the Hesiodic flavour of these scenes of the *Peace* hardly seems misplaced.

The problem of securely identifying a Hesiodic trace is in fact of a very common kind. Towards the end of Aeschylus’ *Eumenides* the chorus ask Athena what she would have them bring to pass for the land of Attica:

ὅποῖα νίκης μὴ κακῆς ἐπίσκοπα,
καὶ ταῦτα γῆθεν ἔκ τε ποντίας δρόσου
ἐξ οὐρανοῦ τε, κἀνέμων ἀήματα
εὐηλίως πνέοντ’ ἐπιστεῖχειν χθόνα,
καρπὸν τε γαίας καὶ βοτῶν ἐπίρρυτον
ἄστοισιν εὐθενοῦντα μὴ κάμνειν χρόνῳ,
καὶ τῶν βροτείων σπερμάτων σωτηρίαν’
(Aeschylus, *Eumenides* 903–9)

905

Such things as are appropriate to a victory which is not evil, and moreover from the earth and the waters of the sea and from the heavens; for the breeze of the winds, breathing the sun’s light, to come over the land; for the products of the land and of the animals never to tire of flourishing for the citizens as time passes, and for human seed to be preserved safe.

The *Eumenides* is concerned with what we might think of as the Hesiodic subject par excellence, namely δίκη, justice, and however many other such lists of blessings in both literary and religious texts may be adduced, it seems hardly possible in reading these verses not to recall the blessings of Hesiod’s just city (*Works and Days* 225–37), and it is important that it is precisely

⁷⁶ Cf. below pp. 175–8. The meaning of *WD* 235 has been much debated: West follows the Proclan scholia in seeing resemblance to the father as a guarantee of legitimacy and the chaste behaviour of the wives, whereas Verdenius argues that the meaning is that the wives bear ordinary, healthy children, rather than τέρατα, a dichotomy found, for example, in the oaths (*GHI* 88.43–4, Aeschines, *Ctes.* 111) cited in West’s note. Whether *Peace* 1325 can suggest how the verse might have been understood in Aristophanes’ day is doubtful at best. On the other hand, the language of the fourth-century texts of these oaths, which are very probably not quoting Hesiod, raises interesting questions about the resonance of the Hesiodic passage: is Hesiod himself evoking the language of ritual and/or oath?

Hesiod's women

a πόλις upon which these blessings fall. In the verses which immediately follow, Athena seems to appropriate the Hesiodic notion of divine care and agricultural prosperity for those who practise justice to a changed political situation:⁷⁷

στέργω γάρ, ἀνδρὸς φητυποίμενος δίκην,
τὸ τῶν δικαίων τῶνδ' ἀπένθητον γένος.
(Aeschylus, *Eumenides* 911–12)

For, like a shepherd of plants, I cherish free from grief the race of these just men.

Hesiodic protreptic, at its most visionary and incantatory in the description of the Just City, becomes a powerful weapon in Athena's semi-magical 'persuasion' (cf. vv. 885, 970) of the once hostile chorus.⁷⁸

Hesiod's women

In his survey of Hesiodic reception, Hugo Koning⁷⁹ considers an apparently remarkable cluster of allusions in early poetry to *Works and Days* 699–705:

⁷⁷ Cf. Solmsen 1949: 211–15, noting, however, that it is not 'necessary' to assume a Hesiodic model for Aeschylus; much hangs, of course, on the model of intertextuality which is chosen. With Athena's 'race of just men' cf. εὐσεβέων ἀνδρῶν γένος at Theognis 1141 in a clear imitation of Hesiod (above p. 134).

⁷⁸ This passage of the *Eumenides* has a close parallel in the *Suppliant Women*, where the chorus of Danaids invoke blessings upon the Argive land because the city has agreed to accept them (*Suppl.* 625–709); here too motifs familiar from Hesiod abound – absence of plague and war, children born healthy, flourishing flocks, fairness and justice to ξεῖνοι and ἄστοι alike.

⁷⁹ Koning 2010: 140–4; in the course of these pages, however, Koning adopts inconsistent positions about the direct debt of some of the passages he discusses to Hesiod. West on *WD* 702–3 adds a list of what he calls 'echoes' of those verses in Theognis 1225–6 and in fragments of Sophocles and Euripides, all of which we owe in whole or part, as we owe Semonides 7, to Stobaeus 4.22 περὶ γάμου. Theognis 1225–6, 'Cyrnus, there is nothing sweeter than a good wife: I am witness of this, and do you witness my truthfulness', need not of course go back directly to Hesiod, but the idea of 'witnessing' turns v. 1225 from a simple statement to a 'citation' to be affirmed or denied: the poet here takes a stance with regard to a piece of received wisdom, which may or may not have been associated with a particular poet. As for the cases in tragedy which West adduces, all are debatable, as is unsurprising when dealing with material of this kind, but Sophocles fr. 682 R is indeed very close to Hesiod; Euripides fr. 494 K is an interesting case, as it is a direct confrontation with the 'misogynist' tradition in Greek culture and vv. 27–9 are indeed very close (again) to *WD* 702–3.

Hesiod and the symposium

παρθενικήν δὲ γαμεῖν, ὥς κ' ἦθεα κεδνὰ διδάξεις·
τὴν δὲ μάλιστα γαμεῖν, ἥ τις σέθεν ἐγγύθι ναίει,
πάντα μάλ' ἄμφις ἰδὼν, μὴ γείτοσι χάρματα γήμῃς.
οὐ μὲν γάρ τι γυναικὸς ἀνὴρ λήϊζεν ἄμεινον
τῆς ἀγαθῆς, τῆς δ' αὖτε κακῆς οὐ ρίγιον ἄλλο,
δειπνολόχης, ἥ τ' ἄνδρα καὶ ἰφθιμόν περ ἐόντα
εὖει ἄτερ δαλοῖο καὶ ὠμῶι γήραϊ δῶκεν.

(Hesiod, *Works and Days* 699–705)

Marry a virgin, so that you can teach her careful ways. Most of all marry one who lives near you, having looked at everything around you so that your marriage is not a source of amusement for your neighbours. A man takes nothing better than a wife when she is good, and nothing worse than a bad one – one who plunders the dinner, who needs no torch to burn her husband, strong though he be, and gives him over to a raw old age.

Koning rightly points out that such sentiments would fit very well into some of the poetic modes most associated with the male symposium, which was in any case the most significant ‘private’ context for poetic performance in the archaic period. In this section I consider briefly two of the best known examples of archaic epodic and iambic poetry, both on the theme (very broadly) of the relations between men and women, which – with differing degrees of probability – may echo these and similar verses of the *Works and Days*; they are placed here not because we can be sure that their performance context was indeed sympotic, but rather because they show how easily Hesiodic themes, particularly when lifted out of their Hesiodic context, fitted into the broader world of non-hexameter archaic poetry, where the pleasures and dangers of the other sex indeed formed a major poetic theme.

Semonides fr. 6 W (= 1 Pellizer–Tedeschi) is cited by Clement of Alexandria and Porphyry as an imitation of Hesiod:⁸⁰

γυναικὸς οὐδὲν χρῆμ' ἀνὴρ λήϊζεται
ἐσθλῆς ἄμεινον οὐδὲ ρίγιον κακῆς.

(Semonides fr. 6 West)

A man takes no thing better than a good wife, nor worse than a bad one.

⁸⁰ Clement's very long list of ‘thefts’ by one pagan poet from another (*Strom.* 6.13.1) covers, of course, what we would regard as many different modes of intertextual relationship.

Provided that conventional views about the relative chronology of Hesiod and Semonides are correct, the verbal parallelisms (ληίζεται, ῥίγιον) seem to make the case for direct borrowing by the iambic poet unanswerable,⁸¹ and so this would be an example comparable to, for example, Alcaeus 347 (above pp. 123–6), namely the transposition of a famous passage into a different poetic mode, perhaps in the context of a symposium. Nevertheless, despite this case, the (misleadingly named) ‘misogynist’ stream in Greek poetry and culture runs so deep that extreme caution is necessary in positing direct literary descent within such material. Thus Koning (p. 140) assumes that when the narrator of Archilochus’ ‘Cologne Epode’ (fr. 196a.33–4 W) tells the young girl he is trying to seduce that he has no interest in Neoboule, for with such a wife he would be ‘a source of merriment to the neighbours’ (γείτοσι χάρμα), he will be alluding to *WD* 701. In both passages the neighbours – always a very potent form of social control – will be amused, particularly during the wedding itself, because the wife in question will be, or will have been, shared by the hapless husband with others, but we may well wonder whether the common phrasing is in this case sufficient to posit an intertextual connection.⁸² One might argue, particularly if we knew that this was a rather later text, that Archilochus’ iambics are a kind of parodic re-interpretation of the Hesiodic passage: Hesiod advises us to ‘marry (γαμεῖν) a virgin’ of an appropriate age whom one can instruct in ‘careful ways’, whereas Archilochus’ concern is with having sex (another meaning of γαμεῖν) with a virgin, whom we might well imagine to fit the Hesiodic age prescription (*WD* 698), rather than with someone whose promiscuity is the subject of local gossip and who is well past her sell-by date

⁸¹ Cf., e.g., Lloyd-Jones 1975: 92. Janko 1982: 97–8 toys with the idea that Hesiod is here influenced by Semonides.

⁸² For other relevant passages cf. also Nicolosi 2007: 221–3. I think it true to say that the majority of commentators on the ‘Cologne Epode’ indeed see Hesiod as a ‘parallel’, not as the source for Archilochus. Osborne 2001: 60 makes an important point about the relationship between the two passages (‘Hesiod’s “marry a maiden so that you can teach her careful ways” is the “soft” version of male exercise of power by penetration in this world, Archilochos’ Cologne epode the eroticised version’), but he is not, I think, arguing for an intertextual relation between them.

(vv. 26–8), and he does indeed then proceed to teach her an important lesson (‘the goddess has many delights for young men other than the divine thing’, vv. 13–15).⁸³ Here too, then, as to some extent with Alcaeus 347, Hesiod would be evoked, somewhat ironically, as an authority allegedly legitimating the indulgence of the speaker’s desires. However attractive such an interpretation might be, concerns about the nature of the circulation of texts at this date, the relatively unmarked nature of the shared phrasing, and the fact that the ‘Cologne epode’ does clearly have other, especially Homeric, intertexts enjoin caution.⁸⁴

In the course of his famous *iambos* on women (fr. 7 W / Pellizer–Tedeschi) Semonides uses this same idea of the malicious pleasure that neighbours can take in a man’s choice of wife. According to this poem, the most outrageous behaviour can be expected from the woman who seems most chaste: ‘while her husband gapes open-mouthed, the neighbours take pleasure (γείτονες | χαίρουσ’) in seeing how he too is fooled’ (fr. 7.110–11 W / Pellizer–Tedeschi). That Semonides fr. 6 does seem to echo *WD* 702–3 (cf. above) might seem to strengthen the case for Hesiodic allusion in fr. 7 also. Such an allusion would in this case, perhaps not unlike Archilochus fr. 196a, also work through parodic subversion. Hesiod holds out the hope of a ‘good wife’ who can be taught to behave properly and to spare one embarrassment, but Semonides resigns us to the delusory nature of such hopes: the most apparently σώφρων, particularly in her husband’s own eyes, is in fact the most debauched. This passage comes in the summary (vv. 94–116) of the κακόν represented by all women, which is immediately preceded by what

⁸³ Much hangs, of course, on what the background situation of the Cologne narrative is understood to be; the apparent stress on marriage in vv. 24–5 Νεοβούλην / ἄλλος ἀνὴρ ἐχέτω and 33 ἐγὼ γυναῖκα τοιαύτην ἔχων is, however, relevant in this context.

⁸⁴ Of particular relevance in the present context is Odysseus’ first speech to Nausicaa in *Odyssey* 6 which combines praise of the girl addressed, a plea for help, a wish that the girl should find a suitable husband and praise of successful marriage as being χάρματα εὐμενέτησι (v. 185); the ‘Cologne epode’ could be, and has been (cf., very briefly, Henderson 1976: 171), seen as an iambic, and hence partly parodic, revision of Odysseus’ speech as the epic paradigm for ‘how to speak to a desirable young woman’. Cf. further Hunter 2005b: 233–5. Some have wanted to connect the καλή τέρεϊνα παρθένος of v. 6 with the ‘soft-skinned virgin’ of *WD* 518–524.

appears to be Semonides' description of the best wife a man can have:

τὴν δ' ἐκ μελίσσης· τὴν τις εὐτυχεῖ λαβών·
 κείνηι γάρ οἱ μῶμος οὐ προσιζάνει,
 θάλλει δ' ὑπ' αὐτῆς κἀπαέξεται βίος, 85
 φίλῃ δὲ σὺν φιλέοντι γηράσκει πόσει
 τεκοῦσα καλὸν κῶνομάκλυτον γένος.
 κἀριπρεπὴς μὲν ἐν γυναιξὶ γίνεται
 πάσῃσι, θεῇ δ' ἀμφιδέδρομεν χάρις.
 οὐδ' ἐν γυναιξὶν ἥδεται καθήμενη 90
 ὅκου λέγουσιν ἀφροδισίους λόγους.
 τοίας γυναικας ἀνδράσιν χαρίζεται
 Ζεὺς τὰς ἀρίστας καὶ πολυφραδεστάτας·
 (Semonides 7.83–93 West)

There is a wife from the bee; the man who gets her is fortunate. On this woman alone does no blame settle,⁸⁵ and under her resources flourish and increase, and she grows old loving her loving husband and has borne him fine and glorious offspring. She is outstanding among all women and divine grace surrounds her. She takes no pleasure in sitting among women when they talk about sex. Such women are the best and most sensible wives which Zeus bestows upon men.

The 'bee wife' seems to reverse, or redirect, the Hesiodic Pandora: under her management, the resources of the household increase rather than diminish, she cares for her husband and bears him splendid children (cf. *WD* 235),⁸⁶ and she is neither idle nor lascivious. Whereas the Hesiodic Pandora's χάρις is a sexual attractiveness which is man's undoing and one of the reasons why men marry in error (*WD* 65–6), the 'divine χάρις' of the 'bee wife' arises from how she has actually performed as a wife, mother and housemate; it is this excellence, not her physical charms, which makes her 'outstanding among all women'.⁸⁷

⁸⁵ As commentators note, the verb is presumably chosen for its pointed resonance in connection with a bee.

⁸⁶ In regard to Semonides, it may or may not be an accident that productive bees figure in *WD* 233.

⁸⁷ Osborne 2001: 59 takes a different view of these verses; he is right to urge caution, but I doubt that v. 86 really makes us focus on 'prolonged intimacy' and I do not think that v. 88 refers (at least principally) to the woman's 'appearance'. The language of vv. 85–6 is normally illustrated (cf. Lloyd-Jones ad loc.) from other passages in literature describing 'mutual marital affection', but we should perhaps

Whether or not such a wife, ‘the best and most sensible’ a man can have, is merely an unrealisable ideal and whether there is an inconsistency between this picture and the later verses about the woman ‘who seems most σώφρων’ may be debated,⁸⁸ but the question of the relationship of these passages to Hesiod cannot be considered in isolation from the relationship more broadly of Semonides fr. 7 to the Hesiodic tradition.

‘It is obvious that [Semonides fr. 7] is influenced by one Greek writer earlier than Semonides – Hesiod...’;⁸⁹ Lloyd-Jones’ view probably deserves to be thought of as the *communis opinio*. We owe our knowledge of Semonides 7 to its citation in section 4.22 of Stobaeus’ anthology, a section devoted to φύγος γυναικῶν; the same section quotes, inter alia, *Theogony* 591–3 and various passages from the *Works and Days* (vv. 57–6, 67–8 (both from the Pandora-story), 375). It is, however, to the *Theogony*, in particular, that students of Semonides’ poem normally turn, though Robin Osborne has argued that, from one perspective, we are to see the *iambos* as a whole as an inversion or parody of the Hesiodic *Catalogue of Women*.⁹⁰ The version of the Pandora-story in the *Theogony*, in which Pandora herself is the origin of both women and men’s misery, might seem more directly relevant to the view of women promulgated by Semonides in fr. 7 than that of the *Works and Days*, and the resigned pessimism of *Theogony* 600–12 (Zeus brought it about that you cannot live with or without a wife) seems completely in tune with the message of the end of Semonides’ poem as we have it: all men are in the same boat, as far as women, the

(also) think of the standard use of φίλος to describe a spouse on epitaphs, often combined with reference to the children left behind: a famous fourth-century epitaphic poem from Athens celebrates a woman called Melite (!), wife of Onesimos (‘Mr Helpful’), as both a χρηστή γυνή and φιλοῦντα ἀντιφιλοῦσα τὸν ἄνδρα (*CEG* 2.530), who (from the tomb) also greets her φίλτατ’ ἀνδρῶν and urges him τοὺς ἑμούς φιλεῖ; whether or not we should think that the author had been reading Semonides may be debated. It has been quite reasonably argued that Semonides’ ‘bee woman’ pointedly draws on and reverses Hesiod’s image of women as drones (*Theogony* 594–9, where drones are contrasted, as at *WD* 305, with μέλισσαι, i.e. productive ‘worker bees’), but it is Hesiod’s Pandora who really gives the passage its force. Xenophon too uses the image of ‘good’ bee-women in the *Oeconomicus*, cf. above p. 65.

⁸⁸ Schear 1984 argues that no wife is a bee-wife except in her husband’s imagination.

⁸⁹ Lloyd-Jones 1975: 18. ⁹⁰ Osborne 2005: 22–4.

μέγιστον κακόν, are concerned.⁹¹ Nevertheless, it is perhaps unwise to seek to draw too firm a distinction between the two Hesiodic poems in this regard, and in an influential article Nicole Loraux argued that Semonides 7 should be viewed as 'une lecture d'Hésiode'.⁹² For Loraux, Semonides replaces the essentially unified Hesiodic view of women with a paradigm of diversity, the φύλα γυναικῶν; thus, for example, whereas the Hesiodic Pandora is made of earth and water (*Theogony* 571, *WD* 60–1) and has a κύνεος νόος (*WD* 67), Semonides offers a sequence of dog-women, earth-women and water-women (vv. 12–42).⁹³ This is not the place for a detailed account or evaluation of Loraux's argument, but it is indeed worth stressing that it is the *Works and Days*, not the *Theogony*, which gives prominence to Pandora's (and hence all women's) νόος and ἦθος (*WD* 67, 77–8), and it is on these that Semonides concentrates, and indeed hangs his poem, 'In the beginning god made woman's mind in different forms . . .' (vv. 1–2). The difference between the two Hesiodic versions in this respect is readily explicable within the different focuses of the two poems,⁹⁴ and the case for some use of Hesiod in Semonides 7 seems indeed hard to resist, whether or not we think that Semonides' repeated insistence (vv. 96, 115) that 'Zeus made this the greatest evil – women [or wives]' inevitably recalls the Hesiodic Pandora stories (cf. *Theogony* 592, 600–1, *WD* 82). Agreement at the level of textual detail about specific borrowings may, however, be harder won.

Semonides' conclusion that women are 'a bond, an unbreakable fetter' with which Zeus has bound men (v. 116)⁹⁵ has

⁹¹ See the remarks of Osborne 2001: 60–1. ⁹² Loraux 1978: 54.

⁹³ Loraux 1978: 55–6, cf. also Lloyd-Jones 1975: 69. Pellizer–Tedeschi 1990: 125–6 are also inclined to see a direct borrowing from Hesiod in Semonides' 'earth-woman'.

⁹⁴ In the *Works and Days* Pandora represents what men look for in a bride (desirable beauty and skill at weaving) and the evil inside which they cannot see; so too, there is greater stress on Epimetheus 'receiving' his bride into his house, because this happens with every wedding in every one of the communities which form Hesiod's audience (we are, moreover, later on to receive instruction on the age at which to 'bring a wife into the house' and the preferred age of the bride, if she is to learn ἦθος κεδνά (v. 699)). Less emphasis is given to these aspects in the *Theogony*, with its greater concern with the relations between Zeus and Prometheus and the consequences which these have for mankind. Cf. further Clay 2003: 122–5.

⁹⁵ The text is uncertain, but the general sense is not in doubt.

often been associated with the binding of Prometheus in the *Theogony*:⁹⁶

δῆσε δ' ἄλυκτοπέδησι Προμηθέα ποικιλόβουλον,
δεσμοῖς ἀργαλέοισι, μέσον διὰ κίων' ἐλάσσας
(Hesiod, *Theogony* 521–2)

He bound Prometheus, the cunning counsellor, in inescapable fetters, in grim bonds, driving them through the middle of a pillar.

An association is here tempting, for there would be something like poetic justice in men sharing, at least symbolically, in the literal fate of their benefactor Prometheus, but the image is perhaps not rare enough to dispel all doubt about a direct link (cf., e.g., Solon 4.33 W). Some colour is, however, lent to the suggestion by the proximity of the image in Semonides to the poet's claim (vv. 100–2) that any man with a wife 'will not quickly thrust Hunger from his home, a hateful (ἐχθρόν) housemate, a god who is hostile'.⁹⁷ In the *Works and Days*, the poet advises Perses to work 'so that Hunger may hate (ἐχθαίρη) you, but fair-garlanded, reverend Demeter love you and fill your granary with the means of life' (vv. 299–301, cf. v. 230); that Hunger 'hates' you means that he will shun you and not come to reside with you, which is precisely the image Semonides offers.⁹⁸ So too, that women are the ones whose actions are most likely to attract Hunger to your house is the implication both of the Pandora story in the *Works and Days* – 'opening the jar' is, from

⁹⁶ Cf. Lloyd-Jones 1975: 91, Loraux 1978: 67–8, Janko 1982: 97. It is perhaps of some interest that in vv. 117–18 (where our text breaks off) Semonides referred to 'those (τοὺς μὲν) whom Hades received as they struggled over a woman'; the reference to Helen and the deaths she caused might make us think (cf. West on *WD* 165, Pellizer–Tedeschi 1990: 154) of *WD* 161–6, where some (τοὺς μὲν) of the heroes died at Thebes and others (τοὺς δέ) at Troy 'Ἑλένης ἔνεκ' ἠυκόμοιο. The last phrase is also Homeric, and a memory of Hesiod is certainly not necessary here, but the running together of Pandora and Helen is at least suggestive; we do not of course know how Semonides picked up τοὺς μὲν in what followed.

⁹⁷ Grotius' θεόν, for the transmitted θεῶν, is adopted by Lloyd-Jones and Pellizer–Tedeschi; West keeps the transmitted text, but understands the genitive as partitive (cf. West 1974: 178).

⁹⁸ Cf. West on *WD* 300.

one perspective, a potent image of the wasting of what agriculture has produced – and of the image of women as consuming drones at *Theogony* 594–9, and is all but explicitly stated at *Theogony* 603–6 (the man who does not marry does not lack food while he is alive).⁹⁹ The personification of Hunger was clearly a phenomenon of literature and indeed cult which went well beyond Hesiod, who himself is presumably drawing on traditional modes of expression in *WD* 299–301, but the possibility that Semonides' combination of the motif with an attack upon women owes more than a little to Hesiod is not, I think, to be dismissed out of hand.¹⁰⁰ Certainly, the most famous post-Hesiodic depiction of hunger in Greek literature, Callimachus' account of Erysichthon in the *Hymn to Demeter*, is very clearly shaped as an illustration of a central message of the *Works and Days*, namely the link between piety, morality and having enough to eat; Erysichthon reverses the Hesiodic wish, and is loved by Hunger and hated by Demeter.¹⁰¹

If the haul of passages where a direct textual relationship can be established with reasonable certainty is rather small,¹⁰² it remains more likely than not that Semonides fr. 7 was indeed directly influenced by Hesiod, and – though this is harder to judge – gains in point if the poet, or (perhaps) reciting

⁹⁹ Janko 1982: 96–7 regards as a 'striking' coincidence the fact that Semonides' bee-woman produces splendid offspring (γένος, v. 87), the only mention of offspring in the entire poem, and that, in the passage immediately following the likening of women to drones, 'Hesiod continues that even if you do succeed in finding a good woman, your offspring will cause you grief unceasing'. This appears to be based on understanding γενέθλης in v. 610 as 'children' (as in Evelyn-White's translation, and cf. also Osborne 2005: 9), a meaning which seems to produce an impossible run for the sentence; even were it correct, the parallel is not really very close, particularly as Hesiod has moved on from the drone-image. West and others understand γενέθλης as 'kind (of wife)'.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. further Loraux 1978: 62 ('La femme, c'est la faim ...').

¹⁰¹ For discussion and bibliography cf. above pp. 37–8.

¹⁰² I have not, of course, discussed every passage of Semonides' poem where a Hesiodic model or parallel has been adduced. There is also something of a Hesiodic 'feel' to Semonides fr. 1 W = 8 Pellizer-Tedeschi, but nothing striking enough to make discussion worthwhile, cf. R. Fowler 1987: 30–1. Phocylides 14 West may combine a reworking of Semonides fr. 7 with a memory of Hesiod, if West is correct that Phocylides took the form τέτορα from *WD* 698; in later poetry at least, such a technique of 'window reference' is very familiar. Not all critics, however, are clear that Phocylides took his series of animal-women from Semonides, cf. Lloyd-Jones 1975: 20, West 1978b: 167.

symposiast,¹⁰³ was known to be adopting what was in part a Hesiodic voice. The ‘misogynist’ strain, or what could be taken as such, in Hesiod was always likely to be exploited in the subsequent tradition, where the dangers of the female were a very productive area for the literary expression of cultural anxieties.

¹⁰³ Osborne 2001 offers the strongest arguments for considering Semonides 7 as a sympotic poem, but cf. also Schear 1984.

CHAPTER 4

PLUTARCH'S *WORKS AND DAYS*, AND PROCLUS', AND HESIOD'S

Finding Plutarch

Although there is no mention of it in the so-called Lamprias Catalogue of his works, there is no doubt that Plutarch, who wrote a *Life of Hesiod* (Lamprias no. 35), which does not survive, and has been called 'arguably Hesiod's greatest fan in antiquity',¹ also wrote an extensive commentary on the *Works and Days* in at least four books; Aulus Gellius 20.8.7 refers to this work as a *commentarius*, but there is no Greek reference to what presumably would have been called a ὑπόμνημα, and the precise form of the work must remain uncertain.² Our principal sources for Plutarch's work are those scholia on the *Works and Days* which go back, through an unknown number of redactions and compressions, to a commentary on the poem (ὑπόμνημα εἰς τὰ Ἡσιόδου Ἔργα καὶ Ἡμέρας, according to the *Suda* π 2473) written by the neo-Platonist Proclus in the fifth century AD. Fortunately, Proclan scholia on the *Works and Days* may be identified not merely by the neo-Platonic flavour of their interpretations, but also because they are indicated in two manuscripts by Greek numerals;³ these scholia form a distinct body of ancient interpretation, although there are clear overlaps with the other class of *scholia vetera*, many of which contain material that will go back to Alexandrian

¹ Koning 2010: 186.

² The Lamprias Catalogue refers to Plutarch's work on one of Nicander's poems as Εἰς τὰ Νικάνδρου Θηριακά, and the title of the work on Hesiod was very likely of the same form.

³ Cf. Pertusi 1951; there is a helpful summary at West 1978a: 68–9. On the nature of Proclus' work see Marzillo 2012, and Faraggiana di Sarzana 1978, 1987, who follows Wilamowitz in stressing the closeness of Proclus to his principal source; in her view, Proclus' commentary was essentially an annotated version of Plutarch's work. For a more cautious view cf. Marzillo 2010: xlviii–li. I have been unable to consult Maes 1939.

scholarship. Proclus⁴ often cites Plutarch by name, but it is also clear that much in these scholia will derive from the earlier scholar, even where he is not named. The relationship between the Plutarchan and Proclan commentaries is, unsurprisingly, a matter of scholarly debate; the older view that virtually all 'the (non neo-Platonist) meat' in Proclus' commentary came in fact from Plutarch is treated with some caution by the most recent editor of the Proclan scholia.⁵ As for the extent of Plutarch's work, material which certainly derives from it, and the fact that it filled at least four books, shows it to have been both full and wide-ranging in its interests; it has been inferred from the fact that in one place the Proclan scholia (on vv. 797–9) note that 'Plutarch [fr. 108 Sandbach] did not even think the preceding verses worthy of mention, as though they were not transmitted' that Plutarch must probably have had something to say about most verses.⁶

There are no really objective criteria to help us in the attempt to decipher Plutarchan material within the Proclan scholia, and differences of judgement are inevitable. A common problem occurs when Proclus explicitly cites Plutarch at one point in an extended note:⁷ does this imply that the rest of the note is not in fact Plutarchan, or is it a rhetorical device precisely to create that impression, or is it the result of the process of compression which the Proclan scholia have suffered in the course of transmission? Parallels of subject-matter in the Plutarchan corpus can be helpful here, but never of course truly clinching. Thus, for example, the Proclan scholia on vv. 240–1 ('often a whole city suffers for one wicked man') adduce the examples of the results of Agamemnon's harsh treatment of Chryses and of Ajax's outrage against Athena; Patzig felt here the manner of Plutarch and ascribed the note to him (= fr. 36 Sandbach).⁸ The case might be thought notably strengthened

⁴ Henceforth I regularly use 'Proclus' as shorthand for 'the Proclan scholia'.

⁵ Cf. Marzillo 2010: xlviii–li. Important representatives of the traditional view are Westerwick 1893 and Wilamowitz 1928: 4; on Plutarch's commentary see also Dimitrijevic 1899: 99–111. I am of course much indebted in this chapter to F.H. Sandbach's notes in his Loeb edition (vol. XV) of the fragments of Plutarch.

⁶ Cf. K. Ziegler, *RE* 21.873. ⁷ Cf. below on the scholia on vv. 591–6.

⁸ Patzig 1876: 26.

by the fact that the phrase which the scholia use to describe Agamemnon's action, τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος αὐθάδως τῶι ἱερεῖ προσ-ενεχθέντος, 'when Agamemnon attacked the priest without regard', finds a striking parallel in Plutarch's essay *How to Study Poetry*: Plutarch (19b) notes that Homer's κακῶς at *Iliad* 1.25 to describe the manner of Agamemnon's dismissal of 'the priest' means ἀγρίως καὶ αὐθάδως καὶ παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον, 'savagely and without regard and contrary to what was appropriate', thus indicating Homer's disapproval of the king's action.⁹ If this case is at least suggestive, we must always remember elsewhere that Proclus will normally have clothed Plutarchan material in his own language, and so the attempt to identify 'Plutarchan' or 'Proclan' vocabulary will ever be of only limited utility.

Another case which is exemplary of the difficulties faced concerns the scholia on Hesiod's famous verses on the power of φήμη:¹⁰

ὥδ' ἔρδειν· δειλὴν δὲ βροτῶν ὑπαλεύεο φήμην·
 φήμη γάρ τε κακὴ πέλεται, κούφη μὲν ἀείραι
 ῥεῖα μάλ', ἀργαλέη δὲ φέρειν, χαλεπὴ δ' ἀποθέσθαι.
 φήμη δ' οὐ τις πάμπαν ἀπόλλυται, ἦντινα πολλοὶ
 λαοὶ φημίξουσιν· θεὸς νύ τίς ἐστι καὶ αὐτή.

(Hesiod, *Works and Days* 760–4)

Act in this way. Avoid the bad report of men, for report is evil: it is very easy to rouse, troublesome to bear and difficult to lay aside. No report ever disappears entirely when large numbers of people report; it too is some kind of god.

That Plutarch elsewhere cites v. 763 in an anecdote about rumour (*Mor.* 737c) can carry very little weight, given the rich *Nachleben* of these verses (their own φήμη) in ancient literature; in such a case it is analysis of the preserved scholia which must

⁹ This is the only use of αὐθάδως in the extant Hesiodic scholia, whereas there are a handful of examples in the Plutarchan corpus.

¹⁰ To the commentators on these verses add Clay 2003: 148 and Hardie 2012: 54–7. Koning 2010: 226 n. 150 (and cf. also 224 n. 138) notes that, in distinguishing in one of his references to these verses between φήμη and συκοφαντία or διαβολή, Aeschines (2.144–5) is 'replying in the manner of Hesiod', who had distinguished two kinds of *eris*, identified two opposite effects of *aidos* and was often cited in connection with the precise meaning of words.

bear the weight. The scholia (fr. 259 Marzillo = Plutarch fr. 99 Sandbach) in fact cite an observation of Plato to the effect that men do not go wrong about the judgement of virtue to the extent that they do about virtue itself. The passage in question is *Laws* 12.950b–c,¹¹ in which Plato notes that even the wicked are often able to distinguish good men from bad, and that is a good reason to give due attention to good reputation (εὐδοξία); the paraphrase in the scholia borrows language, as well as thought, from Plato.¹² Citation of Plato comes as naturally to Proclus as to Plutarch, and we can hardly make a choice on this basis. In what follows, however, the scholia cite, in order to qualify, a saying of Gorgias and also cite an anecdote about Xenocrates, the head of the Academy in the late fourth century BC; Plutarch refers to Xenocrates on very many occasions, but the philosopher also has a significant presence in Proclus, and again we may therefore be required to suspend judgement. Nevertheless, the scholia on v. 376 (fr. 158 Marzillo = Plutarch fr. 57 Sandbach) explicitly ascribe another citation of Xenocrates to Plutarch, and here we may feel that the case is in fact strong enough to be reasonably confident that Plutarch has had at least something to do with the surviving scholia on the verses concerning φήμη.

As we have already noted, a special category consists of those cases where there are clear linguistic or thematic parallels between Proclan scholia and the extant works of Plutarch, or where modes of interpretation on show in the scholia seem to match prescriptions for interpretation found in Plutarch's *How to Study Poetry* (cf. e.g. frs. 42, 44, 49 Sandbach); a glance at Sandbach's edition of the fragments ascribed to Plutarch will show just how many scholia have been thought to contain Plutarchan material on the basis of parallels, often of anecdotes

¹¹ Marzillo's reference to *Theaetetus* 167e–8a is plainly wrong; Pertusi and earlier editors of Plutarch hazard no identification of the Platonic passage.

¹² Note the shared οὐ γὰρ ὅσον . . . τοσοῦτον καί. There are also signs of deliberate *uariatio* of the Platonic model: Plato says that even bad men have 'some divine power to guess correctly' (θεῖον . . . τι καὶ εὐστοχόν), whereas the scholia observe, following Hesiod, that φήμη has τι θεῖον about it, and it often happens that the person who starts a rumour is not correct, but the rumour itself 'hits the mark' (εὐστοχος) as it grows in strength.

or quotations, in Plutarch's extant works. One work which perhaps occupies a special position here is the *Symposium of the Seven Sages*, a work of 'historical recreation' in which quotations and discussions of Hesiod play a significant role.¹³ In some cases there is perhaps little room for doubt. At 157e–8a the symposiasts discuss *Works and Days* 41, 'how great benefit there is in mallow and asphodel'. The Proclan scholia on this verse (fr. 39 Marzillo) retail lore about the connection between this verse and Epimenides' magical 'no-hunger' regime which enabled him to survive without food;¹⁴ the connection claimed between Hesiod and Epimenides is precisely that claimed both in the *Symposium* and elsewhere in Plutarch, and the scholia cite a source, Hermippus' *On the Seven Sages*, which we know Plutarch also used elsewhere. It is therefore hardly bold to ascribe part at least of this scholium to Plutarch (= fr. 26 Sandbach).

The discussion of *Works and Days* 41 is immediately followed in Plutarch's *Symposium* by a general statement by one of the guests about Hesiod's medical knowledge:

ιατρικός γὰρ Ἡσίοδος, ὡς δῆλός ἐστιν οὐκ ἀμελῶς οὐδ' ἀπείρως περὶ διαίτης καὶ κράσεως οἴνου καὶ ἀρετῆς ὕδατος καὶ λουτροῦ γυναικῶν¹⁵ διαλεγόμενος καὶ συνουσίας καιροῦ καὶ βρεφῶν καθίσεως. (Plutarch, *Symposium of the Seven Sages* 158a–b)

Hesiod's medical knowledge is clear from the fact that his discussions of diet and the mixing of wine and the best kind of water and women's baths and the right time for intercourse and how young children should sit are neither casual nor lacking in practical experience.

¹³ Cf. above p. 30. ¹⁴ On Hesiod and Epimenides more generally cf. above pp. 30–1.

¹⁵ The manuscripts are here divided between λουτροῦ γυναικῶν and λουτροῦ καὶ γυναικῶν. The reference of the first phrase, and of λουτροῦ in the second, would be to *WD* 753, the injunction against bathing γυναικείῳ λούτρῳ, 'in water in which a woman has bathed'; although λουτροῦ γυναικῶν is not the most natural way to express this idea (Paton suggested emendation to λουτροῦ γυναικείου), the sequence of varied genitive phrases speaks in its favour, and plain λουτροῦ might seem a bit bald. If λουτροῦ καὶ γυναικῶν were correct, then the reference of 'women' will surely be to *WD* 586, 'women are most wanton (in mid-summer)', where the 'medical' explanation of the Proclan scholium (fr. 215 Marzillo = Plutarch fr. 80 Sandbach), i.e. women, being cooler creatures, are warmed by the sun whereas men are exhausted by it, would both suit the context of *Symposium* 158a–b (Hesiod's medical knowledge) and is known to have been a subject of interest to Plutarch (cf. *QC* 3.4); there can be little doubt that Plutarch is indeed behind the Proclan scholium to *WD* 586.

The reference to how infants should sit is very plainly to *Works and Days* 750–2, 'do not seat a twelve-day old child upon the unmovable – for that is not better and makes a man unmanly – nor a twelve-month old one', on which the Proclan scholia explicitly cite Plutarch (fr. 96 Sandbach) for the view that this does not mean that children should not be placed on graves (a position which is dangerous for adults also), but rather that lack of motion makes infants 'weaker' (hence, for example, the use of rocking cradles). What is important about this scholium in the present context is that Plutarch's explanation of the verses looks, as the *Symposium* would have led us to expect, to their 'medical' content – Hesiod always has an eye on what is healthful – and this will prove useful in seeking to identify Plutarchan material elsewhere.

Although commentators have differed with each other to some degree, it seems clear that the reference of 'diet and the mixing of wine and the best kind of water' is to *Works and Days* 585–96 (quoted above p. 123), which concern the ideal diet in mid-summer. The Proclan scholia on vv. 591–6 (= fr. 217 Marzillo = Plutarch fr. 81 Sandbach) note that Hesiod is prescribing the appropriate diet (δίαίτα, the same word found in Plutarch's *Symposium*) for those hard at work in the countryside who need a strengthening regime, not for the idle and spoiled. The scholia proceed to retail at length apparently contemporary 'scientific' methods to find the 'best water' (ὑδωρ ἄριστον) and to judge the 'badness' (φαιλότης) of water; this clearly is Plutarch's ἀρετὴ ὑδατος. If, then, there can be little doubt that the substance of this note is owed to Plutarch, it might come as a surprise that, within the same note, Plutarch's authority is explicitly cited for a place where the water is both light and of poor quality. It would seem that here we have a clear case where Proclus (or perhaps a subsequent excerptor) has explicitly cited Plutarch for a specific illustrative detail within a longer note which is itself essentially Plutarchan; we should not necessarily assume that the intention was to deceive. The conclusion of the scholium, that Hesiod's advice to farmers was 'simpler' (ἀπλούστερον) than the more complicated, scientific methods now in use, will also carry an ethical charge:

simplicity and moral wholeness go together, and this is a message which would not be unworthy of Plutarch. As for *Works and Days* 753, on not bathing in water in which women have bathed, the Proclan scholia expand this injunction somewhat:

Men should not bare themselves naked in the same place as women. In addition to the impropriety (τὸ ἄσχημον),¹⁶ there are certain effluences and secretions¹⁷ from women's bodies which defile men when they are filled with them. It is inevitable that those who enter the same air and the same water are affected by them. (Schol. Hesiod, *Works and Days* 753–4 = Plutarch fr. 97 Sandbach)

Although there is nothing here which points decisively to Plutarch, it is noteworthy that this scholium offers a decidedly more 'medical' explanation for Hesiod's injunction than does the lacunose scholium of non-Proclan origin, which notes, inter alia, that men and women take baths for different reasons; at the very least, the Proclan scholium would support a claim that Hesiod was ἱατρικός, and as such might well indeed be Plutarchan.

A rather similar kind of argument, which risks circularity, though not, I believe, dangerously so, may be made in connection with the claim that Hesiod speaks knowledgeably about 'the right time for intercourse'. Editors of Plutarch have identified various passages in the *Works and Days* to which this might refer (e.g. 735–6, 812–13), but the reference is all but certainly to vv. 694–8:

μέτρα φυλάσσεσθαι· καιρὸς δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἄριστος.
 ὥραϊος δὲ γυναῖκα τεὸν ποτὶ οἶκον ἄγεσθαι, 695
 μήτε τριηκόντων ἐτέων μάλα πόλλ' ἀπολείπων
 μήτ' ἐπιθεῖς μάλα πολλὰ· γάμος δὲ τοι ὥριος οὔτος.
 ἢ δὲ γυνὴ τέτορ' ἡβῶοι, πέμπτῳ δὲ γαμοίτο.
 (Hesiod, *Works and Days* 694–8)

Be mindful of measures; in all matters the right moment is most important. Bring a wife into your home when you are the right age, neither much short of thirty years nor much beyond it; this is the right time for marriage. Your wife should be four years from puberty and marry her in the fifth.

¹⁶ For this concern elsewhere in the scholia cf. below pp. 183–4.

¹⁷ With Marzillo, I here adopt Dübner's περιπτώματα for the transmitted περιτωμάτων.

Not only is Hesiod's principal emphasis here on the importance of *καῖρός*, but the Proclan scholia on vv. 695–8 (= fr. 234 Marzillo) insistently repeat this emphasis, noting that men must have reached a 'stable' (*σταθερός*) adulthood before begetting children, a view for which Plato is cited in support; as for women, the scholia note that the age for marriage which Hesiod advises is that at which women are more sexually ripe (*ὀργᾶν*, almost 'on heat') for intercourse and therefore the children will be more robust. Here again there is a distinctly more 'medical' approach to these verses in the Proclan scholia than in the non-Proclan, and there is nothing in the scholia (of any kind) on the other verses to which Plutarch has sometimes been thought to be referring which would so well suit the context in the *Symposium*. There seems, therefore, good reason to believe that part at least of the Proclan scholia on vv. 695–8 should be marked as a fragment of Plutarch.

In this category also we may note *Works and Days* 719–21:

γλώσσης τοι θησαυρός ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ἄριστος
φειδωλῆς, πλείστη δὲ χάρις κατὰ μέτρον ἰούσης·
εἰ δὲ κακὸν εἴπηις, τάχα κ' αὐτὸς μείζον ἀκούσαιο.
(Hesiod, *Works and Days* 719–21)

The finest treasure for men is in a sparing tongue, and the greatest pleasure in a tongue that moves in accordance with measure. If you speak ill, soon even greater ill will be spoken of you.

Here the lengthy Proclan scholium includes the famous anecdote, associated with more than one of the Seven Sages, about the tongue being both 'the best and the worst' part of a man. Plutarch cites this anecdote three times, including *Symposium* 146f (though not always in connection with the same sage), and it is not unreasonable to suspect that its presence in the Proclan scholium is owed to him.¹⁸ The attempt to associate Hesiod with the wisdom of the Sages is, as we have seen, very much in

¹⁸ For Plutarch's interest in the immediately preceding verses, *WD* 717–18, cf. *How to Study Poetry* 23f–4a. The fullest ancient exploitation of the 'tongue' anecdote is *Life of Aesop* 51–5, on which see esp. Kurke 2011: 218–23; for material shared between the *Life* and Plutarch's *Symposium* cf. below p. 185.

line with a significant element of the *Symposium of the Seven Sages*.¹⁹

There are several cases where Proclus explicitly reports a view of Plutarch about the *Works and Days*, but leaves us guessing about what exactly Plutarch said. One of the more interesting, and perhaps significant, of these passages concerns vv. 244–5 in Hesiod’s account of the punishment which Zeus inflicts upon the ‘Unjust City’:

τοῖσιν δ’ οὐρανόθεν μέγ’ ἐπήγαγε πῆμα Κρονίων,
 λιμόν ὁμοῦ καὶ λοιμόν, ἀποφθινύθουσι δὲ λαοί·
 οὐδὲ γυναῖκες τίκτουσιν, μινύθουσι δὲ οἶκοι
 Ζηνὸς φραδμοσύνησιν Ὀλυμπίου· ἄλλοτε δ’ αὐτε
 ἦ τῶν γε στρατὸν εὐρύν ἀπώλεσεν ἢ ὃ γε τεῖχος
 ἦ νέας ἐν πόντῳ Κρονίδης ἀποτείνυται αὐτῶν.
 (Hesiod, *Works and Days* 242–7)

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Upon them the son of Cronus brings down great trouble from the heavens, hunger and pestilence, and the people die off; the women do not bear children, and through the plans of Olympian Zeus the households wither away. At other times the son of Cronus destroys their great army or their walls or he takes vengeance upon their ships on the sea.

Proclus (fr. 108 Marzillo) notes that one has to pass straight from v. 243 to v. 246, missing out the two intervening verses (vv. 244–5) ‘which are transmitted in many [or the majority of] copies’; this view he ascribes to Plutarch (fr. 37 Sandbach). It is unclear how much of his (largely paraphrasing) note on the verses goes back to Plutarch, but it is noteworthy that Plutarch elsewhere discusses Chrysippus’ use of vv. 242–3 (*Mor.* 1040b–c = *SVF* II 1175);²⁰ Proclus certainly accepted Plutarch’s position and the Proclan scholia appear simply to ignore vv. 243–4. It has been suggested that the text should read ‘which are <not> transmitted...’, but – for what it is worth – the verses in question appear in all our manuscripts and several papyri. They are omitted in Aeschines’ quotation of vv. 240–7 at *Against Ctesiphon* 134, where however the

¹⁹ Cf. above p. 30.

²⁰ Marzillo puts *Moralia* 1040c in her apparatus of sources and material analogous to the scholia on vv. 242–7, but there is no obvious overlap in language or indeed thought.

omission can easily be explained as being due to the purpose of the quotation, namely an attack upon the calamities which Demosthenes' policies had allegedly brought upon Athens. It seems most unlikely that Plutarch's apparent condemnation of the verses was based simply upon the fact that they were not universally transmitted, but what (else?) Plutarch had against them lies in the realm of conjecture. It has been argued that, like Wilamowitz, he felt them harshly intrusive after v. 243,²¹ or that 'he considered a connection between the fertility of women and moral obligations to be illogical',²² but it may be that they seemed to present more than one problem: total sterility is not the opposite of the birth of legitimate (and healthy) children (v. 235, cf. further below), and Plutarch may also have felt that v. 245 is unnecessary padding, interrupting the clear sequence of Κρονίδης (239) ... Κρονίων (242) ... Κρονίδης (247).

One aspect which gives this case particular interest is the fact that the verses in question probably figure in two Hesiodic reworkings in Hellenistic poetry. Robert Renehan pointed out (cited by West 1978a: 218) that vv. 243–4 'may be echoed' in the speech which the aged Polyxo delivers to the Lemnian women, urging them to welcome (and sleep with) the Argonauts:

εὐτ' ἂν δὴ γεραραί μὲν ἀποφθινύθωσι γυναῖκες,
 κουρότεραι δ' ἄγονοι στρυγερὸν ποτὶ γῆρας ἵκησθε,
 πῶς τῆμος βώσεσθε, δυσάμμοροι; ἤε βαθείαις
 αὐτόματοι βόες ὕμιν ἐνιζευχέντες ἀρούραις
 γειοτόμον νειοῖο διειρύσσουσιν ἄροτρον,
 καὶ πρόκα τελλομένου ἔτεος στάχυν ἀμήσονται;
 (Apollonius, *Argonautica* 1.683–8)

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When the older women fade away and you younger ones reach hateful old age without having had children, how will you live then, poor fools? Will the cattle yoke themselves in the rich fields and pull the earth-cutting plough through the fallow land? As the seasons revolve, will they gather the harvest as soon as it is ripe?

Hesiod's ἀποφθινύθουσι δὲ λαοί is also a Homeric verse-ending (*Iliad* 5.643), but the echo of Hesiod suggested by Renehan seems all but certain. Apollonius uses the Hesiodic idea of

²¹ Cf. Livrea 1967: 4–9. ²² Van der Valk 1964: 359.

women not bearing any children at all, but this now is the result of an absence of men, not of a divinely sent sterility.²³ Moreover, the verses conjure up the spectre of Hesiodic hunger, through Polyxo's reversal of the *topoi* of the Golden Age: are the cattle going to yoke themselves αὐτόματοι, to say nothing of doing the harvesting? The language is Homeric, but the frame of her sarcastic wit very Hesiodic. She harangues the younger women as Hesiod harangues Perses (τάδε φράζεσθαι ἄνωγα, v. 693).²⁴ Secondly, the whole passage of the 'Just and Unjust Cities' was the object of one of the fullest Hesiodic reworkings to have survived from Hellenistic poetry, namely Callimachus' contrast in the *Hymn to Artemis* between the punishment inflicted by the goddess upon the unjust who harm ξεινοί and with whom she is angry and the blessings bestowed upon those on whom she looks with favour.²⁵

σχέτλιοι, οἷς τύνη χαλεπὴν ἐμμάξῃαι ὀργήν·
κτῆνέα φιν λοιμός καταβόσκεται, ἔργα δὲ πάχνη, 125
κείρονται δὲ γέροντες ἐφ' οὐδ' αἰδῶν, αἱ δὲ γυναῖκες
ἢ βληταὶ θνήσκουσι λεχῶνιδες ἢ φυγοῦσαι
τίκτουσιν τῶν οὐδὲν ἐπὶ σφυρὸν ὀρθὸν ἀνέστη.
(Callimachus, *Hymn to Artemis* 124–8)

Poor wretches are those upon whom you press your terrible anger. Pestilence feeds upon their animals and frost upon their crops, the old men cut their hair in mourning for their sons and the women either die, struck in childbirth, or if they survive they bear children who do not stand on upright ankle.

The whole passage, too long for full quotation here, is a very rich example of structural and verbal variation,²⁶ but in the

²³ It is, however, just possible that this is intended as an explanation of the Hesiodic verses: warfare, hunger and disease ravage the (male) population, so that there are in fact no potential fathers.

²⁴ Cf. *WD* 367, 403–4 (context of hunger), 687–8, though φράζεσθαι ἄνωγα is also a Homeric verse-end; for the importance of φράζεσθαι in *WD* cf. above p. 130.

²⁵ For discussion and bibliography cf. Reinsch-Werner 1976: 74–86, Fantuzzi–Hunter 2004: 353–5.

²⁶ The order is reversed, first punishment, then blessings, and the following is a selection of the verbal variations (Callimachus listed first): ξεινους (123) ~ ξεινοισι (225), ἀλιτῆμονα (123) ~ ἀλιτράινει (241), σχέτλιοι (124) ~ σχέτλια (238), διχοστασίη (133) ~ ἀργαλέον πόλεμον (229). Callimachus also shifts the balance: whereas Hesiod explicitly retails the effects upon both communities and individual families within the community, Callimachus concentrates upon the latter.

present context it is vv. 126–8 which are of interest. Callimachus breaks up the Hesiodic syntagm of $\tau\acute{\iota}\kappa\tau\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\nu\ \gamma\upsilon\nu\alpha\acute{\iota}\kappa\epsilon\varsigma$ or $\gamma\upsilon\nu\alpha\acute{\iota}\kappa\epsilon\varsigma\ \tau\acute{\iota}\kappa\tau\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\nu$ (*WD* 235, 244) by spreading $\gamma\upsilon\nu\alpha\acute{\iota}\kappa\epsilon\varsigma\ \dots\ \tau\acute{\iota}\kappa\tau\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\nu$ across three verses, and adds the kind of explanatory detail that Plutarch (perhaps) desiderated in *WD* 244: the population wastes away because (inter alia) women die in childbirth or produce damaged children. That Callimachus was 'improving' upon the Hesiodic model here can only be a speculation, but it raises the possibility that Plutarch was not the only ancient reader who felt that *WD* 244 did not quite provide the right information about how the unjust are punished.

Finally, it is worth noting briefly that there can, of course, be no simple assumption that, when an explanation of a passage of Hesiod in the scholia does not match an explanation found in the Plutarchan corpus, the scholium cannot go back to Plutarch; it goes without saying that Plutarch was not bound to take the same view of a Hesiodic passage in different contexts. As an example we may consider *WD* 744–5:

μηδέ ποτ' οἶνοχόην τιθέμεν κρητῆρος ὕπερθεν
πινόντων· ὅλοῃ γάρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ μοῖρα τέτυκται.
(Hesiod, *Works and Days* 744–5)

Do not put the ladle above the wine-bowl while drinking is going on; a grim fate has been established for such behaviour.

The Proclan scholia refer to 'Pythagorean' precepts of this kind and interpret the verses allegorically: 'This means not to put private concerns ahead of common ones. For the mixing-bowl stood among the tables as a common possession, and those who were dining together drew their wine for drinking with the ladle. Do not therefore consider the part higher than the whole, nor the private more valuable than the common'. It has been suggested that this note goes back to Plutarch (fr. 93 Sandbach), and in *How to Study Poetry* Plutarch does indeed cite the Hesiodic verses as an example of the kind of philological puzzle to which men give their time rather than to the moral lessons and dangers of literature.²⁷ In the *Symposium of the*

²⁷ 28b, cf. Hunter–Russell 2011: 158.

Seven Sages, however, one of the guests apparently offers a more straightforward interpretation:

When men such as you whom Periander has invited come together, there is, I think, no call for the cup or the ladle, but the Muses set discourse in the middle of the gathering as though it were a mixing-bowl of sobriety, containing a maximum of pleasure and playfulness and seriousness. With this they rouse and nurture and spread friendliness, and for the most part allow the ladle to lie undisturbed above the mixing-bowl, a thing which Hesiod forbade for men who were better able to drink than to converse. (Plutarch, *Symposium of the Seven Sages* 156d–e)

Verses of Hesiod which, as we have seen, were a notorious ζήτημα, are here appropriately interpreted in a sympotic setting, where such ‘puzzles’ were a familiar pastime. We do not, of course, have to think that this was Plutarch’s last or only word on the subject. He may just have given a joking interpretation to Mnesiphilos here,²⁸ although there is clearly a serious element to the distinction between types of symposia. Behind this distinction in the Plutarchan text lies in fact Socrates’ distinction between educated and uneducated symposia at Plato, *Protagoras* 347c–8a; there too the present company should make up the more educated kind of gathering. Whereas, however, Socrates certainly does not ban even hard drinking (347d7–8), and the distinction which he draws focuses upon the difference between using hired musicians and conversing ‘with your own voice’,²⁹ Mnesiphilos prescribes an abstemious gathering where there is no need of wine ‘to break the ice’; by aligning Hesiod with a different kind of symposium, he suggests that the ΠΙΝΟΝΤΩΝ of *WD* 745 meant ‘when men are drinking hard’. Verses of an archaic poet are here, therefore, ‘spun’ in such a way that they anticipate the more modern point which a speaker wants to make, and such habits of quotation are, of course, ubiquitous in both sympotic and non-sympotic prose. Here, then, the *Symposium of the Seven Sages* cannot help us decide whether or not Plutarch lies behind the scholia on *WD* 744–5.

²⁸ So, e.g., Wilamowitz 1928: on 127.

²⁹ For another reflection of this distinction from the *Protagoras* in imperial literature cf. Lucian, *Lexiphanes* 13–15.

A clean life

Among Hesiod's various prescriptions for a ritually clean life appears an injunction protecting the purity of the hearth:

μηδ' αἰδοῖα γονῇ πεπαλαγμένος ἔνδοθι οἴκου
ἴστίηι ἐμπελαδὸν παραφαινέμεν, ἀλλ' ἄλέασθαι.
(Hesiod, *Works and Days* 733–4)

Do not inside the house reveal your genitals smeared with semen near to the hearth, but avoid it.

The Proclan scholia on these verses run as follows:

μηδ' αἰδοῖα γονῇ πεπαλαγμένος: ταῦτα τῆς ἀπαιδευσίας ὄντα ἔκγονα, καὶν σμικρὰ ἦι, δεῖ παραφυλάττειν, καλῶς τοῦ Πλουτάρχου λέγοντος ὅτι καθάπερ ἐν λόγοις τὸ μὴ σολοικίζειν οὐ θαυμαστόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ σολοικίζειν καταγέλαστον, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις οὐ τὸ μὴ πράττειν τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπαινέτον, ἀλλὰ τὸ πράττειν ἐπονεῖδιστον. δεῖν οὖν <τὸν>³⁰ μεμολυσμένον ἀπὸ γονῆς ἀποκρύπτειν τὰ αἶτια τοῦ μολυσμοῦ καὶ μὴ γυμνοῦν³¹ ἐγγὺς τῆς ἐστίας· βωμὸς γὰρ καὶ αὕτη τῶν θεῶν καὶ καθημερινῶν θυσιῶν καὶ σπονδῶν ὑποδοχή· μὴ οὖν ἀπογυμνούμενον μολύνειν τὴν ἐστίαν. (Schol. Hesiod, *WD* 733–4, p. 223 Pertusi = fr. 248 Marzillo)

Do not genitals smeared with semen . . . : These things, which are products of lack of education, even if they are minor, must be avoided. Plutarch [fr. 91 Sandbach] well observes that, just as, with regard to words, there is nothing admirable in not speaking ungrammatically, but speaking ungrammatically is laughable, so in actions not to do these things does not deserve praise, but to do them deserves censure. The man who is polluted with semen should hide the things responsible for the pollution and not unveil them near the hearth; for the hearth too is an altar of the gods and receives our daily sacrifices and libations. Therefore do not pollute the hearth by exposing yourself.

Sandbach is doubtful whether the 'religious', as opposed to the 'social' part of the scholium, i.e. δεῖν οὖν κτλ., also goes back to Plutarch, though it is in fact not hard to imagine that the pious Plutarch would have been as concerned as Hesiod with ritual purity.³² For Plutarch, not polluting the hearth by revealing to it one's semen-stained genitals is a matter of education (*paideia*), like speaking grammatically. For men of

³⁰ add. Pertusi. ³¹ γυμνοῦσθαι Pertusi.

³² We may compare the scholia on vv. 724–5, where the man who pours a libation with unwashed hands is 'unfitted for education'; there are good grounds for thinking that this goes back to Plutarch (fr. 90 Sandbach).

Plutarch's class and readership, all of whom think of themselves as *pepaideumenoi*, the avoidance of such behaviour is not something which deserves admiration, any more than (for example) *not* being a plagiarist does, whereas the commission of the deed – being a plagiarist or revealing semen-stained genitals at the hearth – does indeed deserve censure. Such ignorant behaviour is placed by Plutarch on the same level as τὸ σολοικίζειν, 'speaking ungrammatically', a matter which Plutarch elsewhere could take very seriously indeed. In *On Stoic Self-contradictions* Plutarch criticizes Chrysippus for his concern with such things as the facial gesture of speakers, while at the same time not worrying too much about hiatus between vowels:

He [Chrysippus] says that we must cling to the better and overlook this matter [i.e. hiatus] and also certain obscurities and ellipses and – by Zeus – solecisms, of which not a few others would be ashamed. At one moment to yield to speakers how to arrange their speech appropriately (ἐν κόσμῳ), even as far as the decent disposition of hands and mouth, and then at another to take no account of ellipses and obscurities and feel no shame at the commission of solecisms, is the mark of a man who says anything at all which occurs to him. (Plutarch, *On Stoic self-contradictions* 1047b)

'Correct language' was of course crucial to the sense of self of the elite of the Second Sophistic, but another Plutarchan warning about grammatical solecisms will bring out a further point of importance. In his essay *How to Tell a Flatterer from a Friend* Plutarch compares the habit of flatterers to criticize very minor matters while overlooking monstrosities to 'a school-master (γραμματικός) who reproves a boy for the state of his slate and pencil, but pretends not to hear when he commits solecisms and barbarisms' (59f); we are not born solecism-free, it is a matter of education, and such errors are indeed, as Proclus (with or without some kind of punning allusion to the subject of the Hesiodic verses on which he is commenting) put it, τῆς ἀπαιδευσίας ἔκγονα 'offspring of lack of education'. The 'culture' (*paideia*) of the Second Sophistic was, of course, built on an elaborate system of 'education' (*paideia*), which manifested itself in myriad small actions and attitudes, and we can see here how even Hesiod's apparently rustic piety

can be brought into the fold; one has to get the small things right. Whether or not in the current case Plutarch was as concerned with the need to control and keep private sexual activity, the result of dangerously non-philosophical desire, as he was with ritual cleanliness may be debated, but it is in notes like this that Plutarch is most clearly seen in his struggle to domesticate for his time and his world a text which, at least in part, might have seemed recalcitrant.

Plutarch had his limits, of course. *Works and Days* 757–9 enjoin further rules to do with cleanliness and purity:

μηδέ ποτ' ἐν προχοῇσι ποταμῶν ἄλαδε προρεόντων
μηδ' ἐπὶ κρηνῶν οὐρεῖν, μάλα δ' ἐξαλέασθαι
μηδ' ἐναποψύχειν· τὸ γὰρ οὐ τοι λώϊόν ἐστιν.
(Hesiod, *Works and Days* 757–9)

Do not urinate into the streams of flowing rivers nor into fountains, but strictly avoid this; and do not defecate there, for this is not at all good.

Here Plutarch took drastic measures:

μηδέ ποτ' ἐν προχοαῖς: ταῦτα διαγράφει Πλούταρχος ὡς εὐτελῆ καὶ ἀνάξια παιδευτικῆς Μούσης· μὴ οὐρεῖν ἐν προχοαῖσι ποταμῶν ἢ ἐπὶ κρηνῶν μηδ' ἀποπατεῖν – τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ ἀποψύχειν – ἴσως δὲ καὶ ταῦτα παρακελεύεται τῆς ιδιωτείας τῶν πολλῶν στοχαζόμενος· οὐ γὰρ πάντες ἔχουσι νοῦν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῦτά τινες ἂν παρίδοιεν. (Schol. Hesiod, *WD* 757–9 = fr. 258 Marzillo)

Do not in the streams... Plutarch (fr. 98 Sandbach) eliminates these verses as being trivial and unworthy of the Muse of education – not to urinate in the streams of rivers or springs and not to defecate [there], for this is what ἀποψύχειν means. Perhaps, however, with these injunctions too Hesiod is aiming at the vulgarity of the many; not everyone is sensible, and there are people who would ignore even these injunctions.

West, who transposes these verses to precede v. 737, thus bringing them into closer association with other injunctions on urination, speculates that 'Plutarch... may have been passing judgement on verses already suspect because absent from some copies' (n. on 757–9), but we have in fact no way to know; the silence of the scholium to any such effect is certainly not decisive, but it is also not worth nothing.³³ Plutarch may have

³³ At *On Stoic Self-Contradictions* 1045a–b Plutarch apparently criticises Chrysippus for approving *Works and Days* 757–8, because irrational animals also do not do

been influenced by the fact that the verses do rather stick out as anomalous in the place where they are transmitted, even by the standards of the *Works and Days*, but he may also have objected to the mention of defecation, a notably ταπεινόν subject, in ‘high poetry’.³⁴

West notes that vv. 757–9 are ‘no more unworthy than 727–32’, where only urination is at issue, and those verses are indeed helpful *comparanda* here:

μηδ' ἄντ' ἡελίου τετραμμένος ὀρθὸς ὁμείχειν,
αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ κε δύηι, μεμνημένος, ἔς τ' ἀνιόντα,
μήτ' ἐν ὁδῶι μήτ' ἐκτὸς ὁδοῦ προβάδην οὐρήσεις
μηδ' ἀπογυμνωθεῖς μακάρων τοι νύκτες ἔασιν. 730
ἔζόμενος δ' ὁ γε θεῖος ἀνὴρ, πεπνυμένα εἰδώς,
ἦ' ὁ γε πρὸς τοῖχον πελάσας εὐερκέος αὐλῆς.
(Hesiod, *Works and Days* 727–32³⁵)

Do not urinate upright and turned to face the sun, but be mindful to do this when it sets and as it rises; do not urinate while walking on the road or outside it, and do not bare yourself, for the nights belong to the blessed ones. The god-fearing man of wise thoughts crouches, or draws near to the wall of a well-built court.

For the Proclan scholia, Hesiod is here ‘educating us in εὐσχημοσύνη’; there is a right and a wrong way even to carry out the ‘necessary functions’. The notion of εὐσχημοσύνη was of central importance to the élite of the Second Sophistic, such as Plutarch.³⁶ Of particular interest in the current context is Plutarch’s insistent concern with the εὐσχημοσύνη of the symposium (e.g. 613f, 620d, 621a), that arena where cultured

these things, while also insisting on a prohibition against urination at an altar or shrine, although animals do in fact do this (= *SVF* III 754). It is of interest that Chrysippus cited these verses and that Plutarch knew that he did; cf. below on Plutarch and Stoic criticism of Hesiod.

³⁴ This seems to be how Plutarch took ἐναποψύχειν, rightly so according to, e.g., West and Most; Mazon and Sandbach, however, take the sense in Hesiod as ‘bathe, cool down’. Beall 2001: 166 argues for ‘break wind in’, a sense given by one of the ancient glosses.

³⁵ On the problems of these verses see the notes of West and Ercolani ad loc.; the difficult question of the arrangement of the verses does not affect the issue discussed here.

³⁶ Gleason 1994 is rightly a standard reference, though she does not discuss Plutarch’s treatment of Hesiod.

behaviour was most patently on show, but also most persistently exposed to threat; elsewhere Plutarch explicitly associates ἀσχημονεῖν with οἱ ἀπαίδευτοι (467b–c). The Proclan scholium on vv. 753–5 (fr. 256 Marzillo), ‘a man must not cleanse his body in bath water used by a woman . . .’, adduces, inter alia, τὸ ἄσχημον of the idea that men and women should strip bare together; this might be Plutarch (it is fr. 97 Sandbach), but of course need not be. To return to the scholia on vv. 727–32, at the very least Plutarch would certainly agree with Proclus that ‘one must honour the nights and do nothing ἄσχημον’. In a passage of *On Listening to Lectures*, Plutarch warns against being the kind of listener who is critical of every little slip the lecturer makes, but himself gets away with ἀσχημονεῖν καὶ πολλὰ σολοικίζειν περὶ τὴν ἀκρόασιν (45e), and we have now seen both of these verbs used in Proclan scholia to illustrate Hesiod's injunctions in the *Works and Days*. Vv. 757–9, however, which we know Plutarch excised, are precisely *not* (explicitly) about εὐσχημοσύνη or even religious purity; Plutarch does not seem to have been concerned in that place either with the sanctity of flowing sources of water (let alone with issues of public health), but rather with the elimination from a classical poem of something as trivial and everyday as the bodily business of evacuating bodily wastes. Vv. 727–32, however, which concern both *how* to urinate, i.e. where to stand and how to deport or not deport your body, and offer religious reasons for doing so (note that we learn how ὁ γε θεῖος ἀνὴρ does it and that v. 727 was also a Pythagorean rule)³⁷ are in a different league. For Plutarch, it might well have been the case that vv. 757–9 which he athetised *were* ‘more unworthy than 727–32’, which he might well have accepted and discussed.

There is one further piece of circumstantial evidence that Plutarch may have discussed vv. 727–32, perhaps in ways which the Proclan scholia reflect. The injunction against urinating while walking (v. 729), a verse which Wilamowitz tells us is understood by anyone who has ever been on a march in the

³⁷ Cf. West ad loc.; West on v. 729 suggests that that verse also might have had a Pythagorean analogue.

infantry (n. on vv. 727–32), is again associated by the Proclan scholia with ‘the ἀσχήμων disposition of the body’. It is, however, difficult not to bring it into association, as has long been done, with a scene early in the *Life of Aesop* (chap. 28) in which Aesop remonstrates with his new master for urinating while he walks, but the master apparently persuades him that he has good reasons for so doing; this passage of the *Life* has recently been discussed in connection with Hesiod by Leslie Kurke,³⁸ who however does not consider ancient scholarship (including Plutarch and Proclus) on Hesiod, despite her view that the Hesiodic injunctions are ‘part of the weaponry of the elite, enabling them to exert and maintain social control through privileged religious knowledge and practice’. I reserve a fuller discussion for the appropriate place,³⁹ though it is of interest in the present context that the scene takes place in the heat of the middle of the day, and the sun is central to Xanthos’ arguments in favour of perambulatory urination; suffice it to note here that, in the form (or rather two or three forms) in which we now have the *Life*, it may go back to the second century AD, i.e. not too far in time from Plutarch, and that there are other striking parallels between the *Life* and Plutarchan works, notably the *Symposium of the Seven Sages*. That Aesop’s original objection to his master’s mode of urination focused on the fact that it was a pretty poor show for slaves, if members of the leisured, slave-owning class did not even have time to set aside for such functions, i.e. was expressed in terms of the behaviour appropriate to different social classes, does not, at the very least, weaken the case for suspecting how a Plutarch might have approached these verses. How one walked mattered a very great deal.⁴⁰

The ‘Muse of education’ (Μοῦσα παιδευτική) is also, or slides into, an ‘educated Muse’, just as the *paideia* of education is at the base of the *paideia* of culture. Proclus seems to have felt this by seeking to defend vv. 757–9 from Plutarch’s deletion by appealing to the ‘vulgarity of the many’; νοῦς itself is a socially and culturally determined advantage (οὐ γὰρ πάντες ἔχουσι νοῦν

³⁸ Kurke 2011: 205–8. ³⁹ Cf. below pp. 275–81.

⁴⁰ Cf., e.g., Hunter 2002: 189–96, T. O’Sullivan 2011, esp. chap. 1.

κτλ.). This is also an education and a culture which is forever ruling things in or out, which defines itself in fact by an endless series of exclusions, social, economic, linguistic: 'defecation' falls on one side of the line. More generally, of course, there are implications here for the nature of what we call 'didactic' poetry. The scholia on both Homer and Hesiod see both poets as teaching (διδάσκειν, παιδεύειν) and the Proclan prolegomena to the *Works and Days* describe the purpose (σκοπός) of the poem as παιδευτικός (p.1.15 Pertusi = fr.1.13 Marzillo); more specifically, the benefit (ὠφέλεια) of this poem is directed to the formation of character, and as such it should be read before the *Theogony* which concerns itself with the divine guidance of the world. It is of some interest that the Proclan introduction sees the poetic form of the whole as a kind of Lucretian 'honey on the cup',⁴¹ for such ideas are used also by Plutarch in his introduction to *How to Study Poetry*,⁴² a work which Proclus all but certainly knew and elsewhere echoed. Here too then the slide from 'education' to the display of 'education', i.e. elite culture, is very clear. 'Didactic' poetry on this view does not simply teach a set of facts, but also a set of moral attitudes and frames of mind in which to use those facts.⁴³

The verses I have been considering are not perhaps the best known of the *Works and Days*, but the problems they raise are not untypical of those we face in considering the ancient reception of 'didactic poetry'. Plutarch's most famous intervention in the text of *Works and Days* is the deletion of Hesiod's account of his trip to Chalkis and his related profession of lack of personal experience in sailing (fr. 84 Sandbach); the extent of the athetesis is unclear,⁴⁴ as is Plutarch's originality in this matter, but we might not want to put the reasons for athetesis

⁴¹ 1.15–2.2. Pertusi = fr. 1.13–15 Marzillo.

⁴² Cf. Hunter–Russell 2011: 70. ⁴³ Cf. above pp. 43–4.

⁴⁴ The Proclan scholia (fr. 229 Marzillo) explicitly record that Plutarch's athetesis included (and ended) with v. 662. The first line to be struck out may have been 650, though 649 might well have gone too, as being entirely unhelpful in a 'didactic' poet; Wilamowitz suggested that the athetesis covered only 651–62, whereas Lamberton 1988: 500 n. 29 suspects that Plutarch got rid of all of 646–52, cf. further Pertusi 1952: 223–6. If, as seems likely, the Alexandrians had already athetised 651–60, then Plutarch himself will be responsible for including 661–2, thus removing the Muses from the passage entirely. On this passage see esp. Lamberton 1988.

down just to a refusal to believe in the synchronicity of Hesiod with the funeral games for Amphidamas or in the story of the ‘contest of Homer and Hesiod’, here taken as lying behind these verses. Was Plutarch also concerned here both with the authority of the teacher and the value of what was taught, in noting that there is ‘nothing of value’ (οὐδὲν χρηστόν) in these verses?⁴⁵ The denial of any sound basis for education, the idea that one needed no special skill or experience to teach a craft, would have been deeply inimical to Plutarch’s Platonising convictions; ‘the Muses taught me’ (v. 662) may, in other contexts, have served as a poetic way of saying ‘I have been educated’ or ‘I have read in books’,⁴⁶ but that clearly was not good enough for Plutarch, for it undermined the ‘didactic’ value of the subsequent advice, particularly when seen against the general background of his defence of Hesiod’s sound knowledge. It is at least suggestive that the Proclan scholium (fr. 229 Marzillo) which reports Plutarch’s view glosses v. 659, ‘where [the Muses] first set me on the path of clear song’, as ‘where he became possessed (κἀτοχος) by the Muses’; this may just reflect a Proclan view of poetry, but we may wonder whether Plutarch too had stressed the possession of the poet which, allied to (and indeed implying) the poet’s ignorance of ‘technical’ matters, was the position of poets and rhapsodes most famously set out in Plato’s *Ion*. Plutarch would not have wanted Hesiod to put himself on a par with Ion, and in the *Hesiod* Lucian too has fun with the fact that Hesiod’s knowledge involved no hard road of learning, but was simply the instantaneously effective gift of the Muses.⁴⁷

Teaching morality

Immediately after the fable of the hawk and the nightingale, Hesiod turns to Perses himself:

⁴⁵ Cf. Hunter 2008a: 168. By contrast, it would have been easy enough to find didactic point in, say, Hesiod’s verses about his father (vv. 633–40), which we know Plutarch discussed (fr. 82 Sandbach).

⁴⁶ Cf. Dionysius Periegetes 715–17 (with Hunter 2004: 228, and above pp. 56–7).

⁴⁷ Cf. above p. 98.

ὦ Πέρση, σὺ δ' ἄκουε Δίκης μηδ' ὕβριν ὄφελλε·
 ὕβρις γάρ τε κακὴ δειλῶι βροτῶι, οὐδὲ μὲν ἐσθλὸς
 ῥηιδίως φερέμεν δύνатаι, βαρῦθει δέ θ' ὑπ' αὐτῆς
 ἐγκύρσας Ἄττησιν· ὁδὸς δ' ἐτέρηφι παρελθεῖν
 κρείσσων ἐς τὰ δίκαια· Δίκη δ' ὑπὲρ ὕβριος ἴσχει
 ἐς τέλος ἐξελθοῦσα· παθὼν δέ τε νῆπιος ἔγνω.
 αὐτίκα γὰρ τρέχει Ὅρκος ἅμα σκολιῇσι δίκησιν,
 τῆς δὲ Δίκης ῥόθος ἐλκομένης ἦι κ' ἄνδρες ἄγωσιν
 δωροφάγοι, σκολιῆς δὲ δίκης κρίνωσι θέμιστας.
 (Hesiod, *Works and Days* 213–21)

Perses, pay heed to Justice and do not foster *Hybris*. *Hybris* is evil for a man of no account, nor can even a good man bear it easily, but he is weighed down by it and encounters disaster. Better is the other path towards what is just. Justice comes out ahead of *Hybris* at the end; the fool realizes after suffering. Oath runs at once alongside crooked judgements, and a clamour arises as Justice is dragged off to where bribe-eating men carry her, and they pronounce verdicts with crooked judgements.

The Proclan scholia on vv. 214–16 deal with the ambiguity of ἐσθλός in this context:

οὐδὲ μὲν ἐσθλός: οὐδὲ ὁ πάνου ἀγαθὸς οἰστὴν νομίζει τὴν ὕβριν· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ὕβρεως ἀφορητότερον οὐδέν, βαρύνεται δὲ ὑπ' αὐτῆς καὶ ἀγανακτεῖ. λέγει δὲ ἐσθλοὺς οὐ τοὺς τῇ τύχῃ καὶ τῇ δυνάμει προέχοντας, ὥς φησι Πλούταρχος, ἀλλὰ τοὺς κατ' ἀρετὴν προέχοντας, ἐκ τούτου μάλλον δεικνὺς τὴν ὕβριν ἀφορητον. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν δυνάμει καὶ σφόδρα δυσχεραίνουσι ἐπὶ ταῖς ἐκ τῶν ἀσθενεστέρων εἰς αὐτοὺς ὕβρεσιν· οἱ δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῶντες καὶ ταύτας τὰς ὕβρεις διαπτύουσιν. οὐδὲ γὰρ χεῖρων ἐγώ, φησιν ὁ Σωκράτης, ἂν ὁ δεῖνα ἐπὶ κόρρης πατάξῃ με ἀδίκως. καὶ οὗτοι μὲν⁴⁸ ὅλως βαρύνονται ἐπὶ ταῖς παρ' ἄλλων ὕβρεσιν ἐγκύρσαντες ταῖς αἰταις, ὥσει ἔλεγε περιπεσόντες ταῖς ὕβρεσιν ἃς ἐκάλεσεν αἰταις.

Not even the good man . . .: Not even the very good man thinks that *hybris* is bearable; for there is nothing more unbearable than *hybris*, and he is weighed down by it and distressed. By 'the good' (ἐσθλοί) he means not those pre-eminent in fortune and influence, as Plutarch says, but those pre-eminent in virtue, thereby all the more clearly showing *hybris* to be unbearable. For those who are powerful get very angry at acts of *hybris* committed against them by those who are weaker, whereas those who live virtuous lives have contempt even for acts of *hybris*, for I am none the worse, says Socrates, if so-and-so unjustly punches me on the temple. And these men are completely weighed down by acts of *hybris* from others when they meet with disasters (*atai*), as if he said 'when they run into acts of *hybris*' which he calls *atai*. (Schol. Hesiod, *WD* 214b–18a = fr. 97 Marzillo = Plutarch fr. 32 Sandbach)

⁴⁸ Marzillo suggests μέντοι; cf. further below.

The problem is of a familiar kind – in *How to Study Poetry* Plutarch explicitly addresses cases where poets, including Hesiod, use ἀρετή where the meaning cannot be ‘virtue’ (24d–e) – but something has clearly gone wrong. The scholium seems both to say that the virtuous suffer from *hybris* and – witness Socrates – rise completely above it.⁴⁹ The most obvious explanation is that the scholium is a possibly lacunose mixture of Proclus’ citation from Plutarch and his own remarks, either contradicting or confirming Plutarch; Sandbach notes that the text is ambiguous as to which view of ἐσθλός Plutarch took, although the more natural interpretation might seem to be ‘By “the good” (ἐσθλοί) he means *not* “those pre-eminent in fortune and influence”, the view Plutarch took, but . . .’.⁵⁰ A Platonising view would suit either Plutarch or Proclus. There is, moreover, a further complication which may, nevertheless, shed light upon Hesiod.

The Proclan scholium, as indeed the non-Proclan scholium on 214b (p. 78 Pertusi), ‘no one likes being the victim of *hybris*, not the poor man, not the rich . . .’, clearly understands Hesiod to be saying that no one can put up with being the victim of *hybris*. The majority of modern commentators, however, understand Hesiod to be saying that no one can survive committing *hybris*; as West puts it (n. on 215) ‘ὕβρις is treated as a burden which the ὑβρίζων carries with him’.⁵¹ This certainly seems to suit Hesiod’s rhetoric better, and would be of a piece with the persistent Hesiodic theme that wrongdoing harms the doer more than the victim (see especially vv. 265–7). The Proclan scholium on these last verses produces, as we have seen, a very Platonising reading of them, and there is something at least to be said for finding Plutarch there also.⁵² Another (non-Proclan) *scholium vetus* on 266a (p. 91 Pertusi) associates that verse with the Platonic doctrine (*Gorgias* 474c) that ‘doing wrong is more shameful than being wronged’, and Plutarch

⁴⁹ Cf. Westerwick 1893: 19.

⁵⁰ I am grateful to Tim Whitmarsh for focusing my attention on this problem.

⁵¹ Becker 1937: 87 understands that the hybriatic man is ‘weighed down’ by *hybris*, as one is by a wound (cf., e.g., *Iliad* 16.519).

⁵² Cf. above pp. 115–16.

himself, in *How to Study Poetry*, associates v. 266 with 'the doctrines of Plato in the *Gorgias* and the *Republic* that "doing wrong is worse than being wronged" and doing harm is more damaging than suffering it' (36a). Moreover, the next two Proclan scholia, on 216–17a and 217b–19, both seem to understand that the choice is between the path of justice and the path of practising *hybris*, for (schol. 217b–19) 'the person who practises *hybris*, after suffering the evils which arise from *hybris*, pays the penalty and then realises how great an evil *hybris* is'. The *Gorgias* was, then, much in the mind of Plutarch and Proclus in connection with the moral message of the *Works and Days*, for it is cited again in the scholium we are considering on vv. 214b–16a. The reference to the punch on the head could pick up *Gorgias* 486c2, 508d1–2 or 527a2, but clearly combines one or all of these with 527c6–d2, the only one of the four places where the verb is πατάσσειν, rather than τύπτειν:

Allow someone to feel contempt for you as being an idiot and to abuse you, if he wishes to, and – by Zeus – happily allow someone to strike the blow of dishonour upon you. You will suffer nothing terrible [cf. οὐδὲ γὰρ χεῖρων κτλ. in the Hesiodic scholium], if in reality you are a fine and upright man (καλὸς κἀγαθός) practising virtue. (Plato, *Gorgias* 527c6–d2)

The Socratic voice is indeed at its most Hesiodic at the end of the *Gorgias*.

The example of Socrates, whoever adduced it, clearly belongs with the idea of suffering, rather than practising, *hybris*. Sense can be made of the scholium if the last sentence is taken to refer to 'those pre-eminent in fortune and influence', with the transmitted μέν perhaps to be preserved, as a sign that a further contrasting δέ, referring to the virtuous, has been lost; οὔτοι μέν would thus pick up οἱ μέν γὰρ ἐν δυνάμει κτλ. immediately above.⁵³ This, together with Westewick's transposition, λέγει δὲ ἐσθλοὺς [οὐ] τοὺς τῇ τύχῃ καὶ τῇ δυνάμει προέχοντας, ὥς φησι Πλούταρχος (frg. 32 Sandbach), ἀλλ' <οὐ> τοὺς κατ' ἀρετήν, 'by the good he means those pre-eminent in fortune and influence, as Plutarch says, but <not> those pre-eminent in virtue...', restores a single opposition running through the scholium,

⁵³ So Faraggiana di Sarzana 1978: 26 n. 45.

with both Plutarch and Proclus taking Hesiod's ἐσθλοί as the rich and powerful, rather than the virtuous, a position well in keeping with their respective Platonisms. Nevertheless, doubts remain. The assertion that there is 'nothing more intolerable than *hybris*' suggests that the strongest possible proof of this assertion was found in the text, and an argument from 'the virtuous' is certainly stronger than one from 'the rich and powerful' (it is, after all, no real surprise that they find *hybris* hard to tolerate), and the rhetoric of the note makes it overwhelmingly likely that it is Proclus, not Plutarch, who would make such a claim. Secondly, as we have seen, it is much more likely that Plutarch would have felt the need to explain that ἐσθλός meant 'rich and powerful' rather than 'virtuous', than vice versa; this would certainly be of a piece with *How to Study Poetry* 24d–e. Finally, Plutarch elsewhere uses διαπτύειν at least twice in this sense,⁵⁴ whereas the verb is otherwise unknown to the Proclan corpus and occurs only here in all our scholia to Hesiod. I therefore conclude that, as indeed the run of the Greek suggests (cf. above), Plutarch interpreted Hesiod's ἐσθλός along the same lines as do modern scholars,⁵⁵ i.e. as a term denoting social success and prosperity, and that it was he who adduced the views of Socrates from the *Gorgias* in support of his contention.⁵⁶

Both Plutarch and Proclus appear, however, completely to have misunderstood the Hesiodic verses, by taking 'not even the ἐσθλός is able easily to bear [*hybris*]' to refer to the ἐσθλός as the victim, rather than the perpetrator (or 'carrier') of *hybris*; the image of *hybris* as a weight to be carried seems lost on them, and this must make us ask just how unusual it was. Perhaps φέρειν plus object, such as κακά, plus adverb, such as βαρέως, was so common (cf. LSJ s.v. φέρω III 2)⁵⁷ that all interpretative effort was – as we have seen – centered upon the meaning of ἐσθλός, rather than on Hesiod's striking image. The misunderstanding, if that indeed is what it is, seems however to shed light upon Hesiod. φέρειν in the sense 'put up with, endure'

⁵⁴ *Moralia* 101c, 466d. ⁵⁵ So, e.g. Sandbach ad loc.

⁵⁶ So also Westerwick 1893: 19, though for somewhat different reasons.

⁵⁷ LSJ seem to take *WD* 215 in the way that the scholia do, a mistake which perhaps confirms how 'natural' such an interpretation is.

may always hover between the 'literal' and the 'metaphorical'. A very early occurrence of the verb used in this way may be *Odyssey* 18.135:

ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ καὶ λυγρὰ θεοὶ μάκαρες τελέωσι,
καὶ τὰ φέρει ἀεκαζόμενος τετληότι θυμῷ.

(Homer, *Odyssey* 18.134–5)

When the blessed gods bring ills, a man is forced to bear them with an enduring heart.

'With an enduring heart', here performing the function that would later most normally be taken by an adverb, helps to bring out the 'literal' sense of the verb; these λυγρὰ are indeed a burden to be borne 'stoically'. The force of Hesiod's image of *hybris* as a burden carried by the hybriatic man depends, then, in part upon the fact that 'X cannot easily bear *hybris*' would indeed 'naturally' mean 'X cannot easily bear being the victim of *hybris*', as, for example, of misfortune (λυγρὰ); Hesiod's image strains language, it denaturalizes a turn of phrase by 'literalising' it in a very striking, and very probably novel, way – *hybris* is now a burden which brings eventual disaster upon its perpetrator, not its victim. No wonder Plutarch here thought of the *Gorgias*: for Plato that eventual Hesiodic disaster might come in the Underworld, and *hybris* might well be an important cause of it (cf. *Gorgias* 525a4).

This analysis perhaps gains some support from the Proclan scholium on v. 286, the introduction to the 'two paths' passage:

Plutarch (fr. 40 Sandbach) said that the nature of the philosophical character is very beautifully illustrated in these verses. Archilochus and Hipponax wrote abusive attacks against those who had hurt them, while Timocrates and Metrodorus, who were Epicureans and brothers, came into conflict and published writings against each other. Why mention these people? Xenophanes, as the result of some petty jealousy towards contemporary philosophers and poets, wrote unpleasant *silloi* ('lampoons') against all philosophers and poets. But Hesiod, truly a man of culture, did nothing of the kind, for brooding anger is not the mark of the cultured. Although he had been hurt by his brother, he gave him advice rather than abusing him, since he knew the saying of Socrates (Plato, *Laws* 5.731c) that every bad man is unwillingly bad, and therefore requires advice through which he will perhaps come to recognise that he is bad. (Schol. Hesiod, *WD* 286 = fr. 123 Marzillo)

Hesiod here is himself an example of the philosophical attitude described in the scholium to vv. 214–16: he has been injured by his brother, and it would not, I think, be tendentious, to say that he has been the victim of *hybris* (Hesiod at any rate certainly thought so), but – far from being upset – he rather took Socrates as his model and sought to offer improving advice, rather than *hybris* in return; here again we may well think of the opposition of Socrates and Callicles in the *Gorgias*, as almost certainly did Plutarch.

A further ‘ethical’ example concerns a complex of problems at *WD* 353–62:

τὸν φιλέοντα φιλεῖν, καὶ τῷ προσιόντι προσεῖναι,
καὶ δόμεν ὅς κεν δῶι καὶ μὴ δόμεν ὅς κεν μὴ δῶι·
δώτῃ μὲν τις ἔδωκεν, ἀδώτῃ δ’ οὐ τις ἔδωκεν· 355
Δῶς ἀγαθή, Ἄρπαξ δὲ κακὴ, θανάτοιο δότεира.
ὅς μὲν γάρ κεν ἀνὴρ ἐθέλων, ὃ γε καὶ μέγα, δώη,
χαίρει τῷ δώρῳ καὶ τέρπεται ὃν κατὰ θυμόν·
ὅς δὲ κεν αὐτὸς ἔλῃται ἀναιδείῃφι πιθήσας,
καὶ τε σμικρὸν ἐόν, τό γ’ ἐπάχνωσεν φίλον ἥτορ. 360
εἰ γάρ κεν καὶ σμικρὸν ἐπὶ σμικρῷ καταθεῖο,
καὶ θαμὰ τοῦτ’ ἔρδοις, τάχα κεν μέγα καὶ τὸ γένοιτο.
(Hesiod, *Works and Days* 353–62)

Show friendship to a friend and approach one who approaches you. Give to one who gives and do not give to one who does not give; one gives to a giver, and no one gives to a non-giver. Give is good, Snatch is bad, a giver of death. When a man gives willingly, even if it is much, he rejoices in the gift and is pleased in his heart; but when a man gives way to shamelessness and takes for himself, even if it is a little, this freezes one’s dear heart. If you put down a little to add to a little, and you do this often, soon a large amount would result.

Two Proclan scholia and the commentary of Tzetzes are relevant to vv. 353–5:

τὸν φιλέοντα φιλεῖν: τούτους ὁ Πλούταρχος (fr. 51a Sandbach) ἐκβάλλει τοὺς στίχους. ὁ γὰρ μέλλων λέγειν ὅτι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς τὸ διδόναι προσήκει καὶ ὡς χαίρουσι διδόντες, ἄτοπος ἂν εἴη λέγων καὶ διδόναι τῷ διδόντι καὶ μὴ διδόναι τῷ μὴ διδόντι. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν τὰς δόσεις ἀναγκαίως ἐποίει, τὰς δὲ προκαθηγουμένας τῶν εὐεργεσιῶν ἐξέκοπεν. (Schol. Hesiod, *WD* 353–4 = fr. 149 Marzillo)

Show friendship to the friendly . . . Plutarch deletes these verses. For if someone is going to say that giving is fitting for the good and that they rejoice to

give, it would be absurd for him to tell us to give to him who gives and not to give to him who does not give. He would thus make gifts compulsory, and would eliminate those good deeds which lead the way.

ὁ μὲν Πλούταρχος (fr. 51b Sandbach) τούτους ὀβελίζει τοὺς στίχους, λέγων οὐδέποτε ἂν γενέσθαι φίλον, εἰ τῶν φιλιωθησομένων ἑκάτερος ἀναμένει παρὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου προσφιλιωθῆναι. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο, ἀλλ' οὕτως ἔχει τὰ ἔπη· τὸν μὲν φιλικὴν γνῶμην ἔχοντα καὶ εἰδότα φιλεῖν φίλει· καὶ τῶι προσίοντι, καὶ εὐδόμιλον γνῶμην ἔχοντι, προσίεσο, καὶ εὐδόμιλος ἔσο. (Tzetzes on *Works and Days* 353–4)

Plutarch obelises the lines, saying that no one would ever be a friend, if each of two people who might become friendly waits for a friendly approach from the other. This however is not how it is and the meaning of the verses is as follows: show friendship to the man who has a friendly attitude and knows how to be a friend, and approach and be sociable with the person who himself approaches and has a sociable attitude.

δώτηι μὲν τις ἔδωκε: τὸν δώτην καὶ ἁδῶτην οὐ λέγει τὸν δεδωκότα πρότερον ἢ μὴ δεδωκότα – καὶ γὰρ ἂν καὶ τοῦτο ὑπεναντίως ἔλεγε τοῖς περὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν δόγμασιν – , ἀλλὰ τὸν δωρητικὸν καὶ μὴ δωρητικὸν χαρίτων ἐμμελῶν καὶ χαριέντων. ὁ Πλούταρχος (fr. 52 Sandbach) εἰκάζει τοὺς τοιούτους, ὅσοι προαίρεσιν δωρητικὴν ἔχουσι, τοῖς σφαιρίζουσιν οἱ λαβόντες τὴν ὑπ' ἄλλοτριῶν ῥιφεῖσαν οὐτε κατέχουσιν οὐτε ἀντιπέμπουσι τοῖς μὴ εἰδόσι σφαιρίζειν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀντιπέμψαι δυναμένοις. (Schol. Hesiod, *WD* 355 = fr. 150 Marzillo)

One gives to a giver . . . By 'giver' and 'non-giver' he does not mean the man who has given before or who has not given – for this would contradict his principles about goodness – but rather those who are and are not of the kind to give appropriate and charming favours. Plutarch likens such people who have a disposition towards giving to ball-players who, when they catch the ball which has been thrown by others in the game, neither hold on to it nor send it on to those who do not know how to play, but send it on to those who can send it on themselves.

Although the first Proclan scholium is attached to a lemma from 353, it discusses only the matter of giving, which first appears in v. 354, whereas the argument Tzetzes ascribes to Plutarch clearly refers to 353; 'if', as West (n. on 353–5) puts it, 'this is not [Tzetzes'] own construction, he must have got it from the fuller text of Proclus that was at his disposal. In which case the transmitted lemma is correct and Plutarch condemned all three lines (i.e. 353–5).'⁵⁸ Older editors identified Plutarch's

⁵⁸ Elsewhere Plutarch more than once cites the similar v. 342 with approval (cf. below p. 299), though he may well have seen a clear distinction between this and 353.

athetesis as vv. 353–4, but more recently opinions have differed: Solmsen and Most restrict Plutarch's deletion to 354–5, whereas Verdenius follows West.⁵⁹ The only reasons, however, that 355 has fallen under suspicion of having been condemned by Plutarch are that, despite the lemma to which it is attached, Proclus' note on 353–4 refers to 'lines' apparently concerned with giving in the plural, and the modern view that, in West's words, 'Plutarch must have objected to 355 no less than to 354' (loc. cit.), because, as Wilamowitz put it, 355 is 'identical in content to 354'; Wilamowitz himself, however, took 353–4 as the extent of Plutarch's deletion, and he was inclined to accept the deletion, noting that 355 would follow smoothly on 352.

In the state of the evidence, we are unlikely to reach a consensus about Plutarch's intervention, but some progress seems possible. Both the Proclan scholium on v. 355 (above) and the non-Proclan *scholium vetus* on v. 354a (p. 119 Pertusi) suggest a line of argument which would defend one or (in the case of the scholium on v. 354a) both of vv. 354–5 against athetesis, on the grounds that the reference is not to someone from whom you have or have not received a specific gift, but rather to people with the right or wrong attitude or disposition towards giving, the μεταδοτικοί and the μη μεταδοτικοί, as the scholium on v. 354a puts it. The athetesis implied by this defence may go back to Alexandrian times. It is worth noting too that Tzetzes seems to have borrowed this line of defence in coming to the aid of v. 353. Although the comparison to ball-players has close analogues elsewhere, including elsewhere in Plutarch (cf. *Mor.* 582f, Chrysippus, *SVF* III 725), it is very hard to believe that Proclus is here drawing on anything other than Plutarch's commentary; the natural inference is that Plutarch accepted v. 355 as genuinely Hesiodic, and found an explanation for it which accorded with his own ethical principles. If so, Plutarch may well not have agreed with the modern view that vv. 354 and 355 are identical in meaning, and we have seen some evidence to suggest that he may not have been alone, or original,

⁵⁹ Ercolani sees the athetesis as covering vv. 353–4, but is uncertain about v. 355.

in this.⁶⁰ Verse 354, on this view, distinguishes how we should deal with those who have actually given us something from how we should deal with those who have not, whereas v. 355 distinguishes how we should deal with 'givers' from 'non-givers', i.e. people with the correct attitudes to giving, whether or not they actually have given, or indeed have the resources to give; if Hesiod himself intended v. 355 to imply something along the lines of Plutarch's interpretation (a possibility not, of course, ruled out by juxtaposition to v. 354), then he may have chosen the novel forms δῶτης and ἀδῶτης precisely to express what may have been novel ideas. If, moreover, προαίρεσις δωρητική seems redolent of Aristotle, we are probably not going wholly astray.

If indeed Plutarch explained and/or defended v. 355 along the lines indicated, then behind him lay a long tradition into which he sought to place Hesiod. Of particular importance for our understanding of that tradition is Book 4 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, περὶ ἐλευθεριότητος ('on generosity'), that quality which is for Aristotle a mean in the matter of giving and taking (1119b25). The particular characteristic of the ἐλευθέριος is 'giving to those one should give to' (1120a10). Aristotle notes that the correct mode of giving is more important here than the correct mode of taking, because 'conferring benefits' (τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν) is more characteristic of ἀρετή than is 'receiving benefits' (τὸ εὖ παύσχειν), 1120a11–12. It is perhaps not coincidence, then, that the Proclan scholium on vv. 353–4 (and cf. on vv. 356–60 below) seems to ascribe to Plutarch the argument that the retention of v. 354 (at least) would 'eliminate those good deeds (εὐεργεσίαι) which lead the way'. The whole Aristotelian passage deserves quotation here:

It is more the mark of the generous man to give to those he should rather than to take from where he should and not to take from where he should not. For it is more the mark of virtue to do good rather than to receive it, and to perform noble actions rather than not to perform shameful ones, and it is obvious that doing good and performing noble actions is a matter of

⁶⁰ Verdenius 1962: 144 (and cf. his note ad loc.) also distinguishes between the verses: 354 tells you to give only to someone who himself is ready to give; 355 warns that you can only expect a gift, if you yourself are ready to give. Cf. further Livrea 1967: 12–13.

giving [lit. ‘follows giving’], whereas receiving good or not performing shameful actions is a matter of taking. Gratitude (χάρις) goes to the giver, not to the one who does not take, and more praise also. Moreover, not taking is easier than giving, for people give up what is their own less readily than they refuse to take what belongs to someone else. Those who give are called generous, but those who do not take are not praised for generosity, but are, none the less, for justice; those who take are not much praised at all. . . . The generous man will give for the sake of the noble and will give correctly – to those he should, in the correct amounts and at the right time, and all the other things involved in correct giving. He will take pleasure in this (ἡδέως) or not feel any pain (ἀλύπως), for virtuous action is pleasant or without pain, and is least of all painful. The man who gives to those he should not, or not for the sake of the noble but for some other cause, is not called generous but something else. . . . Nor will he take from where he should not, for such taking is not the mark of one who does not honour wealth. Nor will he be the sort to ask favours, for it is not the mark of one who does good readily to receive benefits. He will take from where he should, as for example from his own possessions, not as something noble but as necessary, so that he may have something to give. Nor will he neglect his own possessions, as he wants with them to help others. (Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 4.1120a10–b2)

We are here, of course, a long way from Hesiod: Aristotle’s ‘taking’ is not Hesiod’s ‘snatching’, and the motives of Aristotle’s giver are far removed from those of Hesiod, but the emphasis upon the pleasure that appropriate giving brings and the χάρις which accrues from it suggests that it would not have been too difficult for someone to bring *WD* 355–60 into alignment with these Aristotelian ideas, and one person who did do this, I suggest, was Plutarch.⁶¹

The problems in this passage are, of course, far from over. The next Proclan scholium of relevance is that on vv. 356–60, where (apparently) what is transmitted is a conflation of two originally separate notes, one on 356–60 and the other on what are now called 370–2, verses preserved only in this note, which suggests that Proclus knew them only from Plutarch.⁶² I reproduce below only the section relevant to vv. 356–60:

Δῶς ἀγαθῇ: τὴν μὲν δωρεὰν ἀγαθὸν τι τῷ διδόντι γίνεσθαι, τὴν δὲ ἀρπαγὴν ὀλεθρίαν εἶναι τῷ ἀρπάσαντι. καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν προσέθηκε, τὸν μὲν ἐκουσίως δόντα,

⁶¹ On the general habit of associating Hesiod with later ethical ideas cf., e.g., Koning 2010: 177–83.

⁶² Cf. West on 370–2.

καὶ εἰ μέγα τι δοίη, λέγων ἐφ' ᾧ δέδωκε χαίρειν ὡς εὐεργέτην, τὸν δὲ ἀκουσίως ἀφηρεσθῆναι, καὶ εἰ μικρὸν εἴη τοῦτο, παχνοῦσθαι καὶ ἀλγύνεσθαι διὰ τὴν ἀκούσιον ἀφαίρεσιν. εὖ δὲ καὶ τὸν ἐκουσίως δόντα εἰπεῖν τέρπεσθαι ὃν κατὰ θυμόν. οὐ γὰρ δεῖ τὴν δόσιν αὐτὸν κηρύττειν, ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῷ στέγειν καὶ ἔνδον ἔχοντα τὴν εὐέργειαν ἐπ' αὐτῇ χαίρειν. οὕτως γὰρ ἔσται δῆλος οὐχὶ διὰ τὸν ἔπαινον δοῦς τὸν παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν τῆς δόσεως...

Give is good ...: Giving is something good for the giver but snatching is destruction to him who snatches. And he adds the reason, by saying that the one who gives willingly, even if he gives a great deal, rejoices in what he has given as a benefactor, whereas the one from whom something is taken against his will, even if it is small, freezes and feels pain because of the involuntary loss. Excellently has he said that the one who gives willingly takes pleasure 'in his heart'. One should not oneself announce a gift, but keep it to oneself and take pleasure in the benefaction, holding it inside. In this way it will be clear that the act of giving was not to win praise from others, but because of the intrinsic nobility of the gift... (Schol. Hesiod, *WD* 356–60 = fr. 151 Marzillo)

Here again we are perhaps first reminded of the Aristotelian discussion cited above: that the giver 'rejoices in what he has given as a benefactor' is certainly not far from a 'natural' reading of that passage; that one should not trumpet one's giving, because one has actually given 'because of the intrinsic nobility of the gift' (δι' αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν τῆς δόσεως), is very close to Aristotle's assertion that acts of generosity, being virtuous acts, are done τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα, *I I 20a4*. Here again, it is tempting to see Plutarch behind Proclus. Aristotle had introduced the motif of 'praise' into the discussion of giving, but in a rather different way from the scholium; Plutarch, however, as the author of an essay *On Inoffensive Self-Praise*, will have been very alert to the dangers.

The scholium may seem very confused here – the grief of the person who is robbed can hardly be the reason (αἰτία) why snatching is 'destruction to him who snatches' – but this apparent contradiction can be a fruitful way into discussion of the passage.⁶³ At first glance one might think that Hesiodic

⁶³ Verdenius 1962: 145 n. 2 takes it to be the death of the person robbed, because repeated small thefts lead to a 'big loss'. In his 1985 nn. on 356 and 362, however, he asserts that the man who is repeatedly robbed will eventually give way to 'destructive aggression' and kill the robber. Most transposes 361–3 to follow 367,

rhetoric does indeed favour the Proclan interpretation that snatching brings death to him who snatches: Hesiod is throughout concerned with the effects of actions on the doer – he is seeking to convince Perses (and us) that wrong action harms him who does it. Giving is ‘good’, because of the ‘credit’ it bestows upon the giver as much as for any other reason, and so snatching should be ‘bad’ for the snatcher. The issue might, however, seem indissoluble from the question of whose heart is frozen in v. 360. Proclus takes this to be the heart of the man who is robbed,⁶⁴ but modern commentators are divided, in a nice indication of how problematic this passage is. As a unit, vv. 357–60 fall into two couplets marked by remarkable parallelisms, even by Hesiodic standards;⁶⁵ the parallelisms may be set out in tabular form:

ἐθέλων	αὐτός
ὃ γε καὶ μέγα	καὶ τε σμικρὸν ἐόν
δῶτι	ἔληται
ὄν κατὰ θυμόν	φίλον ἦτορ
χαίρει . . . καὶ τέρπεται	ἐπάχνωσεν ⁶⁶

The sudden shift of syntax in the second half of v. 360, all the more strongly marked by the parallelisms which have preceded, might be thought a clear argument in favour of the view of the scholia that it is the heart of the person who is robbed which freezes. Paul Millett, however, has argued that the reference *throughout* is to the person who receives from another, because to be on the receiving end of a gift ‘freezes the heart and places the taker in a position of dependence’, and repeatedly to do so ‘soon adds up to a big debt of obligation’;⁶⁷ on

where indeed they sit well; there is however no doubt where they were always read in antiquity, despite doubts apparently expressed about their linkage to what preceded. Removing them from their current position also of course strengthens the case for referring 360 to the effect on the robber, not on the person robbed.

⁶⁴ Cf. also Proclus on 361–2 (fr. 152 Marzillo = Plutarch fr. 53 Sandbach, cf. further below). Other modern scholars who adopt this interpretation include Verdenius 1962: 145 n. 1 and Nordheider in *Lfgre* s.v. παχύνομαι.

⁶⁵ For such features of Hesiod’s style cf. Hunter 2009b: 268, and cf. below pp. 313–14.

⁶⁶ This stands in pointed contrast to the idea of ‘pleasure’, because this latter idea is traditionally associated with warmth, cf., e.g., Homer, *Iliad* 23.598.

⁶⁷ Millett 1984: 102.

this view, 'snatching', 'shamelessly taking', and 'receiving a gift' are all ways of referring to the same thing. Millett's interpretation has its attractions, but it is hard to square either with the fact that the introductory context is a warning against 'evil profit' (v. 352) or with the strongly parallel passage at vv. 320–6 ('Goods are not to be snatched . . .'). However the verses are to be understood, we see again that the ancient struggle to understand Hesiodic rhetoric once again foreshadows modern concerns. Our difficulties with Hesiod were difficulties in antiquity also. The *Works and Days* has always offered particular challenges in determining where a 'context' for any particular passage begins and ends.

As for Plutarch, there is no particular reason to associate the scholium under discussion with him, and the idea that even a small theft 'freezes the heart' of the man suffering loss might seem, at first glance, at odds with the Platonising ethics we have encountered earlier in the scholia and which we have had good reason to associate with Plutarch. If it is true that it is more shameful to do wrong than to be wronged, then it might be thought likely that Plutarch would have understood this passage also as marking the damage which wrongdoing, a 'yielding to shamelessness' (359), does to the wrongdoer. Nevertheless, regardless of how modern scholarship understands the Hesiodic verses, Plutarch almost certainly understood 'freezes the heart' as do the scholia, i.e. 'causes grief to'; this was the standard grammatical interpretation not just of this passage, but also of the parallel passage at *Iliad* 17.111–12.⁶⁸ It is one thing to say that wrongdoing harms the doer more than the victim, but something rather different to argue that theft causes 'grief' to the thief. Plutarch would in fact have had little difficulty in explaining and accepting v. 360 as the scholia do. What happens to the robber is not λύπη, but rather destruction coming sooner or later from the gods (cf. 320–6), though we must admit that the scholia at least offer no further explanation of why snatching brings death to the snatcher. I thus conclude that there is no reason to think that, had

⁶⁸ Cf. also Euripides, *Hippolytus* 803 λύπη: παχυνθεῖσα of Phaedra.

Plutarch discussed vv. 356–60, he would have taken any other view than that we find in the Proclan scholia.

Plutarch is more certainly involved in the ancient discussion of v. 220, τῆς δὲ Δίκης ρόθους ἐλκομένης ἥι κ' ἄνδρες ἄγωσιν. The Proclan scholium on this verse runs as follows:

τῆς δὲ Δίκης ρόθους ἐλκομένης: τὸν ρόθον οἱ μὲν ἤκουσαν τὸν ψόφον, ὅθεν καὶ ρόθιον καλεῖσθαι τὸ κτυποῦν κύμα καὶ ῥεῦμα. Πλούταρχος δὲ βιωτιάζων – οὕτω γὰρ καλεῖν φασὶ Βοιωτοὺς⁶⁹ – τὰς ὀρεινὰς ὁδοὺς τὰς στενὰς καὶ δυσάντεις ρόθους ὀνομάζεσθαι φησιν. εἰ οὖν τοῦτο κρατοίη, λέγοι ἂν ὅτι τῆς Δίκης ἐλκομένης ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπὶ δώροις τὰς δίκας κρινόντων σκολιῶς ρόθος ἐστὶ, τουτέστι δυσάντης ἡ ὁδὸς καὶ τραχεῖα, δι' ἧς ἔλκεται ὑπὸ τῶν δικαστῶν ἀντίκειται γὰρ τῷ εὐθεῖ τὸ σκολιὸν καὶ τῷ λείῳ τὸ τραχὺ καὶ τῷ εὐδιοδεύτῳ τὸ στενὸν καὶ δυσχωρίαν ἔχον· τοιαύτη δὲ ἐστὶ πᾶσα μοχθηρὰ κρίσις.

As Dike is dragged off *rhothos*: Some have understood ρόθος to refer to the noise, which is why waves and streams which resound are called *rhothios*. Plutarch (fr. 34 Sandbach), however, used the Boeotian dialect⁷⁰ – for they say that the Boeotians use the term in this way – and asserted that mountain paths which are narrow and difficult are called *rhothoi*. If this is the best interpretation, Hesiod would be saying that when Dike is dragged off by those who are bribed to give judgements crookedly, the path along which the judges drag her is a *rhothos*, that is a difficult and rough path. For the crooked is opposite to the straight, the rough to the smooth, and the narrow and difficult to that which is easily traversable, and every rotten judgement is of this kind. (Schol. Hesiod, *WD* 220 = fr. 100 Marzillo)

Proclus does not explicitly say that this is how Plutarch interpreted v. 220 – he may, for example, simply have noted the possibility of understanding Hesiod's ρόθος as a mountain-path – but it does not seem an unreasonable inference that this was indeed his interpretation of the verse. The meaning of vv. 220–I would then be: 'When Dike is dragged off, a *rhothos* is the path by which bribe-devouring men lead her, and they judge ordinances with crooked judgements', or, perhaps better, 'the path of Dike being dragged off, wherever bribe-devouring men lead her and judge ordinances with crooked judgements, is a *rhothos*'; there would then be a clear contrast between the one path (ὁδός) to Justice (vv. 216–17) and the *rhothos* to hybriistic

⁶⁹ The correct restoration of the text here remains doubtful.

⁷⁰ Or perhaps, 'playing the Boeotian card'.

injustice.⁷¹ The sense and syntax are certainly awkward, and the interpretation has met with little short of derision in the modern age, where it is not passed over in discreet silence. West's claim that 'this idea, even if it could be so expressed, is irrelevant in the context' is among the more moderate of judgements in modern commentary. Nevertheless, if, as is generally acknowledged, the image of Justice being carried off is an image of violent rape (e.g. West on 220, 222), then men dragging a maiden up a remote mountainside 'for their own evil purposes' (West on 220) would at least be at one with the picture. That the whole passage is dominated by images of the path and of 'twistings' is obvious, and Plutarch may well have wanted to 'unify' the imagery here, by bringing the literal and the metaphorical together: in giving 'crooked' judgements, men drag Dike on crooked paths, which are also rough and difficult and where her female body is likely to suffer most. Any reader as familiar as Plutarch or Proclus with the text of the *Works and Days* would not have found it difficult, under the influence of the later contrasting paths of ἀρετή and κακότης, to wish to make sense of this difficult passage through the introduction of another version of 'path imagery'. That this is indeed what Plutarch had in mind seems confirmed by the first part of the Proclan scholium on vv. 222–4, which seems to adopt the Plutarchan interpretation set out in the scholium on v. 220:

ἡ δ' ἔπεται κλαίουσα: ἔπεται μὲν ἐλκομένη διὰ τραχείας ὁδοῦ καὶ δυσβάτου, καὶ οὐκ αὐτὴ ἄγουσα ἢ δίκην, ἀλλ' ἄγομένη βιαίως, ὃ δηλοῖ τὸ ἔλκεσθαι αὐτὴν ὡς βιαζομένην ὑπὸ τῶν δωροφάγων κριτῶν. ἔπεται δὲ ἀποκλαίουσα τὴν πόλιν, ἐν ᾗ τοιοῦτοι δικάζουσι, καὶ τὰ ἦθη τῶν χαίρόντων τοιούτοις δικασταῖς.

She follows weeping: She follows, dragged over a rough and difficult path, and Dike herself is not leading, but she is being forcibly led; this makes clear that being dragged means that violence is done to her by the bribe-devouring judges. She follows, weeping for the city in which such men pass judgements and for the characters of those who rejoice in such judgements. (Schol. Hesiod, *WD* 222–4, p. 81–2 Pertusi = fr. 101 Marzillo⁷²)

⁷¹ I am indebted here to Bruno Currie, who rightly drew my attention to the set of contrasts upon which the scholium focuses.

⁷² The second half of the scholium, to be discussed immediately below, repeats again the Plutarchan interpretation of v. 220: 'as she is being dragged along a narrow and

Although it is later to be the path of ἀρετή which is at first ‘long and steep and rough’ (vv. 290–1), there seems no reason why Plutarch (or any other ancient critic) would necessarily have wanted to bring this passage into strict alignment with the more famous later passage by making the path of Dike here ‘rough and steep’.

The majority of modern editors understand Hesiod’s ῥόθος to be either ‘the murmur of protest that spreads among the people’ (West, so also Wilamowitz on 218–24, noting this is what would, in a later text, be designated θόρυβος), or a more general ‘clamour’ (Most), the ‘tumultuous atmosphere in which the lawsuits take place’ (Verdenius). The Proclan scholium does not, unfortunately, further describe the ‘noise’ (ψόφος) which some critics and/or readers understood Hesiod’s ῥόθος to be, but it seems in fact very unlikely that anyone in antiquity understood the word as modern editors (perhaps rightly) do. The matter is important because Plutarch was probably not just ‘indulging his knowledge of Boeotia’,⁷³ as West on v. 220 has it, but rather searching for an interpretation of the verse which seemed to him more satisfactory than what was currently available; by any reckoning, I think, *WD* 220 is rather obscure, and the surrounding context makes serious demands on understanding, and so Plutarch had every right to be puzzled. Just what is this unexplained and unqualified ῥόθος? It would be nice to know what was the standard ancient interpretation, against which Plutarch was reacting, a question in which no modern critic has in fact been interested. Was it the initial noise and screams for help of the victim that attend any rape (cf., e.g., *Homeric Hymn to Demeter* 20–1), was it indeed ‘tumult’ in the city of a rather less specific kind than that assumed by some modern editors, or was it even the sound of Dike weeping as she is dragged along, i.e. with v. 222 explaining v. 220? All three of these interpretations of the Hesiodic verse have, to some extent, had their modern

rough path, she summons those who have dragged her back to her own broad and smooth path...

⁷³ Plutarch did of course use his knowledge of Boeotia to elucidate the *Works and Days*, cf. frr. 64, 71, 82 Sandbach.

champions.⁷⁴ Whatever was the 'standard' ancient interpretation, however, Plutarch may have thought that he had a better solution, one which depended, as he tells us to do in *How to Study Poetry* (chapter 6), on paying close attention to the meaning of words; in appealing to a dialectal interpretation, he was of course following a critical practice enshrined as canonical ever since Aristotle (*Poetics* 1461a9–15 etc.).

For any Platonist, Hesiod's claim (v. 223) that Dike brings κακόν to men, even wrongdoers, will have been very problematic; this is just the kind of verse which Plato outlaws in *Republic* 2–3, and indeed it has been occasionally athetised in modern times, though not on Platonising grounds. Plato has an extensive discussion in *Republic* 2 about just such passages in which gods are accused of bringing κακά to men, and he associates this precisely with ideas of punishment:

Poets are either not to be allowed to say that [bad things such as the Trojan War] are the works of god, or if they are god's, they have to find the kind of explanation which we are now looking for. They must say that god acted justly and well, and that these people were benefited by being punished. The poet however is not to be allowed to say that those who were punished were wretched (ἄθλιοι) and that this was god's doing. We will allow it if they say that the wicked were wretched because they needed punishment, but to say that god who is good is responsible for ills is to be resisted in every possible way ... (Plato, *Republic* 2.380a8–b7)

What did Plutarch do about it? Of course we do not know, but the remainder (cf. above) of the Proclan scholium on vv. 222–4 is of some interest:

κακὸν δὲ φέρει ἀνθρώποισι, μετ' οὐ πολὺ τιμωρίαν αὐτοῖς ἐπάγουσα τῆς πονηρᾶς κρίσεως. ὁ μὲν οὖν κλαυθμὸς δηλοῖ τὸν ἔλεον τῆς μοχθηρᾶς προαιρέσεως, ἡ δὲ φορὰ τοῦ κακοῦ τὴν ἴασιν. οὕτως γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἐλεοῦν τὸ θεῖον ποινὰς ἀπαιτεῖ καὶ τοὺς ἐξελαύνοντας ἴσθιν τὴν τῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς δίκην ἔλεοῦσα μέτεισιν ἡ δίκη, καὶ τοὺς οὐκ ἰθεῖαν αὐτὴν νείμαντας τοῖς δικαζομένοις ἐπὶ τὸ ἰθὺς μεθίστησιν ἀπὸ τοῦ σκολιοῦ ἥθους. καὶ γὰρ ἐλκομένη διὰ τῆς στενῆς ὁδοῦ καὶ τραχείας ἐπανακαλεῖται τοὺς ἔλξαντας αὐτὴν εἰς τὴν πλατεῖαν ὁδὸν αὐτῇ καὶ λείαν, ὥστε δοκεῖν μὲν ἔλκεσθαι

⁷⁴ Havelock 1978: 197–9, with 354 n. 5, sees a fusion of the first and third interpretations, and he is followed by Schmidt in *Lfgre* s.v. ῥόθος; Mazon also seems to present some version of this: '... une clameur s'élève, celle de Justice, trainée...'. For the second interpretation cf. Verdenius and Most cited above.

ὑπὸ τῶν κακῶς αὐτὴν μετιόντων, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ ἐλκοντο ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς παθῶν δοκοῦντες ἔλκειν.⁷⁵

She brings trouble upon men, as not long afterwards she brings punishment upon them for their wicked judgement. The weeping indicates pity for their corrupt way of life,⁷⁶ whereas the imposition of harm indicates healing. So too does the divine pity us and demand punishment from us, and out of pity Dike pursues those who drive out [real justice], and those who have not dealt with straight justice in their cases she moves from crooked characters to the straight. As she is dragged along a narrow and rough path, she summons those who drag her back to her own path, which is broad and smooth, so that although she seems to be being dragged by those who mistreat her, they in fact, who seemed to be dragging, were being dragged by their own passions. (Schol. Hesiod, *WD* 222–4, p. 82 Pertusi = fr. 101 Marzillo)

This passage presents several problems of text and interpretation, but the general outlines are clear enough. Divine pity and the allegorical interpretation with which the scholium concludes might seem to point unequivocally to Proclus; Marzillo pointed to a passage from Proclus' *Commentary on Plato's Republic* (2.184.21–4 Kroll, discussing *Republic* 10.616a7–b1) where he discusses Plato's views on punishment as healing,⁷⁷ although Marzillo did not consider the Proclan context. Proclus there calls attention in fact to the Platonic distinction between those who are benefited by punishment because their offences are curable and those who are merely punished for the benefit of others, a distinction which Proclus sees as one between δίκη and τιμωρία. The first Platonic passage which Proclus adduces is the myth of the *Gorgias* where Socrates distinguishes between curable and incurable offences discovered in the Underworld by the markings upon the soul; those who are improved and helped by the painful punishment (τιμωρία) which is inflicted upon them are those whose offences are curable (ἰάσιμα), whereas those who have committed incurable offences are displayed in terrible suffering as an improving example to others, for they themselves are beyond help (525b–e). It is less important that the distinction between δίκη and

⁷⁵ There is some uncertainty about the text at the end, as some MSS continue after ἔλκειν; this does not, however, affect the point being made.

⁷⁶ προαίρεσις will cover both their behaviour in general and the moral basis for it.

⁷⁷ Marzillo 2010: 333–4.

τιμωρία does not really hold in the *Gorgias* than that, as we have already seen, Plutarch, and probably others, brought this dialogue, particularly its conclusion, into association with the *Works and Days*.

The second passage which Proclus adduces in this context is *Laws* 5.728c, where, as Proclus states, Plato in fact notes that τιμωρία too is a kind of 'healing'. The greatest so-called δίκη for wrongdoing is to come to be like wicked men:

This condition is therefore not δίκη – for what is just (τὸ δίκαιον) and δίκη are noble things – but a punishment (τιμωρία), a suffering which follows wrongdoing (ἀδικίας ἀκόλουθος πάθη); whether one suffers this or not, such a man is wretched (ἄθλιος), for if he does not suffer he is not healed, and if he does, he is destroyed to save many others. (Plato, *Laws* 5.728c2–5⁷⁸)

A few chapters later Plato recurs to the idea of punishment as healing:

When men commit wrongs which are curable (ιατά), we must recognise first that every wrongdoer (ἄδικος) does wrong unwillingly. There is no one anywhere who would ever willingly acquire one of the greatest evils, least of all within his most precious possessions. As we have said, the soul is in truth the most precious thing for everyone. No one would willingly accept the greatest evil in his most precious possession and live out his life possessing this. The wrongdoer and the man who has these evils are generally pitiable (ἐλπεινός), and it is permissible to pity the man whose evils are curable and to rein back and soften your anger rather than continuing to rage bitterly like a wife; but against the man who commits wrong and wickedness without restraint and possibility of change one must release one's anger. (Plato, *Laws* 5.731c1–d3)

As Plato put it in the *Gorgias* (522e3–4), 'by far the greatest of evils is to come to the Underworld with a soul full of crimes (ἁδικήματα)'. In the *Commentary on Plato's Republic* Proclus does not explicitly cite the definition of τιμωρία as ἀδικίας ἀκόλουθος πάθη (*Laws* 5.728c2–3), but it is cited at the end of the Proclan scholium on *Works and Days* 327–34 (= fr. 141 Marzillo), a passage in which Hesiod lists some of the wicked deeds for which Zeus imposes a χαλεπή ἀμοιβή.

⁷⁸ On this difficult passage cf. Mackenzie 1981: 196–7. Plutarch twice cites *Laws* 5.728a (*Moralia* 92e, 1124e), and 729c three times.

There is some reason for suspecting Plutarchan material in that scholium (= fr. 46 Sandbach), but – however that may be – Plutarch does cite this definition of τιμωρία at *Moralia* 553f, where he in fact explicitly contrasts it with the thought of *Works and Days* 265–6. The thick Platonic texture, covering both the ideas of punishment as healing and of pity, together with the shared use of this passage of the *Laws*, create at least a circumstantial case for seeing Plutarchan influence in the second half of the scholium on vv. 222–4.

Hesiod does not, of course, see the punishment inflicted by the gods as an essentially curative process, but he does warn Perses that justice wins out over *hybris* in the end, and παθὼν δέ τε νήπιος ἔγνων, ‘the fool learns when he has suffered’ (v. 218); punishment brings an increase in knowledge, if nothing else.⁷⁹ What the *hybristes* learns ‘by paying the penalty and suffering the κακά which arise from his *hybris*’ is, according to the Proclan scholium on 217b–19 (= fr. 99 Marzillo), ‘what a terrible κακὸν *hybris* is’. Even here, then, it would not have been difficult to align Hesiod and Plato. There remains, however, the problem of κακόν in *WD* 223. A modern Platonist might see here a question of focalisation: those who are punished consider (at least at first) what happens to them as κακόν, whereas it is of course ἀγαθόν. In *How to Study Poetry* Plutarch does not really suggest ‘solutions’ which depend upon such shifts of focalisation, though related modes of analysis were certainly known in antiquity;⁸⁰ Plutarch is of course very alive to the fact that words such as ἀρετή and κακία are used by poets in more than one way (24c–5b). Nevertheless, as the Proclan scholium on 217b–19 (cited immediately above) shows, it was possible for a Platonist ‘loosely’ to refer to sufferings inflicted as punishment as κακά; indeed, Proclus seems to use this possibility to make a point about how and what the guilty learn from their punishment (κακά . . . κακόν). λιμός καὶ λοιμός (v. 243) were disasters, however you looked at them, and we have no reason to think that Plutarch would not have agreed.

⁷⁹ West’s note ad loc. collects many parallels.

⁸⁰ Cf. Nünlist 2009: 126–32.

'No work is a disgrace'

In his reading of Hesiod, Plutarch did not of course merely draw upon his own resources as Platonist and educationalist, but was also heir to a very long tradition of discussion and commentary on the *Works and Days*. Thus, for example, the extended Proclan commentary (fr. 142 Marzillo = Plutarch fr. 47 Sandbach) about cleanliness and ritual purity on v. 336–7, 'sacrifice to the immortal gods according to your power in a holy and pure manner', would not only suit Plutarch's concerns as a Delphic priest, and indeed finds a number of explicit parallels in Plutarch's extant works, but also goes back, at an unknown number of removes, to Xenophon's discussion of Socrates' piety at *Memorabilia* 1.3, in the course of which we are told that Socrates used to cite *WD* 336 with approval, and indeed extended the injunction to 'act in accordance with one's power' to all areas of life. Whatever 'truth' lies behind the anecdote, it depends upon an equivocation between the two (related) senses of the verb 'do, act' and 'sacrifice',⁸¹ and the interest of the Platonic Socrates and his interlocutors in such verbal ambiguities is very familiar. The Xenophontic anecdote may in fact also be connected with the Hesiodic verse with perhaps the longest extant critical tradition, namely *Works and Days* 311:

ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν ὄνειδος, ἀεργίη δέ τ' ὄνειδος.
(Hesiod, *Works and Days* 311)

Work is no disgrace, not working is a disgrace.

In Plato's *Charmides* Critias is made to explain this verse to Socrates, as one of his reasons, very reminiscent of Prodicus, to deny that ποιεῖν and πράττειν were exactly synonymous:

'Tell me,' I said, 'do you not call making (ποιεῖν) and doing (πράττειν) the same thing?'

'Not at all' he said. 'Nor working (ἐργάζεσθαι) and making (ποιεῖν). I learned from Hesiod, who said "work is no disgrace". Do you think that if he had

⁸¹ Cf., e.g., Ford 2010: 150. The phrase ἔρδεν ἱερά made the slippage from one sense of the verb to the other a very small step indeed.

‘No work is a disgrace’

called the sort of works (ἔργα) which you just mentioned working and doing, he would have said that it was no disgrace for someone to be a shoemaker or seller of pickled fish or sell themselves in a brothel? Obviously not, Socrates. Rather, I think, he considered making (ποίησις) something other than doing (πρᾶξις) and working (ἐργασία), and that something made (ποίημα) was sometimes a disgrace when it was not connected to what is honourable (τὸ καλόν), but no work (ἔργον) was ever a disgrace, for he called what was made honourably and beneficially works (ἔργα), and such makings he called workings and doings. We must think that he considered only such things to be our private concerns (οἰκεῖα), whereas everything harmful belonged to others (ἄλλότριά). As a result, we must think that Hesiod and any other sensible man considers temperate (σώφρων) the man who does his own business.’ (Plato, *Charmides* 163b1–c8)

Socrates associates Critias’ analysis with Prodicus’ fondness for distinctions between words, and Critias is indeed here an early forerunner of critical methods which were to flourish later; they would, for example, be quite at home in Plutarch’s *How to Study Poetry*. In the *Memorabilia* Xenophon alleges that an interpretation of this same Hesiodic verse was used against Socrates by his accuser:

The accuser said that he picked out the most wicked sayings of the most illustrious poets and used them as support in teaching his associates to be evil-doers and inclined to tyranny. With regard to the Hesiodic verse, ‘Work is no disgrace, not working is a disgrace’, Socrates was claimed to say that the poet bids us refrain from no work whether unjust or shameful, but to do even such things for profit. Socrates would have agreed that to be a worker (ἐργάτης) is beneficial and good for a man, whereas idleness is harmful and bad, and working is good and not working bad; therefore he thought that those doing something good were working and were workers, whereas those playing dice or doing some other wicked and loss-making activity he called idle. On this basis the verse ‘Work is no disgrace, not working is a disgrace’ is indeed correct. (Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.2.56–7)

The interpretation allegedly imputed here to Socrates by his accuser clearly depends on taking ἔργον οὐδέν together, so that the emphasis is ‘no work is a disgrace’, rather than ‘work is no disgrace’; this is a critical move which would certainly not have been beyond the Socrates of Plato’s *Protagoras*, whose analysis of a poem of Simonides contains far more forced renderings, although no Socrates – Platonic or otherwise – is likely to have

approved the inference which the accuser drew from the interpretation. As the defences of both the Platonic Critias and of Xenophon understand ἔργον as 'good work', they do not ultimately depend upon either possible grouping of ἔργον οὐδὲν ὄνειδος;⁸² on balance, in fact, it seems that Critias probably keeps οὐδὲν ὄνειδος together (cf. esp. 163c2). What this uncertainty shows, of course, is that the danger of Hesiod's verse resided precisely in the fact that it did not really matter which grouping of words in the first half of the verse was adopted: 'work is no disgrace' might itself be used to defend immoral occupations, though 'no work is a disgrace' gives particular emphasis to that possibility.

Plutarch discusses the Hesiodic verse at *Solon* 2.3–4, in the context of Solon's travels as a young man, for which (at least) two explanations were apparently current – trade (ἐμπορία) and 'broadening of the horizons' (πολυπειρία καὶ ἰστορία):⁸³

Nothing prevents the good and public man either from not taking seriously the acquisition of superfluous wealth or from not looking down upon the use of what is necessary and sufficient. In those times, according to Hesiod, 'work was no disgrace' and a trade brought no inferiority; commerce was an honourable activity as it brought familiarity with what was foreign, produced friendships with kings, and gave experience in many areas. (Plutarch, *Solon* 2.3)

Plutarch writes as a member of the propertied elite of the Roman empire, for whom trade, at least when it was talked about, could indeed be a source of reproach. Some of the advantages which, according to Plutarch, trade bestowed – friendship with kings, for example – are drawn not just from Solon's poetry, but also from what led to a successful political and social career in Plutarch's own day. In adducing *Works and*

⁸² This issue is somewhat fudged in Graziosi's interesting account of the matter, Graziosi 2010: 120–5. For an ancient understanding of Hesiod's words as moderns do cf. the T-scholium on Homer, *Iliad* 24.370, where the δὲν in ἔργον οὐδὲν ὄνειδος is said to be superfluous; conversely, Dio 7.110–11 picks up and exploits the claim, familiar from Plato and Xenophon, that Hesiod, 'who was a wise man', would never have praised any disgraceful activity, and so must have given the name ἔργον only to honourable occupations, cf. above p. 17. On the Socratic concern with Hesiod's exhortation to work as a whole cf. further Wolfsdorf 2008.

⁸³ Cf. Manfredini–Piccirilli 1977: 117–20.

Days 311, Plutarch (and his readers) will have been very familiar with the classical controversies over the verse, but he passes over them in silence, as they would merely cloud the point he wishes to make; there can be no possibility here that ἔργον could denote something base or immoral, and we must assume that οὐδέν and ὄνειδος are here to be taken together. From one perspective, Plutarch approaches the issue of Solon’s engagement in trade as though it were a literary ‘problem’ (ζήτημα), and his ‘solution’ uses the familiar method of explaining that what seems odd in a contemporary setting was normal ‘back then’; the critical method is one of those set out already by Aristotle in the *Poetics* (1461a1–3).

The apparent difficulties posed by *Works and Days* 311 met with various responses throughout antiquity. One was to borrow a doctrine, apparently originating in Homeric scholarship, that when Homer used ἔργον without further qualification he was referring to agricultural work.⁸⁴ A variant of this view, one on show in both the Proclan and the non-Proclan scholia on *WD* 311, was that ἔργον without further qualification in Homer referred to honourable work; when Homer wanted to refer to disreputable actions he would add a qualification, as in the notorious οὐκ ἀρετᾷ κακὰ ἔργα, ‘wicked deeds do not prosper’ (*Odyssey* 8.329).⁸⁵ This latter view is close enough to the relevant passages of Plato and Xenophon to show that these discussions have indeed influenced the scholarly and scholastic tradition, and the first part of the Proclan scholium indeed appeals to Plato:

ἔργον δ’ οὐδέν ὄνειδος: οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ καπηλεύειν [διὰ ταῦτα] καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἔργα μετιέναι τὸν σπουδαῖον δεῖν οὐκ ἀπέγνωσαν διὰ ταῦτα τὰ ῥήματα τοῦ Ἡσιόδου, μηδὲν ἐπαχθεῖς εἶναι λέγοντες. εὖ δ’ ὁ Πλάτων ἐξηγήσατο τὸ ἔπος. ἔργα γὰρ καλεῖν τὸν Ἡσιόδον ἐκάστου τῶν ὄντων τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ἔργα. ταῦτα οὖν καὶ τῷ σπουδαίῳ πρέποντα ἔργα ὅσα οἰκεῖα σπουδαίῳ· διὸ καὶ Ὅμηρος τὰ μὲν βέλτιστα τῶν ἔργων μόνον ἔργα καλεῖ κτλ.

Work is no disgrace: Because of what Hesiod says here, most people have claimed that the morally serious man should not refuse to be a shopkeeper

⁸⁴ Cf. Hesychius ε 5669 and the passages gathered by Pontani on Schol. *Odyssey* 2.22.

⁸⁵ For this doctrine cf., e.g., the bT-scholia on *Iliad* 1.277–8.

and practise the other [disreputable] trades, saying that there is nothing objectionable in that. Plato, however, explained the verse well. [He said] that Hesiod called *erga* the *erga* of each living thing which were in accordance with nature; the *erga* which belong to the morally serious man are appropriate for the morally serious man. For this reason Homer too called the noblest of *erga* merely *erga* . . . (Schol. Hesiod, *WD* 311 = fr. 133 Marzillo)

The non-Proclan scholia share some of this interpretation, though without the allegedly Platonic frame:

οὐκ ἄρα τὸ κλέπτειν καὶ τὸ πορνοβοσκεῖν ὄνειδος· ῥητέον ὅτι τὸ ἔργον τῆς γεωργίας ὄνειδος οὐκ ἔχει, οἷον τὸ βοηλατεῖν, τὸ σκάπτειν· ἢ ἀπλῶς ῥητέον ἔργα, ὡς παρὰ τοῖς παλαιοῖς, τὰ σπουδαῖα. ὅτε γὰρ τὰ φαῦλα σημαίνει, προστιθέασι τὸ κακόν κτλ. (Schol. Hesiod, *WD* 311a, pp. 103–4 Pertusi)

On this basis theft and keeping a brothel are no disgrace. One must reply that the *ergon* of agriculture, such as herding cattle and digging, does not involve disgrace. Alternatively, good [*erga*] are called *erga* without qualification, as was the ancient practice. For when [Homer] signifies ignoble [*erga*], they add 'bad' . . .⁸⁶

There is an obvious puzzle here. In the *Charmides* Plato has Critias claim that what Hesiod called *erga* were τὰ καλῶς τε καὶ ὠφελίμως ποιούμενα, 'what was done honourably and beneficially' (163c3), not ἐκάστου τῶν ὄντων τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ἔργα, 'the *erga* of each living thing which were in accordance with nature'; Plato does not discuss *Works and Days* 311 anywhere else in the extant corpus. Plato was certainly capable of equating 'things well done' (καλῶς ποιούμενα) with 'things done in accordance with nature' (κατὰ φύσιν ποιούμενα), cf., e.g., *Laws* 12.966b8, but it would be very odd for the Proclan scholia to move so far from the verbal form of the Platonic passage to which they were referring. The defence offered by the Proclan scholia seems indeed to have a very marked Stoic flavour, not just in the reference to what is 'in accordance with nature for each of the things which are', but also in its concern with what are οἰκεῖα ἔργα for the σπουδαῖος;⁸⁷ such language was not, of course, uniquely Stoic, but the Stoic resonance here seems unmistakable. We might speculate that post-Platonic

⁸⁶ The text, but not the sense, is uncertain here.

⁸⁷ For such language in Stoic contexts cf. *SVF* III 516 on the τοῦ σπουδαίου ἔργον.

discussion had expanded upon the presence of οἰκεῖα and ἀλλότρια, virtually technical terms of Stoic ethics, in the *Charmides* passage, to create a fuller justificatory account of the Hesiodic verse; the Stoic concern with the explication of early and classical poetry, including Hesiod,⁸⁸ requires no exemplification.

We may indeed even be able to say something more specific about a Stoic attitude to this verse and its context. In chapter 30 of *On Stoic self-contradictions* Plutarch attacks an alleged inconsistency in Chrysippus' attitude to such things as wealth, health and freedom from pain: at one time, Plutarch claims, Chrysippus seems to think that they are important and worth holding on to, even allowing that such 'preferred' (προηγμένα) indifferents may, under certain circumstances, be called 'goods', whereas elsewhere he writes that such things are of no concern to us. When Chrysippus is taking a favourable view of these things, he cites in support, according to Plutarch, *Works and Days* 299 'Work, Perses, noble offspring' and has said that it would be crazy to recommend 'Don't work, Perses, noble offspring' (1047e = *SVF* III 138).⁸⁹ The reason to work would indeed precisely be to acquire wealth, food etc., and such 'preferred indifferents' are 'in accordance with nature' (cf., e.g., *SVF* I 191). We may therefore sense the outlines of a Stoic discussion in which the Hesiodic protreptic to work as a whole (vv. 299–316) was related to the ethical idea of wealth and the avoidance of hunger as 'preferred'; the Hesiodic injunction to work was worth respecting, even if it contributed nothing to εὐδαιμονία or ἀρετή. It is noteworthy that the Proclan scholium on 308–10 (= fr. 132 Marzillo) already explains or paraphrases the very similar praise of 'work' in those verses thus: 'everything (παντί) which fulfils its natural task (τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἔργον) receives the favour of the gods, and therefore men who work and provide what is necessary for themselves (τὰ ἀναγκαῖα) through work are also acting as god wishes...' The structure of this scholium recommends understanding the initial παντί as

⁸⁸ For Stoic concern with and/or citation of the *Works and Days* cf., e.g., *SVF* I 235 (= Plutarch fr. 42 Sandbach), II 430, II 75, III 754.

⁸⁹ Typically, Chrysippus' rewritten verse also scans, with synizesis of μὴ ἔρ-.

neuter, and this extension of the idea of 'natural *erga*' beyond the human realm, presumably to plants and animals, is another reason for seeing here Stoic influence; Stoic discussion and/or citation probably stretched across this whole passage.

If this is on anything like the right lines, how are we to explain the Proclan scholium on v. 311? Given Proclus' deep Platonism, a simple error in quoting the *Charmides* seems improbable. We might posit a lacuna after ἐξηγήσατο τὸ ἔπος in which the *Charmides* passage was summarized and another name introduced; it is, after all, hard to imagine that a Proclus could discuss *Works and Days* 311 without referring to the *Charmides*. Alternatively, 'Plato' might be a scribal slip for another name, perhaps a Stoic, or perhaps rather for Πλούταρχος; Plutarch was no Stoic, though he was intimately familiar with their ethical ideas, and his 'literary criticism', including discussions of the *Works and Days*, shows marked Stoic influence, particularly in *How to Study Poetry*.⁹⁰ Speculation has probably gone far enough already, but three further points are worth noting. This proposal is not, I think, ruled out by the explanation of the verse which Plutarch offers in the *Solon*; the demands of that biographical work were quite different from the commentary on the *Works and Days*, and demands for uniformity of explanation and citation across the Plutarchan corpus have, as we have seen, perhaps in general gone too far in the consideration of Plutarch's account of Hesiod. Secondly, it is easy enough to imagine a discussion in Plutarch which did not single out a Stoic definition as *the* explanation of the Hesiodic verse, but rather proceeded from the *Charmides* to a wider discussion; this may have been telescoped by Proclus or the subsequent redactors. Thirdly, the combination of a 'philosophical' account with supporting evidence from Homer is very much in the Plutarchan manner.

One further matter of some interest concerns the various disreputable ἔργα which were cited in the course of the ancient

⁹⁰ Cf. Hunter–Russell 2011: 11–15, Blank 2011. Plutarch's discussion of *Works and Days* 348 (fr. 49 Sandbach) was, for example, almost certainly indebted to Chrysippus, cf. *How to Study Poetry* 34b with Hunter–Russell 2011: 192. Examples may be readily multiplied.

discussions. Critias in the *Charmides* instanced ‘being a shoemaker or a seller of salted fish or sitting in a brothel’; Xenophon refers merely to ‘dicing or any other base and loss-making activity’. The Proclan scholia adduce ‘being a small shopkeeper/trader’, whereas the non-Proclan scholia have ‘theft and keeping a brothel’. Plutarch has many references to shoemakers, including to their low standing, and at 631d4 ‘seller of salted fish’ is an insult, under any circumstances; as for the other ‘trades’ mentioned, Plutarch strings together ‘dicing, quail-tapping, being a small trader, and being a money-lender’ as disgraceful occupations (34d), and at 173c πορνόβοσκεῖν καὶ καπηλεύειν are two shaming activities; this list could be extended. Whether, moreover, it is significant that ἐμπορία in the discussion of the verse in the *Solon* could be seen as the grand and reputable ‘opposite’ to τὸ καπηλεύειν may be debated. For what it is worth, however, the Proclan corpus offers no example of any of these verbs, and the only shoemaker is to be found in a citation of Plato (*Commentary on the Timaeus* 1.130.5–6 Diehl, citing *Theaetetus* 180d4–5). What evidential value such linguistic ‘facts’ possess may also be debated, but at the very least there does seem (again) a strong circumstantial case for learning from these extant Proclan scholia more than we thought we knew about Plutarch’s discussions of the *Works and Days*.

To Hesiod through Aratus

Plutarch took a serious interest in Aratus. No. 40 in the so-called ‘Lamprias-catalogue’ of Plutarch’s works is Ἄρατος, and this is generally held to refer to the poet; moreover, no. 119 in the same list is the Αἰτίαι τῶν Ἀράτου Διοσημιῶν, ‘Causes of Aratus’ Weather-Signs’, and eight scholia to the second part of the *Phainomena* which cite Plutarch explicitly are reasonably taken to come from that work (frr. 13–20 Sandbach).⁹¹

⁹¹ Plutarch seems to have been one of those who sought a ‘natural’ explanation for both the weather-sign and the weather which it predicted. There is a helpful introduction to this subject in Sider-Brunschön 2007: 5–30.

Plutarch's interest in the *Phainomena* will presumably have had more than one cause, including his own scientific concerns and Aratus' importance in the educational tradition, but relevant also will have been Plutarch's interest in the *Works and Days* of his fellow Boeotian Hesiod, the poem which Aratus imitates in complex and innovative ways and which had been acknowledged as Aratus' principal poetic model for the *Phainomena* almost from the latter poem's first appearance.⁹² In our extant corpus, Plutarch occasionally cites verses from the *Phainomena*, not just from the weather-signs, and it is with one of these quotations, and the Hesiodic texture which lies behind it, that the current section is concerned.

Plutarch's *Sympotic Questions* 8.3 begins as a discussion of why people inside a house can hear those outside more clearly than the reverse, but the subject soon turns to why we hear sounds better at night than in the daytime. This second puzzle is posed by Ammonius, Plutarch's Platonist teacher in Athens, and it comes down in the end to a difference between an Epicurean atomist explanation and the Peripatetic explanation, expressed in part by Plutarch and in part by Ammonius, which considers the role of air as the 'conductor' of sound. A principal source for Plutarch (cf. 720d) is the pseudo-Aristotelian *Problems*, where the same two issues are discussed in very similar terms,⁹³ and with reference to the same discussion of Anaxagoras (59 A74 D-K). Ammonius finishes his account at 722c, with a reference to how Anaxagoras noted that the stirring effect of the sun on the air hinders the passage of sound during the daytime, and then his son Thrasyllus takes up the tale:

ὑπολαβὼν δὲ Θράσυλλος ὁ Ἀμμωνίου υἱὸς 'εἶτ' ἔφη 'τί παθόντες, ὦ πρὸς Διός, †εἶπας τῷ θεωρητᾷ⁹⁴ κινήματα τοῦ ἀέρος οἰόμεθα δεῖν αἰτιᾶσθαι, τὸν δ' ἐμφανῆ σάλον καὶ σπαραγμὸν αὐτοῦ παρορῶμεν; ὁ γὰρ δὴ "μέγας ἡγεμὼν ἐν οὐρανῷ Ζεὺς" (Plato, *Phaedrus* 246e4) οὗτος οὐ λανθάνων οὐδ' ἀτρέμα

⁹² Cf. Callimachus, *Epigr.* 27 Pf., discussed below pp. 292–301.

⁹³ Cf. *Probl.* 11.5 (899a19–21), 11.33 (903a7–26), 11.37 (903b13–18).

⁹⁴ The reading is quite uncertain here; Teodorsson ad loc. adopts ἀεὶ τὰ νῶι θεωρητά, a variation on several earlier suggestions. The point is obviously a contrast between 'movements' not visible to the naked eye and more obvious disturbances.

To Hesiod through Aratus

διακινῶν τὰ σμικρότατα τοῦ ἀέρος ἀλλ' εὐθύς ἐκφανεῖς ἀνίστησιν καὶ κινεῖ πάντα πράγματα

δεξιά σημαίνων, λαοὺς δ' ἐπὶ ἔργον ἐγείρων (Aratus, *Phain.* 6)

οἱ δ' ἔπονται, καθάπερ ἐκ παλιγγενεσίας “ἐφ’ ἡμέρηι φρονέοντες”, ὥς φησι Δημόκριτος (fr. 158 D-K), οὐτ’ ἀφώνοις οὐτ’ ἀπράκτοις ἐνεργείαις ἤ καὶ τὸν ὄρθρον ὁ Ἰβυκος (*PMG* 303(b))⁹⁵ οὐ κακῶς “κλυτόν” προσεῖπεν, ἐν ᾧ κλύειν καὶ ἱῆδη† φθέγγεσθαι συμβέβηκεν. τῆς δὲ νυκτὸς ἀκύμων τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἄκλυστος⁹⁶ ὦν ὁ ἀήρ, ἀναπαυομένων ἀπάντων, εἰκότως τὴν φωνὴν ἄθραυστον ἀναπέμπει καὶ ἀκέραιον πρὸς ἡμᾶς. (Plutarch, *QC* 8.3.5, 722c–e)

Ammonius’ son, Thrasyllus, broke in: ‘What possesses us’, he said, ‘in the name of Zeus always to think that we must hold [invisible] movements of the air responsible [for these things], and pass by its obvious tossing and disturbance. For it is not by secretly or gently stirring the tiny particles of air that the ‘great leader in the heaven, Zeus’ rouses and sets all things in motion, but by his very appearance, ‘giving guiding signs on the right, and waking people to their tasks’. People follow, as though reborn, ‘thinking new thoughts for the day’, as Democritus says, in their tasks which are neither silent nor actionless.⁹⁷ So Ibycus did well to call early dawn *klutos*, as at that time we hear (*kluein*) and speak. During the night, however, the air is generally free of waves and undisturbed (*aklustos*), as everything is asleep, and so it naturally conducts sound to us unbroken and intact.

In his commentary on this passage, Teodorsson notes that Thrasyllus ‘almost describes the god as making himself visible’.⁹⁸ This seems rather understated. Thrasyllus makes the god very visible indeed: εὐθύς ἐκφανεῖς makes clear that Zeus is here in fact identified with the sun (cf. LSJ s.v. ἐκφαίνω II) who rouses people and gets them off to work (ἀνίστησιν καὶ κινεῖ, ἐγείρων), thereby disturbing the air with their noise. Thrasyllus is not really contradicting his father, but rather pointing out

⁹⁵ ἄμος [Bergk: τᾶμος codd.] ἄμπνος κλυτὸς ὄρθρος ἐγείρησιν ἀηδόνας; see Page and Davies ad loc. for possible textual improvements.

⁹⁶ ἄκλυστος Turnebus: ἀκλυτος codd., cf. below p. 221 n. 105.

⁹⁷ This seems to be the meaning of ἀπράκτοις: the fact that what people do in the morning involves ‘activity’ increases the background (and hence interfering) noise; cf. Plutarch’s use of ἀπρακτος for days on which no business may be conducted (*Alcibiades* 34.2, *Roman Questions* 270a). οὐτ’ ἀφώνοις οὐτ’ ἀπράκτοις thus gestures towards the familiar distinction of λόγος and ἔργον. In the Loeb edition, Minar translates ‘without fulfilment’, but this does not seem relevant to Thrasyllus’ point; Minar is followed by Frazier–Sirinelli in the Budé (‘des activités qui ne manquent ni de voix ni d’efficace’). The rather strained language is of a piece with the whole style of Thrasyllus’ intervention, cf. further below.

⁹⁸ Teodorsson 1996: 196.

that the obvious evidence of the sun's work is all around us at the start of every day, as we rise 'born again' (ἐκ παλιγγενεσίας) from death's near brother, sleep; behind Thrasyllus' intervention lies a series of famous passages of Greek poetry describing the noise and busy activity of dawn (Eur. *Phaethon* 63–86 Diggle and Kannicht, Callimachus, *Hecale* fr.74.22–8 Hollis etc.). Modern readers will also think of the first stanza of John Donne's 'The sun rising' and the many ancient anticipations of its erotic theme.⁹⁹

That v. 6 of the *Phainomena* should be referred to the sun is hardly surprising: what other 'sign' does Zeus give to get people going to work than the rising of the sun (cf. also *Phainomena* 771–6)? Moreover, both Aratus and his interpreters will have recalled not just *WD* 20, Aratus' immediate model, with Zeus replacing 'the good *eris*', but also a later passage of the *Works and Days* which makes (from one perspective) much the same point as Aratus; Hesiod is talking about the need to make an early start in the harvesting season:

τημοῦτος σπεύδειν καὶ οἴκαδε καρπὸν ἀγινεῖν
 ὄρθρου ἀνιστάμενος, ἵνα τοι βίος ἄρκιος εἴη.
 ἥώς γάρ τ' ἔργοιο τρίτην ἀπομείρεται αἶσαν·
 ἥώς τοι προφέρει μὲν ὁδοῦ, προφέρει δὲ καὶ ἔργου,
 ἥώς, ἥ τε φανεῖσα πολέας ἐπέβησε κελεύθου
 ἀνθρώπους, πολλοῖσιν ἐπὶ ζυγὰ βουσὶ τίθησιν.
 (Hesiod, *Works and Days* 576–81)

At that time make haste and bring the crops home, rising at first light so that you will have sufficient livelihood. Dawn takes a third part of work as its share; dawn sets you off on the road and on your work, dawn's appearance puts many men on the path and places the yoke on many oxen.

Here we have dawn (or, rather, the third part of the day beginning with first light), rather than the sun, but it would have been easy enough for any reader of the *Works and Days* to associate this passage with vv. 20–4, and Aratus seems to have been one such reader. Behind Plutarch's citation of *Phainomena* 6 we can in fact sense a considerable ancient discussion of this Aratean passage, and Hesiod will have played a major role

⁹⁹ Cf. McKeown's introduction to Ovid, *Amores* 1.13.

in that discussion. It seems worthwhile to try to pick out the traces of that discussion, faint though they sometimes become.

To support his case Plutarch's Thrasyllus adduces four tags from literature. The first is one of the snatches of Plato most commonly quoted in the Greek literature of the Roman empire.¹⁰⁰ This is the opening of 'the celestial parade' from Socrates' 'palinode' in Plato's *Phaedrus* (246e–7a); this tag might have risen almost spontaneously to the lips of any πεπαιδευμένος, but it has here a particular contextual significance. Quotations in Plutarch very regularly evoke more of the context than is actually cited in the text, and this is a good example of that technique:

The great leader in heaven, Zeus, travels first, driving a winged chariot and ordering and taking care of everything (διακοσμών πάντα καὶ ἐπιμελούμενος). He is followed by the host of gods and deities (τῷ δ' ἔπεται στρατιά θεῶν τε καὶ δαιμόνων), arranged into eleven companies; for Hestia alone remains in the house of the gods. All of the other gods who have been stationed in the number of the twelve lead as commanders in whatever place each has been assigned. Many and blessed indeed are the openly visible paths within heaven, along which the race of happy gods moves; each carries out his own function, and anyone who is willing and able follows (ἔπεται), for jealousy has no part in the divine chorus. (Plato, *Phaedrus* 246e4–7a7)

Zeus' winged chariot clearly evokes, in both Plato and in the reminiscence placed by Plutarch in Thrasyllus' mouth, the chariot of the sun, just as here and elsewhere in the *Phaedrus* the celestial parade evokes the movement of the heavenly bodies, led by the sun, through the sky; the Neoplatonist commentator on the *Phaedrus*, Hermeias, helpfully tells us that 'some take Zeus [in this passage] as the sun' (136.11 Couvreur), and that interpretation is indeed found in a variety of contexts (cf. further below). Moreover, the description of Zeus 'ordering and taking care of everything' sits perfectly with Thrasyllus' citation from the proem of Aratus' *Phainomena* which follows (and which may also – as we shall see – evoke the wider context from which it is drawn). The two citations are in fact integrated into a unit, as οἱ δ' ἔπονται ('they follow') which immediately

¹⁰⁰ Cf., e.g., Trapp 1990: 172, Hunter 2012: 172–3.

follows the Aratus-verse in Plutarch picks up τῶι δ' ἔπεται στρατιὰ θεῶν τε καὶ δαιμόνων, 'the host of gods and lesser deities follows him' in Plato (and cf. also ἔπεται δὲ ὁ αἰὲ ἐθέλων τε καὶ δυνάμενος). Thrasyllus' third citation is from Democritus, and again a fuller context, which we in fact owe to another passage of Plutarch himself, is relevant. Having noted how inert drowsiness comes over us as night comes on, Plutarch draws attention to the very different effect of the rising sun:

ἥμος δ' ἡπεροπῆας ἀπεπτοίησεν ὀνείρους¹⁰¹

ὁ ἥλιος ἀνασχών καὶ καθάπερ εἰς ταῦτό συμμίξας ἐπέστρεψε καὶ συνώρμησε τῶι φωτὶ τὰς πράξεις καὶ τὰς νοήσεις τὰς ἀπάντων, ὥς φησι Δημόκριτος, 'νέα ἔφ' ἡμέρῃ φρονέοντες'¹⁰² ἄνθρωποι, τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὁρμῇ καθάπερ ἀρτήματι συντόνῳ σπασθέντες¹⁰³ ἄλλος ἀλλαχόθεν ἐπὶ τὰς πράξεις ἀνίστανται. (Plutarch, 'Live unknown' 1129e = Democritus fr. 158 D-K)

'But when deceptive dreams are scattered' by the rising sun, which by its light blends into one and sets in common motion the actions and thoughts of all men, 'thinking new thoughts for the day', as Democritus says, then do men, drawn by mutual attraction, as by a stretched cord, rise from their different places of sleep to begin their tasks.

Here too then Thrasyllus has alluded to a passage involving the rising sun; we cannot, of course, assume that the original context in Democritus was anything like that of 1129e, in which Plutarch here and elsewhere embeds the quotation, but – at the very least – it seems clear what Plutarch took the context to be.¹⁰⁴

Plutarch's cameo-characterisation of Thrasyllus, who appears nowhere else in the Plutarchan corpus, as a young man bursting to show off in front of his father and his father's learned friends is worth noting; in a very short space we have linked allusions to Plato, Aratus, Democritus and then a humorously improbable interpretation of a verse of Ibycus, all capped by a sentence replete with assonances and matched

¹⁰¹ The origin of this hexameter (*SH* 1046) is not known.

¹⁰² Wyttenbach's certain correction for the transmitted τρέφοντες.

¹⁰³ This is Reiske's text for συντόνῳ πλασθέντες; textual uncertainty does not affect the point being made.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. also Hershbell 1982: 105–6. It is perhaps relevant that Democritus seems to have written about weather-prediction, cf. Sider-Brunschön 2007: 7–9.

synonyms.¹⁰⁵ This might seem an unlikely place to look for reflections of serious critical discussion, but in fact Thrasyllus' youthful enthusiasm may be characterized also by the eager *epideixis* of what he has heard from his 'elders'.

Thrasyllus' citation of v. 6 of Aratus' *Phainomena* also looks to the context in which it is embedded:

ἐκ Διὸς ἀρχώμεσθα, τὸν οὐδέποτε ἄνδρες ἐώμεν
 ἄρρητον· μεστὰ δὲ Διὸς πᾶσαι μὲν ἀγυιαί,
 πᾶσαι δ' ἀνθρώπων ἀγοραί, μεστὴ δὲ θάλασσα
 καὶ λιμένες· πάντῃ δὲ Διὸς κεχρήμεθα πάντες.
 τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος εἰμέν. ὁ δ' ἥπιος ἀνθρώποισι
 δεξιὰ σημαίνει, λαοὺς δ' ἐπὶ ἔργον ἐγείρει
 μιμνήσκων βίότοιο, λέγει δ' ὅτε βῶλος ἀρίστη
 βουσί τε καὶ μακέλησι, λέγει δ' ὅτε δεξιάι ὦραι
 καὶ φυτὰ γυρῶσαι καὶ σπέρματα πάντα βαλέσθαι.

(Aratus, *Phainomena* 1–9)

From Zeus let us begin: we mortals never leave him unspoken. Full of Zeus are all the roads and all the gathering-places of men, and full are the sea and the harbours; all men need Zeus in everything. For we are also descended from him. Out of kindness to men, he gives them guiding signs on the right, and wakes people to their tasks, reminding them of their livelihood. He tells when the soil is best for oxen and the mattock, and he tells when the seasons are right for planting trees and sowing seed of every kind.

Zeus as the sun, an identification of course with roots in the very deepest Indo-European antiquity,¹⁰⁶ is in fact one of the explanations for this passage adduced in a discussion of the opening of the *Phainomena* in Vaticanus gr. 191 (very end of the 13th/beginning of the 14th cent.).¹⁰⁷ The bulk of this learned discussion is given over to the various interpretations of Zeus which had been offered – the heavens, the αἰθήρ or ἀήρ, the sun and indeed the mythical figure of the great god himself – and to quotations of poetry adduced for each interpretation.

¹⁰⁵ I follow, e.g., Teodorsson in accepting Turnebus' ἄκλυτος for the transmitted ἄκλυτος; the former makes a typically Plutarchan pair with ἀκύμων (cf. ἄθραυστον ... ἀκέραιον immediately following), and allows the play with κλυτός still to resonate, whereas ἄκλυτος is more obvious and less elegant.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. West on Hesiod, *WD* 267. For a passage of ancient commentary in which Aratus' *Phainomena* is itself compared to the sun cf. below p. 296.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. J. Martin 1974: 41–3.

The source of this scholiastic material is (unsurprisingly) disputed,¹⁰⁸ but whatever its origin, it is clear that the author was well informed and/or had access to material of some antiquity.¹⁰⁹ Of the passages in support of 'Zeus = sun' which the author adduces, two are of particular interest in the present context. Hesiod, *WD* 267, 'Zeus' eye which sees everything and understands everything', will have been a verse very well known to Plutarch. The Proclan scholium on vv. 267–9 (= fr. 117 Marzillo) notes that Hesiod added πάντα νοήσας to the verse to make clear that Zeus' vision was not physical, but rather noetic and divine; if this is unsurprising from a neo-Platonist, our minds, as well perhaps as those of some ancient scholars, might turn also to the sun in Plato's *Republic* which functions as an analogue in the visible world to the Form of the Good in the intellectual world. The second verse of interest here which the scholiast adduces is *Iliad* 13.837 (the last verse of the book):

ἦχ' ἡ δ' ἀμφοτέρων ἵκετ' αἰθέρα καὶ Διὸς αὐγὰς.
(Homer, *Iliad* 13.837)

The clamour from both sides reached the sky and Zeus' rays.

It may be pure coincidence that this is also a verse about sound travelling, the subject of the Plutarchan discussion, but the T-scholium on this verse reports that some (not unreasonably, we might think) here interpreted Zeus as 'the sun' Πλατωνικῶς. This may be the only instance of this Πλατωνικῶς observation in the Iliadic scholia.¹¹⁰ The most notable 'Platonic' discussion of the equivalence of Zeus and the sun is not by Plato himself, but is rather Julian's 'Hymn to King Helios', a strange (to many people) mixture of Neoplatonism and Mithraism, but one very characteristic of its time and place. Julian unsurprisingly traces some of his ideas in Homer (cf., e.g. 136d–7c, 149b–c), acknowledges their derivation from the Form of the

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Maass 1892: 23–8, 172–8, J. Martin 1956: 130–2, Di Maria 1996: 65–6.

¹⁰⁹ Cf., e.g., Maass 1892: 10–16.

¹¹⁰ For the use of Πλατωνικός more generally cf. Glucker 1978: 206–25.

Good in the *Republic*, and says some things about Zeus-Helios which are not too far from the proem of the *Phainomena*. Nevertheless, Πλατωνικῶς in the Homeric scholium more likely means ‘in the manner of Plato’ rather than ‘in the manner of [later] Platonists’, and it is very hard here not to see either the sun of the *Republic* or (perhaps more probably) the ‘mighty Zeus’ of the *Phaedrus* behind this ‘Platonic’ reading of Zeus as the sun; that Plato called the sun Zeus at this point of the *Phaedrus* is explicitly stated by another Homeric scholium (on *Odyssey* 12.62).

Zeus in the prologue of the *Phainomena* takes the place of Hesiod’s ‘good *eris*’,

ἥ τε καὶ ἀπάλαμόν περ ὅμως ἐπὶ ἔργον ἔγειρεν
(Hesiod, *Works and Days* 20)

... which rouses even the feckless to work ...

Like the Zeus of the *Phainomena*, the ‘good *eris*’ sets men to their agricultural tasks (vv. 21–4). The replacement of the ‘good *eris*’ by Zeus is not just indicative of the different theology of the two poems, but must have at least promoted ‘allegorical’ readings of Aratus’ Zeus. The Neoplatonist Proclus interpreted Hesiod’s ‘good *eris*’ as a ‘contest and striving to attain the good’ (schol. 11b Pertusi = fr. 13 Marzillo) and ‘a concentrated striving of the rational part of the soul towards the good’ (schol. 17 Pertusi = fr. 19 Marzillo), but (again) this language is at least suggestive for a Platonist reading. Such a striving towards the good recalls a number of Platonic passages, including the celestial parade of the *Phaedrus*, but it is also natural to think of the Sun and the Cave of the *Republic*, a passage which Plutarch of course knew well (cf., e.g., *Moralia* 36e). There, the prisoner who escapes to the surface of the earth to see the sun ‘as it is ... of itself in its right place’ (7.516b5–6) comes to the conclusion that it is the sun ‘which provides the seasons (ῥοαί) and the years and guides everything in the visible world (πάντα ἐπιτροπεύων τὰ ἐν τῷ ὁρωμένῳ τόπῳ) and in some way is responsible for everything which they used to see [in the cave]’ (7.516b8–c2); the sun plays the role in the visible

world of the Good in the intelligible realm, and the language there is indeed quite close to the description of the Zeus of the *Phaedrus*, 'ordering and taking care of everything' (διακοσμοῶν πάντα καὶ ἐπιμελούμενος).¹¹¹ The passage of Plutarch with which I began allows us to sense some resonances that the prologue of the *Phainomena* might have had for a Platonist and perhaps allows a glimpse of an interpretation of at least Platonic flavour. The poem that is to deal with the nocturnal stars and constellations would on this reading begin with the biggest star of all, the sun, the 'master (δεσπότης) of the stars' as the scholiast on Euripides, *Phoenissae* 1006 calls the sun in interpreting Menoeceus' oath by 'Zeus with the stars'; the poem of *phainomena*, of things in the visible realm, thus begins with the greatest source of power and nourishment in that realm. If Proclus at least was feeling his way towards an affiliation between Hesiod's 'good *eris*' and the Platonic Good, then his predecessors, such as Plutarch, may not have found it difficult to see in the sun, which Plato had offered as the visible analogy of the Good, the mediating term which allowed interpretation of passages such as the proem of the *Phainomena*.

In his commentary on 722d Teodorsson adduced a passage of [Aristotle], *De mundo* simply as a further reminiscence of the celestial parade of the *Phaedrus*, but this passage may in fact have things to tell us about Aratus and Plutarch. [Aristotle] is discussing the movements of the celestial 'chorus' at the command of 'the god who controls the whole' (τοῦ τὸ σύμπαν διέποντος θεοῦ, 399a18) in language which certainly does recall the *Phaedrus*. One part of the heavenly 'chorus' is the sun which orders day and night, the weather and the agricultural year (399a22–30), but which is, like everything else, subservient to the single power which is visible only to reason and the intellect:

¹¹¹ Another passage concerning the sun which is of some interest in this context is Dio 3.73–81 in which the sun's ceaseless benefits to mankind offer a pattern to be followed by the good king. Whatever the immediate philosophical background of the passage, and the Sun of the *Republic* has a prominent place here, the claim that the sun 'causes and marks out the seasons (διακρίνοντα τὰς ὥρας)' (3.74) might make us think of the proem of Aratus' *Phainomena*.

ὅταν οὖν ὁ πάντων ἡγεμών τε καὶ γενέτωρ, ἄορατος ὦν ἄλλωι πλήν λογισμῶι, σημήνηι πάσῃ φύσει μεταξὺ οὐρανοῦ τε καὶ γῆς φερομένηι, κινεῖται πᾶσα ἐνδελεχῶς ἐν κύκλοις καὶ πέρασιν ἰδίοις, ποτὲ μὲν ἀφανιζομένη, ποτὲ δὲ φαινομένη, μυρίας ἰδέας ἀναφαίνουσά τε καὶ πάλιν ἀποκρύπτουσα ἐκ μιᾶς ἀρχῆς. ([Aristotle], *De mundo* 399a30–6)

When the leader and begetter of all things, who is invisible to anything except reason, gives the sign to all of nature in its passage between heaven and earth, then all of nature is continuously moved in its orbits and its own boundaries, now disappearing, now appearing, revealing and then again concealing myriad forms from a single beginning.

As in the poem of the *Phainomena*, the great leader and begetter ‘gives signs’,¹¹² but whereas it is crucial that Aratus’ signs are visible, are indeed *phainomena*, the signs of [Aristotle]’s god are graspable only with the mind. This was the great power of Plato’s analogy for subsequent writers of all kinds and persuasions. Plato’s sun offered an image of control and illumination in the visible world – hence the suggested interpretation of the poem of the *Phainomena*, but an image which also now suggested another, more (Platonically) real world. It may be worth adding that another passage of Plato might also have eased the way for an association between the Zeus of the prologue of the *Phainomena* and the sun. One of the etymologies for ἥλιος (or, in fact, ἄλιος) which Socrates offers in the *Cratylus* is from ἀλίζειν, because ‘[the sun] assembles people to the same spot when it rises’ (409a2–3). Here the sun gets people underway for the day, just as does Aratus’ Zeus.

We cannot be very much more specific about the kind of discussion of Hesiod and of Aratus’ poem which I have been suggesting lies behind both Plutarch, *QC* 8.3.5 and the scholia to Aratus. Nor, of course, must we insist too rigidly on the intellectual affiliations of that interpretation, though Plutarch’s general intellectual outlook gives some confidence, I think, that we are on the right track. Nevertheless, Cleanthes too gave the sun a very prominent place in his physical system (cf. *SVF* I 499, 502 etc.), and it is at least curious that the Aratean scholia tell us that a Stoic interpretation of the opening claim that ‘we

¹¹² Cf. Schol. Arat. *Phain.* I (p. 38.12 Martin), βασιλεὺς δὲ τῶν ὅλων ὁ Ζεὺς καὶ πατήρ.

mortals never leave Zeus unspoken' was that, because φωνή was ἀήρ πεπληγμένος 'air that has been struck',¹¹³ we never leave Zeus ἄρρητος because as Zeus is air or πνεῦμα, every word we utter is 'through him'.¹¹⁴ In other words, part of the Stoic interpretation of the proem of the *Phainomena* was in terms of acoustics, and this is precisely the context – the relationship between air and sound – in which Plutarch makes Thrasyllus cite the proem in the *Sympotic Questions*. One guess would be that Plutarch himself had elsewhere discussed the proem of the *Phainomena* and set his views against those of the Stoics, and that something of this discussion comes through in *Sympotic Questions* 8.3.

What, I hope, has emerged from this final section is some sense of the extraordinary ancient interest in texts within the Hesiodic tradition, an interest which embraced both φιλόλογοι and φιλόσοφοι and helped indeed to break down any barriers between them. Hesiod, and then the Hesiodic tradition, maintained this appeal from the early days of the pre-Socratic engagement with his poems¹¹⁵ through to Plutarch and beyond. The state of our evidence means, however, as will be only too clear from the foregoing discussion, that we must often follow faint traces, which will inevitably seem clearer to some readers than to others, and try to put together enough pieces of the puzzle to have at least some sense of what the overall picture resembled. Ancient intellectual traditions are rarely preserved for us in full detail, and often the best we can do is to make the most (and perhaps 'more than the most') of what we happen to have; the alternative is simply to leave whole areas of ancient intellectual culture unexplored.

¹¹³ For this definition cf. also *SVF* I 74 (Zeno), II 138–9, Diogenes of Babylon fr. 17 (= *SVF* III p. 212).

¹¹⁴ J. Martin 1974: 41, ll. 2–5; for modern discussion and attempts to salvage something of this view cf., e.g., Erren 1967: 17–22, J. Martin 1998: II 141–2.

¹¹⁵ Cf. above p. 27.

CHAPTER 5

AESOP AND HESIOD

Hesiod and Babrius

Probably in the late first or early second century AD, Valerius Babrius, living perhaps in Syria or elsewhere in the East, prefaced his collection of Aesopic fables in choliambic verse with a poem which set the fables in context, explained the ‘source’ from which they came, and also entered a programmatic plea for the nature of his verse:

γενεή δικαίων ἦν τὸ πρῶτον ἀνθρώπων,
ὦ Βράγχε τέκνον, ἦν καλοῦσι χρυσεῖην,
μεθ' ἦν γενέσθαι φασὶν ἀργυρῇν ἄλλην·
τρίτη δ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἔσμεν ἡ σιδηρεῖη.
ἐπὶ τῆς δὲ χρυσῆς καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν ζώων
φωνὴν ἔναρθρον εἶχε καὶ λόγους ἥιδει
οἷους περ ἡμεῖς μυθέομεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους,
ἀγοραὶ δὲ τούτων ἦσαν ἐν μέσαις ὕλαις.
ἐλάλει δὲ πεύκη καὶ τὰ φύλλα τῆς δάφνης,
καὶ πλωτὸς ἰχθὺς συνελάλει φίλῳ ναύτηι,
στρουθοὶ δὲ συνετὰ πρὸς γεωργὸν ὠμίλουν.
ἐφύετ' ἐκ γῆς πάντα μηδὲν αἰτούσης,
θνητῶν δ' ὑπῆρχε καὶ θεῶν ἔταιρείη.
μάθοις ἂν οὕτω ταῦτ' ἔχοντα καὶ γνοίης
ἐκ τοῦ σοφοῦ γέροντος ἦμιν Αἰσώπου
μύθους φράσαντος τῆς ἐλευθέρης μοῦσης·
ὦν νῦν ἕκαστον ἀνθίσας ἐμῇ μνήμῃ
μελισταγές σοι λωτοκηρίον θήσω,
πικρῶν ἰάμβων σκληρὰ κῶλα θηλύνας.

(Babrius, *Proem* 1 (Perry))

First of all, Branchus my child, there was a race of just men, which men call Golden, and after that they say there was another race, a Silver one; we, the Iron race, are the third in succession. In the Golden Age all the other animals as well had articulate speech and knew the words which we now speak to each other. They held assemblies in the midst of the forests; the pine-tree talked, as did the leaves of the laurel, and the swimming fish chatted to the friendly

sailor, and the sparrows spoke intelligibly with the farmer. Everything grew from the earth which asked for nothing, and mortals and gods enjoyed good society. That this was the situation you may learn and understand from the wise old Aesop, who told us fables in the free Muse [i.e. prose]. Each of these I will decorate in my own work and set before you a drippingly sweet honeycomb, having softened the hard limbs of bitter iambs.

Unfortunately, the text of this poem is very problematic.¹ I have reproduced here that of Perry 1965, which is principally based on a fourth-century AD papyrus (P. Bouriant 1), which clearly arose within the context of school education. The text of our principal manuscript of Babrius, a tenth-century codex bearing corrections by Demetrius Triclinius, offers however a very different text, and one which has often been thought to be lacunose; the most important difference between the two recensions is that the text of the manuscript seems to present five ages in the canonical Hesiodic order, rather than just the three suggested by the papyrus text.² On general grounds, we might think it more likely that attempts would be made within the course of transmission to restore Hesiodic normality, rather than to remove it, but for our present purposes what is most important is the simple fact of Babrius' adoption of a 'Hesiodic' voice at the start of his collection. Babrius was certainly not the first to run together the Hesiodic Golden Age under Kronos with the 'once upon a time' setting of fable in which animals could converse with men and with each other, but

¹ The issues and the rival texts are set out clearly in Vaio 2001: 1–15. It is, however, worth noting that Vaio is not strictly accurate in reporting (p. 4) that Aratus and Antipater of Thessalonica 'reduce the number of ages to three (Gold, Silver, and Bronze) instead of five', though it is in fact the case that the majority of post-Hesiodic accounts of the metallic races offer patterns of three or four metals (cf. Most 1997: 105–6). Aratus has three races, with Dike leaving the earth in the bronze race, but this does not mean that we are to assume that we ourselves are living in the Bronze Age; indeed Aratus' language strongly suggests that 'the race of those men' (*Phain.* 133) belongs to the past; the joke in Antipater, *AP* 5.31 (= CXII G-P) certainly does not imply a reduction in the Hesiodic canon, and cf. also Bion of Borysthenes fr. 78 Kindstrand. Maximus of Tyre 36 offers a comparison between the plentiful life of the first men and current life, a comparison 'of one life with another, the later (δεύτερον) with the earlier, whether one wants to call the later "iron" or anything else'. For helpful surveys of the difficulties posed by the Babrian corpus cf. Perry 1965: lv–lxvi, Jedrkiewicz 1989: 28–30.

² The manuscript text is given preference over the papyrus in the Teubner edition of Luzzatto and La Penna (1986).

Babrius has very particular reasons for recalling the Boeotian poet. Hesiod was often regarded in antiquity as the first fabulist (cf. below) and, as we shall see, the first part of the *Works and Days*, which contains the Myth of Races, could be constructed as itself a series of fables strung together; moreover, close links with Hesiod spring up everywhere in Aesopic traditions. The present chapter will explore some of these links.

Babrius was certainly no ‘illiterate storyteller’.³ As, for example, has long been noted, the choliambic fables of Callimachus (*Iambus* 2, ‘It was the age in which the winged creature and the one in the sea and the four-legged one spoke just the same as the clay of Prometheus ...’, and 4, ‘the laurel, the olive and the thorn-tree’) were an important model for Babrius. The fable was one element of archaic iambic well suited to a Callimachean project which teasingly renounced frontal personal attack (‘an *iambos* singing not of battle’ fr. 191.3 Pf.) in favour of a more indirect mode of correction; the story, which could certainly be called an αἶνος, of the cup of Bathycles in the programmatic *Iambus* 1 is an educative story from the world of the Seven Sages which carries a lesson (or ‘moral’) for its audience, if only they will hear it,⁴ and Aesop and his fables too belong to that world and that form of instruction.⁵ Babrius follows Callimachus in claiming to have softened the bitterness traditionally associated with iambs, but whereas in *Iambus* 2 Callimachus names Aesop as his source (fr. 192.15 Pf.), to use him

³ On Babrius’ allusions to earlier poetry and his mixed diction cf. Luzzatto 1975. Williams 1981 argues that v. 7 of Babrius’ prologue (in the version of the papyrus) picks up Plato, *Politicus* 272c6–8.

⁴ That lesson was obviously to do with putting aside pointless *eris*, cf. the very broken end of the *Diegesis* (Pfeiffer 1949: 1163).

⁵ For Hesiod and the Seven Sages cf. above p. 30. On Callimachus’ fables see Acosta-Hughes 2002: 152–204, Glauthier 2009, Scodel 2011. Sistakou 2009: 228–32 makes an interesting case for a Hesiodic voice in Callimachus’ *Iambi*, though some of the examples adduced might just as well be called ‘Aesopic’. Particularly noteworthy in this connection is *Iambus* 3, which begins with a lament for the time in which the speaker is living, ‘Lord Apollo, I wish I was alive when I was not alive ...’, cf. *WD* 174–5; the *Diegesis* reports that the poet ‘criticises the age as being one of wealth rather than virtue (ἀρετή), and approves the previous ages which held the opposite values’. The ‘Hesiodic’ flavour of this is very suggestive, and it would accord with all that we think we know about the *Iambi* that the poem would open with a position and a voice familiar from the poetic tradition and then move on in different, new directions.

‘as a fig-leaf distancing the speaker from his tale, the poet from his poem’,⁶ Babrius’ acknowledgement of ‘wise old Aesop’ involves no such ironic games: Callimachus’ poem clearly contains elements that would not have appeared in any Aesopic fable known to Callimachus and his audience, whereas Babrius assigns all his material, as opposed to the form in which it is to appear, to the ancient fabulist. As for Babrius’ debt elsewhere to Hesiod, *Myth.* 58 is a fable version of Hesiod’s Pandora story (cf. below), and *Myth.* 33, a clever farmer’s ruse to protect his seed from the birds, begins with an echo of two passages of the *Works and Days*, including one of the most famous of all:

δυσμαὶ μὲν ἦσαν Πλειάδων, σπόρου δ’ ὥρη,
καὶ τις γεωργὸς πυρὸν εἰς νεὸν ρίψας
ἐφύλασσεν ἐστῶς· καὶ γὰρ ἄκριτον πλήθει
μέλαν κολοιῶν ἔθνος ἦλθε δυσφώνων
ψᾶρές τ’ ὄλεθρος σπερμάτων ἀρουραίων. 5
τῷ δ’ ἠκολούθει σφενδόνην ἔχων κοίλην
παιδίσκος. (Babrius 33. 1–7 Perry)

It was the setting of the Pleiades, the time for sowing. A farmer had cast the wheat-seed on the fallow ground and stood by guarding it, for a dark swarm of ill-sounding jays, countless in number, had come, along with starlings, the plague of seed in the fields. A boy with an empty slingshot followed him.

Πληιάδων Ἀτλαγενέων ἐπιτελλομένων
ἄρχεσθ’ ἀμήτου, ἀρότοιο δὲ δυσσομένων.
(Hesiod, *Works and Days* 383–4)

When the Pleiades, children of Atlas, rise, begin the harvest, and the ploughing when they set.

ὁ δὲ τυτθὸς ὀπισθε
δμῳὸς ἔχων μακέλην πόνον ὀρνίθεσσι τιθεῖν 470
σπέρμα κατακρύπτων
(Hesiod, *Works and Days* 469–71⁷)

Let a small slave-boy follow behind with a mattock to make trouble for the birds by hiding the seed.

⁶ Kerkhecker 1999: 62.

⁷ Babrius’ παιδίσκος, who only has to carry a sling, not a heavy mattock, may pick up τυτθὸς...δμῳὸς in Hesiod, where West and Most accept Schaefer’s τυτθόν; Lucian, *Hesiod* 7 paraphrases the passage with θεράπων.

The conditions which prevail in Babrius' Golden Age – talking animals, ἑταιρεία between men and gods – combine details of Hesiod's Golden Age in the time of Kronos with the world of Aesop painted by Callimachus in *Iambus* 2, but we may also be reminded of the opening of the Hesiodic *Catalogue of Women*, which tells of the time when gods and heroes mingled freely,

ξυναὶ γὰρ τότε δαΐτες ἔσαν, ξυνοὶ δὲ θόωκοι
ἀθανάτοις τε θεοῖσι καταθνητοῖς τ' ἀνθρώποις.
(Hesiod fr. 1.6–7 M-W)

Common then were the feastings, common too the councils for the immortal gods and mortal men.

Here then is another Hesiodic past put to the service of fable. Babrius may even have sought to reproduce a detail of the Hesiodic Golden Age which was to have very significant consequences in the poetic tradition. In Hesiod, the earth at that time gave forth abundant crops αὐτομάτη, 'of its own accord':

ἔσθλα δὲ πάντα
τοῖσιν ἔην· καρπὸν δ' ἔφερε ξείδωρος ἄρουρα
αὐτομάτη πολλόν τε καὶ ἄφθονον· οἳ δ' ἔθελημοὶ
ἥσυχoi ἔργ' ἐνέμοντο σὺν ἔσθλοῖσιν πολέεσσιν.
(Hesiod, *Works and Days* 116–19)

Men enjoyed all good things. The generous earth produced crops of its own accord, in unstinting abundance; without constraints and undisturbed they made use of their fields in the midst of great bounty.

The meaning of these verses is much disputed (no great weight is to be attached to the translation offered here). Wilamowitz and West note that ἔργ' ἐνέμοντο is inevitably suggestive of agriculture, which might seem inappropriate in the context. Alternative interpretations have been offered,⁸ but it may be that

⁸ The Proclan scholia (fr. 74 Marzillo) seem to gloss the phrase as ἀπέλαυνον τῶν γινόμενων, and this is broadly followed by Verdenius and Ercolani ad loc., citing Homeric parallels; Most's 'shared out the fruits of their labors' is perhaps as ambiguous as the Greek. One may wonder how much difference μεμηλότα makes in the apparently parallel phrase in the later description of the Just City, μεμηλότα ἔργα νέμονται (v. 231), and what looks like a Theocritean reworking of this description, λαοὶ δ' ἔργα περιστέλλουσιν ἔκηλοι, 'undisturbed [by attacks], his people tend their fields', of the bountiful Egyptian countryside under Ptolemy Philadelphus (Theocritus 17.97), can hardly settle the matter.

we have too readily assumed, in part under the influence of famous later reworkings of the Hesiodic Golden Age, that the bounty of an earth acting αὐτομάτη and ‘working the fields’ ἐθελήμοι | ἥσυχοι were for Hesiod entirely incompatible. The earth’s bounty requires harvesting, after all, and that involves ‘work’ in the fields. This would, of course, be a very different kind of work than men of the present day are forced to pursue, and it may indeed be that the absence of constraint is what is crucial here; ἐθελήμοι might well be understood as ‘of their own will’,⁹ and such an interpretation would also fit Callimachus’ sole use of this adjective (*Hymn to Artemis* 31).¹⁰ Most other Golden Age descriptions which use this αὐτομάτη motif and related ideas are much more explicit than Hesiod about the absence of agriculture (cf. Homer, *Odyssey* 9.107–11, Plato, *Politicus* 272a, Ovid, *Met.* 1.101–2, 109–10),¹¹ but Hesiod’s own account is, or could readily be taken to be, ‘impressionistic’ at best; Aratus’ Golden Age, in which ‘cattle and ploughs and Justice herself, queen of the people and giver of just deserts, provided all things in countless bounty’ (*Phainomena* 112–13) would then be seen to be in less absolute contradiction with Hesiod than is normally assumed. Be that as it may, Babrius’ juxtaposition in his opening poem of the γεωργός to the fact that ‘everything grew from the earth which asked for nothing (μηδὲν αἰτούσης)’¹² may then be seen to reproduce an apparent

⁹ Cf. Reinsch-Werner 1976: 117–20.

¹⁰ Hesychius ε 641 glosses ἐθελήμοι as πρόθυμοι, doubtless with reference to *WD* 118, and West takes this as the sense in Callimachus also; ‘of one’s own accord’ suits that passage rather better, however, and is the sense accepted by Bornmann ad loc. Verdenius takes the meaning in Hesiod as ‘content’, but does not explain how the word comes to mean that. At Apollonius, *Arg.* 2.655–7, which clearly echo *WD* 118–19, ἐθελήμος may carry some of the weight of both Hesiodic adjectives, so ‘paisiblement’ (Vian); Matteo 2007 ad loc. translates ‘spensierato’, but accepts ‘volontario’ in Callimachus.

¹¹ There is a rich supply of passages in Bömer’s note on Ovid, *Met.* 1.101–12.

¹² The implications of μηδὲν αἰτούσης are perhaps unclear: is it that, in the Golden Age, there is no sense of reciprocity between man and the land, as the land ‘gives’ everything but requires nothing, such as ‘being cared for’, in return? For the importance of agricultural reciprocity in later reworkings of Hesiod cf. above pp. 67–9. I have wondered whether *immunis* of the earth at Ovid, *Met.* 1.101 conveys something of this same idea, ‘not receiving any *munus*’; at Virgil, *Ecl.* 4.18 the earth pours forth its own *munuscula* without receiving anything back (*nullo cultu*), and particularly

uncertainty within the Hesiodic model text,¹³ but one with significance for his own Aesopic project: γεωργοί and agriculture are prominent throughout the Babrian collection, and indeed throughout our corpus of Aesopic fables.

Babrius sets before us ‘a comb dripping with honey, after I have softened [literally ‘feminised’] the hard units of bitter iambs’. The text of v. 18 is unfortunately quite uncertain,¹⁴ but part at least of the general sense seems clear enough. We may recall the description of Erinna’s *Distaff* in a (probably) Hellenistic epigram as ‘a honeycomb, a small thing of sweetness, mixed throughout with the honey of the Muses’ (*Anth. Pal.* 190 = *FGE* 38 = Erinna T 7 Neri), or κηρία, ‘honeycombs’, as a title for miscellaneous anthologies (Aulus Gellius, *praef.* 6, Pliny, *HN praef.* 24), but Babrius also has specific literary traditions in mind.¹⁵ The ‘sweet-bitter’ contrast points, as we have seen, to his rejection of the abusive iambic tradition, associated with Hipponax, the ‘founder’ of choliambic poetry, but ‘sweetness’ (γλυκύτης) is also connected, in the system of rhetorical styles particularly associated with Hermogenes of Tarsus, with fable.¹⁶ Not only are μῦθοι ‘sweet’ for Hermogenes (330–1 Rabe), but a particular source of sweetness arises from assigning ‘what is proper to man’ to ‘irrational/speechless (ἄλογα) animals’ (335.8–23 Rabe), and this of course is the very basis of Aesopic fable, in which λόγος is indeed given to the normally ἄλογα. It comes as no surprise, then, to learn that the style of fable narrative should be ‘close to sweetness’ (3.16 Rabe).

close to Babrius in phrasing, though making the ‘opposite’ point is Virgil, *Georgics* 1.127–8 *ipsaque tellus / omnia liberius nullo poscente ferebat*. There may also here be a sexual resonance, in which agriculture is like procuring sexual favours from the earth of the kind which men often seek by offering gifts to women or for which women demand gifts; in the same Ovidian verse the earth is *immunis rastroque intacta*, and Maximus of Tyre contrasts the Golden Age in which the earth was μηδὲν ὑπὸ γεωργῶν ἐνοχλουμένη (36.1) with the current situation in which we act παρέχοντες τῇ γῇ πράγματα (36.2); both ἐνοχλεῖν and πράγματα παρέχειν are regularly used in the context of ‘sexual harassment’.

¹³ A similar point is made by Immisch 1930: 163. ¹⁴ Cf. Vaio 2001: 14–15.

¹⁵ The fullest discussion is Luzzatto 1985, who notes (inter alia) that the final verse of the prologue seems to claim metrical and rhythmical innovations for Babrius (so also Rutherford ad loc.).

¹⁶ Cf. Luzzatto 1985: 120–4.

‘Sweetness’ is also a marked characteristic of Hesiodic poetry, within the rather impressionistic categories of ancient stylistics,¹⁷ and here Babrius has again chosen with his eye on a critical tradition which tended to draw Hesiod together with the popular levels of Aesopic fable. In the ancient view, the style of the *Works and Days* shares with the tradition of fables a ‘simplicity and naturalness’ (τὸ ἀπλοῦν καὶ τὸ αὐτοφυές), which the Proclan proemium asserts to be appropriate for ‘ethical discourse’, just as Aelius Theon notes that the style of fables must be ἀπλουστέρα καὶ προσφυής (74.11–12 Sp.);¹⁸ so too, Proclus notes that the *Works and Days* is ‘for the most part free of beautifying effects and added ornamentation and metaphors’, i.e. it is in some ways close to prose, just as Theon marks the appropriate style for fables as ‘as far as possible, undecorated (ἀκατάσκευον) and clear’ (74.12–13 Sp.). Such judgements are, of course, connected with the (somewhat different) educational roles assigned both to the *Works and Days* and to fables, but they also reinforce the links between these two didactic modes: what matters above all is what is said, not how it is said. Just, however, as Lucretius (1.933–50 ~ 4.8–25) saw the poetical qualities of his work as the ‘honey on the cup’, which was both to help the bitter medicine go down and hold his audience’s attention on his verses (*animum... tenere* | *uersibus in nostris*), so Proclus notes that, in Hesiod, ‘metre is added, like a spice (ἡδυσμα), to the [educational] purpose of the expression, charming the souls [of the audience] and holding firm (κατέχον) their affection for the poem’ (*Proem* Ab Pertusi = fr. 1.13–15 Marzillo). In both cases, of course, we see reflections of a standard ancient view of ‘didactic’ poetry: what matters is content. For Aristotle, for example, Empedocles was not a poet (*Poetics* 1447b18–20), and for Plutarch (or one of his characters), Hesiod was a philosopher, as were Orpheus, Parmenides, Xenophanes and Empedocles (*Moralia* 402f). In *How to Study Poetry* Plutarch notes that ‘Empedocles and Parmenides and

¹⁷ Cf. below pp. 286–9.

¹⁸ Nicolaus, *Progymn.* 11.3–10 Felten (= *Aesopica* T 104 Perry) gives the same account; Perry 1962: 343–6 argues that this stylistic demand goes back to Demetrius of Phalerum.

Nicander and Theognis' have borrowed metre and grandeur from poetry, as a chariot in which 'to flee the pedestrian' (16c–d). These two levels which ancient criticism saw within 'didactic' poetry are now mapped by Babrius' prologue: the dripping honey-sweetness of his verse will play Lucretius' 'sweet honey of the Muses' to the wisdom of Aesop's Epicurus. If Epicurean philosophy was not usually offered to the *pueri* of Lucretius' famous image (1.936–9 ~ 4.11–14), then Aesopic fables certainly were, whatever view we may take of Babrius' own audience; that Babrius was familiar with Lucretius' poem is of course by no means impossible, though no hard argument for direct allusion seems available, particularly given the very familiarity of such 'honey' language.¹⁹

From Aesop one will learn, writes Babrius, that 'this is how things were'; the apparently tautologous μάθοις...καὶ γνοίης (v. 14) carries an important point: not just that Aesop has supplied the raw matter of the poetry, but that this is where one goes for a clear and complete account. Babrius lays no personal claim to the subject matter of his poetry. What he has done rather is to add the honey of poetry to that material; ἀνθίσας, 'adorning, colouring', precisely suggests the decorative layer 'added on top', as Proclus describes the role of metre in the *Works and Days*. In the second prologue, Babrius repeats and extends this idea: he has decorated Aesopic myth in gold,²⁰ so it is now dressed up like a warhorse (vv. 7–8). In claiming originality for a poetic mode, Babrius also turns to another programmatic trope – he, like Horace (*Epistles* 1.19.19–20), has imitators of his innovations:

ὑπ' ἐμοῦ δὲ πρώτου τῆς θύρης ἀνοιχθείσης
εἰσῆλθον ἄλλοι, καὶ σοφωτέρης μούσης
γρίφοις ὁμοίαις ἐκφέρουσι ποιήσεις,
μαθόντες οὐδὲν πλεῖον ἢ ἢ μὲ γινώσκειν.
ἐγὼ δὲ λευκῇ μυθιάζομαι ῥήσει,

10

¹⁹ If Babrius was thinking partly of Lucretius, then πικρῶν ἰαμβῶν will have a further particular point, cf. Lucretius' *absinthia taetra*. With Babrius' language Luzzatto and La Penna in the Teubner edition compare Pliny's praise for the honey-sweetness of his correspondent's Greek epigrams and (interestingly) *mimiambi* at *Epist.* 4.3.3.

²⁰ The text is again uncertain.

Aesop and Hesiod

καὶ τῶν ἱάμβων τοὺς ὀδόντας οὐ θήγω,
ἀλλ' εὖ πυρώσας, εὖ δὲ κέντρα πρηύνας,
ἐκ δευτέρου σοι τήνδε βίβλον ἀείδω.

(Babrius, Part II *praef.* 9–16 Perry)

When the door had first been opened by me, others came in, and they bring out poems belonging to a more sophisticated muse, resembling riddles; they know nothing except how to follow my example. I tell my fables in a clear style; I do not sharpen the teeth of the iambs, but I have bent them in the fire²¹ and softened their stings, and now I sing you this second book.

If the transmitted text of v. 12 is correct,²² the framing μαθόντες... γινώσκειν recalls that of v. 14 of the first prologue to make a very sharp point: Aesop is where one should go to learn the truth from fable, but Babrius' imitators do not make that journey and have learned nothing; they simply rewrite in obscure verse 'like riddles', in comparison to Babrius' own 'white' (i.e. clear) style.²³ We may think of the epigrammatist Philip's dismissal of arcane scholarship, 'May I know works whose verse is clear (λευκόν), and let dark researches waste away the super-Callimachuses' (*Anth. Pal.* 11.346.5–6 = *GP* 2045–6),²⁴ but we might also think of the didactic tradition which came after, and claimed to imitate, Hesiod: where, for example, would a Nicander fit on the spectrum of clarity?

Hesiod and fable

The standard ancient 'school' definition of μῦθος, seen for example at the head of Theon's discussion (72.28 Sp.), was 'a false story presenting an image of truth' (λόγος ψευδῆς εἰκονίζων ἀλήθειαν); the famous claim of Hesiod's Muses that they know how to 'speak many false things which are like true ones'

²¹ This idea presumably matches the reference at the end of the first proem (above p. 227) to the σκληρὰ κῶλα of the iambs.

²² Rutherford and some other editors adopt Nauck's γεγωνίσκειν for με γινώσκειν.

²³ For what it is worth, the snippets of hexameters and elegiacs gathered from the *Suda* by Crusius 1897: 215–21 as fragments of poetic fables are indeed in a more elaborate style than we find in Babrius.

²⁴ Cf. also (so Luzzatto 1975: 68 n. 115) Antiphanes' dismissal of grammarians as 'Callimachus' bitter and harsh guard-dogs, the curse of poets, darkness (σκότος) to children who are beginning' (*Anth. Pal.* 11.322.4–5 = *GP* 774–5).

(*Theogony* 27) has not necessarily contributed to this definition, but behind it certainly stands a long history of critical negotiation, in which issues of truth and falsehood are never far away. In the *Republic* the Platonic Socrates introduces the discussion of the μῦθοι which children are to be permitted to hear at the earliest stage of their education by noting that there are two kinds of *logoi*, the true and the false (ψεῦδος), and that in the current system of education the first μῦθοι which children are told are ‘speaking generally, false, though there are elements of truth’ (*Rep.* 2.376e10–7a5).²⁵ What Socrates is referring to has been much debated,²⁶ but later at least, many ancient readers would have taken this as a clear reference to things such as Aesopic fables, which were indeed the first μῦθοι offered to children,²⁷ and in which Plato elsewhere shows himself more than a little interested (cf. *Phaedo* 60c–1b). In the *Republic*, however, Socrates proceeds to draw a distinction between ‘greater’ and ‘lesser’ μῦθοι (2.377c8–10) and to turn his attention wholly to the former, which turn out to be stories and speeches drawn from the poetry of ‘Hesiod and Homer and the other poets’, because ‘the lesser will be seen within the greater’; the greater μῦθοι above all need to be censored when ‘someone badly represents (εἰκάζει) in discourse the nature of gods and heroes, just as when a painter paints things which in no way resemble the things of which he wished to paint a likeness’ (2.377e1–3). The later school definition of μῦθος (above) is one of the many ways in which traditions of education and criticism came to terms with the Platonic critique.

Plato censors the stories that poets tell, particularly on subjects such as the gods and death, because they are untrue and because the children or young people to whom they are told lack the discrimination to see that and may therefore suffer irreparable moral damage. Antiquity devised ways of trying to deal with this, many of which are on show in Plutarch’s essay *How to Study Poetry*. As far as fables are concerned, Theon

²⁵ This seems to be the best way to understand the plural ἀληθῆ.

²⁶ Cf. the bibliography in Van Dijk 1997: 60; Murray 1996: 135–6 apparently takes the reference to be to Plato’s own myths, which is surely impossible.

²⁷ Cf. Hunter–Russell 2011: 72.

makes clear, immediately after the definition reproduced above, that any dangers were also easily averted:

A *mythos* is a false story presenting an image of truth. It must be stressed that the present discussion is not concerned with every *mythos*, but with those where, after the narrative (ἔκθεσις), we add the *logos* of which it is an image. Sometimes, however, we give the *logos* before we tell the *mythoi*. (Aelius Theon, *Progymnasmata* 72.28–73.1 Sp.)

Such a *logos* is plainly what we call ‘the moral’, the pithy summation of the lesson of the fable; these *epimythia* (or *promythia*) did not always travel with fables, and it is clear from the various surviving fable collections that they were often added, or indeed misapplied, by later readers. Nevertheless, Theon regards them as a defining characteristic of the μῦθοι relevant to that *progymnasma*, and here we can see how, at a very elementary level, the Platonic challenge was met. Children cannot misunderstand fables to their detriment, because the reference of the fable is spelled out for them, and what the fables offer is an image of ‘truth’.

One of the most interesting and sophisticated expansions of these ideas, and one which both embraces Plato and the scholastic reaction to Plato and links Hesiod to this discussion in tantalising ways, occurs in Philostratus’ *Life of Apollonius of Tyana*.²⁸ Philostratus tells how the great man and his followers reached the area of Mt Etna in Sicily, where the locals told them the story of the imprisoned giant responsible for the fire of the mountain, but the visitors themselves were eventually to reach explanations which were ‘more credible and appropriate to philosophers’ (5.14.1). Apollonius then brings the subject of conversation around to Aesop and the nature of fable; unlike poets, whose stories – as Plato too had amply demonstrated – nourish our unhealthy emotions, Aesop struck out on a different path:

‘In my view’, said Apollonius, ‘Aesop’s fables seem more suitable for philosophy... Like those who give excellent hospitality with cheaper food, Aesop teaches big lessons with small subjects, and when he has set forth his tale

²⁸ Some of what follows draws on Hunter 2007a: 47–8.

he adds “Do this” or “Don’t do this”. He was also a greater lover of truth than the poets. They force their stories into an appearance of plausibility, whereas he relates a story which everyone knows to be untrue, and tells the truth precisely by speaking about things which are not true. When a poet has told his story, he leaves it to a listener of sound instincts to test whether it happened or not, whereas the man who tells a false story, but adds instruction (νουθεσία) to it, as does Aesop, makes plain that he is using falsehood for the benefit of the listener. It is also charming that he makes animals more pleasant and worthy to be taken seriously by men . . . The poet says ‘Many are the shapes of divinity’ or some other such line and disappears, whereas Aesop pronounces his own moral and brings the story to its intended conclusion. (Philostratus, *Life of Apollonius* 5.14.2–3)

Aesop, we are told, makes quite clear what lesson is to be drawn from a fable (5.14.2–3), a clear reference to the *logoi* of Theon’s discussion, and makes no pretence that his fables are ‘true’, but rather uses fiction for the benefit of his audience, thus being ‘more devoted to truth than the poets’; moreover, Aesop is a ‘charming’ story-teller as well (5.14.3).²⁹ Apollonius’ account here seems to reflect many strands of ancient thinking about types of narrative, not least the Aristotelian distinction between history and philosophy (*Poetics* 1451b1–19) and the subsequent rhetorical division into ἱστορία, πλάσμα, and μῦθος, but in the present context it may be helpful to view this passage as putting Aesop back into the discussion of poetry in *Republic* 2, where he had been passed over in loud silence;³⁰ for Plato’s ‘greater’ *mythoi* Philostratus’ Apollonius substitutes ‘*mythoi* of the more dramatic kind and the ones which poets trot out’ (5.16.1). As in Plato, what is rejected lies within the realm of poetry, and the particular example chosen, the giant imprisoned beneath Mt Etna for an impious attack upon the Olympians, is the very stuff of Hesiodic ‘myth’, that is of the Hesiod of the *Theogony*.

After his disquisition about the philosophical nature of Aesopic fable, Apollonius proceeds to tell an aetiological fable

²⁹ The language of χάρις might remind us of the Platonic Protagoras’ claim that it will be χαριέστερον to tell a μῦθος rather than a λόγος (*Prt.* 320c6).

³⁰ On the ‘occlusion of prose story-telling’ in *Republic* 2 cf. further Kurke 2011: 248–9; Philostratus seems also to have felt this absence.

about the origin of fable, which he claims to have learned at his mother's knee (5.15): Aesop was a shepherd of down-to-earth common sense, who frequently prayed for *sophia* at a nearby shrine of Hermes, offering the god the humble gifts which were all he had – some milk, a honeycomb, a few flowers – whereas others, who also came to ask for *sophia*, were able to afford very costly offerings. When the day for divine distribution arrived,³¹ Hermes made his allotment in accord with the lavishness of the gifts he had received – first philosophy, then rhetoric, then astronomy, music, epic poetry, iambic poetry and so forth, until there was no part of *sophia* left for Aesop. Hermes then, however, remembered how the Hours who had nursed him as a baby used to tell him a *muthos* about a talking cow, and it was this story which had inspired his desire for Apollo's cows (and was thus, so we are to understand, in some sense responsible for the high status on Olympus which he enjoyed); as a result, he gave Aesop *muthologia*, 'the first thing which I learned'. If Aesop, tending his sheep near a shrine of Hermes and rewarded by the god with μυθολογία, inevitably suggests the Hesiod of the proem of the *Theogony*, tending his lambs 'under holy Helicon' and granted αὐδὴ θεσπιδ by the Muses,³² it is remarkable that what is here rejected is a Hesiodic tradition, the cosmic poetry of the *Theogony*, and even more remarkable that it is rejected in favour of another 'Hesiodic' mode, namely Aesopic fable. If the proem of the *Theogony* tells of the invention of 'the great tradition', of poetry about 'what is to come and what was before ... the race of the blessed ones who are forever, and the Muses first and last' (*Theogony* 32–4), Philostratus' Apollonius gives us the *aition* of the 'the little tradition', as also does the bucolic scene of Isis' favour to Aesop in the *Life of Aesop*.³³ The two traditions are structurally parallel: the Muses grant Hesiod the power to do on earth what they themselves do among the

³¹ Such distribution is itself, of course, a familiar 'fable' motif, one often associated with Prometheus.

³² For the Hesiodic flavour of Aesop's other 'initiation', the granting of a voice in the *Life of Aesop*, cf. below pp. 259–60.

³³ Cf. below p. 259.

gods (cf. *Theogony* 38, 44–52),³⁴ and Hermes allows Aesop to become the mortal *πρῶτος εὐρετής* of a ‘genre’ already practised on Olympus. We might be tempted by this passage of Philostratus to a strong reading in which Hesiod in the *Theogony* claims to be the first poet of theogonic song, not just a specially inspired one; although Orpheus regularly came before Hesiod in the ancient canon of archaic poets, it was Hesiod who was the tangible presence who ranked with Homer, and it is at any rate not an obviously silly reading of the *Theogony* passage that the Muses address mankind in general, ‘shepherds of the field, grim wretches, mere bellies...’, and single out Hesiod for the (? originary) gift of song.

After this ‘Aesopic digression’, Apollonius returns to the matter in hand and produces an explanation for volcanoes drawn from natural science, to set against the common mythical ones; science, a part of philosophy, has now replaced allegorical myth as the mode in which ‘truth’ is (to be) presented. Aesop’s fables are untrue, but beneficial (5.14.3 *ἐς τὸ χρησιμον τῆς ἀκρόσεως*) and, if properly understood, fashion us into beings ready for philosophy; the Plutarch of *How to Study Poetry* would certainly have agreed. It matters less in the present context that Apollonius here echoes standard ancient judgements about Aesopic fable (cf., e.g., *Aesopica* T 1 Perry) or that he himself is here fashioned as a kind of Aesop – almost immediately afterwards it is reported that Apollonius, like Aesop, ‘always ended his *logoi* with valuable injunctions’, 5.17 – than that his judgement on Aesop, that ‘he teaches big lessons from small things’ (5.14.2), could with equal truth have been said (and perhaps was) of the Hesiod of the *Works and Days*.

For many critics in antiquity (cf., e.g., Quintilian 5.11.19, Plutarch, *Symposium of the Seven Sages* 158b), Hesiod was indeed the first fabulist, and the ‘hawk and the nightingale’ of *WD* 202–12 the first fable; moreover, that this fable is explicitly told to βασιλεῖς, i.e. the powerful, who will understand it

³⁴ It is noteworthy that Hesiod picks out the Giants as objects of the Muses’ song alongside the Olympians: it is stories of Giants which are indeed at issue in Philostratus. On the idea of ‘the little tradition’ applied to Aesop cf. Kurke 2011: 7–9.

(v. 202), has been very important in modern attempts to understand how and why fables are used in society and literature, just as it was influential in how the ancients theorised and used fables.³⁵ From a modern perspective, however, the ‘hawk and the nightingale’ is in fact a very unusual fable, if set against the vast majority of those which survive in later collections.³⁶ It seems to begin *in mediis rebus*, without any explanatory narrative,³⁷ one apparently demanded by the hawk’s reference in v. 210 to ‘setting oneself against one’s betters’, as though the *basileis*, ‘who themselves understand’ (v. 202), will know this *ainos* already and ‘get the message’.³⁸ Moreover, the apparent ‘moral’ delivered by the hawk in vv. 210–11, however familiar its message is in fables from later collections, seems one hardly likely to cause the *basileis* any sleepless nights, unless it is then read (as many modern critics do read it) in the light of the protreptic material which follows concerning ὕβρις and δίκη; animals live by ‘might is right’, but men have δίκη (cf. the very similar sequence of thought, almost recapping vv. 202–24, in vv. 274–85).³⁹ This fable, then, is not complete in itself, as

³⁵ Within the Hesiodic text, however, it is obviously important that the oracular and in many respects ‘grand’ Myth of the Races is told to the foolish Perses, whereas the ‘understanding’ βασιλεῖς receive the popular form of a fable.

³⁶ Some of the oddity is well set out by Daly 1961. Some modern discussion has stressed that it may be dangerous to assume that the ‘hawk and the nightingale’ is a variety of ‘fable’, as that term is normally understood, as αἶνος can cover a range of modes of ‘figured speech’; it is, however, the fable tradition which best explains how the αἶνος functions within the Hesiodic text, and – odd though the shape of this αἶνος undoubtedly is – it looks like nothing so much as a fable. For Archilochus’ possible use of the ‘hawk and the nightingale’ cf. Irwin 1998.

³⁷ Contrast, for example, Archilochus fr. 174 W which seems to give us the narrative beginning of ‘the fox and the eagle’. In this structure it is often rightly compared to PMG 892, ‘the crab and the snake’, which also seems to assume a narrative (cf. *Aesopica* 196 Perry) which would clarify the reference, beyond the snake’s shape, to ‘straightforward’ and ‘crooked’; an important difference, however, is that the ‘moral’ uttered by the crab is entirely in keeping with the sympotic values of the context in which the song would have been performed (the thought finds very many parallels in, say, Theognis), whereas the ‘moral’ delivered by the Hesiodic hawk is not.

³⁸ Theon in fact commends this technique of ‘beginning from the middle’ for pupils (74.15–23 Sp.); he notes that v. 210 makes clear that the nightingale has competed (ἡρίκεν) with the hawk, which has then got angry. This view is accepted by many modern interpreters, and the contest is often assumed to have been one of song; for discussion and bibliography cf. Dalfen 1994/5, Mordine 2006, Steiner 2007, 2012, Ercolani 2010: 204–6.

³⁹ On WD 272–85 cf. Gagné 2010.

fables in literature usually are. Aristarchus' athetesis of vv. 210–11 on the grounds, as reported by the Proclan scholia, that 'it would not be appropriate for an animal (ἄλογον) to utter *gnômai* (γνωμολογεῖν)' is, as West puts it, 'a little surprising', but helps to point up one of the most important and distinctive things about this fable. Whether or not Hesiod and his audience were familiar with fables to which 'morals' or *epimythia* were added in the voice of the narrator or poet, as became regular in the fable collections of the imperial age, Hesiod does not offer this moral in his own voice and therefore withholds any confirming authority from it; if we stress, as both ancient and modern readers have, the quasi-identification between the nightingale and the poet (both ἄοιδοί), then the 'moral' is in fact delivered by a voice directly opposed to that of the poet. Like very many fables in the later collections, then, the 'hawk and the nightingale' may accurately suggest 'the world as it is', but anyone paying any attention to the *Works and Days* up to this point would indeed recognise that the poetic voice of the poem would not endorse this as a statement of the way things *should* be. The poet's own voice returns with renewed urgency in the explicit address to Perses at the head of v. 213, and there is an obviously pointed contrast between the use to the *basileis* of a potentially misleading animal fable requiring interpretation and the straightforward warning of the 'fable' of Oath and Justice (cf. below) which the poet addresses immediately afterwards to Perses. If the *Works and Days* were a later text, then we would certainly see in Hesiod's use of the fable form a sophisticated variation away from a standard model; this observation is less an indictment of critical assumptions than a rueful reminder of what the absence of pre-Hesiodic texts does to our understanding.

In noting that Aesop was not the 'first inventor' of fables, because 'Homer and Hesiod and Archilochus and some others who were older than [Aesop] clearly knew [fables]' (73.16–18 Sp.),⁴⁰ Theon seems to be choosing his words carefully.

⁴⁰ Homer, Hesiod and Archilochus are also named as having been 'concerned with fable' at Philostratus, *Imag.* 1.3 [= *Aesopica* T 52 Perry].

Modern scholars, on the other hand, have stressed the apparent absence of fable from the Homeric poems and sought explanations in the obviously tight parameters which Homer drew around his epic world and/or in an unwillingness to blur the force of the similes, many of which contain 'fable-like' elements. Nevertheless, ancient scholars did not find it difficult to find intimations of *muthos* of an Aesopic kind in Homer. When Achilles' horse addresses its master, some scholars at least saw Homer at the head of a line of the creators of speaking animals: 'First Homer did this, then Hesiod with the hawk, Archilochus with the eagle, and later Aesop' (Schol. T *Iliad* 19.407c); in *Iliad* 22, Achilles rejects any pacts with Hector because there can be no 'trustworthy oaths between lions and men' (22.262), and the scholia note that 'from here Aesop fashioned the fable about lions and men'. Of particular interest is the famous passage of *Iliad* 24 in which Achilles tells Priam of the two (or, in some interpretations, three) jars which sit on Zeus's floor and from which men, if they are lucky, draw a mixture of good and evil (24.527–30); the scholia trace here the origin of Hesiod's 'fable of Pandora's jar', just as the scholia on *WD* 94 infer from the sudden introduction of a jar in Hesiod's account that Homer came before Hesiod, allowing Hesiod to assume knowledge of the jar story.⁴¹ So too, Eustathius places the Homeric jars within an educational context, which is indeed where fables were most at home: Achilles had had very good teachers, Cheiron, Phoenix and Peleus, and here 'tells a new *logos*' (λογοποιοῦντά τι καινότερον), which he has either made up (πλασάμενον) himself or has taken from the educational tradition (*Hom.* 1362.39–42). When in *Republic* 2 Plato outlaws the Homeric passage about the jars, Socrates says that 'we must not accept it either from Homer or another poet' (2.379c9–d1), and it is perhaps not unlikely that he is thinking of the affinity between this passage and Hesiod's jar. In any case, Hesiod's Pandora-story is replete with motifs which we find in our

⁴¹ Cf. below p. 247 n. 46. Similar scholarly lore will lie behind [Plutarch], *Consolation to Apollonius* 105 c–e where the two 'jar passages' are juxtaposed and it is explicitly stated that Hesiod was later in time than Homer.

later collections of fables – the gods fashioning man, an important role for Prometheus (cf. further below), the presence of ills across the world, even what looks like a ‘moral’ (v. 105) – and this major part of the first half of the *Works and Days* will have brought Hesiod and Aesop as close together as did the ‘hawk and the nightingale’.⁴²

In *Fable* 274 Perry the unhappy human lot is explained in recognisably Hesiodic terms:

The good things were weak and so were chased by the bad things and went up to heaven. The good things asked Zeus how they should associate with men.⁴³ He told them not all to keep company with each other, but to go to men one by one. For this reason constant evils are always close at home to visit men, but good things descend more slowly from heaven. (*Aesopica*, Fab. 274 Perry)

The message is related both to that which Achilles gives Priam and to that of the Hesiodic Pandora-story, though with the complications of both of those *mythoi* removed. We may compare Babrius 63 in which the object of a hero-cult tells a house-owner that no hero can give him anything good, because all they have to offer are the bad things which live among men – it is the gods who have the good. That ‘good things’ abandon earth for heaven is a motif related to *WD* 197–201, in which Hesiod foresees the abandonment of the earth in favour of Olympus by Αἰδώς and Νέμεσις, leaving behind for men only ἄλγεα λυγρά; already a poem in the Theognidean corpus combines this motif with elements of the Pandora-mythos (Theognis 1135–50).⁴⁴ In Babrius 126 (~ *Aesopica*, fab. 355 Perry) a man on a journey in the desert comes across Truth and asks her why she has abandoned the city for the desert; ‘because’, she replied, ‘among men of old only a few told lies, but now this has spread among all mankind’. Such a halfway house, in which Truth has left the centres of population but not utterly abandoned the earth, may remind us of Aratus’ Dike, another Hesiodic being, for whom the mountains

⁴² On the *Nachleben* of the Pandora-story cf. Musäus 2004.

⁴³ There is some uncertainty about text and interpretation here.

⁴⁴ Cf. above pp. 133–9.

(a kind of structural equivalent of the desert) acted as home during the degenerate Silver Age, before she finally abandoned the earth in the Bronze Age. If Aratus' dependence upon Hesiod is clear, the relationship between Hesiod and the fable tradition is much less clear and clean. On any view of the 'origin' of fables in Greek tradition, Hesiod has both exploited a popular mode of moralising, but also himself fed back into that tradition, a contribution constantly acknowledged by allusion and evocation in later texts; by mining Hesiod extensively, the subsequent fable tradition retrospectively constructs much of the *Works and Days* as indeed built out of fables.

A clear case of 'literary' imitation of Hesiod within the fable tradition, but also of the construction of Hesiod as a 'fabulist', is Babrius 58:

Ζεὺς ἐν πίθῳ τὰ χρηστὰ πάντα συλλέξας
 ἔθηκεν αὐτὸν πωμάσας παρ' ἀνθρώπῳ.
 ὁ δ' ἀκρατὴς ἀνθρώπος εἰδέναι σπεύδων
 τί ποτ' ἦν ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ τὸ πῶμα κινήσας,
 διίηκ' ἀπελθεῖν αὐτὰ πρὸς θεῶν οἴκους,
 κἀκεῖ πέτεσθαι τῆς τε γῆς ἄνω φεύγειν.
 μόνη δ' ἔμεινεν ἐλπίς, ἣν κατελήφει
 τεθὲν τὸ πῶμα. τοιγὰρ ἐλπίς ἀνθρώποις
 μόνη σύνεστι τῶν πεφευγόντων ἡμᾶς
 ἀγαθῶν ἕκαστον ἐγγυωμένη δώσειν.

5

(Babrius 58 Perry)

Zeus gathered together all good things in a jar, placed a lid on it, and deposited it with a man. The man could not control himself in his eagerness to know what on earth was inside, and so he opened the lid and let the good things depart to the dwellings of the gods, and there they fly and escape us, high above the earth. Only hope remained, as this was caught when the lid was put back. Therefore only hope remains among men, pledging to give us each of the good things which have fled from us.

In keeping with the structure of fables and with the fable-motifs we have just examined, Babrius' narrative, which may of course reflect other sources in addition to Hesiod, seems artless and straightforward. Here there is no role for Prometheus and his brother, or for a woman: the whole thing is the work of Zeus

(? testing mankind).⁴⁵ The origin of the jar in Hesiod's version, a source of puzzlement for ancient (as well as modern) scholars,⁴⁶ is here made very clear and simple, and it is opened by a man who cannot contain his desire to know (such *curiositas* is of course a very familiar story-telling motif), thus giving an explicit motivation for what is left to be understood in Hesiod, where the image of jar-opening is suggestive of women's wasting of the agricultural stores, but the action of 'the woman' is most naturally understood as the result both of Zeus' plan (cf. vv. 57–8) and of female inquisitiveness (cf. vv. 373–4).⁴⁷ In Babrius, the jar has (explicitly) good things in it, not bad; when these good things are let out, they fly off to heaven, rather than, like Hesiod's ills, wandering among men. Common to both versions is the fact that Ἐλπίς remains in the jar; the meaning of Hesiod's myth, and whether Ἐλπίς is to be understood as something good or something bad, was debated almost as fiercely in antiquity as it has been in modern times (cf. the scholia to *WD*, pp. 44–6 Pertusi).⁴⁸ In our earliest extant reworking of the Hesiodic story, Theognis 1135–50, Ἐλπίς is unequivocally a

⁴⁵ It is just possible that Zeus's role in the fable-version of the story was influenced by *WD* 99, a verse which has mixed textual authority and is deleted by some modern editors.

⁴⁶ The *scholia vetera* on *WD* 89 explain that Prometheus received the jar from 'the satyrs' and deposited it with Epimetheus (probably a reference to Aeschylus' satyr-play, *Prometheus the Fire-bringer*, cf. fr. 207a Radt and Sommerstein 2008: 211–12), and on v. 94a they imply that Hesiod borrowed the detail from Homer, cf. above p. 244, and that therefore he assumes our knowledge of the story; that Hesiod is indeed assuming a story known to his hearers but lost to us is also a familiar tenet of modern discussion, cf., e.g., Wilamowitz on v. 89. More recent scholars, while regularly pursuing symbolic interpretations of the jar, often nevertheless assume that Pandora brought the jar with her (so, e.g., Zeitlin 1996: 55), though there is nothing explicitly said about this in the text.

⁴⁷ In an extant prose paraphrase of Babrius' fable (*fab.* 123 Chambry) the man who opens the jars is described as λίχνος. Pandora's most famous female descendant as a *curiosa* female is Psyche in Apuleius' *Metamorphoses* (cf. esp. *Met.* 6.20–1).

⁴⁸ This is not the place to discuss at any length the various modern interpretations of the Hesiodic fable which have been offered in recent decades; for helpful guidance cf. Leinieks 1984, Zeitlin 1996: 53–86, Clay 2003: 103, 124–5; Clay 2009: 77 n. 22 lists further bibliography. A variant of the view that the Hesiodic jar contained only good things is that of Beall 1989, who argues that Hesiod must be referring in a shorthand way to a known story in which the jar contained 'beneficent spirits' which afforded protection against the evil in the world; now that those spirits have departed, just as Αἰδώς and Νέμεσις will also depart, we have no protection. Beall insists that there is no reason in the text to assume that what Pandora scattered from the jar are the evils of vv. 100–4. On the opposed view, accepted for example

θεὸς ἐσθλή,⁴⁹ and most modern commentators have taken this view also of the Hesiodic passage, though Aristarchus took it to be ‘expectation of bad things’ which remained behind (Schol. *WD* 97a Pertusi).⁵⁰ In Babrius, hope is among us ‘pledging to give each of the good things which have escaped us’. On the surface this is presumably, as in Theognis, a positive thing; the Proclan scholia on *WD* 94–8 (= fr. 66 Marzillo) explain that we have hope as a consolation for our misfortunes, because we thus expect things will turn better and that there will be a change from our present ills, and it is unlikely that Proclus was the first to argue in this way. It is indeed hard to imagine the gods wanting life to be utterly ‘without hope’, for otherwise there would be little point in sacrificing and making offerings to them, and yet one wonders just how much ‘hope’ man can put up with. If we live in a perpetual state of ‘expectation’ that each of the good things which have passed from the earth will return and return to us, most of us at least are bound to perpetual disappointment; how often will hope’s ‘pledge’ be fulfilled? This may indeed be an accurate image of the human condition, but Babrius’ hope is thus no less ambiguous than ancient criticism took Hesiod’s to be: if it is not in fact simply pessimistic,⁵¹ the end of Babrius’ fable, at the very least, offers a wry glance at human delusion, while acknowledging the ambivalence of its Hesiodic model.

It is not, of course, difficult to find motifs and themes shared between the *Works and Days* and the world of Aesopic fable;

by West, that Pandora let evils out into the world, but Ἐλπίς is nevertheless a good, we may note how the jar also functions in more than one way in its larger context: contemporary women, who are descendants of Pandora, scatter the (good) contents of jars because they waste the fruits of agricultural labour, whereas Pandora herself opened the jar and let out bad things. On this view, the story functions with the logic of an aetiological ‘just-so story’, but with a very potent difference which disturbs the neat analogical schema of such stories; some may think that such an innovative procedure is at least not un-Hesiodic: cf., for example, his innovations in the form of the fable (cf. above pp. 242–3). Osborne 2001: 61 observes (after broadly accepting Zeitlin’s view of Pandora) ‘Hesiod’s Pandora fits exactly into the type of woman as the abject: her jar is full of filth, her appearance and talk are deceitful, and yet men convince themselves that her jar also contains hope’.

⁴⁹ Cf. above pp. 133–9.

⁵⁰ A version of the Aristarchan view is accepted by Verdenius 1985: 69–70.

⁵¹ As, e.g., Reinhardt’s rather unsympathetic reading (1960: 202–4) takes Babrius’ fable to be.

the lesson which the hawk teaches the nightingale in Hesiod is one almost endlessly repeated throughout the fable collections, and both Hesiod and the fable-tradition teach us the age-old wisdom that ‘experience brings learning’ (πάθει μάθος, cf., e.g., *fab.* 207 Perry, Hesiod, *WD* 218 etc.). Both are, moreover, centrally concerned with reciprocity and its failure, with the competition for scarce resources, and with the workings of justice in the world;⁵² the distinction which Hesiod draws in the *Works and Days* between humans, who have δίκη as a gift from Zeus, and animals who do not and therefore eat each other (*WD* 276–80), is both erased by the nature of Aesopic narrative in which the characters are animals, but also confirmed because we know that the fables are actually ‘about us’. In the worlds of both Hesiod and Aesop there is a narrative drive towards getting what you deserve, and that may involve hard work and forethought:

In the summer the ant roamed through the fields gathering seeds of wheat and barley and storing these away to feed himself in the wintertime. A beetle observed the ant and was amazed at the labour it was giving itself, toiling away at the very time when other animals relax their tasks and take a break. So the beetle rested at that time, but when winter came and the dung had been washed away by the rain, the beetle was hungry and came to ask the ant to share his food. The ant said: ‘If, beetle, you had worked, when you found fault with me for labouring, you would not now be in need of food.’ (*Aesopica fab.* 112 Perry)

The beetle here, or the cicada in the very similar Babrius 140, differs little from Hesiod’s ἀεργός, for whom also hunger and the need to ask for help are the rewards for time-wasting (*WD* 298–307, 366–7, 394–5 etc.).⁵³ Particularly close, one might think, is the other principal passage in the *Works and Days* which focuses on the role of ἐλπίς in human life:

πολλὰ δ’ ἀεργὸς ἀνὴρ, κενεὴν ἐπὶ ἐλπίδα μίμων,
 χρηίζων βιότοιο, κακὰ προσελέξατο θυμῷ.
 ἐλπίς δ’ οὐκ ἀγαθὴ κεχρημένον ἄνδρα κομίζειν

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⁵² Cf. Millett 2011: 198–205.

⁵³ For this theme in the fable-tradition cf. Zafiroopoulos 2001: 69–71, who notes however that the theme of 112 Perry is not very common in fables.

Aesop and Hesiod

ἦμενον ἐν λésχηι, τῶι μὴ βίος ἄρκιος εἶη.
δείκνυε δὲ δμῶεσσι θέρευσ ἔτι μέσσου ἐόντος·
‘οὐκ αἰεὶ θέρος ἐσσεῖται, ποιείσθε καλιάς.’

(Hesiod, *Works and Days* 498–503)

The man without work, waiting upon empty hope and lacking the means of life, heaps much abuse upon his spirit. Hope is not good at caring for a man in want, one who sits in the public lounge and who does not have enough for life. Tell your slaves while it is still midsummer: ‘It will not always be summer: make huts for yourselves’.

The advice which one should give one’s slaves functions almost like the ἐπιμύθιον of a fable, and it operates in that mode of language – ‘it will not always be summer’ –, hovering between the literal and the proverbial, which is so typical of the fable tradition. It is suggestive to find this in Hesiod in close association with the theme of ἐλπὶς, which has such close links, as we have seen, to traditions of fable and popular story-telling.

Hesiod’s exploitation of popular modes of story-telling is thus certainly not limited to the αἴνος of the hawk and the nightingale; particularly important will be those cases where Hesiod and the fable-tradition seem to share a symbolic way of picturing the workings of the world. Consider *Fab.* 239 Perry:

Someone had taken a monetary deposit from a friend and tried to defraud him. When the friend challenged him to swear an oath, he took precautions and went off to the countryside. When he was at the city gates, he saw a lame man going out and asked him who he was and where he was heading. The lame man said that his name was Oath and he was going to the impious; he then asked a second question, namely at what interval of time Oath usually visited cities. Oath answered ‘every forty years, or sometimes even thirty’. The man now did not hesitate and the following day he swore that he had not received the deposit. He then met Oath who hauled him off to the top of a cliff, and he asked Oath why, having said that he comes every thirty years, he did not give him even one day’s grace; Oath replied, ‘Be assured that when someone really causes me pain, then I come on the very same day’. (*Aesopica fab.* 239 Perry)

Oath here speaks very much in the character of the Oath of the *Theogony*, one of the children of Eris (cf. *WD* 804), along with Grief, Murder, Lying and so forth:

Hesiod and fable

“Ὀρκον θ’, ὅς δὴ πλεῖστον ἐπιχθονίους ἀνθρώπους
πημαίνει, ὅτε κέν τις ἐπίορκον ὁμόσσηι”
(Hesiod, *Theogony* 231–2)

...and Oath, who causes men upon the earth the greatest of grief, whenever someone willingly swears a false oath.

In the *Works and Days*, however, “Ὀρκος takes part in the race with Δίκη and Ὑβρις (vv. 217–19, above p. 188), just as at Babrius 50.17 a fox who has been betrayed by a woodcutter warns him τὸν “Ὀρκον οὐ φεύξει, ‘you will not escape/outrun Oath’. Babrius may indeed have been influenced by Hesiod here, as also apparently was the Delphic oracle Herodotus records as having been given to Glaucus the Spartan, when he enquired whether he could use an oath to defraud some Milesians of a deposit which their father had left with them:⁵⁴

Γλαῦκ’ Ἐπικυδεΐδη, τὸ μὲν αὐτίκα κέρδιον οὕτω
ὄρκω νικῆσαι καὶ χρήματα ληίσσασθαι·
ὄμνυ, ἐπεὶ θάνατός γε καὶ εὐορκον μένει ἄνδρα.
ἀλλ’ Ὀρκου πάσις ἔστιν, ἀνώνυμος οὐδ’ ἐπὶ χεῖρες
οὐδὲ πόδες· κραιπνὸς δὲ μετέρχεται, εἰς ὃ κε πᾶσαν
συμμάρψας ὀλέσῃ γενεὴν καὶ οἶκον ἅπαντα·
ἄνδρὸς δ’ εὐόρκου γενεὴ μετόπισθεν ἀμείνων.
(Herodotus 6.86γ2)

Glaucus, son of Epicydas, it is immediate profit to win by using an oath and plundering money. Swear an oath, since death awaits the man who respects oaths as well. But Oath has a son, without name or hands or feet; he is swift in pursuit, until he has seized hold of the entire family and destroyed both it and the whole house. The family of the man who respects oaths is stronger in future time.

The final verse of the oracle is identical to, and presumably borrowed from *WD* 285, and as a whole the oracle shares more of the Hesiodic context of baneful perjury than just the emphatically repeated γενεή in the same position in each of the last two verses:⁵⁵

⁵⁴ On this oracle see esp. Gagné forthcoming, Parke–Wormell 1956: I 380–2. Pausanias twice refers to the story of Glaukos, once (2.18.2) paraphrasing *WD* 282–5 and once (8.7.8) citing v. 285.

⁵⁵ Editors also compare χρήματα ληίσσασθαι in the oracle with *WD* 322, but there is no compelling reason to see that verb as notably ‘Hesiodic’. Plato, *Rep.* 2.363d4–5

Aesop and Hesiod

ὅς δέ κε μαρτυρήσιν ἑκὼν ἐπιόρκον ὁμόσσας
ψεύσεται, ἐν δὲ Δίκην βλάψας νήκεστον ἄσσθη,
τοῦ δὲ τ' ἀμαυροτέρῃ γενεῇ μετόπισθε λέλειπται
ἄνδρός δ' εὐόρκου γενεῇ μετόπισθεν ἀμείνων.
(Hesiod, *Works and Days* 282–5)

Whoever willingly swears a false oath and lies when bearing witness harms Justice but himself meets incurable disaster; his family is diminished in future time. The family of the man who respects oaths is stronger in future time.

The Herodotean oracle speaks riddlingly, as we expect it to do: how can the ‘nameless child of Oath’ come ‘swiftly’ after the perjurer if it has no feet, and how can it ‘lay hold of’ his whole family and household if it has no hands?⁵⁶ The curse upon himself which someone swearing an oath makes will catch up, sooner or later, and the perjurer cannot know when that day will come: oaths have children and/or consequences, which are often only seen in the generations of the perjurer’s own children.

In the Herodotean oracle the namelessness and apparent formlessness of the ‘child of Oath’, there made explicit in contrast to its Hesiodic father who can run but is not otherwise described (v. 219),⁵⁷ is one of the reasons that we can neither see it coming nor predict when it will come nor understand its workings. In the Aesopic fable, however, Oath is lame, reflecting the very widespread idea that divine retribution may be certain, but often comes after great passage of time; we may compare Horace’s *pede Poena claudo* (*Odes* 3.2.32), which may perhaps even be modeled on the ‘lame Oath’ of the

may be a reference to Glaucus’ oracle in a generally Hesiodic context or to Hesiod himself or both, cf. above pp. 118–19.

⁵⁶ Cf. the Cyclops’ actions at *Odyssey* 9.288–9; a directly parallel thought is Euripides fr. 979.3–4 Kannicht, [ἡ Δίκη] σῖγα καὶ βραδεῖ ποδὶ | στεῖλχουσα μάρψει τοὺς κακοὺς, ὅταν τύχηι.

⁵⁷ Gagné forthcoming draws attention to the ‘theological’ implications of this formlessness, which places the workings of the ‘child of Oath’ ‘beyond all human comprehension’. We may also wonder whether the oracle is responding to a greater attention to elaborated detail in allegorical figures in post-Hesiodic poetry; cf. further below on the Homeric Λιταί.

fable.⁵⁸ The nearest Greek parallel is perhaps the equally lame Litai ('Prayers') from Phoenix's great speech in *Iliad* 9:

καὶ γάρ τε Λιταί εἰσι, Διὸς κοῦραι μέγαλοιοι,
 χωλαί τε ῥυσαί τε παραβλῶπές τ' ὀφθαλμῶ,
 αἱ ῥά τε καὶ μετόπισθ' Ἄτης ἀλέγουσι κιοῦσαι.
 ἦ δ' Ἄτη σθεναρή τε καὶ ἄρτίπος, οὔνεκα πάσας
 πολλὸν ὑπεκπροθέει, φθάνει δέ τε πᾶσαν ἐπ' αἶαν
 βλάπτουσ' ἀνθρώπους· αἱ δ' ἐξακέονται ὀπίσσω.
 ὅς μὲν τ' αἰδέσεται κούρας Διὸς ἄσσον ἰούσας,
 τὸν δὲ μέγ' ὤνησαν καὶ τ' ἔκλυον εὖξαμένοιο·
 ὅς δέ κ' ἀνήνηται καὶ τε στερεῶς ἀποείπηι,
 λίσσονται δ' ἄρα ταί γε Δία Κρονίωνα κιοῦσαι
 τῶι Ἄτην ἅμ' ἔπεσθαι, ἵνα βλαφθεὶς ἀποτείσηι.
 (Homer, *Iliad* 9.502–12)

There are Litai, the daughters of great Zeus, lame and wrinkled and squint-eyed, who come after Folly and take care of things. Folly is strong and sound of foot, and far outruns all the Litai, and reaches the whole earth to damage men. The Litai heal after this. The man who respects the daughters of Zeus as they approach him is greatly benefited by them and they hear his prayers; when a man rejects them and harshly refuses them, they go to Zeus, son of Kronos, and beg him that Folly should attend that man so that he should be damaged and pay the penalty.

Phoenix's allegorical *mythos* of Ate and the Litai – the bT-scholia on v. 502 note that Phoenix speaks μυθικῶς, 'as an old man' – is without clear parallel in the *Iliad* (Achilles' 'Jars of Zeus' is perhaps the nearest analogue), and although comparison with Hesiod's 'fable' of *hybris*, *atê*, Oath and Justice is understandably often drawn,⁵⁹ and the account to the *basileis* of Dike's complaints to Zeus at *WD* 256–62 is undeniably close – this is, if you like, Homer at his most Hesiodic⁶⁰ – the

⁵⁸ Nisbet and Rudd ad loc. collect much relevant material on the 'slow but sure' nature of divine justice (cf. also Stobaeus 1.3, Flower Smith on Tibullus 1.9.4, Kannicht on Eur. fr. 979), but their statement that 'there is no recorded parallel to H[orace]'s limping Retribution' needs correction. *Odes* 3.2 has in fact a number of features which might recall Hesiod: the 'hymn to *uirtus*', *uirtus* leaving the earth behind, the destruction of the innocent along with the guilty, the certainty of justice.

⁵⁹ Cf., e.g., R. Martin 1992: 16. West 2011: 223 takes the Litai-passage to be 'a new invention on the Hesiodic model'.

⁶⁰ In his speech in *Republic* 2 in which he urges Socrates to argue for justice 'for its own sake' (cf. above pp. 117–22), Adeimantos pairs *WD* 232–4 with Homer, *Odyssey*

Hesiodic figures are short on detailed description (Justice is ‘clothed in mist’, i.e. invisible) in comparison with the Litai, who provide rather a glimpse forward to the great allegorical figures of Roman poetry. Phoenix’s image is fashioned *ad hominem*: his addressee, Achilles, is himself a remarkable master of image and metaphor. Perses, however, is asked to understand something put in much starker terms. Dike gets the better of Hybris ‘at the finish’ (of the race, or perhaps of the road), and Oath ‘runs alongside’ (τρέχει ἄμα) ‘crooked judgements’; we would most naturally be tempted to take ‘lame Oath’ of the fable to be a later development, as a particular instantiation of the idea of the slowness of divine justice, but it is perhaps worth suggesting that, for Hesiod’s audience, the ‘running’ of Oath was in fact an arresting and innovative variation on a more familiar idea of a slow, or even limping, retribution.⁶¹ The later texts containing this idea may well be influenced by Hesiod, but they also reflect ideas which will have been familiar to Hesiod’s audience and may therefore allow us to grasp something of Hesiod’s own very distinctive imagination. The Delphic oracle given to Glaucus in Herodotus (cited above) distinguished the short-term or immediate (τὸ αὐτίκα) advantage of a deceitful oath from the longer-term consequences (μετόπισθεν); Hesiod is well aware that retribution is often deferred to the future (vv. 282–5), but as in the Aesopic fable, there is no certainty about that – the clock starts ticking immediately (αὐτίκα, *WD* 219).

19.109–13 (363a8–c2) and *WD* 287–9 with *Iliad* 9.497–501, the introduction to the Litai, rather than the allegory itself (364c6–e2). The first Homeric passage is Odysseus’ extravagant praise of Penelope’s *kleos* as like that of a good king under whose rule the land and its people flourish; this passage, like the allegory of the Litai, is very ‘Hesiodic’ (cf. Rutherford’s note *ad loc.*). When the subject is justice and the relations between men and gods, Adeimantos finds it rhetorically useful to construct as Hesiodic a Homer as possible.

⁶¹ West on v. 219 adduces Aeschines, *Ctes.* 233 ‘the oath which [a juror who votes for Ctesiphon] voted before judging follows him around (συμπαράκολουθῶν) and causes him pain’; this is a remarkable description of what we would call ‘a guilty conscience’, but it differs importantly from the idea that Justice catches up eventually with the wrongdoer.

As the final passage in this section I want to look briefly at what has some claim to be the best known passage from Nicander's *Theriaca*, the poem on poisonous creatures, particularly snakes, of (very probably) the second century BC. Nicander is here telling of the διψάς, a snake whose bite imparts parching thirst:

ὦ γύγιος δ' ἄρα μῦθος ἐν αἰζηοῖσι φορεῖται,
 ὥς, ὅπότε οὐρανὸν ἔσχε Κρόνου πρεσβίστατον αἶμα,
 Νειμάμενος κασίεσσιν ἑκάς περικυδέας ἀρχάς 345
 Ἰδοσύνην νεότητα γέρας πόρην ἡμερίοισι
 Κυδαίνων· δὴ γάρ ῥα πυρὸς λήϊστορ' ἐνιπτον.
 Ἀφρονες, οὐ μὲν τῆς γε κακοφραδίης ἀπόνηντο.
 Νωθεῖ γάρ κάμνοντες ἀμορβεύοντο λεπάργωι
 Δῶρα· πολύσκαρθος δὲ κεκαυμένος αὐχένα δίψῃ 350
 Ρῶετο· γῶλεοῖσι δ' ἰδὼν ὀλκήρεα θῆρα
 Οὐλοὸν ἔλλιτάνευε κακῇ ἐπαλαλκόμεν ἄτηι
 Σαίνων· αὐτὰρ ὁ βρῖθος, ὃ δὴ ῥ' ἀνεδέξατο νώτοις,
 ἦιτεεν ἄφρονα δῶρον, ὃ δ' οὐκ ἀπανήνατο χρεῖῳ.
 ἐξότε γηραλέον μὲν αἰεὶ φλόον ἐρπετὰ βάλλει 355
 ὀλκήρη, θνητοὺς δὲ κακὸν περὶ γῆρας ὀπάζει·
 νοῦσον δ' ἄζαλέην βρωμήτορος οὐλομένη θήρ
 δέξατο, καὶ τε τυπῆισιν ἀμυδροτέρησιν ἰάπτει.
 (Nicander, *Theriaca* 343–58⁶²)

An ancient tale (*muthos*) circulates among men that,⁶³ when the oldest offspring of Kronos gained control of heaven, he apportioned to his brothers their glorious spheres far apart, and to mortals he gave in his wisdom the prize of youth, honouring them because they had denounced the fire-stealer.⁶⁴ The fools! They got no benefit from it because of their folly. Growing weary, they entrusted the gift to a slow ass to carry; because his throat was parched with thirst, however, the ass bounded away. When it saw the trailing, deadly beast in its hole, it begged the snake pleadingly to help it in its dread plight. The snake asked the foolish animal for the gift of the burden which had been

⁶² I print Jacques's text; I do not think that textual and interpretative uncertainties affect the argument here, unless explicitly noted. To the standard commentaries on this passage add Hopkinson 1988: 142–6 and Sullivan 2013.

⁶³ Aelian, *NA* 6.51 and the scholia on Nicander claim that the story had been told or mentioned by various poets before Nicander, notably Ibycus (*PMG* 342) and Sophocles (fr. 362 R).

⁶⁴ This is not the standard meaning of ἐνίπτειν, nor the standard action of men with respect to Prometheus, but this translation (borrowed from Gow-Scholfield) follows the version of the story given in Aelian, *NA* 6.51.

placed on its back, and the ass did not refuse the request. Ever since then, trailing snakes cast off their skins when they are old, but wretched old age attends mortals. The deadly beast received the parching disease from the braying ass, and passes it on with dull strikes.

This passage, specially marked out by the author's identifying acrostic, is an almost Aesopic story of one animal being outwitted by another.⁶⁵ It is, moreover, a story which follows on from the Hesiodic story of Prometheus' theft of fire, and as a story of mankind not knowing how to use a valuable gift and hence making the human condition far worse than it might otherwise have been, there are motifs shared with the Pandora-story.⁶⁶

Nicander's introduction to his story, ὠγύγιος δ' ἄρα μῦθος ἐν αἰζηοῖσι φορεῖται κτλ., 'an ancient tale circulates among men ...', is an echo and evocation of Aratus, *Phainomena* 100–1, λόγος γε μὲν ἐντρέχει ἄλλος / ἀνθρώποις κτλ., 'another story is current among men ...', which itself goes back to Hesiod's introduction to the 'Myth of Races' (*WD* 106); the verses of Aratus and Nicander introduce the most elaborate 'aetiological' tales of their respective poems,⁶⁷ both of which, as does Hesiod's 'Myth of the Races', concern transitions from one state of life on earth to another. Nicander's passage thus mixes Hesiod, Aratus and the Aesopic in a remarkable demonstration of the 'Hesiodic' tradition and the lessons which it has to teach, if only men are willing to listen.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ Perry prints Aelian, *NA* 6.51 as *Aesopica* 458; both snakes and asses are, of course, frequent characters in Aesopic fables. The 'kennings' λέπαργος and βρωμήτωρ for the ass also add to the Hesiodic flavor. For bibliography on this passage cf. Reeve 1996/7 and Magnelli 2010: 215. At the conclusion of his telling of the story of the διψάς, Lucian claims that he was not motivated to his story by a sense of rivalry with 'Nicander the poet' (*Dipsades* 9); does Lucian thus acknowledge the acrostic written in to Nicander's account of this snake, as Dionysius Periegetes also seems to have done (Reeve 1996/7)?

⁶⁶ Clauss 2006: 172 suggests that there is also an element in the story of men bringing about their own downfall by unwillingness to work hard, regardless of whether νοθεῖς or νοθεῖ is read in v. 349; such a motif would go back to the *Works and Days*.

⁶⁷ The closest rival in the *Theriaca* is the story of Helen and the αἰμοροῖς at *Theriaca* 309–19, introduced by a simple εἰ ἔτυμον.

⁶⁸ For another example where Nicander has blended Hesiod and Aratus cf. above pp. 25–6. We should probably add Callimachus to Nicander's mix here, if (as seems likely) the association of the snake's shedding of γῆρας with the poet's fame, here expressed through the acrostic, picks up Callimachus fr. 1.33–5 (in a passage which seems to evoke both Hesiod and Aesop, cf. Scodel 1980: 318–19).

The *Life of Aesop*

Both Hesiod and Aesop were believed to have been killed as a result of false charges against them. In the standard account of Hesiod's death, most familiar from the *Contest of Homer and Hesiod* and Plutarch's *Symposium of the Seven Sages*,⁶⁹ the poet was drowned (or killed and then thrown into the sea) by men who thought that he had seduced their sister, or had helped someone else to do so, but his body was brought back to land by dolphins. As for Aesop, a tradition already alluded to by Herodotus (2.134.4) and apparently familiar to Aristophanes' Philocleon (*Wasps* 1446–9), an old man very fond of fables, has the storyteller killed by the Delphians on the grounds that he stole a sacred bowl, which they had in fact planted on him. Our fullest elaboration of the story is the narrative *Life of Aesop*, which in its present form probably goes back to the second century AD, but very clearly contains much of greater antiquity, as well as later elaborations developed in the course of transmission. Just as there presumably was never a 'fixed' and/or 'authorial' text of the *Life*, a fact driven home to us most clearly by the papyri which have survived, so the versions preserved in the manuscript tradition show radical differences. What is clearly the oldest version (known as G and perhaps in essence going back to the second century AD), though it has suffered badly in transmission, survives in just one manuscript, whereas the other part of the tradition, which was widely diffused throughout the Byzantine world and generated translations into Latin, the so-called W-version, has a much fuller tradition.⁷⁰

In the *Life* Aesop is framed and eventually executed by the Delphians because his plainly spoken criticism of them

⁶⁹ Cf. T 30–4 Most and the discussion of Scodel 1980.

⁷⁰ For the sake of simplicity I refer throughout, as has become traditional, to the G- and W-versions, although a distinction may be made within the W-version, thus producing three, rather than two, recensions surviving in manuscripts, rather than papyri; I do not think that this simplification materially affects any of my discussion. On the history and nature of the various versions cf. Perry 1936, Avlamis 2010b: 47–71. The most important recent discussions of the *Life* are Avlamis 2010b and Kurke 2011; Holzberg 1992 is a rich bibliographical resource. The nature of the present chapter excludes anything like a full appreciation of the *Life*.

suggests that, if they let him leave the city, he will damage their reputation throughout Greece. In the G-version Aesop's miserable fate at Delphi is the climax of two related structures which run in and out of the narrative, and which are largely absent from the W-version, namely a close association between Aesop and the Muses and a corresponding antagonism between Aesop and Apollo.⁷¹ The opposition between Aesop on the one hand and Apollo/Delphi on the other clearly goes very far back in the development of the legend, but as far as the *Life* is concerned the motif enters suddenly in chapter 100, when Aesop returns to Samos after having arranged a reconciliation between King Croesus and the Samians. In the W-version the grateful islanders voted their benefactor 'honours and a *temenos*, and called that place the Aesopeion'. Unfortunately, the G-version is both obscure and corrupt: the Samians 'called the place in which Aesop had been (?) changed⁷² the Aesopeion', and then Aesop apparently sacrificed to the Muses and established a shrine to them, together with – and here the text is irremediably uncertain – some kind of memorial 'not of Apollo', as a result of which Apollo became angry with Aesop, just as he had been with Marsyas, who had challenged his musical superiority. The transmission allows textual reconstructions in which Aesop dedicates a statue of himself with the Muses, which would certainly anger the god – and it is hard to imagine an Aesopeion without an image of Aesop, but the whole matter must remain uncertain.⁷³ What is clear, however, is that the close association of Aesop and the Muses is a central theme within the G-version of the *Life*.

Much here might bring Hesiod to mind. Apollo occurs remarkably infrequently in the *Theogony* and only once (v. 94)

⁷¹ The matter has been very much discussed, cf. Perry 1936: 14–16, Wiechers 1961, Jedrkiewicz 1989: chapter 3, Kurke 2011: 53–94.

⁷² The meaning of ὅπου ἦν ἐνηλλαγμένος remains uncertain; many understand 'where his status had changed', i.e. where he had become a free man, cf. Kurke 2011: 174–5, arguing that this refers to the Samian theatre (contrast, e.g., Holzberg 1992: 65); D. Clay 2004: 128 translates 'in which he had brought about the reconciliation' (though that was not, literally speaking, on Samos).

⁷³ The reconstructions of Ferrari 1997 and Papathomopoulos 1990 (and cf. Holzberg 1992: 65) have Aesop erecting a statue of himself; Perry has Aesop erect a statue of 'Mmemosyne, not Apollo', but it is hard to see why this would anger Apollo.

in association with the Muses, and only once in total in the *Works and Days* (v. 771). This absence is especially marked, and may have been felt as such, when set against the god's prominence in the *Iliad*, where he is the first god to appear to set the narrative in motion and the god whose anger – or so it would have seemed in hindsight – thus launches the 'epic tradition'. As for the Muses, however, in chapters 6–7 of the G-version of the *Life* the previously dumb Aesop, as he sleeps in a pastoral *locus amoenus*, is rewarded by Isis and the Muses for his piety by the gift of a voice and the power to create stories and fables which will bring him a great reputation.⁷⁴ This scene of bucolic initiation stands in the tradition of Hesiod's initiation by the Muses at the opening of the *Theogony*, in which he was given (as was, quite literally, Aesop) αὐδὴ θεσπῆς and the power of theogonic song, Hesiod's specialty, just as the Muses bestow story-telling upon Aesop. The intertextual relationship between Hesiod and the *Life* here is very unlikely to be a simple and/or direct one, despite the fact that the author of the *Life* identifies the Muses' home as Mt Helicon (7, cf. *Theogony* 1–2, 7, 23) and that the Muses' gifts to Aesop, 'invention of stories (λόγοι) and the weaving and creation of Greek fables (μῦθοι)',⁷⁵ are, as it were, the 'popular' analogue of the Muses' gifts to Hesiod. Very many scenes of 'poetic (and other) initiation' had intervened between Hesiod and extant versions of the *Life*, and some of the more distinctive marks of the Hesiodic model, such as the giving of a symbolic object (the staff, *Theogony* 30), are absent from Aesop's acquiring of a voice. An association between Aesop and the Muses did not, of course, depend upon a debt to Hesiod: for later Greeks, Aesop and the Muses will have been linked inter alia by the very close

⁷⁴ On this scene cf. Hunter 2007a and Mignogna 1992; Mignogna traces echoes of *WD* 582–96 (filtered through Theocritus) in the description of the *locus amoenus* in which Aesop sleeps, but it is unlikely that everyone will be convinced, given how many related texts have come in the intervening space. In structure, this scene of the *Life* is fashioned as a contextualised fable involving Aesop, as indeed many fables seem originally to have been, with 'piety is a good thing' (chap. 8) as the ἐπιμύθιον pronounced by Aesop himself.

⁷⁵ In the shorter W-version Aesop is granted (by Tyche) 'excellent speech (λόγος) and speed of tongue and a ready and inventive supply of varied fables'.

association both of them had with the elementary stages of school-education.⁷⁶

The Muses dominate the whole opening sequence of the *Theogony* (vv. 1–115), not just the account of Hesiod's initiation, are addressed in the opening verse of the *Works and Days*, and it is to the Muses of Helicon that Hesiod dedicated the tripod which he won at Chalcis, as he tells us in verses (*WD* 654–62) which (inter alia) plainly recall the initiation of the *Theogony*.⁷⁷ Probably at the period at which the G-version of the *Life* arose, Mt Helicon was sacred to the Muses, full of their images and also home both to an image of Hesiod and to (what was claimed to be) the famous tripod itself (Pausanias 9.29–31).⁷⁸ As is clear principally from our text of the *Contest of Homer and Hesiod*, it was widely believed that this victory at Chalcis was won over Homer (*WD* 654–62 are presumably in some senses the origin of the 'contest' story), and the inscription (modelled on *WD* 657–8) which Hesiod is believed to have placed upon the tripod became very well known:

Ἡσίοδος Μούσαις Ἑλικωνίσι τόνδ' ἀνέθηκεν,
ὕμνῳ νικήσας ἐν Χαλκίδι θεῖον Ὅμηρον.

Hesiod dedicated this to the Muses of Helicon, having at Chalcis defeated in song the godly Homer.

The story in the *Contest* shows of course no disrespect to Apollo, for Hesiod goes immediately after his victory to Delphi to make an offering to the god (*Contest* 13); the oracle which greets him, however, picks up the inscription in addressing him as Ἡσίοδος Μούσησι τετιμένος ἀθανάτησιν, 'Hesiod honoured

⁷⁶ Very striking is the repeated reference in chapter 33 (Aesop on the origin of misleading dreams) to 'the leader of the Muses' and 'the one in charge of the Muses', who must be Apollo, but is never named.

⁷⁷ Cf. above p. 54. On Plutarch's athetesis of these verses cf. above pp. 186–7. Even if Lambertson 1988 was correct to suggest that these verses, together with the proemia of both *Theogony* and *Works and Days*, are the result of the Hellenistic creation of a 'real' Hesiod to accompany a cult of the Muses at Thespieae, the indissoluble link between Hesiod and the Muses will have been established centuries before the most probable date for the ancestors of our texts of the *Life of Aesop*.

⁷⁸ Cf. D. Clay 2004: 136, Hunter 2006a: 17–20, both with earlier bibliography. On the Heliconian Muses in the *Life* see further Kurke 2011: 166–7.

by the immortal Muses'. This is the indissoluble partnership between poet and protecting divinities which persists throughout ancient traditions. As for Homer, however, there is no such close association in legend with the Muses, despite his poetic appeals to them; Homer too is of course 'honoured by the immortal Muses', but he is also too much of a one-off, too extraordinary in every respect, to travel in any kind of team, as do Hesiod and the Muses. Be that as it may, Hesiod's victory and its physical embodiment, the tripod dedicated to the Muses of Helicon, stand as reminders of an opposition between Hesiod and Homer, and – as the story of the *Contest* has it – an opposition between two types of poetry. If, as has often been thought, the opposition between Aesop and Apollo/Delphi is, in Perry's words, an opposition between 'the native talent of the common folk' and 'the formal learning of the aristocrats and academicians whose god is Apollo', or – as we might rather be tempted to say – between two different traditions of *sophia*, then it is not difficult to see how some version of that opposition could easily enough be mapped on to a constructed opposition between Hesiod and Homer. Whether or not that happened, and whether – if it did – this influenced the construction of an opposition between Aesop and Apollo, we are in no position to say; we are, however, dealing with analogous cultural oppositions, which may both have arisen at roughly the same period.

The opening chapter of the *Life* introduces us to its hero – a slave of mind-boggling ugliness and no voice (both like and unlike Thersites, we might say),⁷⁹ but one who, paradoxically, is already known to us as βιωφελέστατος, a man who has 'taught us how to live';⁸⁰ this paradox introduces what will be a very important theme of the *Life*, namely the need to look inside, at men's hearts and intelligence, not at their outward appearance. The Aesop of the *Life* is here, of course, another Socrates,

⁷⁹ The Thersites – Aesop analogy has been much discussed; Maximus Planudes makes the comparison explicitly in his introduction to the *Life* (T 2 Perry).

⁸⁰ Cf. chapter 99 (Aesop speaks) 'with my worthless body I speak good sense, thus aiding human life'; on this idea in the *Life* and other similar texts cf. also Avlamiš 2010a: 88 n. 63.

the most famous wise man who, like Aesop (chap. 25), disclaimed all knowledge, but contained the most marvellous wisdom inside a very unprepossessing exterior (cf. especially Plato, *Symposium* 215a6–b2, 216e2–17a2); the association between Socrates and Aesop was established by Plato himself at the opening of the *Phaedo*, where Socrates refers to the fable-teller and reports that, while in prison, he has versified some of Aesop's fables (*Phaedo* 60c1–1b7).⁸¹ The opening chapter of the *Life*, with its string of rare adjectives describing Aesop's extraordinary physiognomy, is in one sense a kind of parody of laudatory dictionary entries,⁸² but in another itself apes the Aesopic manner, grabbing our attention with the wide-eyed rhetoric of the oral story-teller, 'That Aesop, whom you have all heard about . . . Well, his master . . .'. What follows is the story of how two of his fellow-slaves plotted to have Aesop, who could not speak to defend himself, take the blame for eating the master's figs, but were outwitted by Aesop and were themselves punished. Through their subsequent flogging, adds the narrator, the slaves learned that

ὁ κατὰ ἄλλου μηχανευόμενος κακὸν αὐτὸς καθ' ἑαυτοῦ τοῦτο
λανθάνει ποιῶν. (*Life of Aesop* 3, G version)

He who devises ill against another does not realize that he is devising this against himself.

Moralising comment by the narrator of the kind which we find at the end of the fig episode is extremely rare in the *Life*.⁸³

⁸¹ From the perspective of the analogy with Socrates, the opening chapter of the *Life* may usefully be compared to the opening of the fourth book of Xenophon's *Memorabilia*: 'Socrates was so helpful (ὠφέλιμος) in every matter and in every way that it is obvious to anyone observing the facts with even moderate perceptiveness that there was nothing more helpful (ὠφελιμώτερον) than to be with Socrates and spend time with him anywhere and on any matter'.

⁸² A comparison with the *Life* printed as T 1 Perry is instructive in this regard, though of course that *Life* is a later product and one which seems to have integrated Aesop into ordinary elite culture, cf. Kurke 2011: 13 n. 35.

⁸³ Holzberg 1992: 44 links this example with the narrator's observations about piety and its rewards in the G-version of chapters 5 and 11; chapter 11, however, comments specifically about Aesop and is not a generalising 'moral', and chapter 5, though generalising – 'an utterance concerning an act of piety quickly reaches the ears of the gods' – is not really of the 'Aesopic' kind.

This is a text where virtually all of the authority is carried and expressed by Aesop himself, but – as the G-version makes clear again at the start of chapter 4 – the wicked slaves paid the penalty for wronging someone who could not (yet) speak; hence the unusual ‘moral’ from the narrator at the start of the work, when it could not be pronounced by Aesop himself. Such a moralising narrative voice only really reappears at the very end of the narrative, after Aesop’s death, when we are told that the Delphians paid the penalty for their killing of him; we may wish to call this ‘ring composition’,⁸⁴ but what is plain is that the moral at the end of the ‘fig episode’ is intended to evoke the style of *epimythia* attached to Aesopic fables from (probably) a fairly early date.⁸⁵

This ‘moral’ to the fig episode, which the W-version offers in the form of two iambic trimeters,⁸⁶ is also found in the *Works and Days*,

οἱ τ’ αὐτῶι κακὰ τεύχει ἀνὴρ ἄλλωι κακὰ τεύχων,
ἡ δὲ κακὴ βουλὴ τῶι βουλευέσσαντι κακίστη.
(Hesiod, *Works and Days* 265–6)

The man who devises evil against another devises evil against himself; evil plans turn out worst for the plotter himself.

and became indeed something of a motto, or summary, for the whole moral world of Hesiod’s poem.⁸⁷ In Hesiod the ideas may be ‘a pair of pre-existing proverbs’ (West ad loc.) – they are, as West shows, easy enough to parallel within the proverbial and narrative traditions of more than one culture – and there are good reasons not to assume that this moral came direct from Hesiod to the *Life*. This moral lesson, or something very like it, is in fact found attached to several surviving

⁸⁴ For other parallels and reversals between the opening episode and events at Delphi cf. Holzberg 1992: 71.

⁸⁵ Cf. Perry 1936: 172. For an *epimythion* attached (by Aesop) to a ‘real fable’ in the *Life* cf. chapter 97.

⁸⁶ Cf. Hunter 2010: 241–3, some of which is repeated here. I have discussed this scene and its ‘moral’ also in Hunter 2007a: 45–6 and Hunter 2008b.

⁸⁷ Cf. above pp. 111–22, Reinsch-Werner 1976: 309–11.

fables (cf. 191, 258,⁸⁸ 279 Perry), and the λανθάνειν motif, i.e. people who do silly or damaging things do not realise the consequences, occurs more than twenty times in our extant collection of fables. The opening ‘fig episode’ is thus clearly shaped as an exemplary ‘fable’, featuring Aesop as a character, which stands at the head of the *Life* and stresses the importance of what we are about to read by evoking the whole tradition of Aesopic wisdom. That that wisdom is also ‘Hesiodic’ speaks volumes.

It is in fact again not difficult to find what looks like Hesiodic material or Hesiodic structures in the *Life*, though lines of descent must always remain hazy. When Aesop strings series of λόγοι together (cf. 130 (G), 141 ἕτερος λόγος), it is hard not to recall *WD* 106–7 (εἰ δ’ ἐθέλεις, ἕτερόν τοι ἐγὼ λόγον ἐκκορυφώσω κτλ., ‘if you like, I shall briefly tell you another story...’) which forms the link between the story of Prometheus and Pandora and the Myth of Races, which then in turn is followed by the *ainos* (v. 202) of the hawk and the nightingale; at the very least, this parallel structure allows us to see something of how both Hesiod and Aesop construct themselves as storytellers, λογοποιοί.⁸⁹ Of particular interest perhaps is chapter 94 in which Aesop tells the Samians a *logos* when they ask him to advise them as to whether or not they should accede to the demand of King Croesus for submission and the payment of tribute:

Once upon a time, on Zeus’s instructions, Prometheus showed men two roads, one of freedom and one of slavery. The road of freedom was at the beginning rough and difficult and steep and waterless, overgrown with thorns, and very dangerous; at the end was a level plain, with walkways and full of orchards and well-watered, since suffering had its end in respite...⁹⁰ The path of slavery was at first a level plain, with flowers and a lovely view and general pleasantness, but at the end it was difficult and tough-going and dangerously steep. (*Life of Aesop* (G) 94)

⁸⁸ 258 Perry is of particular interest for the *Life* as it involves a ‘skinning’ as punishment and a clever fox playing the ‘Aesop role’, cf. Hunter 2010: 243.

⁸⁹ The Proclan scholia on *WD* 202–6 (= fr. 94 Marzillo) indeed count the ‘hawk and the nightingale’ as the third in a series.

⁹⁰ The text here is very uncertain.

This is the text of G, with Perry's ὁ Προμηθεύς for the transmitted αὐτοῖς εὐθέως, which leaves the first sentence without a necessary subject. In the W-version, which is considerably shorter, there is no mention of Zeus and the fable begins *in mediis rebus* with Tyche: 'I will tell you a *logos* and do you grasp what is advantageous. Tyche showed two roads in life ...'⁹¹ In defence of his emendation Perry adduced *fab.* 240 in which Prometheus fashioned men and animals 'at the command of Zeus'. The matter has an interest beyond this one passage.⁹²

Ancient scholars were well aware of the fact that τύχη (with or without, as we would say, a capital letter) was absent from both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*,⁹³ but its Hesiodic profile is also of some interest. Τύχη appears as an Oceanid at *Theogony* 360, but is otherwise entirely absent from the corpus; one might say that in the *Works and Days* you make your own luck. In the *Life of Aesop* τύχη may be used to mean 'situation, status', and 'chance' too may of course be operative in the world, nowhere more pointedly perhaps than in chapter 77 where Xanthos, who fancies himself as an interpreter of bird-omens, sends Aesop outside to check on the bird life and 'by chance' Aesop sees a favourable conjunction of birds.⁹⁴ There is, however, a clear difference between the G- and W-versions in this matter. Whereas in the G-version it is Isis and the Muses who bestow the power of speech and story-telling on Aesop, in the principal tradition of the W-version it is Τύχη, although the narrative, including the narrative in W, has led us to expect an intervention by Isis.⁹⁵ So too, the choice between the roads of freedom and slavery (chap. 94) may perhaps be a matter of τύχη, particularly in a world of powerful military rulers, but it certainly is, as Aesop presents it, a matter requiring 'forethought', whether or not we

⁹¹ Papathomopoulos 1990 takes Tyche into the G-version and reads ἡ Τύχη εὐθέως for αὐτοῖς εὐθέως.

⁹² Perry 1962: 331 argues that the 'two roads' fable, together with most of the 'mythological fables' featuring 'deities and personified natural forces', go back to Demetrius of Phalerum's original collection.

⁹³ Cf. Hunter–Russell 2011: 134–5.

⁹⁴ On this scene cf. Kurke 2011: 168–9, 209–10.

⁹⁵ Tyche here could be explained as Isis-Tyche (cf. Hunter 2007a: 39 n. 2), but doubts remain; on the role of τύχη in the *Life* cf. further Avlamiš 2010b: 31–2, 176–7.

accept Perry's ὁ Προμηθεύς into the text; in the version of 'the two roads' in Prodicus–Xenophon (*Memorabilia* 2.1.21), Heracles precisely goes to a quiet spot to think things out. So too in chapter 89, Aesop undertakes to interpret an omen for the Samians when his master is at a loss to do so, but only if they first make him a free man. In the G-version, Aesop simply says that 'it makes no sense' (οὐκ ἔστιν εὐλογον) for a slave to act as interpreter for a free state, but in the W-version his rhetoric is rather more elaborate:

Men of Samos, since Fortune, which is fond of bestowing honours,⁹⁶ has set up a contest of reputation between a master and a slave ... (*Life of Aesop* (W) 89)

It would seem then that the prominence of Tyche in the W-version of the *Life* makes this version also less Hesiodic than the G-version.

If we move from the *Life* to the *Fables* we will again find chance naturally operative in the world, and the importance of τύχη is on several occasions singled out in *epimythia*, as for example in 218 Perry 'the story shows that *tyche* is more powerful than any forethought', a moral that resonates interestingly against the chapter of the *Life* which we are considering. As for a role for Τύχη, however, this seems to be limited in our extant corpus to two instances. In 61 Perry, Tyche appears to a farmer who had unearthed a treasure and paid honour to Earth as his benefactress to remonstrate that, if something bad happened to him, she (Tyche) would certainly get the blame; here Tyche is entirely appropriate, as there is no suggestion that the farmer, unlike Aesop, has done anything to deserve his luck. So too in 174 Perry, a version of which also appears in verse as Babrius 49, Tyche appears in a dream to a man who is sleeping beside a well to stop him from rolling into it, observing that if indeed he did fall, she would certainly get the blame. These fables, while showing that the role of Tyche in the W-version of the *Life* could claim good precedent in the fable tradition, nevertheless also suggest that the *Life* uses Tyche in ways which are

⁹⁶ This may be the meaning of φιλόκαλος, but it also may not be.

not entirely in keeping with the fable-tradition. What conclusions, if any, are to be drawn from this may be debated, but it is certainly again the G-version which is here ‘Hesiodic’.

As for Prometheus, he makes regular appearances in the fable tradition as the creator of humans and animals (cf. 100, 240, 259, 266, 430 Perry), and is so at home there that he features in one of Theon’s paradigmatic examples of fable (77.17 Sp.); when Callimachus begins the explicitly Aesopic fable (cf. v. 15) of *Iambus* 2 with ‘It was the age in which the winged creature and the one in the sea and the four-legged one spoke just the same as the clay of Prometheus...’, he is concentrating fable-motifs together.⁹⁷ Of particular importance of course is the μῦθος (cf. 320c3, 324d6–7, 328c3) which Protagoras tells in Plato’s dialogue named for him:⁹⁸

Once upon a time there were gods but no race of mortals. When the fated time for the production of mortals too came, the gods moulded them within the earth by mixing earth and fire and the things which are blended with fire and earth. When they were about to bring these creatures to the light, they ordered Prometheus and Epimetheus to arrange them and to assign appropriate faculties to each. Epimetheus begged Prometheus to allow him to do the assigning, saying ‘When I have assigned, do you examine’. And so he persuaded him and did the assignment... When Prometheus came to do the inspection of the assignment he saw that the other living things were properly equipped with everything, but man was naked and without shoes or bedding or weapons... Prometheus was perplexed as to what means of safety he could find for mankind, and so he stole from Hephaestus wisdom in crafts together with fire... and he gave it as a gift to mankind. (Plato, *Protagoras* 320c8–1d3)

Whatever relationship this story might have to genuine *epideixis* of Protagoras, this is the first major mixing of Hesiodic motifs (Prometheus and Epimetheus, the fashioning of human beings by the gods, the theft of fire etc., to say nothing of ἀρετή, which is the peg upon which Protagoras’ whole μῦθος is hung) with those of fable which survives to us;⁹⁹ as with the *Works*

⁹⁷ Cf., e.g., Acosta-Hughes 2002: 177.

⁹⁸ For recent surveys and bibliography on this speech cf. Morgan 2000: chapter 5, Koning 2010: 219–22, Kurke 2011: 282–8; Denyer 2008 offers a rich commentary.

⁹⁹ For a recent survey of the Hesiodic material in Protagoras’ *mythos* cf. Koning 2010: 219 n. 125; Protagoras includes the fact that some animals eat each other (321b4, cf.

and *Days* itself, this passage seems both to have used motifs from fable, and itself then fed back into the fable tradition in ways which we can no longer disentangle (cf. especially *fab.* 311 Perry, ‘man the only creature with *logos*’). The central importance of αἰδώς and δίκη in Protagoras’ myth (322c2–d5) need not point exclusively to the *Works and Days*, but it is hard not to feel there also the resonance of that poem; δίκη is the marked poetic form for δικαιοσύνη. From one perspective, part of Protagoras’ myth may be seen as an inversion of the Hesiodic account: when men are living in a kind of Iron Age in which they wrong and kill each other, Zeus fears that the human *genos* will be wiped out and so sends Hermes to earth to bring men αἰδώς and δίκη (322b7–c5); in Hesiod, on the other hand, αἰδώς and δίκη are first perverted by being exercised through violence (*WD* 192–3), and finally αἰδώς (or Αἰδώς) and Νέμεσις will abandon earth to dwell with the immortals (*WD* 199–200). In Protagoras’ myth, then, there was indeed a κακοῦ ἄλκή (*WD* 201). The Hesiodic heritage of Protagoras’ speech means that, not just is the *Works and Days* recruited to the message about

WD 209, 277–8), but this is downplayed in contrast to the Hesiodic model, in keeping with Protagoras’ generally positive presentation of Epimetheus’ arrangements for the animal kingdom, despite the fact that Epimetheus was ‘not very clever’ (321b7); what Epimetheus lacked was precisely the προμήθεια which would have enabled him to plan the distribution so that all species were properly cared for, just as Prometheus should have ‘foreseen’ that his brother would mess things up (cf. Koning 2010: 221).

At Plato, *Laws* 12.943e1–2 Dike is said to be the daughter of Aidos; the context is decidedly poetic, but no poetic source for the claim is extant; it is not impossible that we have an inaccurate ‘quotation’ of Hesiod. In the speech *On Rome* (26 Keil) Aelius Aristides notes that Hesiod should have foretold Roman power, when Dike and Aidos would return to mankind (§106); this is unlikely to be simply a slip for Aidos and Nemesis (cf. *WD* 200), as Nemesis would not be appropriate in the context, and Dike and Aidos are paired earlier in chap. 89, but it cannot be certain that we have a kind of ‘window allusion’ to both the *Protagoras* and its Hesiodic source, as argued by, e.g., Pernot 2004: 117–18. A further instance which shows the flexibility of this story is Dio’s account of how Diogenes the Cynic allegedly used the Prometheus story (6.25–9): the whole is a revision of the history of society which Protagoras offers in Plato’s dialogue, with some clear textual echoes (note 6.25 ~ 322b7–8), but the lesson is that Prometheus was justly punished because man’s possession of fire was the starting point for human μαλακία καὶ τρυφή, and Zeus would not have wished mankind harm. Life becomes, however, as Hesiod rather than Protagoras knew, ever more ‘unpleasant and laborious’, not because of the plans of the gods, but because of man’s incessant pursuit of pleasure; men give their attention, their προμήθεια (cf. Προμηθεύς), to this, rather than to courage and justice.

πολιτική ἀρετή which Protagoras wants to deliver, but that the poem is itself fashioned as a text on the nature of ἀρετή and, more precisely, on the fact that ἀρετή is teachable, which is the lesson that Protagoras' *epideixis* sets out to demonstrate (320c1, 328c4). This is, after all, with due allowance made for development in the meaning of ἀρετή,¹⁰⁰ not an unreasonable representation of Hesiod's 'didactic' poem, one that Protagoras shares with many modern students of Hesiod; the stress that Protagoras lays, in both the μῦθος and the λόγος sections of his speech, upon ἐπιμέλεια, the need to work hard at the acquisition of ἀρετή, and upon the punishment which awaits those who do not, fits again entirely within parameters descending from the *Works and Days*.¹⁰¹ Hesiod then, along with Homer and Simonides, really was a sophist *avant la lettre* (316d7).

There is, then, a strong case for accepting Perry's introduction of Prometheus to the text of the G-version of chapter 94 of the *Life*. It may well indeed be that behind some of the uses of the figure of Prometheus in the fable tradition and the *Life* lies a sense of the structural analogy, written into the *Works and Days*, between the pairs of Hesiod and Perses and Prometheus and Epimetheus: the wise adviser who aims to help men on one side, and the foolish brother on the other, who only realizes his mistakes too late (cf. *WD* 89 ~ 218). There is, moreover, little doubt that the fable which Aesop tells the Samians goes back, through various intermediaries, to Hesiod's famous two paths of κακότης and ἀρετή, however often that passage had in the meantime been imitated and adapted. Immediately after the account of the two paths, Hesiod offers words of commendation to someone who can indeed see where good for himself lies:

οὗτος μὲν πανάριστος, ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσῃ,
φρασσάμενος τὰ κ' ἔπειτα καὶ ἐς τέλος ἦσιν ἀμείνω·
ἔσθλός δ' αὖ ἀκάεινος ὃς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθηται.

(Hesiod, *Works and Days* 293–5)

¹⁰⁰ Cf. above pp. 143–4.

¹⁰¹ On Xenophon's use of the Hesiodic theme of *epimeleia* in the *Oeconomicus* cf. above p. 71.

That man who devises everything himself, taking a view of what will be better in the future and at the end, is best of all. Good also is that man who follows good advice.

Many editors have wanted to draw a firm line between these verses and the ‘two paths’ which precede, but both the following injunction to work (v. 299) and the sequence in the *Life* shows how this is far from inevitable.¹⁰² Immediately after Aesop has told the fable, the Samians ‘realised from his words what was in their best interests (τὸ συμφέρον)’ (95 (G));¹⁰³ they are here acting like Hesiod’s target audience, namely Perses, if he had any sense. The Samians may indeed not be able to think out everything for themselves, but they do show good sense in listening to one ‘who advises well’.

The switch from the Hesiodic choice between *kakotês* and *aretê* to a political choice between slavery and freedom is of course imposed by the context in the *Life*, but it also has analogues elsewhere in the history of the reception of Hesiod’s ‘two paths’, as indeed in the history of fable. As to the latter, Aristotle (*Rhetoric* 2.1393b10–22) reports how, by means of a fable, Stesichorus warned the people of Himera against allowing Phalaris the final trapping of absolute power, namely a body-guard, which would turn them into his slaves; it is noteworthy, from the perspective of the *Life*, that Aristotle juxtaposes this story to one of how Aesop told a fable to save a politician who was on trial for his life on Samos, which is where the *Life* places Aesop’s ‘political’ reworking of Hesiod.¹⁰⁴ As for the Hesiodic paths themselves, it is perhaps not without significance that, in Xenophon’s report of Prodicus’ ‘Choice of Heracles’ (*Memorabilia* 2.1.21–34), a sophistic *epideixis* which is clearly an elaboration of Hesiod’s image, as Xenophon indeed suggests by citing the Hesiodic verses immediately before Socrates’ report of Prodicus’ work, the lady called Virtue (Αρετή) is described as εὐπρεπής τε ἰδεῖν καὶ ἐλευθέριος φύσει ‘fair to look upon and free in nature’ (2.1.22); Vice’s resort to make-up and revealing

¹⁰² Cf. further Clay 2003: 43 n. 38.

¹⁰³ The W-version is here not significantly different.

¹⁰⁴ On this passage of the *Rhetoric* cf. Kurke 2011: 255–6.

clothes, on the other hand, suggests that she is little better than a slave prostitute. Vice would, moreover, make Heracles a slave to pleasure, whereas Virtue offers him the role and rewards of a free benefactor of the community. That dichotomy, which is expressed by Xenophon/Prodicus within the ideological context of a democratic *polis*, was subsequently adapted, as the *Life of Aesop* shows, to a world of autocracies. In the first of his orations on kingship, Dio Chrysostom tells Trajan ‘a myth, or rather a sacred and edifying (ὕμνης) *logos*, in the shape of a myth’ (1.49), about how, while wandering in the wilds of the Peloponnese,¹⁰⁵ he met, in a grove sacred to Heracles, a prophetic priestess who told him the story of how Hermes had taken the young Heracles to a remote spot where a great mountain loomed up, a terrifying place of sheer cliffs and gorges (1.56). Closer inspection, however, such as in real life is only vouchsafed to the political elite, not to the mass of common people, reveals that there are in fact two peaks, very far apart, the higher called ‘kingly’ (βασιλῆϊος) and sacred to Zeus the King, and the lower called ‘tyrants’ peak’ (τυραννική) and named after the rebellious giant Typhon; the path to the kingly peak was ‘safe and broad’, that to ‘tyranny’ was ‘narrow and twisting and hard-going’ (1.67) – an obvious inversion of the Hesiodic model in which it is the better path which is difficult (at first), but one imposed by the fact that the two peaks represent not just alternative destinations or results, as in Hesiod, but are themselves complex images of these two destinations. It is indeed tyranny which is the dangerous form of power, where threats lurk (or are believed to do so) at every turn, where sudden death is the norm, and where every step might be one’s last (cf. chap. 77). Heracles then proceeds to inspect the two women, Basileia and Tyrannis, who sit upon the respective peaks, with their respective followers, and who are of course the ‘political’ descendants of Virtue and Vice

¹⁰⁵ Dio introduces the story in his familiar pose as an Odysseus (‘when I was wandering in exile... I visited as many lands as I could’, chap. 50, and followed by a quotation of *Odyssey* 17.222), and this pose was as good as any for delivering a lesson about political ἀρετή.

whom the young Heracles met in Prodicus' famous elaboration of this same Hesiodic passage.¹⁰⁶ The priestess herself cites Hesiod, along with Orpheus, as inspired prophets of old and parallels to herself,¹⁰⁷ and Hesiod's meeting with the Muses is one element in the richly allusive tapestry of this scene,¹⁰⁸ which in its creative *mimesis* of both Prodicus/Xenophon and, through them, of Hesiod may be thought emblematic of much of Greek literature of the high Roman empire. Basileia's companions (chaps. 73–5) too should remind us of Hesiod: Δίκη, Εὐνομία and Ειρήνη, the first three companions named, together make up a hexameter in the *Theogony* as the three Horai (902), and Δίκη and Ειρήνη both of course play important roles in the *Works and Days*; when Dio has Δίκη 'sitting on Basileia's right' we should perhaps think of *Works and Days* 259, where Δίκη 'sits beside her father Zeus' to complain of men's outrages against her. Although Dio's Heracles is shown two types of supreme power, there are analogues with the choice which Aesop sets before the Samians: freedom is associated with laws (91, cf. Dio 1.74–5), slavery with the illusion of ease and τρυφή (94, cf. Dio 1.78–9).

Dio's informant about Heracles is a *mantis* (1.54–6), and the Samians look to Aesop for the advice he gives in chapter 94 because they look upon him as a 'true *mantis*' (93), as a result of his explanation of an omen which they had received. This similarity does not merely acknowledge the 'mantic' quality of the Hesiodic verses about the two paths,¹⁰⁹ but also brings these

¹⁰⁶ Cf. above pp. 98–9. It has indeed been argued that Prodicus' fable was already more 'political' than the version in Xenophon might lead us to believe, cf., e.g., Kurke 2011: 278 n. 51.

¹⁰⁷ I take 1.58, 'a shepherd on some mountain in Boeotia who heard the Muses themselves', to refer to Hesiod, rather than to Linus as, for example, Cohoon understands it in the Loeb edition (in some versions, Linus was killed by Heracles, the deity of Dio's sacred grove).

¹⁰⁸ For discussion and bibliography cf. Moles 1990: 318–31, Trapp 1990: 141–8, Whitmarsh 2001: 198–200. I have wondered whether Dio's introduction of his tale, εἰ δ' ἄρα μῦθον ἐθέλεις τινὰ ἀκοῦσαι κτλ. (1.49), already adopts a Hesiodic voice, cf. *Works and Days* 106; for a different view ('as one might speak to a child') cf. Moles 1990: 318.

¹⁰⁹ The 'mantic' quality of passages of both Hesiodic poems has often been noted, cf., e.g., R. Martin 1992: 28, Fernández Delgado 1986, and Hesiod does claim that the Muses granted him power to tell the future (*Theogony* 32), a claim which Lucian

two passages close to what is probably the nearest analogue for the fable of instruction which Aesop offers to the Samians. In book 7, Diodorus Siculus records a series of Delphic oracles given to Lycurgus, the Spartan lawgiver, and of particular interest here is the one which Diodorus reports as given in response to Lycurgus' enquiry as to how both those in power and those they governed should best behave:

εἰσὶν ὁδοὶ δύο πλεῖστον ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ἀπέχουσαι,
ἡ μὲν ἐλευθερίας ἐς τίμιον οἶκον ἄγουσα,
ἡ δ' ἐπὶ δουλείας φευκτὸν δόμον ἡμερίοισι.
καὶ τὴν μὲν διὰ τ' ἀνδροσύνης ἐρατῆς θ' ὁμονοίας
ἔστι περᾶν, ἣν δὴ λαοῖς ἡγεῖσθε κέλευθον·
τὴν δὲ διὰ στυγερῆς ἔριδος καὶ ἀνάλκιδος ἄτης
εἰσαφικάνουσιν, τὴν δὲ πεφύλαξο μάλιστα.

(Diodorus Siculus 7.12.2)

There are two paths, a very great distance from each other. One leads to the honourable house of freedom, the other to the hall of slavery which mortals shun. The one is travelled with manliness and lovely concord: lead the people on this way. The other is the way of hateful strife and unmanly folly: steer clear of this above all.

Whether or not Diodorus or his source has correctly linked the nature of the enquiry with the oracle may perhaps be doubted, but Lycurgus is clearly given instructions to establish the rule of law based on the unity of the citizen-body; ἀνδροσύνη here stands in for the Hesiodic ἀρετή, and the rejection of 'hateful strife'¹¹⁰ and *atê* are given a Hesiodic resonance by the context in which they appear.¹¹¹ Aesop's variant of this version of the two paths is notably closer to the Hesiodic original than is the oracle reported by Diodorus, but it is at least worth

ridicules in the *Hesiod*, cf. above pp. 31–2. It is noteworthy that Aeschines 3.136 calls *WD* 240–5 'an oracle about Demosthenes' political career'; it is not necessary that this already reflects a familiar way of describing his verse, but the possibility is not to be dismissed.

¹¹⁰ στυγερή is an epithet of ἔρις in Hesiod (*Theog.* 226), but not in Homer, where however the Erinyes are στυγεραί.

¹¹¹ The stress upon ὁμόνοια is clearly adapted to the Spartan situation (cf. the elite ὁμοῖοι). The claim of Parke–Wormell 1956: II 90 that 'the antithetical style [of the oracle], as well as the subject-matter, suggests a Sophist as author', seems to have little to commend it.

entertaining the possibility that the *mantis* Aesop here takes over a Delphic voice, thus pointedly supplanting Apolline wisdom with his own; as we have seen, this would be in keeping with an important strand of the structure of the G-version.

The shift from *aretê* and *kakotês* in their moral sense to freedom and slavery is of course not a very violent one (such dichotomies tend to travel together), and – as we have seen – it is not difficult to imagine various socio-political contexts in which the two pairs of opposites might well have been mapped on to each other. Nevertheless, the change signals an important strand of the Aesopic tradition. Not only is Aesop himself a slave who eventually wins his freedom through his benefactions, but slaves and slavery are an important theme in our corpus of fables;¹¹² it is perhaps not chance that when, in the course of his discussion of *mythos*, Theon has to cite an ambiguous verse, he chooses one whose subject is freedom and slavery: ἐγὼ σ' ἔθηκα δοῦλον ὄντ' ἐλεύθερον, 'a slave I made you free' (Theon 76.30 Sp. = Euripides fr. 953.11 Kannicht). The *Vita minor* of Aesop (= T 1 Perry) notes that his fables are useful for 'slaves and free men', and Phaedrus famously suggests an origin for fables in the figured speech of slaves who could not speak their minds directly (3 *prol.* 33–7). As for ἀρετή, this has virtually no direct role to play in the world of the fables, particularly if the term is understood as 'moral virtue', which is indeed the way that the post-Hesiodic tradition largely interpreted it.¹¹³ As for the *Life*, there is of course great implicit 'virtue' in the Socrates-like Aesop, particularly in connection with the theme of the need to look inside rather than outside any man, but there is no explicit prominence given to this idea. Xanthos' parodically heroic claim, when he is planning to kill himself because he cannot solve the public omen which the Samians have received, that he will kill himself 'with *aretê* [courage? virtue?]' rather than live a life of reproach and

¹¹² Cf. Millett 2011: 192–3. On the presentation of slavery in the *Life* cf. esp. Hopkins 1993, Fitzgerald 2000: 26–7, Hunter 2007a: 53–6.

¹¹³ In our extant fables the word appears only in the *epimythion* of *fab.* 247 Perry, where it means 'courage'.

without *kleos*’ (chap. 85 (G)) speaks volumes as the only occurrence of ἀρετή in a possibly relevant sense in the *Life*.¹¹⁴

In an important discussion of the relationship between the Hesiodic and Aesopic traditions, Leslie Kurke has argued that the *Life* offers scenes which, if not necessarily in direct intertextual dialogue with passages of the *Works and Days*, nevertheless contest the authority of the rules and regulations offered in the second half of the poem, which are thus constructed as a body of elite *sophia* against which the more popular and hard-headed Aesopic tradition takes its stand.¹¹⁵ In the context of the Hesiodic tradition, the most important set of passages to which she calls attention is the clear correspondence between *WD* 727–32 and chap. 28 (G) of the *Life*:¹¹⁶

μηδ' ἄντ' ἡελίου τετραμμένος ὀρθὸς ὁμείχειν,
αὐτάρ ἐπεὶ κε δῦηι, μεμνημένος, ἔς τ' ἀνιόντα,
μήτ' ἐν ὁδῶι μήτ' ἐκτὸς ὁδοῦ προβάδην οὐρήσεις
μηδ' ἀπογυμνωθεῖς· μακάρων τοι νύκτες ἔασιν. 730
ἐζόμενος δ' ὅ γε θεῖος ἀνὴρ, πεπνυμένα εἰδώς,
ἦ ὅ γε πρὸς τοῖχον πελάσας εὐερκέος αὐλῆς.
(Hesiod, *Works and Days* 727–32)

Do not urinate upright and turned to face the sun, but be mindful to do this when it sets and as it rises; do not urinate while walking on the road or outside it, and do not bare yourself, for the nights belong to the blessed ones. The god-fearing man of wise thoughts crouches, or draws near to the wall of a well-built court.

In the *Life*, Aesop wants to leave his new master immediately when he sees him urinating while walking along, because,

¹¹⁴ Διάξω γὰρ τὸν μετ' ἀρετῆς θάνατον ἢ τὴν ἐπονείδιστον ἐν βίῳ ζωὴν ἀκλεῶς κτήσομαι; W does not preserve this moment. Not only does Xanthos' melodramatic posturing as a would-be Achilles recall some of the attitudes of novel 'heroes' such as Chariton's Chaereas, but the style of his declaration – the sentence framed by the chastically arranged verbs, the mannered variation of the prepositional phrases, the unusual διάξω θάνατον, and the juxtaposition of ἐν βίῳ ζωὴν – show that he has prepared his 'final words' with posterity in mind.

¹¹⁵ Kurke 2011: 204–12; for a related formulation about the wisdom of the Aesop of the *Life* 'setting itself apart from ... the whole *élite* tradition' cf. Hunter 2010: 240.

¹¹⁶ Cf. also above pp. 184–5, and Hunter 2010: 240–1. Kurke also considers *WD* 746–7 against *Life* 77 and *WD* 755–6 against the Aesopic traditions of criticism of sacrificial practice at Delphi; I will not consider these cases here, as in neither case is a specific intertextual relationship at all probable, nor indeed is one claimed by Kurke.

unlike the slave who has pressures and threats hanging over everything he does, the master who is under no time-pressure at all will not even give half an hour to calls of nature: what prospects are there then for slaves? Xanthos, however, has a ready defence:

‘I urinated on the move in order to avoid three bad things’. ‘What things?’ Aesop asked. ‘The heat of the ground, the bitter smell of the urine, and the burning of the sun’, replied Xanthos. ‘How is that?’ asked Aesop. Xanthos said, ‘You see that the sun is in the middle of the sky and is burning the earth with its heat. When I stand still to urinate, the boiling earth burns my feet, and the bitter smell of the urine runs up into my nostrils and blocks my passages, and the sun burns my head.’¹¹⁷ I wanted to escape these three things and so I urinated while walking.’ Aesop replied, ‘You have persuaded me – a clever [σοφῶς Castiglioni: σαφῶς] invention! Well then, walk on!’ Xanthos said, ‘I did not know that I had purchased myself a master’.¹¹⁸ (*Life of Aesop* (G) 28)

Kurke argues that we are initially tempted to think that Aesop is a θεῖος ἀνὴρ in the Hesiodic mode, but we soon discover that ‘his annoyance has nothing to do with religious scruple; it is instead all about the unequal power relations of master and slave . . . it is only an issue of labour and leisure, not of pollution and religious feeling . . . society’s powerless and abjected cannot afford the luxury of such ritual punctiliousness’. We have already noted the importance of themes of freedom and slavery to the Aesopic tradition as a whole. As for Xanthos, in Kurke’s reading his Diogenes-like rejection of ‘ossified convention in favour of the rationality of natural law’ produces a justification which is ‘eminently reasonable’. Kurke rightly notes that we may be surprised to find Xanthos here cast in a successful light (cf. further below), particularly in competition with Aesop, but the balance of the chapter in this regard seems in fact very nuanced. Aesop appeals, not to convention, but to ‘the bounds of nature’ (φυσικοί ὅροι), to which Xanthos appears

¹¹⁷ If it were the case that the *Life* here looks directly back to the *Works and Days*, then it would be worth asking whether Xanthos’ apparently bare head picks up ἀπογυμνωθεῖς at *WD* 740, though the absence of head-covering is very unlikely to be the sense of the participle in Hesiod.

¹¹⁸ There is a very similar quip at Euripides, *Hecuba* 397 (Odysseus to Hecuba), ‘I did not know that I had acquired a master’; a Euripidean tag, though one now verbally distorted, would not be out of place for Xanthos.

unwilling to cede even half an hour, and much might be thought to hang upon Aesop's final response: πέπεικός με, σαφῶς ἐπενόησας, περιπάτει λοιπόν. Castiglioni proposed σοφῶς, 'cleverly, like a philosopher', and it might be thought that this is a significant improvement, particularly with ἐπενόησας;¹¹⁹ it is important of course that philosophers should be able to explain their actions 'clearly', as Xanthos here does, but we might well wonder whether the matter of urinating in the road requires an elaborate tripartite explanation such as Xanthos offers.¹²⁰ Xanthos seems to exercise his σοφία in the most trivial places. The tone of Aesop's response may in fact be anything from admiration to sarcastic mockery, but it might be thought closer to the latter.¹²¹

The debate between Aesop and Xanthos about urination is not in fact our first real glimpse of what Xanthos' *sophia* consists in. In chapter 23, when Xanthos and his students visit the slave-market to purchase a slave for Xanthos' wife, the philosopher identifies a beautiful example of 'silent philosophy' in action:¹²²

Seeing from a distance the two handsome slaves and the one ugly one, [Xanthos] was full of admiration (ἐθαύμασεν)¹²³ for the slave-trader's inventiveness and he shouted out: 'Ah, beautiful, by Hera! This trader is clever and

¹¹⁹ It is adopted by Papathomopoulos and Ferrari, and in the translation offered above.

¹²⁰ As a parallel for Xanthos' 'eminently reasonable justification', Kurke 2011: 207–8 notes the anecdote about Diogenes who, when criticised for masturbating in public, said 'I wish I could allay hunger by rubbing my belly' (Diog. Laert. 6.46); that anecdote, however, which is concerned as much with self-sufficiency as with the flouting of convention, precisely makes a philosophical point completely lacking from Xanthos' self-defence. Xanthos' explanation, moreover, lacks the witty, apothegmatic style associated with Diogenes; for 'cynic' traits in the portrayal of Aesop and Aesopic wisdom cf. Adrados 1999: 659–61, 673–81 and Jedrkiewicz 1989: 116–27 (citing earlier bibliography).

¹²¹ Cf. Xanthos' wife's sarcasm to Xanthos when she has first been confronted with the full horror of Aesop's ugliness: εὐεπινοήτως, φιλοσόφως καὶ πρεπόντως ἔπραξας κτλ. (31 (G)). At the end of chap. 28 the W-version has Aesop merely saying 'Walk on, you've persuaded me', and omits Xanthos' final remark.

¹²² The G-text which I here translate (or in part paraphrase) is badly corrupted, but the general sense seems clear; in the W-text the episode is broadly the same but is much abbreviated.

¹²³ We should perhaps remember the ancient tradition that makes *thauma* the beginning of philosophy.

philosophical, or rather amazing and the very summit!'. The students said, 'Teacher, what are you praising? What is worth your admiration? Share it with us: do not begrudge us a share in the beautiful (τοῦ καλοῦ)'. Xanthos said, 'Do not, you students of discourse (ἄνδρες φιλολόγοι), consider that philosophy takes place only through words, but it happens through deeds also: often indeed silent philosophy surpasses or confirms the philosophy of words. One can learn this from dancers: what they reveal with the gestures of their hands displays a silent philosophy.¹²⁴ This chap has two handsome slaves and one ugly one, and <he put the ugly one between the handsome ones> so that his ugliness would make their beauty more visible (ἐκφαίνῃ); if ugliness had not been placed beside what surpassed it, knowledge of the beautiful [ones] (ἡ τῶν καλῶν εἴδησις) would not have been reached.' The students said, 'Teacher, you are divine (θεῖος) and brilliant (κάλλιστος) in the way you have precisely realized his rationale (ἐνθύμησις).' (*Life of Aesop* (G) 23)

Xanthos here finds serious philosophy in the stratagem of a slave-auctioneer; it has been claimed that this is the only teaching of Xanthos in the whole work which is not silly,¹²⁵ but we should perhaps pause before endorsing that judgement. Xanthos sees in the slave-trader's wheeze, which in fact has to do with creating misleading appearances where that is possible (which it is not with Aesop, chap. 21), what looks like a mixture of Platonic metaphysics ('knowledge of the beautiful') and a relational view of the nature of qualities ('there is no beautiful without ugly' etc.); his language becomes equally elevated: εἴδησις is not a word of 'popular' level. How seriously are we to take this? Opinions may differ, but at the very least the absurdly exaggerated admiration of his students, which is probably not simple irony, is unlikely to be echoed by (modern) readers of the *Life*. From one perspective, Xanthos' lecture to his students may be seen as a descendant of the *epideixeis* delivered by sophists in the pages of Plato and elsewhere and regularly greeted by cries of admiration from onlookers and hangers-on (cf., e.g., Plato, *Euthydemus* 276d1–2); the obvious irony at work in the Platonic text does not (at least) predispose us towards a positive assessment of Xanthos' *epideixis*.

¹²⁴ The text here is particularly problematic.

¹²⁵ Jedrkiewicz 1989: 189; cf. also Avlamiš 2010b: 200 n. 2.

Moreover, Xanthos' appeal to the 'silent philosophy' of dancers, i.e. (presumably) pantomimes, brings him close to Lycinus' lengthy defence and encomium of that art in the face of a philosopher's scorn in Lucian's *On the Dance*, and such company is at least not unequivocally favourable to Xanthos;¹²⁶ Lycinus claims at one point that dancing is 'an art which has reached the highest peak of all education... and most of all natural and moral philosophy' (chap. 35), and we may well view such a claim with a scepticism resembling our approach to Xanthos' claims. Xanthos is a man who pretentiously 'theorises' the everyday, the εὐτελῆ, and indeed he is a philosopher who has a δόγμα that one should not buy expensive slaves, only cheap ones (25, W),¹²⁷ and who is about to be shown up by the 'wisdom' of Aesop when he examines him as he stands on sale; Xanthos may have sorted out a system for urination, but it is unclear that 'philosophy', as embodied in this Samian representative of the art, has moved on very far from the opening description in Aristophanes' *Clouds* of Socrates' clever experiments (*Clouds* 143–79).¹²⁸ Moreover, we already know (chap. 21) that the very reverse of what Xanthos claims lies behind the slave-dealer's strategy is in fact the case: the only reason that the slave-dealer has not sold any of the three slaves is that would-be buyers were put off by Aesop's ugliness which, far from 'making their beauty more visible' (ἐκφαίνῃ), in fact 'blocked out' (ἀφανίζει) the two handsome slaves, so that the customers advised the slave-dealer to get rid

¹²⁶ On Lucian's work see esp. Lada-Richards 2007, who does not however discuss this passage of the *Life of Aesop*. For dance as 'silent poetry' cf. Plutarch, *QC* 9.748a.

¹²⁷ Our attention is called to Xanthos' use of the term δόγμα when the students react with the term παράγγελμα, 'precept'. It is possible also that Xanthos' claim in chap. 30 (G) that it is a δόγμα παιδείας not to enter someone else's house unless invited is intended to sound absurd, when it is applied to a slave, despite the rituals that could attend the entry of a new slave into a house: Who is likely to 'invite' a slave? How could a slave enter any house which did not belong to someone else? On the role of the doorway in the *Life* more generally cf. Avlamis 2010b: 167–73.

¹²⁸ The existence of the Hesiodic prohibition and parallels in other cultures (cf. West on 727–32, 757–9) probably prevent us from asking about the mechanics of Xanthos' urination, but it may be worth asking whether, in escaping 'three disadvantages', he is not causing other problems for himself. For similarities between Xanthos and the Aristophanic Socrates cf. also Goins 1989.

of Aesop from the sale.¹²⁹ Even as he utters his philosophising theory, then, we know that Xanthos is talking nonsense. As a philosopher Xanthos should really be concerned with τὸ καλόν as an intellectual ‘idea’ or as an inner, moral virtue, not as an aesthetic quality of external beauty, and herein of course lies some of the pointed irony: Aesop does indeed represent τὸ καλόν, if only Xanthos knew what to look for, and the two slaves who surround him, a *grammatikos* and a harp-player (chap. 20), are, by implication, τὸ αἰσχρόν.¹³⁰

Even closer in some ways to Xanthos than Aristophanes’ Socrates is the σχολαστικός, the literally-minded pedant who is the subject of so many of the jokes collected in the so-called *Philogelos*, a surviving joke-book from late antiquity, though certainly containing material of a much earlier date.¹³¹ There are connections of various kinds between this collection and the *Life of Aesop*, not least the interest of both works in the results of taking language literally, thus highlighting how both language and social convention rely on ‘commonsensical’ supplementation of what is not made explicit, but Xanthos’ usual pretentious stupidity, permanently on display for his own σχολαστικοί, has more than a little in common with the naïve confidence of the σχολαστικός of the *Philogelos*, and this is another reason to be cautious about the interpretation of Xanthos’ justification for his perambulatory urination.¹³² The *Philogelos* standardly travels with both Aesopic fables and the *Life* in its manuscript transmission, and although this need not point to

¹²⁹ The W-version omits this last piece of advice.

¹³⁰ It is tempting to think that the author (or authors) of the *Life* allowed themselves a smile in putting a *grammatikos* in such a situation and such company.

¹³¹ The standard edition is the Teubner of R. D. Dawe (Munich/Leipzig 2000), whose numeration I adopt in the following note; for discussion and bibliography cf. Thierfelder 1968, id. *RE* Suppl. 11.1062–8, Winkler 1985: 160–5, Andreassi 2004, Floridi 2012.

¹³² On the σχολαστικός of the *Philogelos* cf. Andreassi 2004: 43–51. The most significant parallels between *Philogelos* and the *Life* are *Philogelos* 103, 129 ~ *Life* 48 (Aesop solves the puzzle of the sheep and the pig for the σχολαστικοί), *Philogelos* 23, 130 ~ *Life* 65 (the empty baths), *Philogelos* 251 ~ *Life* 75–6 (the master’s wife); Aesop’s cleverness is essentially the reverse of the delusions which characterise the figures in *Philogelos*. For material shared between the *Philogelos* and the fables cf. Andreassi 2004: 42–3, and on the relation between the *Life* and *Philogelos* more generally Avlamiis 2010b: 181–95.

any perceived deep similarity, it is at least suggestive for how these works fit within the same areas of the generic landscape.

In the case of the ‘urination episode’, then, there is indeed a clear difference between the Hesiodic and Aesopic traditions, but the implications of that distinction remain suggestively ambiguous; the Hesiodic παράγγελμα is indeed challenged, but challenged by a character of (at best) dubious wisdom, and the point of the exchange seems to lie not in that challenge, but rather in laying out the character of the self-proclaimed philosopher as he fully enters the narrative in which he will be a focus for absurdity and the comic.

CHAPTER 6

HESIOD'S STYLE

Towards an ancient analysis

Classifying Hesiod

Perhaps the best known of the few stylistic observations about Hesiod which survive from antiquity is Quintilian's judgement:

raro adsurgit Hesiodus magnaue pars eius in nominibus est occupata, tamen utiles circa praecepta sententiae, leuitasque uerborum et compositionis probabilis, daturque ei palma in illo medio genere dicendi. (Quintilian 10.1.52 = Hesiod T 66 Jacoby, 125 Most)

Hesiod only rarely rises to the heights and a great part of his work is taken up by names; nevertheless, his gnomic maxims are useful and the smoothness of his diction and word-arrangement is convincing. He wins the palm in the middle style.

The first question a modern critic might be tempted to ask of this passage is 'Which Hesiod does Quintilian mean?', for 'Hesiod has many styles',¹ and the *Theogony* and the *Works and Days* feel to us (at least) very different from each other; moreover, whereas Quintilian's reference to Hesiod being largely taken up by 'names' would seem to point to the *Theogony* (and the *Catalogue*), 'gnomic maxims' most naturally evoke the *Works and Days*. It may, of course, be that this is indeed the point: Quintilian is offering a summary account of the whole Hesiodic corpus as potential reading-matter for the would-be orator. Nevertheless, there is in fact almost no surviving evidence for ancient stylistic distinctions within the Hesiodic corpus: what mattered was how Hesiod differed from Homer, not how one Hesiodic poem differed from another. If Hesiod 'only rarely rises to the heights', this is in explicit

This chapter is a revised version of Hunter 2009b; since that chapter appeared, some of the ancient material has also been surveyed in Koning 2010: 350–7.

¹ West 1966: 72.

contrast to Homer (cf. Quintilian 10.1.46–51), and it is this contrast which was the most important element in ancient views of Hesiod's style.

As for the second part of Quintilian's judgement ('the smoothness of his diction and word-arrangement is convincing'), this finds a very close parallel in the extant *Epitome*² of the *On imitation* of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, a work which Quintilian either used or with which he shared sources or both:

Ἡσίοδος μὲν γὰρ ἐφρόντισεν ἡδονῆς καὶ ὀνομάτων λειότητος καὶ συνθέσεως ἑμμελοῦς. (Dionysius Hal. *De imitatione* fr. 2.2 Aujac = Hesiod T 64 Jacoby, 124b Most)

Hesiod was concerned with pleasantness, the smoothness of words³ and a harmonious composition.

Although no particular work of Hesiod is named here, it is very likely not the *Works and Days* which lies behind this judgement. In discussing 'pointing', δεῖξις, in dancing, Plutarch (*QC* 9.15.747e–f) compares success in this technique to 'proper names in poetry expressed with a degree of ornament and smoothness' (τοῖς ἐν ποιητικῇ κυρίοις ὀνόμασιν μετὰ τινος κόσμου καὶ λειότητος ἐκφερομένοις) and the two examples he adduces, though without naming the poet, are from the *Theogony* and the *Catalogue*:

καὶ Θέμιν αἰδοίην ἑλικοβλέφαρόν τ' Ἀφροδίτην
Ἥβην τε χρυσοστέφανον καλήν τε Διώνην
(Hesiod, *Theogony* 16–17⁴)

...and reverend Themis and Aphrodite of the glancing eyes and golden-crowned Hebe and lovely Dione

Ἕλληνος δ' ἐγένοντο φιλοπτολέμου βασιλῆος
Δῶρός τε Ξοῦθός τε καὶ Αἴολος ἵππιοχάρμης
(Hesiod fr. 9 M-W)

² Cf. Tavernini 1953: 22.

³ Or perhaps 'names', cf. Plutarch cited immediately below. Quintilian (10.1.52, cited above) perhaps understood Dionysius, or their common source, as referring to 'names'. Some editors adopt Usener's δι' ὀνομάτων for the transmitted καὶ ὀνομάτων; this may be right, but it is difficult to have confidence in the stylistics of the *Epitome*.

⁴ Plutarch apparently cited Ἥβην in v. 17, rather than Ἥβην, presumably by a slip of memory; in fr. 9 he cited θεμιστοπόλοι βασιλῆες, referring to the figures in v. 2.

The sons of Hellen, the war-loving king, were Doros and Xouthos and Aiolos who delights in horses

Plutarch here produces both a very 'female' and a very 'male' example to illustrate how what he is describing is not limited to one effect: in the *Theogony* passage, the four epithets, each describing a desirable female quality (hence 'pleasant', ἡδεῖαι, in Dionysius' scheme) are arranged in two contrasting chiasms, with the compound being placed second in v. 16, but first in v. 17; in the couplet from the *Catalogue*, the powerful (in both senses) phrase which occupies the second half of v. 1 introduces the tricolon of v. 2, which is anchored by Αἰολος ἱππιохάρμης, whereas neither Doros nor Xouthos received an epithet. The liquid sounds and the poetic elaboration which avoids too overt an artifice are the 'degree of ornament and the smoothness' which Plutarch admires.⁵ It was other non-stylistic qualities which Plutarch looked for in the *Works and Days*, and something of his attitude has probably filtered into Proclus' description of the style of that poem:

ὁ μὲν οὖν σκοπὸς τοῦ βιβλίου παιδευτικός... διὸ καὶ ἀρχαίотροπος ἐστὶν ἢ ἐν αὐτῷ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἰδέα· τῶν γὰρ καλλωπισμῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπιθέτων κόσμων καὶ μεταφορῶν ὡς τὰ πολλὰ καθαρεύει· τὸ γὰρ ἀπλοῦν καὶ τὸ αὐτοφυὲς πρέπει τοῖς ἠθικοῖς λόγοις. (Hesiod, *Works and Days*, Prolegomenon Ab Pertusi = fr. 1.13–18 Marzillo)

The aim of the book is educational... For this reason its poetic style is archaic, for it is largely free of adornments and added embellishments and metaphors. Simplicity and naturalness suit ethical discourses.

In discussing the *Contest of Homer and Hesiod* we will see how perceived stylistic differences were central in conceiving of Hesiod's relationship to Homer (cf. below Section 3), but – to anticipate – we may set Proclus' judgement of the *Works and Days* against the standard ancient view of Homeric style, which stressed not just its elevation, but also the range of different

⁵ Plutarch contrasts these passages with 'the excessive prosaicness and bad metre' of a bald tragic trimeter (Adesp. 400 K-S) dominated by proper names and an elegiac couplet about Olympias (*SH* 1146); the prosaic quality contrasts with the 'degree of ornament' and the bad metre with the smoothness of Hesiod.

sources and dialects from which Homer drew, as well as his brilliant and measured use of glosses and tropes such as metaphor. The author of the essay on Homer ascribed to Plutarch puts the general principle well:

Not only does Homer elevate events (πράγματα) and remove them from customary experience, but he does this also with words (λόγοι); it is presumably obvious to everyone that what is new and outside the familiar arouse wonder (θαυμάζεται) and capture the listener. ([Plutarch], *De Homero* 2.6)

This critical idea is a very common one,⁶ but one very clear statement of it is put by Dio in the mouth of Pheidias in the course of his comparison of the resources available to poetry and to the plastic arts:

The art of the poets is very self-willed and free from censure (αὐθάδης καὶ ἀνεπιληπτος),⁷ and particularly that of Homer, who enjoyed the greatest freedom of language (παρρησία) and did not choose one style of diction (χαρακτήρ λέξεως), but mingled together the whole language of Greece which had been separated out before his time... and not only [the language of] his contemporaries, but also of those before him, if in his love of language (φιλορρηματία) he could take up some word no longer in use, like an ancient coin from some treasure-trove which no one claims... he also used many barbarian words... moreover, he transferred (μεταφέρων) not only things next door or near at hand, but also those very far away, in order to charm his listener by amazing and bewitching him (μετ' ἐκπλήξεως καταγοητεύσας)... Finally, he showed himself a maker (ποιητής) not only of verses, but also of words; he spoke from his own resources, sometimes simply giving names to things, and sometimes adding names to the ordinary existing ones... through his epic art he was able to implant any emotion at all in people's souls. (Dio Chrysostom 12.66–9)

Both Hesiod's language, and – certainly in the *Works and Days* his intentions and effects – were conceived as utterly different from this; it is not just that the same might be said for almost any ancient poet not composing in the 'grand' style, but what is important is not just style, but rather the effect of style on the audience, and in the case of the *Works and Days* the very last effect sought for should be ἐκπληξίς, let alone the 'great mental

⁶ Cf., e.g., Hillgruber 1994–9: I 96.

⁷ On the use of the term αὐθάδης in stylistic criticism cf. Hunter 2009a: 5–6.

confusion and disturbance' which Pheidias claims Homer's creation of 'terrifying and truly strange wonders' (δεινὰ καὶ ἄτοπα τῶι ὄντι θαύματα) can create (12.68).

The suspicion that it was poems other than the *Works and Days* which were most influential in the few surviving ancient stylistic judgements on Hesiod is strengthened by Quintilian's assignment of the poet to the 'middle style',⁸ which is later briefly described in the tenth chapter of Book 12: the middle style is also called *floridum* or ἀνθηρόν (12.10.58), its purpose is *delectare* or *conciliare*, its principal characteristic *lenitas* (12.10.59), it freely accommodates metaphors and figures, and its effect is as soothing as a *locus amoenus*:⁹

medius hic modus et tralationibus crebrior et figuris erit iucundior, egressionibus amoenus, compositione aptus, sententiis dulcis, lenior tamquam amnis et lucidus quidem sed uirentibus utrimque ripis inumbratus. (Quintilian 12.10.60)

This middle manner is richer in metaphors and made more pleasing by figures; it is made lovely by digressions, has a well-structured composition and the sweetness of *sententiae*; it is like a gentle river which is translucent but shaded on both sides by verdant river-banks.

As the principal characteristics of the 'middle' style include *suauietas* and τὸ ἡδύ and τὸ γλυκύ,¹⁰ it is unsurprising that it maps in good part on to what in the rather idiosyncratic scheme of styles in Dionysius of Halicarnassus' *De compositione verborum* is called the γλαφυρὰ σύνθεσις, the 'smooth style', to which is opposed the αὐστηρά, the 'austere', with a middle or mixed (εὐκρατος) style, as evidenced by Homer, holding the privileged centre-ground; for Dionysius, Hesiod is the hexameter model of the γλαφυρὰ σύνθεσις, where he keeps company with such as Sappho, Anacreon and Euripides. The hallmarks of this style include a lively and purposeful flow of words which are 'smooth and soft and maidenly' (*De comp. uerb.* 23.2–4, cf. *Demosthenes* 40.1, and Hesiod, *Theogony* 16–17 discussed above), 'delicate and winning figures' (*De comp. uerb.* 23.7) which avoid the

⁸ Virgil's *Georgics* were also assigned to this style, cf. Jocelyn 1979: 73.

⁹ For such stylistic descriptions cf. Hunter 1997: 23–6, 2012: 155–61.

¹⁰ Cf., e.g., Cicero, *Brutus* 40, *Orator* 91–2.

heaviness of archaism, and the blending of all parts into a single harmonious whole.

Just as ancient categories of style very rarely map straightforwardly on to individual authors, whatever claims the proponents of those categories might make, so too the move from ancient analyses of style to modern ones is never uncomplicated, partly because of the fluidity and instability of ancient categorisations,¹¹ partly because of our ignorance of the pre-suppositions underlying many of them, and in part because they can seem to operate at a level of impressionism which works against the modern demand for definitional precision. It is also true that the extension to whole works and authors of notable stylistic features of a few selected passages is a common feature of ancient critical rhetoric. Nevertheless, the example drawn from Plutarch (above) has shown that some progress is possible, and further help in understanding the assignment of Hesiod to the ‘middle’ style may come from considering the origins of this classification, which were found, inevitably, in Homer. ‘From Nestor’s mouth Homer said flowed forth a speech sweeter (*dulcior*) than honey and no pleasure (*delectatio*) greater than this can be imagined’, notes Quintilian (12.10.64), and this Homeric paradigm for the middle style is a commonplace of ancient rhetorical writing.¹² The allusion is, of course, to *Iliad* 1.247–9:

τοῖσι δὲ Νέστωρ
ἡδυεπὴς ἀνόρουσε λιγύς Πυλίων ἀγορητής,
τοῦ καὶ ἀπὸ γλώσσης μέλιτος γλυκίων ῥέεν αὐδή.
(Homer, *Iliad* 1.247–9)

Nestor sweet of speech rose up among them, the clear-voiced orator of the Pylians; from his tongue flowed a voice sweeter than honey.

The scholia on this passage note that Nestor’s style is προσήνεξ καὶ καταστέλλειν ὀργήν δυνάμενον ‘soothing and able to calm

¹¹ There is helpful guidance in Russell 1964: xxxiv–xxxvii.

¹² Cf., e.g., [Plutarch], *De Homero* 172 (with Hillgruber ad loc.), Radermacher 1951: 6–9, Kennedy 1957: 26–7.

anger',¹³ whereas αὐστηρός speech 'stirs up anger'; here precisely is Quintilian's distinction, and that of the rhetorical tradition in general, between the soothing 'middle' style and the 'grand' style which rouses emotion.

In the Iliadic verses quoted above, Nestor's speech is ἡδύ, λιγύ, 'sweeter than honey', and it 'flows', as do both the 'middle style' of Cicero and Quintilian and the γλαφυρὰ σύνθεσις, 'smooth style', of Dionysius; the principal aim of Dionysius' 'smooth style' is indeed to produce a unified λέξις which is ἡδεῖα καὶ λιγυρά 'pleasant and clear' (*Demosthenes* 40.6). Hesiod himself invokes the Muses as ἡδυέπειαι in the opening verse of the *Catalogue* and elsewhere (fr.1.1 M-W, *Theogony* 965, 1021), 'from their mouths flows untiring, sweet (ἡδεῖα) speech' (*Theogony* 39–40),¹⁴ and he characterises his own song as καλή (*Theogony* 22); any ancient, rhetorically minded reader would have seen here specific stylistic claims about the nature of Hesiod's poetry, not merely a vague advertisement of quality. Moreover, the description of Nestor from *Iliad* 1 has two close Hesiodic parallels, which occur in the famous passage of the *Theogony* on kings and poets:

ὄντινα τιμήσουσι Διὸς κοῦραι μέγαλοιο
γαινόμενόν τε ἴδωσι διοτρεφέων βασιλῆων,
τῷ μὲν ἐπὶ γλώσσηι γλυκερὴν χεῖουσιν ἔέρσην,
τοῦ δ' ἔπε' ἐκ στόματος ρεῖ μείλιχα

(Hesiod, *Theogony* 81–4)

Whomever of god-nourished kings the daughters of great Zeus honour and behold when he is born, on his tongue they pour sweet dew and from his mouth flow soothing words.

ὁ δ' ὄλβιος, ὄντινα Μοῦσαι
φίλωνται γλυκερὴ οἱ ἀπὸ στόματος ῥέει αὐδὴ.

(Hesiod, *Theogony* 96–7)

Blessed is the man whom the Muses love; sweet is the voice which flows from his mouth.

¹³ Cf. Horace, *Epistles* 1.2.11–12.

¹⁴ For the interpretative difficulty in these verses cf. West ad loc.

To a later audience brought up with the stylistic divisions of rhetorical theory, it would not have been unnatural to conclude that Hesiod made the utterances of both just kings and poets, most notably of Hesiod himself, examples of the middle or γλαφυρόν or ἀνθηρόν style. The scholiast on *Theogony* 83 notes that γλυκερήν refers to τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ ἀπαλὸν τῶν λόγων, ‘the sweetness and softness of the words’, and such softness is, as we have seen, a hallmark of this style. When the Hesiodic kings mollify the injured μαλακοῖσι... ἐπέεσσιν ‘with soft words’ (v. 90), it is not difficult to believe that some ancient rhetoricians would have seen here a confirmation of the correctness of a stylistic approach to these verses: the γλαφυρὰ σύνθεσις, after all, prefers τὰ λειότατα καὶ μαλακώτατα, the ‘smoothest and softest’, among words (Dion. Hal. *Dem.* 40.1, cf. *De comp. verb.* 23.4). For Velleius Paterculus, Hesiod’s poetry was indeed marked by a *mollissima dulcedo* (1.7.1 = Hesiod T 8 Jacoby, 7 Most). The assigning of Hesiod to the middle or ‘florid’ style appears to be not merely the inevitable result of the fact that he *had to be* different from Homer, but may also arise from a ‘programmatically’ interpretation of Hesiod’s own verses.

There is a further important consequence of Hesiod’s own programmatic language. The majority of the passages I have just considered come from the *Theogony*; if we turn to the *Works and Days*, there is far less material with which to work. At *WD* 659 the poet recalls how the Muses set him on the path of λιγυρή... ἀοιδή, the same (Homeric) phrase which is used of the cicada in v. 583,¹⁵ and a few verses later (v. 662) he refers to the same incident but varies the phrase with ἀθέσφατος ὕμνος (cf. ὕμνωι in v. 657), but that is all; not even the qualities of the Muses’ singing are described in the proem, and there too Hesiod notoriously describes what he is about to do as ‘tell Perses true things’ (v. 10), with no explicit hint that he will do so in song, let alone ‘beautiful song’. As for vv. 659–62, it can hardly be an accident that this is the passage which, together with the ‘Heliconian Muses’ (cf. *Theogony* 1), recalls the

¹⁵ Much is made of this similarity by Rosen 1990: 107–9, cf. above p. 126 n. 7.

proem of the *Theogony*, perhaps indeed specifically ‘rewrites’ *Theogony* 22, i.e. evokes a style of poem different from that of the *Works and Days*, and it is a familiar fact (or should be) that the ‘sailing’ passage is stylistically distinctive within the *Works and Days*. We may point to the unusually ‘grand’ epithets or phrases: πολυφλοίσβοιο θαλάσσης (only here (v. 648) in Hesiod, but common in Homer), καλλιγύναικα (v. 653, found also in the *Catalogue* and used of Greece in Homer),¹⁶ δαίφρονος (v. 654, found also in the *Catalogue* and the *Aspis*), μεγαλήτορος (v. 656, common in Homer and found also in the *Catalogue* and the *Aspis*),¹⁷ τρίποδ’ ὠτῶεντα (v. 657, a phrase found twice, though not in this *sedes*, in the horse-race scene of the funeral games for Patroclus in *Iliad* 23),¹⁸ and πολυγόμφων (v. 660);¹⁹ ἀθέσφατος ὕμνος in v. 662 is a strikingly grand collocation, whatever the precise nuance of the epithet.²⁰ The reasons for the stylistic distinctiveness of this passage will presumably have much to do, not only with the recall of the *Theogony*, but also with the explicit reference to the Trojan expedition and the implicit evocation of epic poetry on that theme in vv. 651–3. In the present context, however, we see that behind Proclus’ judgement of the style of the *Works and Days* lies (ultimately) a marked distinction in the way in which Hesiod presents the two poems which have survived to us;²¹ this distinction may also help to explain the fact that the few surviving ancient stylistic

¹⁶ Cf. Ercolani ad loc., Scodel 2012b: 502–3.

¹⁷ If the transmitted μεγαλήτορος, referring to Amphidamas, is correct (cf. West ad loc.), then it is possible that this harshly ‘truncated’ form of expression aims at a particular stylistic effect; I know of no Hesiodic parallel.

¹⁸ It would be easy enough to suggest that by this phrase Hesiod puts his own achievement on a par with victory in an ‘epic’ event.

¹⁹ Cf. Ibicus, *PMG* 282.18, where the influence of Hesiod has been seen (above p. 54 n. 37).

²⁰ West understands ‘unlimited’ (cf. *Theogony* 830), which makes sense in the context – Hesiod can sing *even* of sailing – and would perhaps look back to the all-inclusiveness of *Theogony* 31–2, cf. Fränkel 1923: 281–2, Ercolani ad loc., *LfgRE* s.v.; a more general positive sense, ‘heavenly, beautiful’ cannot however be ruled out.

²¹ This distinction also ultimately led to the well-known acrostic poem from later antiquity (*POxy* 3537 = Hesiod T 95 Most) in which, all but certainly, Hesiod is inspired to abandon the lowly ‘bucolic’ verse of the *Works and Days* for the grand poetry of the *Theogony* and the *Catalogue*; for bibliography and discussion cf. Most 2008: 64–70.

judgements about Hesiod are probably more influenced by the *Theogony* than by the *Works and Days*.²²

One other ancient observation about Hesiodic style perhaps deserves notice in this connection. Hermogenes (second century AD) observes that it is obvious what kind of diction (λέξις) is poetic and that the diction of Homer is the ‘most beautiful’ within poetry, ‘for Homer is probably the only one whose poetry is pure (καθαρός), in the context of poetry, or perhaps Homer and Hesiod’ (393.14–17 R). Hermogenes’ meaning is here not immediately obvious. Elsewhere (229.8–9 R), ‘pure’ diction is for Hermogenes that which is ordinary and everyday (ἡ κοινὴ καὶ εἰς ἅπαντας ἤκουσα) and which serves clarity; this may remind us of Proclus’ observation that the *Works and Days* ‘is largely free (καθαρεύει) of adornments and added embellishments and metaphors’, but it could hardly be said that Homer’s poetry consists of such ‘ordinary’ words, and in any case the ‘obvious’ fact about poetic diction to which Hermogenes must be referring is that it precisely rises above the ordinary (cf., e.g., Aristotle, *Poetics* chap. 21–2, *Rhet.* 3.1404b15a2 etc.). Probably, therefore, Hermogenes means that Homer, and perhaps also Hesiod, preserve an appropriate level, in keeping with τὸ πρέπον, of poetic diction throughout, without falling into the opposed vices of triteness (τὸ ταπεινόν, cf. Arist. *Rhet.* 3.1404b4–5, *Poetics* 1458a17–19) and excessive reliance on obscure words, compound adjectives and so forth (cf. Arist. *Rhet.* 3.1404b428–39, *Poetics* 1458b10–9a13). Aristotle had demanded of poetry that it be serious and rise above the everyday (σεμνὴ καὶ ἐξαλλάττουσα τὸ ἰδιωτικόν, *Poetics* 1458a20), but that it should do this appropriately and in a manner consistent with clarity, and this will indeed involve

²² A related modern approach has been to see a self-conscious Hesiodic construction of poetic difference in the contrasts between a ‘Homeric’ hawk and a ‘Hesiodic’ nightingale (vv. 202–12) and between the expedition to Troy and Hesiod’s aversion to sailing (vv. 646–62), cf. Rosen 1990, Steiner 2007, 2012, above p. 55. That the hawk in the fable is characterised by the attitudes and language of a vaunting Homeric warrior has been noted by many critics (cf., e.g., Puelma 1972: 89); whether or not that makes the hawk a carrier of a ‘Homeric poetics’, in contrast to the ‘Hesiodic poetics’ of the nightingale, seems a question where difference of opinion is inevitable.

the use of standard, ordinary words, as well as a sprinkling of glosses and metaphors. Clarity is, therefore, indeed central to Hermogenes' observation, and Homer's 'purity' consists in the fact that he does not 'stain' his poetry by falling on either side of the fine balancing-act which Aristotle describes. When Hermogenes adds Hesiod as the only possible other poet to have succeeded in this matter, he is perhaps merely acknowledging Hesiod's stature, but if he has any particular poems in mind, it is more likely to have been the 'grander' *Theogony* and *Catalogue* than the *Works and Days*, which we know sometimes caused critical amusement by the very banality (σμικρολογία) of some of the objects and actions mentioned in it.²³ It is in keeping with this analysis that Menander Rhetor singles out Hesiod for the 'purity and moderation' (καθαρότης καὶ τὸ ἀπροσκορές) of his use of periphrasis, specifically in the context of 'genealogical hymns' (i.e. the *Theogony*) and specifically in contrast with Orphic poetry (340.24–9 Sp.-RW = Hesiod T126 Most); here too, clarity will probably have been the most important element of 'purity'.²⁴

Callimachus on Aratus, Hesiod and Homer

Ἡσιόδου τό τ' ἄεισμα καὶ ὁ τρόπος· οὐ τὸν ἀοιδῶν
 ἔσχατον, ἀλλ' ὀκνέω μὴ τὸ μελιχρότατον
 τῶν ἐπέων ὁ Σολεὺς ἀπεμάξατο· χαίρετε λεπταί
 ῥήσιες, Ἀρήτου σύμβολον ἀγρυπνίης.
 (Callimachus, *Anth. Pal.* 9.507 = Epigram
 27 Pfeiffer)

1 ἀοιδῶν *POxy* 4648 (coniecera iam Scaliger): ἀοιδόν codd.

4 σύμβολον ἀγρυπνίης Ruhnken: σύντονος ἀγρυπνίη *Anth. Pal.*: σύγγονος ἀγρυπνίης indirect witnesses

Hesiod's is the subject matter and the manner: not the ultimate of songs,²⁵ but it may be that the man from Soli has caught the sweetest of verses. Hail subtle lines, the sign of Aratus' sleeplessness.

²³ Cf. above p. 48 n. 24.

²⁴ Cf. Hagedorn 1964: 24–7 and the note of Russell and Wilson ad loc.

²⁵ For this translation cf. further below.

This famously difficult epigram²⁶ is a typically innovative Callimachean ‘take’ on what may have been a quite common type of epigram: the poet celebrates a literary work, sometimes at its first appearance,²⁷ and, in doing so, acknowledges its principal inspiration. Thus, for example, a third-century BC papyrus preserves part of an epigram in which the tragedian Aristarchus is said to have ‘moulded’ (ἀπεπλάσαστο) a tragedy ‘from Homer’s book’ (*SSH* 985.10–12). Callimachus’ less usual verb, ἀπεμάξατο ‘copied, caught the manner of’, may derive from the criticism of the plastic arts,²⁸ but it has regularly been associated with Aeschylus’ claim in the *Frogs* to Homeric inspiration for his characters:

ὄθεν ἡμὴ φρήν ἀπομαξαμένη πολλὰς ἀρετὰς ἐποίησεν,
 Πατρόκλων, Τεύκρων θυμολέοντων, ἴν’ ἐπαίροιμ’ ἄνδρα
 πολίτην
 ἀντεκτείνειν αὐτὸν τούτοις, ὅπταν σάλπιγγος ἀκούσῃ.
 (Aristophanes, *Frogs* 1040–2)

From him [i.e. Homer] my mind took its model and depicted in my poetry many acts of heroism, of Patroclus and lion-hearted Teucers, so that I might incite a citizen to seek to rival these men, whenever he heard the war-trumpet.

A direct link between this passage and the epigram is in fact not as improbable as it may at first seem, given Callimachus’ evident familiarity elsewhere, notably in the ‘Reply to the Telchines’ (*Aitia* fr. 1), with the literary contest of the *Frogs*; if Callimachus does wish us to remember the *Frogs*, then this will have some interesting consequences. In Aristophanes, the poet

²⁶ For earlier discussion and guides to the bibliography on this poem cf. Reitzenstein 1931: 41–7, *HE* II 208–9, Reinsch-Werner 1976: 9–13, Cameron 1995: 374–9, Stewart 2008.

²⁷ That this is the situation with Callimachus’ poem on Aratus is perhaps suggested by the hymnic χαίρετε in v. 3, which presumably picks up the repeated invocation of *Phainomena* 15–16, but which is also suggestive of the epiphany of a divinity. Farrell 1991: 47 observes that Callimachus’ epigram ‘was probably written when *Phaenomena* was new’, but without giving reasons.

²⁸ Cf. Asclepiades, *Anth. Plan.* 120.1 (= *HE* 1010) on Lysippus’ image of Alexander, and Prioux 2007: 100–2. We may also think of ‘Longinus’, *De subl.* 13.4 where Plato’s use of Homer is (rather obscurely) compared to the ‘reproduction (ἀποτύπωσις) of good character by sculptures or other works of art’. For the use of the term in literary criticism cf. the scholium in MS B at Euripides, *Hippolytus* 219 (II 32 Schwartz) ἀρκῶς δὲ ἐρωτικὸν ἦθος ἀπέμαξατο κτλ.

whom Aeschylus claims as his model is Homer, and specifically Homer as the martial poet par excellence; in Callimachus, the model poet is Hesiod, and Hesiod as the poet of the regular movement of the seasons and years, almost, then, the poet of agricultural peace, as he is at the end of the *Contest of Homer and Hesiod*.²⁹ As we have seen, the two great hexameter poets were from an early date opposed stylistically to each other – Homer the poet of grand sublimity, Hesiod the poet of smooth sweetness and plainness;³⁰ it will therefore be tempting to wonder whether τὸ μελιχρότατον | τῶν ἐπέων in Callimachus' poem means, not 'the sweetest of [Hesiod's] verses', but rather 'the sweetest of hexameter verses', i.e. the poetry of Hesiod. Aratus has chosen for his model the hexameter poetry which par excellence deserves the epithet μελιχρός; in another poetic field that prize would have gone to Sappho.

If something like this oppositional structure is present in the epigram, then there will be a strong temptation to find Homer, or at least Homeric verse, somewhere in the opening phrases, as indeed has often been done.³¹ In v. 1 Scaliger's ἀοιδῶν for the transmitted ἀοιδόν has now been found in a quotation of this poem in a work on star-signs and the value of astronomy, partly preserved on a third-century AD papyrus (*POxy* 4648), and if this is the correct reading, then, as Dirk Obbink points out,³² ἔσχατον should probably be taken with τρόπος, 'the ultimate/highest mode [i.e. Homeric epic] that poets (or, perhaps, 'poems') can have'.³³ This interpretation will also, to some extent, lessen the difficulty which has been felt in applying ἔσχατος in a positive sense to an individual poet;³⁴ Pindar, *Olympian* 1.113, celebrating Hieron's victory in the 'ultimate' contest, the Olympic one, offers a good illustration of the positive force of the superlative, τὸ δ' ἔ – | σχατον κορυφοῦται | βασιλεῦσι. μήκετι πάπταινε πόρσιον, 'the highest point is crowned by kings: look

²⁹ On parallels between Aristophanes' *Frogs* and the *Contest* cf. below pp. 305–6.

³⁰ Cf., e.g., O'Sullivan 1992: 66–72, Koning 2010: 350–7.

³¹ Cf., e.g., Farrell 1991: 44–5. ³² Obbink 2003: 62.

³³ Cf. perhaps τρόπος in Epicharmus fr. 77 K-A.

³⁴ Cf. Cameron 1995: 374–5, citing *LSJ* s.v.

no further'.³⁵ On this reading, then, there is indeed a contrast between Homer and Hesiod in these verses, but its force is not, as has often been thought, to congratulate Aratus for choosing Hesiod rather than Homer; rather, Callimachus emphasises Aratus' stylistic affiliations to Hesiod, by noting that there was a grander style, the Homeric, which he could have used, but did not. What might in fact look like a criticism of both Hesiod and Aratus is then (humorously) 'corrected' by ὁκνέω μή, 'not the ultimate mode, but – dare I say it – it was the sweetest of hexameters which ...'. Callimachus' ὁκνος is induced by the fact that the following claim that Hesiod is the μελιχρότατος of poets *could* be (mis)understood as a criticism of Homer, as indeed the modern critical tradition shows us that it has been.

In *POxy* 4648 (cf. above) Aratus is (with a quite probable restoration) called a ζηλωτής οὐκ ἀγεννής, 'a not unworthy imitator', of Hesiod; such an expression is clearly connected to a debate, of which we learn in the ancient *Lives* of Aratus, as to whether that poet was more indebted to Homer or to Hesiod.³⁶ The principal witness to this debate is a passage in *Vita* 2 Martin:

In the composition of his verses he was an imitator of the Homeric style (χαρακτήρ). Some, however, say that he was rather an imitator of Hesiod, for just as Hesiod began the *Works and Days* with a hymn beginning 'Muses of Pieria, glorifying with your song, hither and tell of Zeus', so too did Aratus begin his poem with 'Let us take our beginning from Zeus'. The story of the golden race is also like Hesiod, <and> many other stories also. In the first book of his work on Aratus, Boethos of Sidon says that he was not an imitator of Hesiod, but of Homer, for the style (πλάσμα) of his poetry is greater (μεῖζον) than in the case of Hesiod. Many others have indeed written *Phainomena* – Kleopatros and Sminthes and Alexander the Aetolian and Alexander of Ephesus and Alexander of Lykaia³⁷ and Anacreon and Artemidorus and Hipparchus and many others – but Aratus' power (δύναμις) is the most brilliant (λαμπροτέρα) of all and overshadows (ἐπισκοτήσασα) the others, for he used the power of the natural philosophers. He says that there is a

³⁵ Pindar's image is perhaps that of a mountain, cf. ὑψοῦ in the following verse, and Callimachus' epigram will also be expressed in the traditional 'high' and 'low' categories of ancient poetics.

³⁶ Cf. *Vita* 1 p. 9.10–16 Martin, 2 p. 12.7–18 Martin, 4 p. 21.7–8 Martin, Cameron 1995: 380, Obbink 2003: 61.

³⁷ 'homo obrutus oblivionis tenebris' (Maass 1892: 149–50).

force which governs the cosmos in every detail (ἀκριβῶς), in the years, months, days, hours, in the risings and settings of the sun and the moon and the five planets ... (*Life of Aratus* 2 pp. 12–13 Martin)

The citation of the Stoic philosopher Boethos of Sidon pushes this debate back to the second century BC, and it will be at least tempting to wonder whether the oppositional structure we have traced in Callimachus' epigram on the *Phainomena* shows that this debate began already in Aratus' lifetime. Be that as it may, of particular interest in the present context is the reason given for Boethos' view, a reason which all but certainly goes back to Boethos himself: the *plasma* of the *Phainomena* is 'bigger/greater' than Hesiod. As a Stoic philosopher, Boethos had an investment in finding very serious, indeed cosmic subject matter in Aratus; if the basis of the whole note cited above is indeed derived from him,³⁸ then it would seem most likely that *plasma* here means something like 'invention' (Cameron 1995: 380) or 'substance' (Obbink 2003: 61). Boethos would be finding in Aratus a philosophical seriousness which he could not find in Hesiod.³⁹ Most of Aratus' poem, after all, concerns the heavenly bodies and their movements; the language of the *Life* – 'Aratus' power (δύναμις) is the most brilliant (λαμπροτέρᾳ) of all and overshadows (ἐπισκοτήσασα) the others' – precisely evokes the power of the greatest of all heavenly bodies, the sun, to describe Aratus' superiority to other *Phainomena*; these lesser works stand to Aratus' poem as the lesser stars in the sky stand to the sun: they disappear at the appearance of the sun, which can thus be said to cast them into darkness (ἐπισκοτήσασα). It is a pity that we do not know more of the corresponding view which Boethos took of Homer's *plasma*.

In other contexts, however, talk of a 'greater' πλάσμα would suggest the meaning 'style', a not uncommon meaning of πλάσμα in Hellenistic criticism.⁴⁰ An Aratean scholium (on

³⁸ J. Martin 1956: 188–9 suggests that the list of writers of *Phainomena* in the *Life* interrupts the report of Boethos' view and so will not go back to him.

³⁹ Cf. J. Martin 1956: 21–2.

⁴⁰ It seems to have been a favourite with Philodemus, cf. LSJ s.v., *On Poems* 1.191, 197 with Janko's notes.

v.100) apparently expresses Boethos' dichotomy in very similar terms:

By the story of Justice he [Aratus] emphasises for mortals what is useful and helpful in the myth, representing it in a brilliant and grand mode (λαμπρῶς καὶ μεγαλοφώνως), using, so to speak, a Homeric style (πλάσμα). (Schol. Aratus, *Phainomena* p. 128.5–8 Martin)

As we have seen,⁴¹ the contrast between Aratus' ordinary, 'Hesiodic', style and his occasional adoption of the grander 'Homeric' mode is one of the ways in which the elements of 'didactic poetry' could be separated out. Whereas for the Homeric scholia the label 'poetic' marks a feature, whether a figure of thought or a verbal form, as different from ordinary discourse, for the Aratean scholia it tends to mark features as departing from what they construct as the Hesiodic/didactic norm of Aratean style. Those features themselves, of course, may have very good Hesiodic models. What is striking in the case of the scholium cited above, beyond the ascription of a Homeric style to a quintessentially 'Hesiodic' passage, is the conjunction of so many of the elements of the judgement apparently ascribed to Boethos: brilliance, grandeur or size, the use of πλάσμα and the bringing of Aratus into line (in this passage at least) with Homer rather than Hesiod; given the subject matter under discussion, the myth of the maiden Justice, we might be tempted to refer πλάσμα to both subject and style, 'mode' perhaps; the closeness of the link in ancient thought between subject matter and verbal style makes such an extended sense for πλάσμα almost what one might expect.⁴² A poem about so 'cosmic' a theme as the stars was, so one kind of argument would go, almost *ipso facto* bound to be grand in style.

That stylistic considerations were an important element in Boethos' use of πλάσμα gains some support from the use of χαρακτήρ at the start of the passage quoted above from *Vita* 2, for this is another regular word for 'style', whether as a term for a general way of writing ('the three styles' etc.) or for the 'stamp' of a particular author's style, and is often found

⁴¹ Cf. above pp. 110–11.

⁴² Cf. J. Martin 1956: 188–9.

in association with πλάσμα.⁴³ It is reported, for example, that one of the reasons which led Apollonius Rhodius to defend the Hesiodic authorship of the *Aspis* was the poem's χαρακτήρ ('Hypothesis' to *Aspis* 7–8 Solmsen = Hesiod T 52 Most); whether Apollonius was principally thinking of the opening ἦ οἷη passage shared with the *Catalogue of Women* (vv. 1–56 = fr. 195 M-W)⁴⁴ or other notably 'Hesiodic' passages as well, such as the description of summer (vv. 393–7)⁴⁵ or of agricultural activity (vv. 286–300), or the poem's remarkable fondness for personifications and symbols (cf. especially vv. 144–60) which may have reminded him of the *Theogony*,⁴⁶ or details such as the location of the Muses on Pieria (v. 206, cf. *WD* 1, *Theogony* 53),⁴⁷ or indeed some more general 'character' which he thought he found in the poem, this is a good illustration of the importance this criterion held in ancient discussions of poetry. The Homeric scholia, moreover, adduce three instances of Ἡσιόδειος χαρακτήρ in Homer (Hesiod T 68 Jacoby).⁴⁸ At *Iliad* 18.39–49 the catalogue of Nereids was athetised by Zenodotus and Aristarchus, inter alia, 'as having a Hesiodic χαρακτήρ'; the reference is not simply to the Hesiodic flavour of a list of names, but rather has a specific Hesiodic passage in mind, namely the Nereid catalogue of *Theogony* 243–62. So too, Aristophanes of Byzantium and Aristarchus athetised the description of Niobe's fate at *Iliad* 24.614–17 because (inter alia) those verses are 'Hesiodic in χαρακτήρ, and particularly

⁴³ [Plut.], *De Homero* 2.72 equates the χαρακτήρες τῶν λόγων with 'the so-called πλάσμα', cf. Hillgruber 1994–9: I 184–5, Körte 1929: 79–83, Ritchie 1964: 12–13.

⁴⁴ So, e.g., Russo 1965: 68. ⁴⁵ Cf. above p. 146. ⁴⁶ Cf. Russo 1965: 7–14.

⁴⁷ The other reason which we are told persuaded Apollonius to his view was that Iolaos and Heracles appeared together both in the *Aspis* and in the *Catalogue*. On the ancient debate about the authenticity of the *Aspis* cf. Montanari 2009: 323–5. We should bear in mind the possibility that one of the frames of Apollonius' judgement was a debate about whether the χαρακτήρ of the *Aspis* was 'Homeric' or 'Hesiodic'; such a debate would have obvious overlaps with the ancient debate about Aratus. The *Hypothesis* reports that Aristophanes of Byzantium (fr. 406 Slater) judged the poem to be the work 'not of Hesiod, but of someone else who chose to imitate the Homeric "shield"'. *Aspis* 156–9 are identical to *Iliad* 18.535–8, and Eustathius (*Hom.* 1160.47) notes that it is obvious that the *Aspis* took over these grim Homeric 'divinities' out of Ὀμηρικός ζῆλος (cf. ζήλωτής in the debate about Aratus).

⁴⁸ Cf. Montanari 2009: 338.

the phrase ἀμφ' Ἀχελώϊον ἐρρώσαντο' (A schol.). Particularly influential may have been the fact that, whereas ἐρρώσαντο is a Homeric *hapax*, ἐπερρώσαντο is found in a prominent place in Hesiod (*Theogony* 8); here too, then, there is a specific 'parallel' behind the assertion of 'Hesiodic χαρακτήρ'. We may compare *Iliad* 24.30, where one of the arguments against the passage on the Judgement of Paris is that μαχλοσύνη is a 'Hesiodic word' (schol. A vv. 25–30). It is, moreover, worth noting that, in both of the instances from *Iliad* 24, the scholia find something γελοῖον about the passage which is athetised and which is said to be 'Hesiodic'; Homer's poetry should be 'higher' than Hesiod's in every way.⁴⁹

The final instance of the 'Hesiodic' in the Homeric scholia is *Odyssey* 15.74 (Menelaus to Telemachus), χρή ξεῖνον παρέοντα φιλεῖν, ἐθέλοντα δὲ πέμπειν, 'cherish a guest when he is with you, and send him on his way when he wants to go': the scholia note that the verse is omitted in many copies and that the χαρακτήρ of the expression is Hesiodic. Here there is probably no single specific model in mind, but rather what are important are the gnomic nature of the utterance and the parallel form in which it is expressed; there are certainly Hesiodic verses close enough in expression to have prompted the critical turn to Hesiod, cf., e.g., *Works and Days* 342 τὸν φιλέοντ' ἐπὶ δαῖτα καλεῖν, τὸν δ' ἐχθρὸν ἔᾶσαι, 'invite the friendly to a feast, but leave out the hostile', and 353 τὸν φιλέοντα φιλεῖν, καὶ τῷ προσιόντι προσεῖναι, 'show friendship to the friendly, and approach him who approaches you'. Modern scholarship has indeed confirmed the ancient observation that such proverbial and gnomic verses falling into two parallel parts form a significant element in the *Works and Days*,⁵⁰ and their relative prominence certainly makes the judgement of this style as 'Hesiodic', and by implication 'not Homeric', entirely comprehensible.

⁴⁹ The Proclan scholia on *WD* 797–9 (= fr. 271 Marzillo) preserve an instance of Plutarch (fr. 108 Sandbach) defending Hesiod against the charge of writing γελοῖως, and at *Moralia* 530d Plutarch defends *WD* 342, τὸν φιλέοντ' ἐπὶ δαῖτα, τὸν δ' ἐχθρὸν ἔᾶσαι, against 'certain people' who consider it γελοῖον and ἀβέλτερον.

⁵⁰ Cf. R. Martin 1992: 25–7, citing earlier bibliography.

Callimachus, *Epigram* 27 Pf. thus clearly takes its place within a set of ancient oppositions between Homer and Hesiod. In identifying Hesiod as Aratus' principal source of inspiration, Callimachus probably had more than one feature of both subject and style in mind. It has been suggested that Callimachus may have noticed that, in at least one particular, the structure of Aratus' hexameters bucked contemporary trends and was more reminiscent of Hesiod than of Homer,⁵¹ and Callimachus' obvious sensitivity to the niceties of metrical style makes such a suggestion generally plausible.⁵² I have suggested that perceived stylistic distinctions between Homer and Hesiod more broadly were also at stake, but we must not forget the strongest, and most obvious, link between Hesiod and the *Phainomena*, namely subject matter. If there is almost universal consent that the poem of Aratus which is celebrated in Callimachus' epigram is the *Phainomena*, an identification put almost beyond doubt by the adjective λεπτταί which presumably acknowledges the now famous λεπττή acrostic of *Phainomena* 783–7, the identity of the Hesiodic model to which Callimachus points has been disputed; the *Works and Days* is the most commonly accepted candidate, but Alan Cameron perhaps speaks for many critics when he writes: 'It was no doubt primarily the *Works and Days* that Callimachus had in mind, but he is not referring to any particular poem'.⁵³ That an *Astronomia* was ascribed to Hesiod makes such a point of view understandable, but the evidence in fact does indeed point towards the *Works and Days* as the poem predominantly in Callimachus' mind.⁵⁴ Moreover, Callimachus' association of the *Phainomena* with Hesiodic poetry clearly 'reads' Hesiod as (at least in part) a poet of the stars and/or weather-signs. If we ask what was the 'essence' of Hesiod in antiquity, then one (comic) answer is given by Aristophanes, *Frogs* 1033: 'workings of the land, the seasons for the crops, ploughings'. Another answer, quite compatible with this one, is *Works and Days* 383–92,

⁵¹ Cf. Porter 1946. ⁵² Cf., e.g., Krevans 1993.

⁵³ Cameron 1995: 378. ⁵⁴ Cf. above p. 103 n. 166.

‘When the Pleiades rise ...’, that passage which, in the *Contest of Homer and Hesiod*, Hesiod is made to choose as τὸ κάλλιστον of his verses (*Contest* 12), and a passage which is precisely about the behaviour of stars and the need for mortals to watch them and to regulate their lives by them.⁵⁵ Like the *Contest*, to which I turn in Section 3 of this chapter, Callimachus’ epigram opposes Hesiod to Homer, without in any way impugning Homer’s pre-eminent position in the world of poetry.⁵⁶

Callimachus, *Epigram* 27 Pf. has long been a prime witness in the debate about the importance of Hesiod for Hellenistic poetry, and it is certainly true that ancient stylistic assessments of Hesiod made him easy to appropriate for the rhetoric of a new, sweet but slender poetry. When Callimachus reworked *Theogony* 81–2 at fr. I.37–8 immediately before the scene which made him a ‘second Hesiod’, he claims the Hesiodic stylistic virtues of τὸ γλυκύ, τὸ μελιχρόν and τὸ λιγύ for his own poetry (cf. fr. I.11, 16, 29), and the Roman ‘Callimacheans’ copied and enriched this vocabulary many times over. On the other hand, ‘Longinus’ (at least in what survives to us of *On the Sublime*) quotes no example of sublimity from Hesiod, and suppresses entirely the name of Callimachus;⁵⁷ there is no reason to think (and some reason not to) that ‘Longinus’ would have included Hesiod among the poets who are ἀδιάπτωτοι καὶ ἐν τῷ γλαφύρῳ πάντῃ κεκαλλιγραφημένοι, ‘flawless and quite beautiful writers in the smooth style’ (*De subl.* 33.5), but the stylistic criticism we have been tracing here shows how easy it was to find, or construct, in Hesiod a model both for the kind of poetry which was to come off second-best in ‘Longinus’ scheme of things and for a non-Homeric way of seeing poetic composition.

⁵⁵ Cf. Section 3 below. This passage of the *Works and Days* is also cited by the treatise preserved in *POxy* 4648 immediately before the citation of Callimachus, *Epigram* 27 Pf.

⁵⁶ Cf. Hunter 2006a: 19–20.

⁵⁷ Cf. Hunter 2011: 233–5. The *Aspis* is cited unfavourably at *De subl.* 9.5, cf. Hunter 2009a: 136–9, Koning 2010: 356–7.

The Contest of Homer and Hesiod

When in the *Contest of Homer and Hesiod* the two poets are asked by King Panedes each to choose the finest (κάλλιστον) passage from their verses, Hesiod chooses *Works and Days* 383–92⁵⁸ and Homer chooses a passage which puts together *Iliad* 13.126–33 and 13.339–44:⁵⁹

Πληιάδων Ἀτλαγενέων ἐπιτελλομενάων
ἄρχεσθ' ἀμήτου, ἀρότοιο δὲ δυσομενάων. 385
αἱ δὴ τοι νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέματα τεσσαράκοντα
κεκρύφεται, αὖτις δὲ περιπλομένου ἐνιαυτοῦ
φαίνονται τὰ πρῶτα χαρασσομένοιο σιδήρου.
οὗτός τοι πεδίων πέλεται νόμος, οἳ τε θαλάσσης
ἐγγύθι ναιετάουσ' οἳ τ' ἄγκεα βησσήεντα
πόντου κυμαίνοντος ἀπόπρωθι, πῖονα χῶρον, 390
ναίουσιν· γυμνὸν σπείρειν, γυμνὸν δὲ βοωτεῖν,
γυμνὸν δ' ἀμάειν, εἴ χ' ὦρια πάντ' ἐθέλησθα.
(Hesiod, *Works and Days* 383–92⁶⁰)

When the Pleiades, daughters of Atlas, rise, begin the reaping, the ploughing when they set. For forty nights and days they are hidden, and then as the year moves round they make their first appearance when the iron is sharpened. This is the rule of the plains, both for those who dwell near the sea, and those who dwell near the wooded glens far from the surge of the ocean, a rich land. Sow naked, drive the cattle naked, and reap naked, if you want everything in rich season.

ἀμφὶ δ' ἄρ' Αἴαντας δοιοὺς ἴσταντο φάλαγγες
καρτεραί, ἅς οὗτ' ἂν κεν Ἄρης ὀνόσαιτο μετελθὼν
οὔτε κ' Ἀθηναίη λαοσσόος· οἳ γὰρ ἄριστοι
κρινθέντες Τρῳάς τε καὶ Ἑκτορα δῖον ἔμμινον,
φράξαντες δόρυ δουρί, σάκος σάκεϊ προθελύμνωι· 130
ἀσπίς δ' ἀσπίδ' ἔρειδε, κόρυς κόρυιν, ἀνέρα δ' ἀνὴρ,
ψαῦον δ' ἱππόκομοι κόρυθες λαμπροῖσι φάλοισιν

⁵⁸ For the possibility that, in the original version of the *Contest*, the Hesiodic quotation was more extensive than this cf. West 1967: 442 n. 3, Heldmann 1982: 48–50, above pp. 82–3. For recent accounts of the *Contest*, together with further bibliography, cf. Graziosi 2001, Koning 2010: chapter 7.

⁵⁹ The two parts of the composite Homeric passage are held together by a general compatibility, a shared interest in armour, and some 'echoes' (130 ~ 342, 132 ~ 341).

⁶⁰ γυμνοὺς in v. 392 seems to have replaced γυμνόν, but it might well have been in the original text of the *Contest*.

The Contest of Homer and Hesiod

νευόντων· ὡς πυκνοὶ ἐφέστασαν ἀλλήλοισιν.
ἔφριξεν δὲ μάχη φθεισίμβροτος ἐγχείησιν
μακράϊς, αἷς εἶχον ταμείχροας. ὅσσε δ' ἄμερδεν 340
αὐγὴ χαλκείη κορύθων ἄπο λαμπομενάων
θωρήκων τε νεοσμήκτων σακέων τε φαινῶν,
ἐρχομένων ἄμυδις, μάλα κεν θρασυκάρδιος εἶη
ὅς τότε γηθήσειεν ἰδὼν πόνον οὐδ' ἀκάχοιτο.
(Homer, *Iliad* 13.126–33, 339–44)

Around the two Ajaxes stood the mighty battle-lines, with which neither Ares, had he come there, nor Athena, stirrer of armies, would have found fault, for the very best, picked men awaited the Trojans and godly Hector. They hedged spear with spear, shield with overlapping shield; shield pressed on shield, helmet on helmet, man on man, and the helmets with horsehair crests and shining plates touched each other as they nodded. So close did they stand to one another. The battle in which men are destroyed bristled with the long, flesh-slicing spears which they held. Their eyes were dazzled by the brazen gleam from the shining helmets and fresh-polished breastplates and bright shields, as they came together. Very bold-hearted would a man be who could take pleasure in seeing that struggle and not be dismayed.

The passages of Homer and Hesiod are, as Martin West put it, ‘clearly chosen so as to embody what [Alcidamas] wished to represent as most characteristic of and peculiar to the two poets’,⁶¹ and fit very well the account of the two poets offered by the Aristophanic Aeschylus (*Frogs* 1033–6, cited above p. 86). Just as the comic Aeschylus, with his own didactic agenda, sees Homer’s principal virtue as residing in the fact that he ‘taught excellent things – military formations, acts of heroism, the arming of soldiers’, so *Iliad* 13.130–5 are virtually taken by the bT-scholia as a military handbook; when the comic Aeschylus describes what Hesiod taught as ‘workings of the land, seasons for crops, times for ploughing’, he may indeed be referring to, or his audience may think of, *WD* 383–4.⁶²

As we shall see, the almost literal ‘brilliance’ of the Homeric passage leads to an ‘aestheticisation of war’⁶³ which lifts the passage far beyond the realm of military handbooks. Modern readers might, nevertheless, be surprised at the choice of

⁶¹ West 1967: 442–3.

⁶² On the links between the *Contest* and the contest in *Frogs* cf. below pp. 305–6.

⁶³ I borrow the phrase from one of the Press’ anonymous readers.

passages, particularly the Homeric, and appeals, reasonable enough in themselves, to a fifth-century interest in a passage of Homer that might be thought to describe classical hoplite warfare hardly seem to provide a full explanation.⁶⁴ As we shall see, however, the two passages play off against each other in such complex patterns that they were clearly selected as a pair and – it might well be thought – with an eye to the decision, and the reason for it, which Panedes is going to impose. As for the passage of the *Works and Days*, the grand three-word hexameter with which it begins would certainly have drawn attention to it in any context, and a major break at this point in the poem was presumably felt in antiquity, as it is today: the immediately preceding couplet, ‘if your spirit in your heart longs for wealth, then act in this way (ὦδ’ ἐρδεῖν) and work at work upon work’ (*WD* 381–2), seems to introduce the ‘farmer’s year’ (ὦδ’ ‘in the following way’) rather than conclude the previous section, but the emphatic anaphora also gives the sentence a very strong sense of finality, particularly if one happens to think of the poem as the Ἔργα.⁶⁵ This is then reinforced by the emphasis on ‘beginning’ in vv. 383–4: the Pleiades ‘rise into view’ and give the signal to ‘begin’ the harvest. Moreover, the advice in this passage (vv. 383–92) embraces the whole productive year, from ploughing to harvest,⁶⁶ and thus it serves well as emblematic of the whole second part of the poem.

The two passages are, of course, also chosen with an eye to their opposition, or perhaps rather complementarity.⁶⁷ Homer is made to choose a suitably martial passage, or rather two such passages, with which to fight his own contest (‘man against man’), whereas Hesiod’s passage stresses not division, but rather the universality of the *nomos* and the pattern of the heavens which govern all men’s lives. The remarkable stress on armour in the combined Homeric passage plays off against Hesiod’s repeated γυμνός, which in other contexts may mean ‘unarmed’, with which his passage ends; so too the metaphor in

⁶⁴ Cf. Graziosi 2002: 175–80, an otherwise helpful discussion.

⁶⁵ On these verses cf. also above p. 84, and on the title of the poem cf. above p. 21 n. 52.

⁶⁶ Cf. West 1978a: 52. ⁶⁷ Cf., e.g., Heldmann 1982: 51.

ἔφριξεν δὲ μάχη, ‘the fight bristled [like a grain field]’,⁶⁸ picks up the literal ‘reaping’ with which the Hesiodic passage is framed. Peace and war are inscribed in the contrast; in Hesiod iron is sharpened for agricultural pursuits, in Homer metal is for cutting flesh. Hesiod’s didactic imperatives work against any ‘distancing’ effect which might create a barrier between the poetry and its audience (i.e. ourselves); these verses are ‘about us’. In Homer, however, it is awed amazement which the poetry works to create; only an Ares or an Athena could behold this sight with unalloyed pleasure. The closing verses of the passage do write a mortal observer into it, but one who will feel only terror. On one hand, Homer’s powerful mode of *enargeia* allows us to ‘see’ the battle, but from a safe distance; as Richard Janko notes, ‘if we were really watching it, we could not enjoy it as we enjoy this description’. Nevertheless, the contrast between the gleaming beauty of the weapons and the terrible carnage which they represent (‘man-destroying . . . flesh-cutting’) means that the distance from which we appreciate this passage may be ‘safe’, but it is also fragile: we need to be very ‘bold-hearted’ to have a purely ‘aesthetic’ response of pleasure to this passage; we too should feel frightened, as indeed ‘Longinus’ recognised was a proper response to ‘sublime’ writing of this kind.⁶⁹

The Hesiodic passage moves from its grand opening⁷⁰ to speak of things we know, of – to use the language of the *Frogs* – οἰκεῖα πράγματα (*Frogs* 959). A reference to the *Frogs* is hardly out of place here, as there are obvious and striking similarities between the debate in the *Frogs* and the conduct of the *Contest* between Homer and Hesiod.⁷¹ Some of the οἰκεῖα

⁶⁸ In the course of a helpful note on the style of vv. 339–44, Janko suggests that here the spears ‘bristle like hair standing on end from terror’ (i.e. the effect on the observer); this seems less likely than the more standard comparison to a grain field (an interpretation implied by the use of this passage in the *Contest*, and cf. also Dio Chrys. 2.9–10). Nevertheless, ἔφριξεν certainly prepares for the introduction of the ‘observer’, for φορική and ἔκπληξις are what such descriptions should induce (cf., e.g., Plato, *Ion* 535c7–8). It is noteworthy that Apollonius imitated this passage of Homer in his description of Jason’s ‘reaping’ of the Sown Warriors, *Argonautica* 3.1354–8 (where see my notes).

⁶⁹ Cf. further below on the *enargeia* of the metaphor in v. 339.

⁷⁰ Cf. below p. 311 n. 88 on time-indications in the *Works and Days*.

⁷¹ Cf. esp. Rosen 2004. Rosen sees the Euripides of the *Frogs* as ‘Hesiodic’, but he does not really make the case, other than (p. 308) claiming that Hesiod’s choice of

πράγματα which the comic Euripides claims to have introduced into tragedy and with which Aeschylus and Dionysus mock him (cf. esp. vv. 980–8) might well make us think of ancient charges of *σικρολογία* against the Hesiod of the *Works and Days*.⁷² When Euripides claims that, as a result of his tragedies, people now ‘manage their houses better’ (τὰς οἰκίας | οἰκεῖν ἄμεινον),⁷³ he is not of course identifying himself as ‘Hesiodic’, but the Proclan *prolegomena* at least describe the subject of the *Works and Days* as ἡ οἰκονομία καὶ ἀπράγμων ζωή, or as ἴδιος βίος, and that is clearly one important strand in how Euripidean tragedy is (comically) represented in the *Frogs*. At a purely general level of style, of course, Euripides and Hesiod are the two ‘plain’ poets, set against the ‘grand’ Aeschylus and Homer. Battles are the ‘grand’ subject par excellence (Demetrius, *On Style* 75–6), and the passage of Homer cited in the *Contest* is clearly chosen for its ‘weight’ of style as well as of subject. It is striking that the final ‘heavy’ verse which Aeschylus is made to cite in the *Frogs* (v. 1403) comes from a passage which seems to recall *Iliad* 13.130–1, verses cited by Homer in the *Contest*:

ἔφ’ ἄρματος γὰρ ἄρμα καὶ νεκρῶι νεκρός,
ἵπποι δ’ ἔφ’ ἵπποις ἦσαν ἐμπεφυρμένοι
(Aeschylus fr. 38 Radt)

Chariot on chariot and corpse on corpse, horses on horses were piled

Here Aeschylus really is the heir of Homer, as Dionysus’ response makes clear (with *Frogs* 1406 cf. Homer, *Iliad* 5.302–4, 12.447–9, 20.285–7 etc.). The grander the style, the more ‘poetic’ it is.⁷⁴

The verbal style of the passage which Homer is made to choose as τὸ κάλλιστον deserves further attention, particularly

passage in the *Contest* reminds us of the Aristophanic Euripides’ claim ‘that his own poetry encouraged rational thought and offered practical advice’.

⁷² Cf. above p. 48 n. 24.

⁷³ Commentators compare the claim of the Platonic Protagoras to teach *euboulia* ‘about private matters (οἰκεῖα), how one might best manage one’s house, and about the affairs of the city...’ (*Protagoras* 318e5, where see Denyer’s note and Pohlenz 1965: II 449–50).

⁷⁴ Should chronology allow, it might be tempting to see Archilochus fr. 119 West as a parody of these same Homeric verses, and as such a witness, not just to their circulation, but also to their perceived resonance as ‘Homeric’.

as, in the narrative of the *Contest*, the audience of Greeks single out for praise the fact that Homer's verses were παρά τὸ προσήκον, 'transcended the merely fitting' in Martin West's translation;⁷⁵ the ἀγών between the Homeric and Hesiodic passages may in fact be seen as one between 'style' and 'subject', and this is to some extent confirmed by Panedes' justification for the decision he imposes. I here briefly list some noteworthy features of the verbal style of the Homeric passage:

- δνόσαιτο: this verb (δνομαι) occurs many times in Homer, but otherwise perhaps only once in Herodotus; the D-scholia here see the need to gloss the word.
- λαοσσός: this gloss was of disputed meaning in antiquity ('rousing' or 'saving' armies?), as it has been in modern times; outside Homer, it appears only in the *Aspis* and once in Pindar.⁷⁶
- προθελύμνωι: another Homeric gloss (again explained by the D-scholia) whose meaning was disputed in antiquity, and is still argued over today.⁷⁷
- φάλοισιν: the scholia and the grammarians show that the nature of these 'plates' on Homeric helmets was disputed; this is another detail which creates distance between the Homeric description and its later readers.⁷⁸
- φθεισίμβροτος: twice in Homer, and then of Ares in the *Argonautica* of Apollonius of Rhodes (3.1357).
- ὄσσε δ' ἄμερδεν: both noun and verb are notably poetic (neither appear in the *Works and Days*), and the D and bT-scholia feel the need to gloss the verb; Hesiod has a similar phrase at *Theogony* 698.
- νεοσμήκτων: a Homeric *hapax*.
- θρασυκάρδιος: twice in Homer, then once in the *Aspis*; a strongly 'martial' word, quite opposed to the ethos of the Hesiodic passage.⁷⁹

⁷⁵ Graziosi 2002: 173 understands 'were even better than expected'; this is perhaps implied in the reaction of the audience, but cannot be the primary sense of παρά τὸ προσήκον.

⁷⁶ For the evidence of the ancient dispute cf. the T-scholium ad loc., Apion fr. 66 Neitzel (with Linke–Haas–Neitzel 1977: 245), Apollonius Sophista 107.3 Bekker, *Lfgre* s.v.

⁷⁷ Cf. *Lfgre* s.v., Janko on *Iliad* 13.130–1.

⁷⁸ Cf. Apion fr. 145 Neitzel (with Linke–Haas–Neitzel 1977: 294), Apollonius Sophista 161.13 Bekker, Cornutus 20.13, *Lfgre* s.v., Janko on *Iliad* 13.132–3.

⁷⁹ It may be worth adding that, but for ἀχέων at *WD* 399, any form of ἀκάχοιτο, the final word of the Homeric passage and glossed by the D-scholia, is restricted in Hesiod to the *Theogony* and the *Aspis*, as also is the poetic form ἄμυδις (*Iliad* 13.343).

The diction of the passage is thus, from the perspective of a later reader, whether that be Alcidas in the fourth century BC or the Hadrianic compiler of our text of the *Contest*, notably 'poetic' and ξένον, in Aristotelian terms. To this we might add the elaborate polyptoton of vv. 130–1, which is not of course 'non-Hesiodic' (cf. *WD* 25–6 etc),⁸⁰ and the matched and rhyming noun-epithet phrases of vv. 341–2, in which the variation of λαμπομενάων . . . νεοσμήκτων . . . φαεινῶν is favourably commented upon by the bT-scholia. It is thus clear that the Homeric verses are not merely typical of what, should the occasion demand, could be felt to be the most 'Homeric' of subject matter, warfare, but are also chosen to illustrate the grand and poetic elaboration of Homeric style, the powerful effect of which owes much to its very difficulty. Here again we may be reminded of the Aeschylus of Aristophanes' *Frogs*.⁸¹

It may also be instructive to view the competing sets of verses in the *Contest* through the lens of Demetrius, *On Style*; this will, of course, not provide an 'authoritative' ancient stylistic appreciation, but it may act as a guide to the kinds of phenomena for which we should be looking. Thus, for example, in chapters 48 and 105 Demetrius considers how δυσφωνία contributes to μέγεθος, 'since smoothness and euphony [two paradigmatic markers of Hesiodic style, as we have seen] have little place in the grand style (ἐν μεγαλοπρεπείαι)'; 'ugliness of sound', as Demetrius further observes, 'often lends weight (ὄγκος)'. The example which Demetrius chooses is *Iliad* 16.358, another battle passage concerning Ajax and Hector:

Αἴας δ' ὁ μέγας αἰὲν ἐφ' Ἑκτορι χαλκεοκορυστῇι
(Homer, *Iliad* 16.358)

Ajax the mighty [aimed] always at bronze-helmeted Hector

The 'ugly' clash of sounds lends solemnity and matches the grandeur of 'Ajax the mighty', as well – we might note – as

⁸⁰ The prosodic variation of δόρυ δουρί belongs to the traditional resources of poetic language, but it may be noteworthy that Hopkinson 1982: 163–4 adduces vv. 5–7 from the stylistically elaborate proem and πλείων . . . πλέονων in v. 380 as the only examples in the *Works and Days*, as opposed to the very many Homeric examples.

⁸¹ Cf. Hunter 2009a: 24.

echoing the martial clash actually being described. A similar analysis of (at least) *Iliad* 13.126–33, and particularly the accumulation and elision of particles in vv. 126–8, would not seem beyond ancient critics.

A second subject which Demetrius considers is metaphor, which is, in his scheme, a mark of the grand style in rhetoric (78); Demetrius in fact cites ἔφριξεν δὲ μάχη, ‘the battle bristled’, from *Iliad* 13.339, which the bT-scholia label as ‘poetic’, as an example of Homer’s wonderful use of the kind of metaphor in which something inanimate is personified, ἡ κατὰ ἐνέργειαν μεταφορά:

Some things are described more clearly and properly (κυριώτερον) in metaphors than by the proper terms themselves (ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς κυρίοις), such as ‘the battle bristled’. No one could change this by using the proper terms and speak more truly or clearly. Homer has called ‘bristling battle’ the confused motion of the spears and the low noise which continually arises from them. He has made use of the personifying metaphor of which we have spoken, by saying that the battle bristles as though it was a living creature. (Demetrius, *On Style* 82)

Demetrius is here explicitly (81) following Aristotle, who also noted the ἐνέργεια of Homeric metaphors in which the inanimate is made animate (*Rhetoric* 3.1411b32–12a9). As so often in ancient criticism, however, ἐνέργεια, ‘actuality’, is very closely connected with ἐνάργεια, ‘envisionment’, for Aristotle observes (*Rhetoric* 3.1411b25–6) that things which are given actuality through metaphor are ‘set before our eyes’.⁸² Demetrius’ stress upon the truth and clarity of the metaphor of ‘the battle bristled’ both picks up this Aristotelian point and also suggests how the idea of the observer whom Homer has written into his description (cf. above p. 305) has been drawn into an appreciation of the simile through the stress upon clarity and mental sight; the brilliant weapons may dazzle the eyes, but we see the battle clearly because of the power of Homer’s metaphor. Demetrius is here far removed from ‘Heraclitus’ (*Hom. Probl.* 5.13–16), who illustrates Homer’s

⁸² For further discussion and bibliography cf. Manieri 1998: 101–4, Marini 2007: 205, Otto 2009: 71–6. It is generally agreed that Aristotle himself does not use the term ἐνάργεια in the manner very familiar from later criticism.

use of allegory from the very disputed verses (*Iliad* 19.222–4) in which Odysseus compares battle to harvesting, verses which have an obvious connection to the metaphor of the battle ‘bristling’:⁸³ ‘what is said concerns agriculture, what is meant (τὸ νοούμενον) is battle’. Such an ‘allegorical/metaphorical’ mode was for many ancient critics the quintessence of ‘poetry’, and when the T-scholia describe as ‘bold’ (τολμηρόν) the use in *Iliad* 13.341 of ‘the brazen gleam’, rather than ‘the gleam from the bronze’ (‘Homer has virtually set the weapons alight in ascribing to them the brightness of the sun’), we may recall that Dionysius of Halicarnassus notes that what he calls the γλαφυρά style, to which he assigns Hesiod,⁸⁴ avoids ‘everything bold and risky’ (τὸ θρασὺ πᾶν καὶ παρακεκινδυνευμένον, *De comp. verb.* 23.4).⁸⁵ There is in fact almost nothing in *Works and Days* 383–92 which ancient critics would have considered metaphorical (or allegorical), no hermeneutic gap between what is said and what is meant, just that clarity which comes by calling things by the proper words and a linguistic certainty to match the set patterns of the heavens and of agricultural life.

As a final example from Demetrius’ textbook we may consider compound nouns and adjectives, which Demetrius, again following Aristotle’s lead (cf., e.g., *Rhetoric* 3.1405b34–6b3), sees as a marker of the grand style (91–3). Here the contrast between the cited passages of Hesiod and Homer could hardly be clearer. After the initial Πληιάδων Ἀτλαγενέων, the Hesiodic passage is all but free of compounds, as indeed it is very largely free of notably poetic diction;⁸⁶ against this Homer can boast λαοσσόος, ἵππόκομοι, φθεισίμβροτος, ταμείχροος, νεοσμήκτων, and θρασυκάρδιος. Here again, as with metaphor, the picture is a very clear one from the perspective of ancient stylistic criticism, and we may recall again Proclus’ explanation for the lack of adornment in Hesiod (cited above p. 284). Another Proclan scholium on *Works and Days* 578–81 is also relevant:

⁸³ On the ancient discussion of these verses cf. Pontani 2005: 185–6.

⁸⁴ Cf. above p. 286. ⁸⁵ Cf. further Hunter 2007b: 218.

⁸⁶ The primary exception is probably βησσηντα, which Hesiod uses again at *WD* 530.

The Contest of Homer and Hesiod

ἡὼς γάρ τ' ἔργοιο τρίτην ἀπομείρεται αἶσαν·
ἡὼς τοι προφέρει μὲν ὁδοῦ, προφέρει δὲ καὶ ἔργου,
ἡὼς, ἣ τε φανείσα πολέας ἐπέβησε κελεύθου
ἀνθρώπους, πολλοῖσι τ' ἐπὶ ζυγὰ βοῦσι τίθησιν.
(Hesiod, *Works and Days* 578–81)

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Dawn takes a third part of work as its share; dawn sets you off on the road and on your work, dawn's appearance puts many men on the path and places the yoke on many oxen.

After discussing the importance of making an early start to one's activities, the scholia report a note of Plutarch on this passage:

Plutarch says that Homer ornamented dawn with epithets notable for the pleasure they give, calling it 'saffron-robed' (κροκόπεπλος) and 'rosy-fingered' (ρόδοδάκτυλος), but Hesiod gave it greater ornament (μειζόνως) [by referring to] the tasks to which its appearance stirs mankind and from the change it brings from relaxation to the life of activity. (Schol. Hesiod, *Works and Days* 578–81 = fr. 214 Marzillo = Plutarch fr. 79 Sandbach)

Plutarch's use of *μειζόνως*, if indeed that is his word and not Proclus,⁸⁷ may be seen as a pointed reversal of the standard language of stylistic categorisation: it is for him the useful, the χρηστόν, not the poetic, which is of truly 'grand' value.⁸⁸ The AbT-scholia on *Iliad* 8.1b note (inter alia) that ἡὼς κροκόπεπλος and ροδοδάκτυλος ἡὼς are 'poetic periphrases', and Plutarch would agree: there is for him, however, a higher criterion by which to judge.

⁸⁷ Two of the other four instances of *μειζόνως* in the Plutarchan corpus are in Proclan scholia to the *Works and Days*, in passages in which Plutarch is not explicitly cited.

⁸⁸ On the relative lack of adornment in Hesiod's language cf., e.g., Sellschopp 1934: 40. Hesiod does in fact call Dawn ροδοδάκτυλος at *WD* 610, Ἀρκτοῦρον δὲ ἴδῃ ροδοδάκτυλος Ἥως. West notes that v. 610 is 'a charming phrase that hints at interaction of celestial personalities', and such potential 'interaction' was of course a 'poetic' device which Aratus picked up from passages such as this one and very greatly extended in his 'drama of the skies'. It is in fact the case that Hesiod's indications of time are more than once tinged with a (sometimes humorous) poetic grandeur, as ancient stylists would have seen it, beyond the ordinary level of his verse; the principal witness is of course v. 383 ('when the Pleiades rise...'), but note also vv. 565–9 ('the star Arktouros leaves the holy stream of Ocean... the swallow, daughter of Pandion, who laments at dawn (ὀρθρογόνῃ)'), 571–2 (the snail fleeing the Pleiades) and 619–20 (the Pleiades fleeing 'the mighty strength of Orion'), cf. Beall 2005: 235–6.

The marked features of the Homeric passage to which I have pointed strongly suggest what Hesiod is not. When we turn again to attempt a more positive analysis of Hesiodic style, what perhaps seems most striking about the passage which Hesiod cites in the *Contest*, after the grand three-word opening verse (*raro adsurgit Hesiodus*...),⁸⁹ is the matched phrases and rhymes of vv. 383–7, where memorability and musicality might be thought to predominate. I have suggested above that the apparent openness, in the critical tradition, of the ‘Hesiodic’ middle and γλαφυρόν styles to figures and poetic adornment is not primarily concerned with the *Works and Days*, or at least not with that poem as a whole. Less impressionistically, perhaps, in his extended discussion of χάρις, ‘charm’, in the γλαφυρός χαρακτήρ, Demetrius notes that repetition and anaphora can lend charm, and he quotes Sappho:

Ἔσπερε πάντα φέρῃς ὅσα φαίνολις ἐσκέδασ’ Αὔωσ’
φέρῃς δῖν, φέρῃς αἶγα, φέρῃς ἄπυ μάρτερά παῖδα
(Sappho fr. 104a Voigt)

Evening-star, you bring everything which bright Dawn has scattered; you bring the sheep, you bring the goat, you bring the child back to its mother

Hesiod’s γυμνὸν σπείρειν, γυμνὸν δὲ βοωτεῖν, | γυμνὸν δ’ ἀμάνειν might perhaps have fallen under this heading also, though the subject matter seems less obviously ‘charming’ than Sappho’s; memorable, however, the verse certainly is.⁹⁰ Be that as it may, Dionysius notes of the γλαφυρά style:

⁸⁹ Dio Chrysostom makes Philip of Macedon describe *WD* 383–4 as μεγαλοπρεπῶς οὕτως εἰρημένα (2.9); Philip is trying to convince Alexander of Hesiod’s merits as a poet. A sharp ancient critic, however, might well have felt the shift from the grandeur of v. 383 to the subject of v. 384 as bathetic, despite the juxtaposed variation of genitives in ἀμήτου ἀρότοις. The very rare three-word trimeter (v. 383) is characteristic of neither Homer nor Hesiod, cf. Richardson on *Homeric Hymn to Demeter* 31, Bassett 1917.

⁹⁰ Virgil’s translation of this verse (*Georgics* 1.299) attracted (unfavourable) stylistic notice, cf. Barchiesi 2004, above p. 83 n. 108, and for the broader intellectual background Jocelyn 1979. It is possible that one of the stylistic ‘frigidities’ of the Virgilian verse lay in the ‘mannered’ chiasmus applied to very ordinary subject-matter, cf. Demetrius, *On Style* 120–1; the chiasmus itself seems at some level indebted to *WD* 384.

The appropriate figures [for this style] are those which most rouse mass crowds; these add beauty and richness, provided they are used in such a way as not to offend the ears of the hearers. Among such figures are parallelisms and assonances (παρισώσεις καὶ παρομοιώσεις), antitheses, paronomasia, antistrophe,⁹¹ anaphora, and many other such figures which are features of poetic and lyric expression. (Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Demosthenes* 40.10)

Dionysius' list shares many features with Hermogenes' account of the figures which create stylistic κάλλος (pp. 299.8–306.22 Rabe), and here we may well be reminded of the marked stylistic patterning of the proem of the *Works and Days*, verses which it is likely enough (the case can be put no more strongly than that) were influential on ancient conceptions of Hesiodic style; certainly, the proem well illustrates several of the common features of ancient prescriptions for the γλαφυρόν and ἀνθηρόν.

Homer's verses cited in the *Contest* respond to the Hesiodic challenge in this, as in every, respect. The polyptoton of *Iliad* 13.130–1 and the rhymes of vv. 341–2, which directly echo the rhyme of *Works and Days* 383–4, take on Hesiod on his own terms; not even in these respects can the didactic poet write 'more beautifully'. It is in keeping with this that the bT-scholia on *Iliad* 13.340–2 note as χαρίεν the variety (ποικιλία) of vv. 341–2, in which each piece of armour is given a different epithet, though all emphasise the weapons' brightness.

Poetical and rhetorical figures may have been classed as 'characteristic' of a particular style, but it was usually a simple task to find them in other styles also. Nevertheless, the figures listed by Dionysius and Hermogenes, and others closely related to them, are indeed very familiar features of the *Works and Days*.⁹² A very incomplete listing might run somewhat as follows: polyptoton (*WD* 25–6, 150–1, 182–3, 382), anaphora (*WD* 101, 150–1, 317–19, 453–4, 578–80, 644),⁹³ assonance

⁹¹ I.e. clauses which end with the same word or words (a kind of inverse anaphora).

⁹² For the *Theogony* cf. West 1966: 75–7.

⁹³ The anaphora and repetition of the *Works and Days* has been influentially connected with features of 'speeches of advice' in the *Iliad*, notably those of Nestor in Books 1 and 23 and that of Phoinix to Achilles in Book 9; in particular, Munding pointed to the similarity between the striking anaphora of μητι 'by cunning skill' (*Iliad* 23.315–18) and such features as Hesiod's anaphora of σιδῶς (*WD* 317–19)

(*WD* 243 λιμὸν ὁμοῦ καὶ λοιμὸν), parallelisms (*WD* 244, 299–300, 375 (all with chiasmus), 345–8) and antithesis (311, 355, 471–2). For modern scholars, much of this will simply reflect traditional stylistic features of ‘wisdom literature’, in which the proverbial and memorably pithy are sought-after didactic effects – what matters is *how* something is said as well as what is said – but such historical considerations will, of course, not have been of concern to ancient readers and critics. Nevertheless, the prominence of such features within the relatively short space of the *Works and Days* gave this Hesiodic poem at least a very marked stylistic flavour, and as we have seen throughout this book, it was the distinctiveness of the Hesiodic voice, in both subject and style, to which critics returned time and again. It is no accident that in *Oration* 77, from which this book began, Dio Chrysostom chose *WD* 25, καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων, ‘potter is angry with potter and carpenter with carpenter’, as the starting point for his essay on envy; this verse, like the one which follows it in the *Works and Days*, is as memorable for how it speaks as for what it says. The existence of Dio’s essay rightly acknowledges the power that such stylistic effects can have, and it is these effects which, to some extent, help to explain the continuing place which the *Works and Days* held in literate culture, long after much of its advice must have seemed (at least) quaintly archaic to its educated readers. With the *Works and Days*, subject and style were as closely linked and mutually reinforcing as for any ancient poet, as we have seen Proclus bear eloquent witness.⁹⁴

Finally, the style of the *Works and Days* was not just distinctively ‘Hesiodic’, it was also clearly felt as ‘different from Homer’, however easily Homeric examples of the most marked

and φήμη (*WD* 760–4) and the insistent repetition of ἔργον and related words in the ‘protreptic to work’, cf. Munding 1959: 68–71, accepted by, e.g., Diller 1962: 64–5. For links between Hesiod and Phoinix’s exhortation to Achilles cf., e.g., R. Martin 1992: 16–19. The point is important – there *are* similarities between, say, *WD* 306–13 (work brings more than one blessing) and Nestor’s anaphora of μήτι, but the scholia identify *Iliad* 23.315–18 as an ἐπαγωγὴ form of argument, and Hesiod’s anaphoric passages are not really like this. The unsurprising similarities of argumentative style and structure in speeches of exhortation should not be given undue prominence in assessing Hesiod’s stylistic affiliations.

⁹⁴ Cf. above p. 284.

features of Hesiod's poem (cf. the list above) could be found. As we have seen throughout this book, difference from Homer was a crucial determinant of Hesiod's fate and his ancient reception, and this applies of course to style, no less than to subject, as the *Contest of Homer and Hesiod* so clearly shows. If comparison with and contrast to Homer, both explicit and implicit, was a dominant ancient mode of assessing Hesiod, then – to an important extent – modern scholarship has here, as so often,⁹⁵ imitated its ancient forerunners. Hesiod's supporters have, however, little to fear or complain about – 'this strife is good for men'.

⁹⁵ Cf. above pp. 5–6.

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